9 Witnesses who gave evidence in the course of the plea described the appellant as caring, considerate and a loving father. His employer said that he was "respected and responsible". The sentencing judge found that the appellant's offending conduct was out of character. In addition to the mitigating factors I have mentioned, and of importance, were the appellant's pleas of guilty, which entitled him to a discount notwithstanding the strength of the Crown case.
10 The good character of the appellant, the revulsion he feels for his own conduct, his remorse and permanent loss are matters often encountered in cases of culpable driving. That is not to say that those matters are to be devalued. They remain powerful mitigating factors entitled to due weight.
11 The mitigating factors must, however, be viewed in the context of the circumstances of the offence, an offence in which general deterrence is of more than usual importance. The appellant drove at an excessive speed on a narrow road while the concentration of alcohol in his blood was more than three times the prescribed limit. The combination of speed and alcohol rendered the case apt to promote general deterrence. In addition, the victims of the appellant's conduct were children entrusted to the care of the appellant. The boys' mother in a victim impact statement said:
"The boys should have been safe with their dad; they were not."
The victim impact statements disclose that the mother and grandmother of the children were stricken by their fate. The offence of culpable driving is to be viewed as a species of involuntary manslaughter.[1] It carries the same maximum penalty as the offence of manslaughter. Its consequences are terrible and irreversible. As Tadgell, J.A. said in R. v. Scholes[2], the offence is essentially one against public safety. General deterrence is the principal objective in sentencing for the offence.[3]
12 I think the sentence can be described as stern, yet by reason of the circumstances of the offences I consider that it was within the range available to the sentencing judge. In my opinion the sentence was not manifestly excessive and did reflect the pleas of guilty, which the sentencing judge expressly took into account.
13 As to the non-parole period, counsel for the appellant submitted that it was unusually high. Counsel pointed to the facts that self-deterrence was not important in this case and that the appellant had a good prospect of rehabilitation. The non-parole period was high, but in my view was not so unusually high as to bespeak error.
14 The appellant's prospects of successful rehabilitation were by no means assured. The sentencing judge said that the appellant appeared to have a problem with alcohol and that he had not satisfactorily explained his conduct. In any event, in fixing a non-parole period a sentencing judge is not primarily concerned with the prisoner's prospects of rehabilitation: Bugmy v. R. [1990] HCA 18; (1990) 169 C.L.R. 525 at 530 per Mason, C.J. and McHugh, J. In the end, the minimum term is to be fixed because all the circumstances of the offence require that the offender serve no less than that term without the opportunity of parole: R. v. Robinson (1979) 22 S.A.S.R. 367 at 370 per King, C.J.
15 In the present case I am of the view that a minimum term of seven years was not more than the sentencing judge was bound to fix having regard to the circumstances of the offences and taking into account the appellant's personal circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation.
16 I would dismiss the appeal.