After a trial at Wollongong District Court a jury found Phillip Johnston (a pseudonym) guilty of six sexual offences where his stepdaughter, Christine was the complainant. Each of the offences occurred at the family home near Wollongong. Five occurred in the latter half of 2008 to March 2009. The child was then aged seven. They include four (4) counts of sexual intercourse with a child under ten: s 66A Crimes Act 1900 and one count of assault and commit act of indecency on a child under ten: s 61M(2) Crimes Act 1900. A sixth count of assault and commit act of indecency on child under ten. The child was then aged ten. Section 61M(2) had been amended during that period.
I note that after the trial Johnston, through his counsel and psychologist, has accepted responsibility for his crimes. He has also accepted the original statement of facts put forward as part of the Crown case statement prior to the trial. That acceptance accords with not just the jury's verdict but my own understanding of the facts, having sat through the trial. The material I set out is an abbreviated version of the evidence given at trial and what is set out in exhibit B. It is designed, as far as I am able, to reduce what occurred to a rather bland but necessary outline of what occurred without adding details which, for present purposes, are unnecessary.
In 2017, when she was 15, Christine complained that Johnston had regularly sexually or indecently assaulted her from when she was seven years old. She particularised three incidents but also said she had a general recollection of other touching and incidents, including the offender coming into her bedroom in the early morning and placing his hands into her pyjamas and touching her vagina. On other occasions he would put his hands down her pants, touch her and then walk away pretending nothing had happened.
These specific allegations set out in counts 1, 2 and 3 concern an incident where it was alleged, and is now accepted, that the offender contrived to be at home alone with Christine, who was then aged seven. Christine told the jury that Johnston made her masturbate his penis. He then forced it into her mouth. He then inserted his finger into her vagina before telling her to go and play "as if nothing had happened".
R v Johnston [2019] NSWDC 410 | Case summary | Zoe
A second incident is said to have occurred later but when Christine was still aged seven. She recalled being alone with the offender in the adult's bedroom. While she was lying on the bed the offender had penile vaginal intercourse with her. He then performed cunnilingus on her. He threatened her and told her to not tell: counts 4 and 5.
Count 6 is said to have occurred after the offender and Christine's mother separated. Christine was then aged ten and staying at the offender's home. It is alleged that he leant over and stuck his tongue into her mouth, moving it around. His tongue had a piercing. She told him to "stop" and moved away.
A second trial was listed to follow that involving Christine . I had previously made separate trial orders: see R v Johnston (a pseudonym) [2019] NSWDC 61.
After the jury verdict in the first trial the parties engaged in discussion and leave was given to present a fresh indictment. Johnston then entered pleas of guilty to three counts:
1. Between January 2012 and January 2013 he assaulted Monika Brown and committed an act of indecency on her when she was aged 12: s 61M(2) Crimes Act 1900.
2. Between August 2015 and December 2015 he assaulted Natalie Green and committed an act of indecency on her when she was aged 12: s 61M(2) Crimes Act and
3. Between 1 June 2017 and 16 August 2017 he assaulted committing an act of indecency on Natalie Green while she was under his authority: s 61M(1) Crimes Act.
Johnston admitted his guilt to a further assault with act of indecency on Monika. That matter will be taken into account when I sentence him for count 1 on the second indictment.
Johnston admitted his guilt to a further assault with act of indecency on Natalie. That matter will be taken into account when I sentence him for count 2 on the second indictment.
Briefly, it is accepted that Monika and her family would holiday at a South Coast caravan park. So too would Johnston and his extended family. The families became good friends. Monika alleges that one evening in January 2012 when she was 12, after dinner she was walking in the caravan park. She met the offender and two of his children. When the offender and Monika were out of sight of her caravan Johnston put his arm around her shoulders making her feel uncomfortable, he kissed her forehead. He then walked her back to his caravan annex where he offered her an alcoholic drink. He then used her phone to zoom in on her breasts, made comments about her appearance saying how sexy she was and started saying "I wish you were mine". He then wrestled her as Monika sought to get her phone back. During the wrestle he squeezed her breasts; form 1 matter. He then ran his hands over her thighs on the count. He continued to make comments about her body.
After Johnston and Christine's mother separated, he lived with and then married Natalie's mother. Natalie complains that on occasions he would rub her thigh, walk in while she was in the bathroom and flick tea towels at her buttocks. Count 9 relates to an allegation when she was 14 the offender sat next to her on the lounge while she was watching television. He placed his hand on her knee and moved it up her leg. She closed her legs but he continued to rub her inner thigh for about 40 minutes. Natalie was too scared to say anything.
When Natalie was 15 or 16 the offender came up behind her while she was writing at the kitchen table. He massaged her shoulders and then five or six times placed his hand under her T‑shirt and bra and rubbed her breasts. He then hugged her and said, "I love you and I love your body"; this is a matter on the form 1. It went on for about ten to 15 minutes.
The final count is said to have occurred when Natalie was 16. Again it is said that Johnston sat on the lounge next to her while she was watching television. She was wearing shorts. He first put his hand on her knee for a few minutes before massaging her inner thigh. He then moved first his fingers and then his hand onto her vagina over the top of her clothing. He continued to massage her inner thigh.
Section 66A Crimes Act carried at the relevant time a maximum penalty of 25 years. Parliament, on behalf of the community, had fixed a standard non‑parole period of 15 years relating to an offence that, taking into account only objective factors, fell in the middle of the range of seriousness. Section 61M(1) carried a maximum penalty of seven years with a standard non‑parole period of five years. Section 61M(2) carried the maximum penalty of ten years with a standard non‑parole period of eight years.
Judges must always pay careful attention to maximum penalties and standard non‑parole periods. Content must be given to them. This is not just because parliament has legislated for them. They both provide sentencing measures to be balanced with all other relevant factors. They also invite a comparison between the instant case and worst cases or cases said to be in the middle of the range, taking into account only objective factors. It is not however appropriate to look first at the maximum or even the standard non‑parole period and then proceed by way of making proportional reductions; see Markarian (2005) 228 CLR 357, at [30]. A point also made in R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168.
Section 54B Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 applies whenever a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a standard non‑parole period offence. That section must be read as a whole. The standard non‑parole period is a matter to be taken into account, as I have said, but I have to do so in a single stage process when I synthesise all relevant factors.
In construing s 54B it is important to keep in mind since the decision of the High Court of Muldrock (2011) 244 CLR 120, Parliament introduced s 54B(6). A sentencing court is not required to identify the extent to which the seriousness of the offence in question differs from some abstract notional or theoretical offence referred to in s 54A(2). The process of comparing and contrasting the actual offence with the abstract one is not necessary, nor is it necessary to identify features of the offence which were or were not taken into account in considering the role of the standard non‑parole period, Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247, at [103] ‑ [120]. That said, in every case an assessment of the objective gravity of the offence is necessary.
Section 61M(1) has a standard non‑parole period of seven years. The ratio between the maximum penalty and the standard non‑parole period has been subject to criticism. Justifiably so.
In BT v R [2010] NSWCCA 267 RS Hulme AJ, described the relativity between the maximum and standard non‑parole periods as "absurd". Parliament has had opportunity over many years to take into account this criticism and another court in R v NJK [2011] NSWCCA 151 has told judges sentencing at first instance so far as s 61M(2) "Nevertheless an eight year standard non‑parole period has been prescribed by the legislature and the Court must give effect to it", that decision binds me. However, care needs to be taken.
Adequate punishment requires the sentence bear proportion to the gravity of the crime committed. Where a standard non‑parole period is fixed, courts have to have regard to objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of the assault. So far as indecent assaults are concerned, the Court also has to compare the relative seriousness of indecent assaults with sexual assaults which would generally justify objectively greater penalties. Proper reference to the guidance offered by the different maximums requires differentiation. Here, despite the seriousness of the indecent assault matters, none could be said to fall into objectively the middle of the range but all are serious examples of their type. While those offences involving penile or penile vaginal or penile oral penetration could, given the age of the child and the age of the complainant and other objective factors, fall into the middle of the range.
There are reasons for some variation from the standard non‑parole period; the principal of totality, the need to accumulate, the need to take into account all the purposes of sentencing in one process of instinctive synthesis and the need to avoid simple accumulation of penalties. Further, the need to take into account the subject case made for the offender require some variation from the standard non‑parole period so far as each indicated offences concerned.
In assessing any act involving sexual offences against a child, the Court must take into account a number of important factors:
1. The actual character of the acts involved, including the degree of physical contact involved.
2. The age difference between the perpetrator and the child.
3. The relationship that exists between the child and the perpetrator. Stepfathers are expected to protect and nurture, not abuse children in their care. A stepfather of a child is in a particular position of trust. They take upon themselves the duty effectively of being a father for the child, that trust was abused here.
4. Where the offence occurred and in what circumstances: a child in her own bed in her own home is virtually helpless against attack, particularly by a stepfather.
5. The age of the child relative to the range encompassed by the offence. The younger the child, the more serious the offence.
6. When the criminal act involves sexual intercourse with a child there is no rigid hierarchy distinguishing the different forms of intercourse. No one type of intercourse is by itself more or less serious than the other. What is however of considerable significance is the nature of the intercourse, the degree of physical contact involved, the time over which the act occurred and whether any harm, hurt or injury, physical or psychological resulted and of course the extent of that harm. It is necessary that all relevant facts be considered.
7. Every act that involves the sexual exploitation of a child is serious.
There is an absolute prohibition on sexual activity with children. That prohibition is intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity. Harm which is well demonstrated in the Victim Impact Statements presently before the Court. This is one important reason for the high maximum penalties and the high standard non‑parole periods fixed for such offences.
These maximum penalties and standard non‑parole periods provide, as I have said, a measure of how serious the offences are viewed by Parliament and the community. They carry with them an implicit instruction to courts that retributive sentences, with a focus on protection of children from exploitation, is required: Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267 at [46]; R v Herring (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 203, at [205]. Therefore general and specific deterrent sentences are required. They reflect the community abhorrence of and concern about adult sexual abuse of children.
The courts must reflect that concern in the sentences imposed. Legislatures do not enact maximum penalties merely as formalities, as the High Court pointed out in Markarian. Judges need sentencing measures. Here I will have proper regard to those measures.
So far as the trial matter, incident one, is concerned. The offender was Christine's stepfather, she was only seven, she was alone and vulnerable in her own home. The offender exploited her vulnerability. He exploited her innocence for his own pleasure. He thought nothing of her. She was entitled to protection, not abuse. He exploited his relationship with her mother and the child's love of him, he exploited the trust inherent in both relationships. He forced her to manipulate him and then penetrated her mouth with his penis, he then penetrated her vagina with his finger. Individually and collectively these were serious examples of their type.
The second incident involved both penile vaginal intercourse and cunnilingus. He threatened her and told her not to tell. There was an obvious risk of disease. There was also consideration, as with both incidents, of the age of the child, she was far too young. They are both serious examples of their type.
The third incident occurred when Christine was then ten, a guest in the offender's home. A kiss is not of itself indecent but to stick your tongue in a ten year old's mouth in the way he did was an indecent assault of some seriousness.
So far as the offence involving Monika is concerned it is notorious that young women are vulnerable to exploitation by older men. Monika was alone and isolated. The intent of the offender was clear. The young girl's premature sexualisation and exploitation. Young girls are vulnerable. They can become confused and upset. Lasting damage is possible by inappropriate and exploitative touching of breasts and other intimate parts.
While there may be far worse examples of assaults with act of indecency, that does not excuse the offender's behaviour. Natalie was also the offender's stepdaughter. Again, she was entitled to look for him for protection and support. The offences involved attempts at premature sexualisation of the child and grooming of her in their own home. There was skin on skin and persisted and repeated contact. Again while there are far worse examples, this does not excuse what occurred.
In each case so far as Monika and Natalie are concerned the offender used his influence as an older man to attempt to secure the child's silence. In each case the child spoke up bravely and was listened to, and importantly, believed.
So far as each complainant is concerned there are Victim Impact Statements, which I have received and considered. Christine's statement was read to the Court. It speaks of her confusion now and as a child. She loved and respected the offender. He abused her. He demanded her silence. She was far too young to understand what was going on or to deal with the confusion that his behaviour generated in her.
The offences had a physical impact. The physical impact was not detected because presumptions had been made that the complaints of discomfort related to an existing medical condition. Now, a young person, Christine has some regret for the period that the offender will have to spend in custody separated from his own children but she also demonstrates in her statement a fear for her own future particularly when he will be released; demonstrating the confusion he caused her is still existing.
Christine's Victim Impact Statement and the associated psychologist report indicates the psychological harm that these events caused. It is a sad but tragic reflection of such offences that such harms, while obviously substantial, are inherently a consequence of offending of this type. I do not find, although I used the term, that they fall within the category envisaged by s 21A(2) of the Crime (Sentencing) Procedure Act 1999; only because it is accepted that such harm is generally a result of such matters and has been, as I said, built into the sentencing regime and maximum standard non‑parole periods. It is well recognised as the Court of Criminal Appeal said in R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56, that such consequences will flow from offending of this nature. I have to be very careful not to double count matters of aggravation in matters such as this.
Christine says that she wants to move forward but also notes that she feared that she would not be believed. It's important to note that she was believed. She was believed by me. She was believed by the jury. She was believed by the police and everyone who supported her. That gives her some foundation for her future. The Court does not underestimate the stresses of giving evidence and the fear and disruption that a trial causes any witness, let alone a young woman sitting her Higher School Certificate. I cannot increase the sentence because the matter went to trial. It is important that those who criticise court's giving discounts for early pleas of guilty take into account that the reduction in sentence given reflects the court's understanding of the potential harm and exacerbation of harm that giving evidence in court can cause a child and the child victim of sexual assault in particular; see R v Thompson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 at [3].
Natalie's Victim Impact Statement notes in particular the support that she has had from her family. She says to the offender "I want you to live with regret. I want you to know what you did made me more determined. I not only graduated year 12, I graduated in the top percentage of my grade. I am going to uni and building my business. I want you to live with the fact that we can live our lives and be happy!". She also says however, "There are times when I close my eyes at night and see and feel what he did to me and I can't close my eyes no matter what, no matter how hard I try and how tired I am. You make me feel sick and dirty but you should be feeling this, not me".
Monika's Victim Impact Statement sets out her lack of trust for older men, her fear, how she would check her locks at night and have panic attacks. She notes she has been seeing a psychologist and went into a suicide prevention program. She notes her depression and anxiety and her fear for the future. She notes, as is all too common, that although many years ago, the offences still affect her.
Behavioural responses to child sexual abuse vary. There is no unique set of behavioural constellations. They vary because of the diversity of the experience. Courts have to be wary about making generalisations about such impact because the impact is, as is shown here, highly individualised. However, there are some common features of child sexual assault that the courts are now well aware of.
Such offences can lead to developmentally inappropriate and dysfunctional interpersonal relationships, feelings of betrayal, powerlessness, guilt and shame. The longer term effects can include a number of psychological conditions, but the courts are also aware that there is a remarkable resilience in survivors of sexual assaults and indecent assaults. On behalf of the community, I thank the complainants for coming forward and raising these matters because unless children are encouraged and supported in coming forward we can't, as a community, deal with such offending in a just and appropriate manner.
I have to have regard to the case made for the offender. It is important he is not the sole focus of the court's concerns but it is necessary, so far as appreciating what just and appropriate sentence can be imposed, that I take into account the man who now stands before me for sentence.
He did not give evidence. A statement was put to the Court through his psychologist and through his counsel, Mr Coyne. He wishes to put this on the record:
"I am devastated for what I did. I destroyed those girls' lives. I destroyed my kids' lives. There is no excuse for what I did to them. At the time I didn't think about the girls. Now I can see my behaviour will affect them during their lives. I wish I could take it back. I am sorry."
The expression of remorse came late. It was not supported by evidence on oath although I suspect that if it had been on oath it would not have been eroded by cross‑examination. For anyone who has done what this offender has done to at last realise the consequences of their action, is I suppose the first step on the road to rehabilitation.
As I have said, his expression of remorse came too late, far too late. It indicates that he has, by acknowledging his guilt, engaged on the first step to what will be a lengthy process and he is to receive some credit for that. He has no criminal antecedents and he has never been in trouble before.
As Madam Crown correctly points out in her submissions, the Court can take into account that lack of criminal history but prior good character carries less weight for offences where there is a determined and conscious course of offending over a significant period of time: R v Kennedy [2000] NSWCCA 527. This is not a matter where it is suggested that the provisions of 25A to 25A(5) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 apply.
Care has to be taken when I have regard to the man who stands for sentence. He knew what he was doing was wrong. He still has no capacity to explain why he did it, knowing what he was doing was wrong. He is now 50. He says that he was abused by a stepfather when he was young. He has had a number of relationships. He has trade qualifications. He has been in regular work for most of his life. He has a history of alcohol and cannabis use and has at times been medicated for depression. There is evidence that since these matters came to light he has made a number of attempts on his own life, a matter I can and do take into account.
It is not clear whether they are cries for help or expressions of remorse or attempts to gain sympathy. Nevertheless, that history will mean that when in custody he needs to be subject to some supervision. His psychologist concludes that he has a "sexually deviant attraction to young girls". Something he was at times able to subdue except when alcohol and drugs and access to vulnerable children occurred. His psychologist says that he will need alcohol and other drug treatment, psychotherapy supervision and a graduated assistance while in custody engaging in both the PREP and ultimately CUBIT sex offender programs.
As I said, there was no evidence on oath from the offender. Nevertheless the report of Mr Jones: exhibit 1, does not attempt to parrot mitigatory material. While I have to be careful, there is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the respected psychologist. Most of the material is not controversial. The acceptance, implicit in the tender of the report, of the diagnosis of "deviant attraction to young girls" will have to be taken into account by the State Parole Authority when he comes up for release. It will have to be taken into account when considerations are given to how he is to be supervised on release. It is at least some indication that he is prepared to acknowledge responsibility for his actions and work towards dealing with that particular problem.
I do not underestimate the lived experience of gaol. For a significant proportion of his life the offender will now be locked away from the community. He will require considerable assistance while he is in custody. He will require assistance in coming to grips with normal community life on release. For those who criticise the leniency of sentences, it is important that everyone note how much the world changes every year. None of us can predict how much society will advance over the next few years but it is clear that there will be changes and the offender will need to have assistance in adjusting to them.
I am indebted to Mr Jones for his comprehensive report and commend it to Corrective Services. The other material, as I said, indicates that Johnson has a number of psychiatric problems manifested in self‑harm, which require consideration by the custodial authorities.
There are a number of matters for sentence. There will be an aggregate sentence in this matter. I am allowed some flexibility when it comes to structuring the sentence. I am required to impose or indicate appropriate sentences for each offence. I am required to structure the sentences so that the overall sentence is just and appropriate to the totality of the offending behaviour. There are three complainants against whom harm was done. There are three incidents so far as Christine was concerned. It is accepted that those incidents fall into a pattern of behaviour towards the young complainant.
Sentences are not made concurrent simply because of similarity of conduct or because they are seen as one course of criminal conduct. Public confidence in the administration of justice requires courts avoid any suggestion of some sort of discount for multiple offending. Nevertheless there should be, so far as the incidents are concerned, more concurrence than there would be so far as different complainants are concerned or different incidents are concerned.
The purposes of sentencing also overlap so far as each of the offences are concerned. It has been recognised that long sentences can have a crushing effect. It is also recognised that retributive justice sometimes excuses that crushing effect, but if he keeps the promises he has made to himself as to his future behaviour and treatment while in custody, Johnston will be released into the community. He should not be released more damaged than when he went in.
A long sentence should not operate to destroy any prospect of reform on release. It is also recognised the severity of a sentence increases at a greater rate than the increase in the length of the sentence. That is, the sentence of two years is more harsh than a sentence of one year and that goes up as the sentence increases.
I have received some Judicial Commission statistics. I have had regard to the sentences imposed by myself in similar matters, which I have had to deal with. I have had regard to sentences imposed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. I have been careful in reviewing other authorities because the maximum penalty for the s 66A offence has increased since the commission of these offences. Although I have been told by the legislature in s 25A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act have regard to current patterns of sentencing, I also have to have regard to the difference in maximum penalties that apply now and then. I have to have regard to s 19 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
A pattern of past sentences can serve to help establish a range. However, each case and each offender is individual and distinct. Sentencing is a discretionary judgment. The mix of factors that have to be weighed in determining the appropriate sentence can never be precisely the same in every case.
I am indebted to Ms Keay, the Crown Prosecutor, and Mr Coyne, for the offender, for their comprehensive written submissions which I received this morning. I hope this judgment does justice to them. I do not intend to explicitly refer to each of the matters raised but I have considered and address them in coming to my determination as to the appropriate sentence in each matter and the total aggregate sentence.
The written submissions do draw my attention to matters which are not in significant dispute. Mr Coyne concludes; Mr Johnston finds himself at the age of 50 in custody for the immediate future with a diagnosis of paedophilic disorder with diagnosed psychiatric issues warranting heavy medication, suicidal ideation with no outside support. In future he will need to be continually monitored as a sex offender, continually treated as a sex offender and rebuild his life from scratch alone.
He reminds me that the sentence should not be a crushing burden. Given the length of the aggregate sentence that needs to be imposed, he will have time on parole, if he justifies that parole, to deal with those matters. Apart from some minor adjustments to avoid unnecessary mathematical complications I have determined that there should be no finding of special circumstances here given the length of the non‑parole period that must be imposed will allow for adequate assistance on release.
Ms Keay in her submissions reminds me of the potential risk of reoffending given the disorder that has been diagnosed. But there are mechanisms in place so far as the Serious Offenders Review Council and the State Parole Authority are concerned to protect the community if it is not safe to release Johnson. I do not believe his acceptance of responsibility it is entirely self‑serving. To accept the offender has at last realised what he must do to prevent reoffending. Nevertheless, as Ms Keay reminds me, combined punishment has to be imposed to reflect the courts understanding of the long term effects of childhood trauma as a result of offences such as this and the offending conduct against three young girls.
[2]
Synthesis
Convictions for the offences against Christine came after trial. The expressions of remorse and concern for the child only came after she gave evidence. I cannot and will not increase the sentences because Johnston exercised his right to put the Crown to proof.
So far as Natalie and Monika are concerned, the pleas came late. Nevertheless, each of the children were spared the ordeal of giving evidence, although they had to wait till the last minute to be told. I will reduce the otherwise appropriate sentences for the offences against Monika and Natalie by 10% to take into account the utilitarian value of that late plea.
I have taken care when I came to consider questions of accumulation not to erode the benefit of those pleas. The non‑parole periods that I will indicate are less than those fixed as standard non‑parole periods. I have varied them so far as the s 66A matters involving Christine are concerned because of the subjective case for the offender and because not every matter is of the same level of objective criminality and because I have to consider overall the appropriate sentence for each matter. The aggregate sentence recognises that as a first offender, this offender will have to rebuild his life after a lengthy minimum period in custody, which minimum period I have taken into account for purposes of sentencing.
Those purposes include the need for adequate punishment, the need to attempt to deter this offender and others, the need to protect the community from the offender. His removal from the community will do that in the short term but in the long term after he is released the sentence should not impede any progress towards rehabilitation made and should allow for him being supervised in the community. On release he should be less of a danger to young children than he presented prior to findings of guilt.
The sentence must also attempt to make him accountable for his own actions. Importantly, it must denounce what he did and recognise the harm that he did. The courts have an obligation to vindicate the dignity of each victim and to express the community's disapproval for the offending.
Mitigating factors must be given appropriate weight but they must not lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to what was done. The sentence imposed is only one indicator of the seriousness with which the courts view the crimes committed. The judge has to take into account all relevant considerations. That means that no direct correlation can be made between the harm done and the time to be served and the harm done to the child complainants. Not every matter can be fitted into categories.
A sentencing judge is obliged to synthesise all the competing features and as the High Court said in Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629 "attempt to translate the complexity of a human condition and human behaviour insofar as the complainants are concerned and the offender is concerned, to some harsh mathematics, some units of punishment expressed here in terms of time". I will need to indicate a sentence for each matter. I will then indicate an aggregate sentence and an aggregate non‑parole period.
[3]
Indictment relating to the complainant Christine
As each matter involves a standard non‑parole period defence I will indicate the non‑parole period and the total sentence.
Count 1, s 66A: I indicate a non‑parole period of ten years and three months and a total sentence of 14 years.
Count 2, s 66A: I indicate a non‑parole period of nine years and a total sentence of 12 years.
Count 3, s 61M(2): I indicate a non‑parole period of two years and three months and a total sentence of three years.
Count 4, the second incident, s 66A: I indicate a non‑parole period of ten years and three months and a total sentence of 14 years.
Count 5 s66A the cunnilingus matter: I indicate a non‑parole period of nine years and a total sentence of 12 years.
Count 6, the indecent assault, s 61M(2): I indicate a non parole period of one year and six months total sentence with a non‑parole period of one year, one month.
[4]
Indictment relating to the complainants Monika and Natalie
Turning now to the matters where a late plea of guilty was entered. Count 1: Taking into account the matters on the form 1 there will be I indicate a non‑parole period of one year four months and a total sentence of one year and nine months.
Count 2: I indicate a non‑parole period of one year six months and a total sentence of two years, that is slightly different to the last.
Count 3: I indicate a non‑parole period of seven months and a total sentence of ten months.
There will be an aggregate sentence of 16 years and six months. There will be a non‑parole period of 12 years which will commence on 5 January 2018 and expire on 4 January 2030. There will be a balance of term, four years and six months to commence on 5 January 2030. Total sentence expire 4 July 2034. There has been some slight adjustment for the maths but there is no finding of special circumstances apart from that.
[5]
Amendments
23 September 2019 - Amendment made to [22] - "extensive" amended to "instinctive"
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Decision last updated: 23 September 2019