The offenders come before the Court for sentence, having each pleaded guilty to one count of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company. This is conduct contrary to the provisions of section 35(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (Crimes Act). This offence carries a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of five years.
In each case the offenders have pleaded guilty to the count at an early time, and it was common ground between the parties that as a consequence they are entitled to a 25% discount on sentence to reflect the utilitarian value of that plea.
[2]
Agreed Facts
The matter proceeded by way of agreed facts, which to some extent was supplemented by uncontested evidence given by the offenders and other witnesses at the sentence hearing. The following, I believe, is a fair summary of those facts.
On Friday 20 March 2020, the victim, Mr Justin Lowry, was at the Oaks Hotel in Neutral Bay. He was there to meet work colleagues. From 4:00pm he drank four full strength schooners of beer and ate a meal.
The offenders were also at the Oaks Hotel. They were there to celebrate the birthday of a friend. They were in a party of approximately eight people. One of the members of the party, Mr Mucktaru Savage, is a gentleman of African ethnicity.
While certain of the offenders' party and the victim were at the bar ordering drinks, one of the offenders' party, Ms Cassandra Arnold, thought that she noticed the victim looking intently at Mr Savage. She says that the victim said of Mr Savage words to the effect of "It's Will-I-Am". This was apparently a reference to an African American rap entertainer. Ms Arnold took umbrage at this comment, and informed others, including the offenders, as to what she had heard. This led to verbal exchanges between members of the offenders' party and the victim, the effect of which was to upbraid him for making racially stereotypical comments.
The offenders' party and the victim then left the bar and returned to their separate tables where they were sitting in the hotel's beer garden. From time to time, the victim passed the offenders' party's table without incident. The comments concerning Mr Savage, to which I have referred, were apparently the subject of a certain amount of ongoing discussion amongst the members of the offenders' party. Several hours later, the victim passed the offenders party table heading up a short flight of stairs towards the main bar area. The offender, Tonazzi, who obviously was still agitated by the comments, announced that he was going to "go and say something to him." He got up to do so. The offender Jung followed. Apparently, there was no communication between the offenders which led to Jung following Tonazzi.
The offender Tonazzi approached the victim from the victim's left-hand side, he poked the victim in his stomach area and said words to the effect of, "do you think it's funny making fun of black people?" Both offenders formed the view that the victim had smirked at them in reply and/or was otherwise dismissive. This was merely the offenders' perception of what had occurred, as in fact the victim was on his mobile phone, speaking into it, while holding it up to his right ear. That he was doing so was in fact apparently unknown to the offenders, who were on the victim's left side. For reasons which both offenders were unable to explain, they both reacted to the perceived dismissive response of the victim with acts of spontaneous violence. The offender Tonazzi threw a punch which struck the victim to his face on the left-hand side. The victim fell to the ground. Immediately thereafter, he was struck by a punch from the offender Jung, to the same area of the face. The offender Jung said to the victim words to the effect of, "you racist dog."
Both offenders ran from the hotel. On 1 April 2020, the offenders were arrested and charged.
After the offenders had left the Oaks Hotel, they engaged in text message communications which suggested a preparedness to concoct a story to provide to police so as to ameliorate the situation which they correctly perceived themselves to be facing. These communications do them no credit, however, the offenders did not in fact lie to police. More concerning was an exchange of messages suggesting that they were glad of their attack on the victim. I shall return to these messages later in these reasons.
[3]
The Victim's Injuries
Unfortunately, the victim suffered significant injuries which have resulted in a series of surgical interventions, and the loss of sight in his left eye. There is a further risk of his developing glaucoma and retinal detachment, which risk will remain with the victim for the rest of his life. In the worst-case, there is also the possibility that he will also lose the sight in his right eye.
The victim's injuries and their consequences were agreed by the parties in the following terms:
When the victim was taken to Royal North Shore Hospital by ambulance. He presented with the following injuries:
a. A fractured nose;
b. A fractured cheek bone;
c. A fractured eye socket which was shattered in several pieces; and,
d. A left ruptured eyeball.
At the time the treating Doctor considered that reconstruction of the victim's eye socket and cheek bone could not be completed for 12 months due to the risk of infection of the eyeball. The victim had normal vision and pressure in the right eye, but the left eye presented as follows:
a. reduced vision acuity of hand movements in the left eye;
b. low intraocular pressure of 3mmHg in the left eye;
c. central prominent corneal fold, not actively leaking. Flat anterior chamber, inferior hyphemia about 2mm, traumatic aniridia and aphakia, superior laceration/ rupture to limbus with choroidal prolapse. Hazy fundus: unable to get clear view.
d. CT scan demonstrated: 1) left inferior orbital fracture with prolapse, 2) abnormal anterior segment of left globe - deformity of anterior segment consistent with penetrating eye injury/ globe rupture with superior area of hyperdensity.
In order to treat the injuries, the victim underwent emergency surgery on 21 March 2020 to have the injuries repaired.
During the surgery it was confirmed that the injury had ruptured the globe and caused expulsion of the crystalline lens. The surgery involved removing the expulsed crystalline lens and repairing the ruptured eyeball.
Further injuries sustained by the victim which included:
a. Damage to his voice box;
b. Lesions and cartilage damage to the left thyroid;
c. Nerve damage to the left side of the face;
d. A loss of feeling in the neck; and,
e. Back trauma.
These further injuries could not be treated at the time due to the threat of infection to the eyeball.
As a result of the injuries, the victim was referred to Dr Joseph Dusseldorp (Plastic and Reconstruction Surgeon) for left infra-orbital neuropathy and reconstruction to the orbital structure. The victim had hypersensitivity of his upper lip on the background of numbness of his cheek, lateral nose, upper lip and teeth due to the injury to his left globe meaning that his orbital floor fracture was not fixed. The surgery that took place occurred on 7 October 2020 and was medically complex.
A post-operative CT was performed. The victim was advised that the result of this type of decompression surgery is unpredictable. In the short term it may not resolve his symptoms and could make it worse, or it could make it better.
As a result of the surgery the post-surgery treatment involves the victim being medically reviewed every six months for the foreseeable future to monitor him for complications. The complications include the threat of the condition known as sympathetic ophthalmia which is not an infection, but an inflammation related to the original trauma, and which, in the worst-case scenario, can lead to loss of not only the injured eye, but also the uninjured eye. Dr Smith advised that the threat of glaucoma and retinal detachment is one which will remain with the victim for the rest of his life, and which is a complication of any injury or surgery to the eye.
On 1 January 2021 the victim presented to Royal North Shore Hospital with a bleeding left eye with some pain with eye movement and migraines. It was determined that this was a normal side effect of the orbital fracture repair.
The injury to the victim's left eye globe, caused complete and permanent loss of vision to that eye. The victim may also lose vison [sic] from his right eye.
[4]
Victim Impact Statement
The Court has had the benefit of a moving Victim Impact Statement, which was provided by the victim, Mr Lowry, in which he described the significant pain and suffering which he has experienced as a result of the attack, and the subsequent surgical interventions which were required.
He also spoke of the continuing effect of the ongoing disabilities which he suffers on the quality of his life. His statement concludes as follows:
The senseless attack on Friday 20th March, 2020, is having an enormous impact on my life; physically, mentally, socially and professionally and the permanency of these impacts is extremely difficult to manage on a daily basis.
[5]
Objective Seriousness
The Crown submitted that the offences should be considered as being well above the middle range of objective seriousness. This contention was based heavily on the indisputably serious nature of the injuries suffered by the victim, as a result of the offences.
At the end of the day, however, the Crown accepted that while the seriousness of the injuries sustained in an offence such as this is an important factor, often the most important factor, it is not the only factor to be taken into account in determining objective seriousness (Waterfall v R [2019] NSWCCA 281 at [33], [38]). The nature of the attack and the surrounding circumstances are also highly relevant. Matters such as the number of blows, and the circumstances which in which they were delivered are relevant (R v Douglas [2007] NSWCCA 31 at [12]). The degree of violence used, or the ferocity of the attack, is also a material consideration.
The Crown accepted that in cases such as the present, serious injuries may attend a tolerably low level of violence.
In the present case, as the offenders correctly contended, the attack consisted of one punch by each of the offenders. The acts were spontaneous, and of short duration. There was no weapon used. I accept these contentions.
The offenders also submitted that it was important that I avoid double counting by taking into account the harm suffered by the victim pursuant to s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (Sentencing Act), as serious harm was inherent in the offence. I also accept this as a correct proposition, and have taken it into account in the sentencing synthesis.
Both offenders relied upon subjective factors, especially factors of a psychological/psychiatric nature, which they contended were apt to be brought to account in the assessment of objective seriousness as being, in their submission, causative of the offending. They also submitted that these factors also have a role in lowering the offender's moral culpability, and in making each of the offenders a less appropriate vehicle for specific and general deterrence. It is to those contentions that I now turn.
[6]
Subjective Considerations in Relation to the Offender Tonazzi
Adam Tonazzi is a man of 28 years of age. At the time of the offence he was 27. He has one child, a daughter now approximately 18 months of age, with his ex-partner. His relationship with his ex-partner is amicable, and he is much involved in his daughter's young life. He has the benefit of loving and supporting parents. He is of prior good character, having no criminal convictions of any nature. He is currently a self-employed owner and manager of a scaffolding business. At one time, he was in this business in partnership with his co-offender.
The offender's mother, Mrs Melanie Tonazzi, gave evidence in which she relayed a history of difficulties which her son had experienced in fitting in at school, and in coping with the demands of schoolwork. He achieved the High School Certificate, but, according to Mrs Tonazzi, did so only barely, which result was fashioned by the offender concentrating on the subjects which she said were those involving less exam work, and which were more practical and project driven. She gave, as an example, woodwork.
Mrs Tonazzi told the Court that when her son was in kindergarten, he appeared to be struggling, and she and her husband suspected that he had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). He was duly taken to doctors who expressed the view that he did not have that condition. This apparently was a misdiagnosis, which was repeated on a number of occasions during the offender's childhood and adolescent life.
On 13 May and 18 May 2021, the offender attended on Dr Antony Henderson, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, who furnished a report in respect of the offender for the purposes of sentencing. Dr Henderson was not required for cross-examination.
As a result of these consultations, Dr Henderson diagnosed the offender with previously undiagnosed, and thus untreated, ADHD, the effect of which was described by Dr Henderson in the following terms:
… [it is] characterised by severe impairment in his executive functioning with attention and concentration impairment, impulsivity, hyperactivity and restlessness with a childhood onset and ongoing symptoms extending into adulthood. Mr. Tonazzi's ADHD has remained undiagnosed and untreated and has had a profound impact on his educational attainment with a below average school performance despite his superior intelligence. He has also struggled in his professional career and the associated impulsive behaviours and irritability has adversely impacted his relationships.
Dr Henderson opined that this untreated condition left the offender vulnerable to the depressive illness, which had later developed.
In this regard, it is important to note that the offender Tonazzi had sought assistance for mental health issues on 27 February 2020. That is to say, only a month before the offence. The clinician upon whom he attended diagnosed the offender as having anxiety and panic attacks related to work and home pressures. He was proscribed an antidepressant, Luvox, which was not particularly effective. His mother noted a deterioration in the offender's mental health in the time leading up to the offence. He told the doctor with whom he consulted that he thought he was "going mad", and was "going to explode". Referrals were made to a clinical psychologist, but an appointment had not been made prior to the offence.
Returning to Dr Henderson's analysis, ultimately Dr Henderson makes three important findings. These were as follows:
1. Both ADHD and Adjustment Disorders are associated with violent offending behaviour on account of the irritability, frustration, impulsivity and impaired decision making associated with both conditions: at [14.4].
2. Treatment with stimulant medication has been demonstrated, clinically, to significantly reduce the risk of violent offending behaviour in the case of ADHD: at [14.4].
3. That the offender's untreated ADHD and other mental conditions at the time of the offending: at [14.5]
'… significantly contributed to his offending behaviour. I believe he was experiencing excessive levels of irritability and frustration upon observing his friends being taunted by the complainant and acted in a highly impulsive manner as a result of his ADHD and Adjustment Disorder. I also believe his mental conditions are associated with such disturbances and his thought processes that enable his ability to consider the wrongfulness or consequences of his behaviour at the material time were severely compromised. …' (my emphasis)
Dr Henderson prescribed Dexamphetamine to the offender Tonazzi. The use of this drug by the offender has resulted in a marked improvement in his psychological state, and his capacity to cope. This improvement was very quickly achieved following the taking of dexamphetamine, and the improvement in her son's presentation was confirmed by his mother in evidence before me.
Dr Henderson sees the continued treatment of the offender with dexamphetamine as being crucial to his mental health. Dr Henderson, who, it was accepted, has a deep experience of the operations of Justice Health within the Corrective System, says that it is most unlikely that the offender will be prescribed dexamphetamine if he is incarcerated. This, he explained, was due to the fact that the drug is sought after by other members of the general prison population, who have no medical need for it. This results in some inmates standing over inmates who are prescribed the drug. As a consequence, there is a reluctance within the custodial system to make the drug available.
Dr Henderson has prescribed to the offender Tonazzi a supervised treatment plan. The offender has agreed to comply with this plan.
[7]
The Subjective Case of the Offender Jung
Jae Geun (David) Jung is a man of 29 years of age. At the date of the offence he was 28 years of age. He lives with his fiancée and her parents. He is now employed full-time in the health food sector, and is studying personal training. As I have earlier indicated, the offenders were previously partners in running a scaffolding business. Prior to the offences which bring him before the Court, his only involvement with the criminal justice system has been in relation to a relatively minor drug offence some 8 years ago. It was accepted by the Crown that, for relevant purposes, he is to be considered to be a person of otherwise good character.
The offender Jung was born in South Korea, where he spent his childhood before moving to Australia at age 13. He had very little contact with his father. In his father's absence, the offender's mother was a formidable disciplinarian, which placed strain on his relationship with her during childhood. Very shortly after he completed school, his mother left him and his brother to return to Korea, thus leaving the two young men to live independently in Australia. He subsequently ceased having contact with his mother.
He has a supportive and stable relationship with his brother, and he has been in a relationship with his current partner for the previous 12 years. He has known his partner since school. They became engaged to be married two years ago, and the relationship is stable.
The offender maintains a respectful and supporting relationship with his partner's parents. The offender and his partner have no children
The offender relied on a medical report from a forensic psychologist, Mr Jason Borkowski (with whom the offender consulted on 9 April 2021), and a report of Dr Rafe Pulley, a forensic psychiatrist (with whom the offender consulted on 10 May and 24 May 2021). Neither were required for cross-examination.
Mr Borkowski diagnosed the offender Jung as having the following conditions at the time of the commission of the offence:
1. Major Depressive Disorder, with Anxious Distress; and
2. Adjustment Disorder, with mixed disturbance of moods and conduct.
Dr Pulley, on the other hand, diagnosed the offender Jung with suffering from a Major Depressive Disorder, thus concurring with Mr Borkowski's diagnosis, but did not make diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder.
Dr Pulley expressed the view, which was unchallenged, that there was a nexus between the offender's mental condition and the offending. He explained that, "due to specific issues that Mr Jung had experienced in his childhood, the offender has a personality style that leads him to suppressing anger to an extent that he lacks awareness of many problems in his life that cause him considerable [difficulties]." He went on to explain that this build-up of unresolved anger is a risk factor that can lead to acts of impulsive aggression. In his view, the offender's history suggested that this is what happened in the present circumstances.
Dr Pulley explained that the offender had experienced many racist taunts over the years, without complaint. He expressed the view that the offender Jung's expressed intention to merely confront the victim as being compelling, and in keeping with his personality style, and consistent with his internalising personality.
Further, Dr Pulley expressed the opinion that the perceived dismissive reaction of the offender's victim seems to have pushed the offender over the edge, and led to a violent act, which act was extremely impulsive, and unforeseen by the offender.
Dr Pulley went on to say that he believed that the offender had excellent prospects for rehabilitation, and set forth a treatment plan which he recommended should be capable of being delivered in a non-custodial setting.
[8]
The offenders' submissions on subjective and mitigating factors
Both offenders contended that the unchallenged psychiatric evidence established that both were suffering from psychiatric conditions, which, on the balance of probabilities, were causative of the offending. They went on to submit that this factor served to both lower their moral culpability, and reduce the objective seriousness of the offending. There was no dispute other than that this was an appropriate manner in which to consider causally related subjective matters when consideration is being given to the issue of objective seriousness (MDZ v R [2011] NSWCCA 243 at [67]; Biddle v R [2017] NSWCCA 128 at [68]; Yun v R [2017] NSWCCA 317 at [47]; Lawson v R [2018] NSWCCA 215 at [35]; Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247, 275 A Crim R 233, at 258 [112]).
I also find that the offenders' mental health issues serve to lower their moral culpability for their offending.
As I have earlier indicated, both the offenders relied on the following factors which, in addition to the psychiatric conditions, they contended had a tendency to lower the objective seriousness of the offending, these were:
1. That the offending was impulsive and spontaneous, which was to say that it was the opposite of being planned or part of an organised criminal activity;
2. That there was no weapon used;
3. That the offending was of short duration.
I accept these submissions.
Both Mr Odgers of Senior Counsel for Jung, and Mr Boulten of Senior Counsel for Tonazzi made submissions concerning provocation. The submission was one of some subtlety, which description is not intended to in any way detract from its force.
This submission was to some extent in answer to the Crown's contention that the offence was not a "red mist" offence. By this I understood the Crown drew attention to the fact that the offending happened hours after the initial perceived racial slight.
Mr Odgers SC submitted that the initial interaction between the victim and the offenders' party caused angst amongst the latter. This, he submitted, provides important context to what follows. As I have indicated, the perceived racial slights were the subject of some discussion by the offenders' party in the period between the initial interaction and the offences. This led to the offender Tonazzi saying that he was going to have it out verbally with the victim. The offender Jung followed him. By this stage, the two were angry with the victim. They perceived the victim to be dismissive when they spoke with him. This perception may well have been wrong, but it was nonetheless real. This perception based upon the earlier perceived racial slight, caused the angry, impulsive assault.
Mr Odgers' submission was adopted by Mr Boulten.
I accept this explanation of the offending on the balance of probabilities.
Neither offender suggested that he was less culpable than the other. This was appropriate. As Mr Odgers pointed out, where there was a factor which tended to lower the culpability of one of the offenders, there was usually a countervailing factor which would have the opposite effect. For example, the offender Jung did not throw the first punch, but on the other hand, he struck a defenceless and injured person while that person was on the ground. At the end of the day, no one suggested that considerations of parity did not other than call for an identical sentence in both cases.
As I have previously indicated, both offenders contended that the psychiatric issues to which I have earlier referred, lessened the emphasis which might otherwise be placed on general and specific deterrence. I accept that this is an appropriate approach.
At the end of the day, the offender Jung submitted that I should find the offending to be below the middle range of objective seriousness, while still well above the bottom of the range. Mr Boulten SC, for the offender Tonazzi, submitted that when all the matters were taken into account the offending should be characterised as significantly below the midrange, but not at the bottom of the range.
Taking into account all the matters to which I have referred in relation to objective seriousness, I am of the view that the objective seriousness of the offending should be found to be slightly below the midrange of offending.
I have come to this conclusion acutely conscious of the serious injuries inflicted on the victim, however I am also conscious of the need to not allow this factor to overwhelm the factors which ameliorate the objective seriousness, to which I have referred in these reasons.
[9]
Remorse
As I have previously indicated, various text messages were sent and received by the offenders following the offences. A document containing a complete compilation of text messages exchanged between the offenders and various members of their party was tendered and marked Exhibit C2.
One troubling aspect of the exchange of text messages which followed the assault is derived from the following extracts of the exchange:
At 10:15pm, the offender Jung sent a message to a contact who was saved in his device as "Queen Lindz", the message read:
That bloke deserved it lindz. He was racist to Mucky.
At 11:50pm, the offender Tonazzi sent a message to the offender Jung, which read:
We nut it out later but I'll cop the charge I don't care I'm happy we did it.
At 11:51, the offender Tonazzi sent another message to the offender Jung, which read:
Should I message Lindz and apologise?
At 12:01am, the offender Jung replied:
Nah u got nothing to apologise for
This exchange self-evidently could cast doubt on the offenders' professed contrition.
For the offenders it was submitted that at the time of the exchanges they were unaware of the extent of the serious injuries which they had inflicted on their victim. When the full extent of these injuries became apparent to them, they were immediately remorseful, which remorse continues to this day. I accept that on the balance of probabilities this explains the text messages.
Both offenders gave evidence of their remorse in compelling terms. The Crown, in fairness, did not cross-examine them to contrary effect, on the contrary, in respect of the offender Tonazzi, the Crown in cross-examination invited the offender to speak directly to his victim. This resulted in an apology being delivered in self-evidently sincere terms. I accept that both offenders are contrite.
[10]
Good Character
I also accept that both offenders were of prior good character, and in so doing I do not find that the 2013 cannabis offence in relation to the offender Jung deprived him of such a finding. That they were of good character is also attested by numerous character witnesses relied upon by the offenders. Prior good character supports a conclusion there is reduced need for specific deterrence and an enhanced prospect of rehabilitation.
[11]
Intoxication
The Crown on two occasions raised the issue of the level of intoxication of the offenders. It did so first to cast doubt on whether the offenders' violence was the result of intoxication rather than mental illness. It also did so in relation to the issue as to how I should take the factor into account in relation to the principles set forth in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1.
At the hearing, the offenders gave evidence that they were not significantly intoxicated at the time of the offending, which evidence was not challenged by the Crown. I accept their evidence as establishing on the balance of probabilities that they were not significantly affected by alcohol at the time of the offences.
[12]
Rehabilitation
Both offenders contended that their prospects for rehabilitation were excellent, and that there was a correspondingly low risk of them reoffending. This factor, it was submitted, also has the effect of lessening the need for a deterrent sentence, and heightening the weight to be given to rehabilitation as a sentencing goal. I agree with the offenders' submissions, and thus conclude that their prospects of rehabilitation are excellent, and their risk of reoffending to be low.
I should also note that my assessment of the offender's risk of reoffending is in conformity with the opinion expressed on the subject in the Sentencing Assessment Reports provided in respect of both offenders. My conclusion in relation to rehabilitation is also in conformity with the unchallenged opinion of Dr Pulley in that regard in relation to the offender Jung.
[13]
The Offending Conduct Receives Denunciation
It is well to pause, stand back from the details, and reflect on this tragic incident. Two fleeting acts of violence visited upon the victim, a total stranger, have resulted in terrible consequences. I accept that these consequences were not intended, but nevertheless, they are real. The acts moreover were ultimately a response to a series of perceptions of racism, and perceptions of the victim's response thereto. At the end of the day these perceptions may have been quite erroneous. The Court will never know.
Be that as it may, these senseless acts of violence deserve both the community's and the Court's resolute denunciation.
[14]
The Section 5 Threshold
It was common ground between the parties that the section 5 (of the Sentencing Act) threshold has been crossed, and that, as a consequence, the only appropriate punishment in the circumstances was a term of imprisonment. This was a proposition that could hardly be gainsaid, I agree with it and will proceed to sentence accordingly.
The crucial question remaining therefore is how that sentence is to be served. That is to say, whether the offenders should serve the sentence by way of a full-time custodial sentence, or whether the sentence should be served in the community by way of an Intensive Correction Order (ICO).
The Crown contended that in all the circumstances, a full-time custodial sentence was appropriate. It did so, not because an ICO was outside of an acceptable range per se, but because a head sentence of more than two years was appropriate, thus precluding any consideration of an ICO.
The Crown's submission on the appropriateness of an ICO is based on an important, unstated, and correct premise; namely, that before a sentencing Judge can consider an ICO, he or she must first determine a head sentence. This is so as an ICO is a means of serving a gaol sentence, rather than a factor determinative of the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
In the sentence of imprisonment which I am about to impose, I have taken into account the matters set forth earlier in these Reasons in relation to the objective seriousness of the offences, applicable mitigating factors, and the subjective considerations in respect of the offenders. The sentence will also contain the 25% discount for the offenders' early pleas.
In arriving at the offenders' sentences, I have attempted to carry into effect the instinctive synthesis described by McHugh J in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [51].
I have come to the conclusion that the appropriate head sentence to be imposed is a sentence of imprisonment of 2 years and 6 months, which after the 25% discount for early guilty pleas results in a head sentence of 1 year and 10 months imprisonment.
[15]
Intensive Correction Order
I turn then to the issue of the appropriateness of an Intensive Correction Order (ICO).
For the offenders, it was contended that the appropriate manner in which to serve the term of imprisonment, which I am about to impose, is in the community, by way of an Intensive Correction Order.
In Pullen v R [2018] NSWCCA 264, 275 A Crim R 509 at [89], Harrison J (Johnson J and Schmidt J agreeing) stated:
In some cases, [community safety] will be best achieved through incarceration. That will no doubt be the case where a person presents a serious risk to the community. In other cases, however, community protection may be best served by ensuring that an offender avoids gaol. As the second reading speech makes plain, evidence shows that supervision within the community is more effective at facilitating medium and long term behavioural change, particularly when it is combined with stable employment and treatment programs.
His Honour's reference to the second reading speech was a reference to the second reading speech of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Sentencing Options) Bill 2017 where the Attorney-General, the Hon. M Speakman SC, in introducing the amendments which now constitute the statutory regime governing the making of ICO's, said the following:
We know from Australian and international research that community supervision, combined with programs that target the causes of crime, reduce offending. We know that community supervision is better at reducing reoffending than leaving an offender in the community with no supervision, support or programs. We also know that community supervision is better at reducing reoffending than a short prison sentence.
The sentencing task which confronts me, I have found to be a most difficult one. At the end of the day, however, I have come to the view that the interests of justice are best served by the offenders serving their sentences in the community by way of an Intensive Correction Order. It should be understood, however, that serving a term of imprisonment in the community by way of an Intensive Correction Order is still a substantial punishment. In reaching this conclusion, I respectfully adopt what fell from Harrison J in Pullen v R, to which I have referred.
In the present circumstances, I am of the view that community safety in fact will be best achieved through the offenders not serving their sentences in gaol. I believe that supervision in the community is more likely to achieve long-term behavioural change in the offenders, particularly when it is combined with stable employment and treatment programs.
In relation thereto it is well to note that both offenders retain stable, full-time employment. The offender Tonazzi remains in the scaffolding business, and as earlier indicated, owns and manages a business, with some 20 employees. The offender Jung has left the scaffolding industry, currently he is employed full-time and is also studying for a qualification in personal training.
In addition, the offenders' psychiatrists, who provided expert reports for the Court's benefit, have provided treatment plans, which treatment plans I will, by condition of the ICO, require the offenders to undertake.
I also propose to impose a significant community service condition. I note that the Sentencing Assessment Report provided in respect of each offender has assessed the offenders as suitable to carry out community service work.
[16]
Sentence
David Jung, stand.
1. You are convicted of one count of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company.
2. I impose a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 10 months, which is to commence from today, 2 July 2021, and to expire on 1 May 2023.
3. I direct that such sentence be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order in the community.
4. The standard conditions of the Intensive Correction Order are:
1. You must not commit any offence.
2. You must submit to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer for the term of the order.
1. The following additional conditions will apply to the Intensive Correction Order:
1. You must submit to and undertake the treatment plan referred to in the expert report of Dr Rafe Pulley dated 1 June 2021 at [46].
2. You are to undertake 200 hours of community service.
1. I direct the offender to attend on the Registry forthwith, where a copy of the order will be made available to the offender, and the terms and obligations of the order will be explained to him.
2. I direct that a copy of the order be forwarded to Community Corrections at Burwood, together with a copy of the report of Dr Rafe Pulley dated 1 June 2021.
3. I direct that the offender contact Burwood Community Corrections office by telephone within seven days hereof.
Adam Tonazzi, stand.
1. You are convicted of one count of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company.
2. I impose a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 10 months, which is to commence from today, 2 July 2021, and to expire on 1 May 2023.
3. I direct that such sentence be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order in the community.
4. The standard conditions of the Intensive Correction Order are:
1. You must not commit any offence.
2. You must submit to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer for the term of the order.
1. The following additional conditions will apply to the Intensive Correction Order:
1. You must submit to and undertake the treatment plan referred to in the expert report of Dr Anthony Henderson dated 5 June 2021 at page 15 of his report.
2. You are to undertake 200 hours of community service.
1. I direct the offender to attend on the Registry forthwith, where a copy of the order will be made available to the offender, and the terms and obligations of the order will be explained to him.
2. I direct that a copy of the order be forwarded to Community Corrections at Hornsby, together with a copy of the report of Dr Antony Henderson dated 5 June 2021.
3. I direct that the offender contact Hornsby Community Corrections office by telephone within seven days hereof.
[17]
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Decision last updated: 05 July 2021