19 No attack has been made on the allowance of forty percent which the sentencing judge made for the subjective features. His Honour was bound, when considering the case of Senior, to take into account in addition to the different criminality the fact that his sentencing judge had allowed a discount of fifty percent for subjective features.
20 In my opinion, there is nothing about the facts of the respective cases which could be shown to support an argument that the difference between the two assessments was unfair to the applicant. It seems to me that these matters combine to provide a substantial reason why his Honour was entitled to differentiate between the effective sentence to be passed upon on the applicant and that which had been passed upon Senior. In my opinion, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he has any justifiable sense of grievance.
21 During oral submissions, Mr Stewart, counsel for the applicant, referred to a Crown submission that the structure of the sentences did not strictly accord with the principles set forth in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610. Accordingly, it was submitted, error had been disclosed, so the applicant was entitled to have this Court set aside the sentences and impose appropriate sentences. I do not apprehend that the Crown raised the matter in order to found any such submission. The Crown's purpose in doing so was to point out that sentences not imposed in accordance with the principles in Pearce, may lead to a masking of error and in turn, to artificial claims of disparity. That, the Crown submitted, was what these claims really were.