R v Jackson

The s.31 Procedure

1. A hearing under s.31 of the Act is not a trial. No trial date has been fixed. Accordingly, there is no need for the Accused to elect to be tried by Judge alone under s.132 Criminal Procedure Act 1986: R v Sands [2021] NSWSC 1325 at [3]. The s.31(c) procedure has been described as an "evidentiary inquiry": R v Gough [2021] NSWDC 180 at [13].
2. If the Court is satisfied that the defence of mental health impairment is established for the purpose of s.31(c) of the Act, the Court is required to enter a special verdict under s.31 of "act proven but not criminally responsible". The Court must then consider what consequential orders should be made under ss.33 and 34 of the Act.
3. In the absence of s.31, a criminal trial would take place for the purpose of determining whether the defence of mental health impairment had been established. A criminal trial is conducted as adversarial litigation where an accusatorial process is involved, in which the prosecutor bears the onus of proving the elements of the crime charged: Robinson v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [138]. In this case, if the matter proceeded to trial, it would be for the Crown to prove that the Accused committed the act in question and the other elements of the crime of murder (apart from the question of intention) and it would be for the Accused to establish, on the balance of probabilities, the defence of mental health impairment under s.28(2) of the Act.
4. Section 31 is a statutory modification of these usual procedures and permits the Court to consider the agreed position of the parties without the need for a criminal trial. In R v Siemek (No. 1) [2021] NSWSC 1292, reference was made (at [19]) to the origin of s.31 as explained in the second reading speech: "In the second reading speech for the MHCIFP Bill, the Attorney General explained that s.31 'aims to avoid the need for an expensive and lengthy trial when the prosecutor and defence are in agreement that a special verdict should be found' (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 3 June 2020, page 2352). The Attorney General observed that the Bill added 'extra safeguards' in that 'the defendant must be legally represented and the court must be satisfied that, on the evidence, the defence is established'. This was in line with the recommendation of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 138, 'People With Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice System - Criminal Responsibility and Consequences', 2013, paragraphs 3.159-3.160."
5. The operation of s.31 has been considered in cases which had been fixed for trial and where, following an election for Judge-alone trial, the trial proceeded but culminated in a special verdict by way of s.31: R v Tonga [2021] NSWSC 1064; R v Siemek (No. 1). In those cases some consideration was given to the interaction between s.31 of the Act and ss.132 and 133 Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
6. However, that analysis has no application to the present case where s.31 has been engaged before any trial date has been fixed, let alone any election for Judge-alone trial.
7. It remains the case, however, that the Court is required to provide reasons for a decision to return a special verdict under s.31. In R v Siemek (No. 1), the Court said in this respect at [21] and [22]: "21 However, the Court's decision fulfills another important purpose. It provides reasons for the verdict of the Court announced in open court on a serious charge where there is a strong public interest in the community understanding the basis upon which the verdict has been returned. The provision of reasons for a decision is an expression of the open justice principle. The importance of a public explanation for final decisions has long been recognised: Wainohu v State of New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; [2011] HCA 24 at [54]-[58]. 22 In addition, where the Court returns a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible under s.31 MHCIFP Act, it is necessary for the Court to consider what further orders should be made under s.33 in circumstances where the Court must refer an accused person to the Mental Health Review Tribunal under s.34 MHCIFP Act if such a special verdict has been returned. The reasons of the Court for reaching the verdict, and for making consequential orders, serve an important role in the discharge by the Mental Health Review Tribunal of its functions with respect to a person in relation to whom such a special verdict has been returned: cf Craigie v Faircloth & Reynolds Pty Ltd and Ors [2021] NSWSC 1211 at [17] (concerning the giving of reasons where the parties signed consent orders in civil proceedings under rule 36.1A Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005)."

The Defence of Mental Health Impairment

1. The explanation of the defence of mental health impairment and of the importance of expert medical evidence, as contained in R v Siemek (No. 1) at [84]-[94], has application to the present s.31 hearing as well. In R v Siemek (No. 1), the Court said at [84]-[89]: "84 The defence of mental health impairment under s.28 MHCIFP Act has two limbs (see [10] above). 85 The first limb is that the Accused, at the time of carrying out the act constituting the offence, had a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment or both: s.28(1) MHCIFP Act. 86 The second limb is that the relevant impairment had one or other of the effects referred to in s.28(1)(a) or (b). 87 The presence of each limb is to be determined on the balance of probabilities (s.28(2)) and, until the contrary is proved, it is presumed that the Accused did not have a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment (or both) that had the effect set out in s.28(1): s.28(3) MHCIFP Act. 88 In the second reading speech for the MHCIFP Bill, the Attorney General said that Part 3 of the Bill 'updates and legislates what was the common law test for the defence of mental illness' arising from the decision in M'Naghten's Case (1843) 8 ER 718 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 3 June 2020, pages 2351-2352). The Attorney General said that Clause 28 'provides for the defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment, which closely mirrors M'Naghten's test but with updated terms'. With respect to the formulation of the defence, the Attorney General explained that 'it is important to victims of those forensic patients who have successfully raised the defence of mental illness that the defence recognises that the person did do an act'. 89 The language used in s.28(1)(a) and (b) originates from the renowned summing up to a jury in a murder trial in Canberra by Dixon J, a Judge of the High Court of Australia, in The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 187-190; [1933] HCA 1. In recommending a statutory provision along these lines, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission made clear that the summing up of Dixon J in The King v Porter had been widely accepted and adopted, and that it was an appropriate formulation to be included in the statutory statement of the defence: Report 138, 'People With Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice System - Criminal Responsibility and Consequences', 2013, paragraphs 3.90- 3.109."
2. With respect to medical evidence where a defence of mental health impairment is raised, the Court said in R v Siemek (No. 1) at [91]-[92]: "91 Prior to the enactment of the MHCIFP Act, it had been said that, although there is no legal requirement that medical evidence be adduced to prove the defence of mental illness (Lucas v The Queen (1970) 120 CLR 171 at 174; [1970] HCA 14), the need to establish the elements of the defence made the calling of medical evidence a practical necessity: Tumanako v R (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 at 160. 92 An elaborate definition of 'mental health impairment' now appears in s.4 MHCIFP Act (see [12] above) which requires the Court to consider whether, amongst other things, 'a temporary or ongoing disturbance of thought, mood, volition, perception or memory … would be regarded as significant for clinical diagnostic purposes': s.4(1)(a) and (b). The introduction of an assessment of the relevant 'disturbance' as being 'significant for clinical diagnostic purposes' means that expert medical evidence is now more than a practical necessity in cases where the s.28 defence is raised."
3. I have applied these principles concerning the construction and operation of s.28 when determining, in the present case, whether the Court is satisfied, after considering the evidence, that the defence of mental health impairment is established for the purpose of s.31(c) of the Act.

Evidence at the s.31 Hearing

1. Placed before the Court, with the agreement of both the Crown and the defence, was a tender bundle which contained a range of documents, including a Statement of Agreed Facts, a report of Anne Lucas, psychologist, dated 18 November 2021, a report of Dr Sathish Dayalan, psychiatrist, dated 15 February 2021, a supplementary report of Dr Dayalan dated 16 August 2021 and a report of Dr Kerri Eagle, psychiatrist, dated 23 April 2021. Ms Lucas and Dr Dayalan examined the Accused at the request of the legal representatives for the Accused. Dr Eagle examined the Accused at the request of the Crown.
2. In addition, contained in the tender bundle (which was admitted as Exhibit A), are statements of a number of persons who made observations of events relevant to this tragic case. Finally, also included in Exhibit A are certain medical records concerning the Accused, to which reference will be made shortly.
3. It was that body of evidence which gave rise to the agreement between the parties for the purpose of s.31 of the Act.
4. Section s.31 requires, firstly, agreement between the parties that the evidence in the proceedings establishes the defence of mental health impairment under s.31(a), and that requirement is satisfied. In addition, the Accused is to be represented by an Australian legal practitioner for the purpose of s.31(b), and that requirement is satisfied as the Accused is represented by highly experienced counsel and solicitor in this field of the law.
5. The remaining aspect is whether the Court is satisfied, for the purpose of s.31(c), after considering the evidence, that the defence of mental health impairment is established.
6. A helpful written submission prepared by the legal representatives for the Accused is before the Court (MFI1). The Crown agrees with the matters contained in that submission.
7. Against that background, I turn to the facts of the matter.

Facts

1. At the time of his death on 21 March 2020, Paul Hughes was 77 years old. At that time, the Accused was 41 years old.
2. The Accused, Mr Hughes and five other residents lived in a share house at Croydon. The premises were comprised of six apartments, with shared laundry and shared bathrooms.
3. Mr Hughes had lived there for about two years. He had worked as a furniture removalist, but he had retired some years earlier. Mr Hughes was described in the evidence by other residents of the Croydon premises as a pleasant person. He was well known and well liked in the house and in the community. He and another resident acted as the caretakers of the property.
4. The Accused had lived in the share house for about eight years. He was described by several residents as difficult to get along with and had been involved in altercations and disputes with members of the share house over the years. The Accused had also had prior disputes with Mr Hughes about household matters.
5. On Saturday, 21 March 2020, events unfolded which culminated in the death of Mr Hughes. The Accused had available to him at that time a Hyundai motor vehicle which was registered in the name of his mother, which he utilised from time to time.
6. At 5.30 pm on 21 March 2020, the Accused was observed by another resident to reverse the Hyundai motor vehicle into a spot at the back of the Croydon property. Some time after that, Mr Hughes spoke to another resident and told him of an argument he had earlier that day with the Accused.
7. Some time after 7.00 pm, Mr Hughes was in the driveway of the Croydon property. It is not known whether he was there as a result of a coincidence or some arrangement.
8. When Mr Hughes was on the driveway, the Accused drove the Hyundai motor vehicle forward, running over Mr Hughes and causing fatal injuries. Other residents came to the assistance of Mr Hughes and remained with him, comforting him, whilst a "000" call was made and an ambulance attended. After running over Mr Hughes, the Accused drove away from the premises.
9. Ambulance officers arrived on the scene and provided assistance to Mr Hughes, but his injuries were very substantial and proved fatal, with him passing away by about 7.38 pm.
10. As I have mentioned, the Accused left the scene in the vehicle. Police spoke to him by telephone at about 10.30 pm that evening. The Accused made no admissions with respect to what had happened. Police ascertained that the Hyundai motor vehicle was at the premises of the Accused's mother at Lilyfield, as was the Accused himself.
11. At about 4.15 am on Sunday, 22 March 2020, police attended the premises at Lilyfield. The Accused was arrested. He made no admissions at that time with respect to causing the death of Mr Hughes.
12. The Hyundai motor vehicle was taken by police for examination. There was no mechanical fault detected in the vehicle. Forensic examination connected the vehicle to the death of Mr Hughes by means of the observation of markings on the outside of the vehicle, linking the vehicle directly to Mr Hughes.
13. The Agreed Statement of Facts expands on conversations that police had with the Accused in the course of Sunday, 22 March 2020. It is not necessary to recount those matters. The Accused was arrested and charged with the murder of Mr Hughes.
14. Also included in the Agreed Statement of Facts are references to other aspects of the evidence, including the annexure of statements of a number of the residents at the Croydon premises. For present purposes, it is not necessary to recite in any further detail, the facts of this tragic event.
15. It is sufficient to observe that the evidence before the Court demonstrates clearly that it was the act of the Accused in driving over Mr Hughes which caused the death of Mr Hughes.

The Expert Evidence

1. A number of expert reports form part of the agreed material before the Court.
2. The report of Anne Lucas, psychologist, dated 18 November 2020 provides a helpful background in a number of respects. Ms Lucas spoke to the mother of the Accused, who confirmed that the Accused had been born in the Netherlands and the family had moved to Australia in 1980.
3. Other matters in the report of Ms Lucas include her examination of medical records concerning the Accused, about which more will be said a little later. The records indicated historic diagnoses of schizoaffective (manic subtype) with paranoid ideation, depression and schizophrenia. Ms Lucas had been provided with reports from Croydon Health Centre, which also form part of the tender bundle.
4. The report of Ms Lucas indicates that the Accused is an intelligent man. Between 2008 and 2010, he reported that he had completed a diploma at TAFE. He was working at times, but he was not working by the time of these events in March 2020. The Accused had at times used various illegal substances, including cannabis, ecstasy and methamphetamine, as well as alcohol, although he informed Ms Lucas that he was drug and alcohol free at the time of the events on 21 March 2020.
5. Ms Lucas observed the history of acrimony which had arisen between the Accused and other persons at the Croydon premises over a period of time.
6. Ms Lucas administered a Personality Assessment Inventory, which had certain limitations, as explained in her report in this case. There was no indication of intellectual disability on the part of the Accused. Ms Lucas stated that the Accused's composite full-scale IQ estimate indicated a scaled score of 105, so that his IQ would fall towards the higher end of the average range.
7. Ms Lucas noted aspects of the Accused's criminal history and then his account of the events of 21 March 2020, which she noted was affected by paranoid ideation and involved what she described as "a circuitous account of events".
8. The report of Ms Lucas was clearly of assistance when Dr Dayalan came to examine the Accused on 18 January 2021.
9. I will not set out in great detail what Dr Dayalan said, apart from noting particular features of the report which are of direct relevance for present purposes. At page 13 of the report of 15 February 2021, Dr Dayalan noted: "Mr Jackson has a documented history of schizoaffective disorder diagnosed from his presentations to the Local Health Districts. His psychotic illness had been characterised by bizarre delusional beliefs, thought disorder and auditory hallucinations. The affective component to his illness included increased irritability, pressured speech, grandiose beliefs, increased energy levels in the form of agitation and impaired sleep. He had also suffered from depressive symptoms with associated suicidal behaviour. His psychiatric illness has contributed to impairment in occupational and social functioning. His condition had been complicated by poor insight resulting in noncompliance. Whilst living with his mother, he had been prompted to attend mental health assessments due to concerns raised by her. He has had very limited contact with mental health services since he moved out on his own and has been largely noncompliant with treatment since 2014. He continued to present with psychotic symptoms at the time of my assessment. Based on the information available, I would concur with the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. In my opinion, schizophrenia will need to be considered as a differential diagnosis."
10. A little later, Dr Dayalan said (page 14 of the report): "His account of his mental state at the time of the alleged offence indicated that he had been experiencing persecutory delusions. Increased irritability was observed by fellow residents. Furthermore, interaction with his former work colleague supported the presence of persecutory beliefs preceding the alleged offence. He has a history of presenting as guarded in interviews and it does not appear that he had had a comprehensive psychiatric assessment following his incarceration. However, he had been involved in a few altercations whilst in custody that appear to be associated with persecutory beliefs. He had also made an odd request to have saline water for confusion. A detailed assessment by a psychologist towards the end of last year had noted residual symptoms of psychosis and that he had been experienced paranoid ideation at the time of the alleged offence. Mr Jackson continued to present with psychotic symptoms during my interview. Based on the information available, Mr Jackson was probably suffering from a psychotic episode associated with his schizoaffective disorder at the time of the alleged offence and therefore suffering from a disease of the mind. Given the presence of delusional beliefs around the time of the alleged offences, it would be reasonable to conclude that Mr Jackson had been suffering from a defect of reasoning at that time due to his psychotic illness."
11. Dr Dayalan concluded (at page 15 of the report): "Based on the information available Mr Jackson's capacity to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure as to whether his actions were wrong was seriously impaired at the time of the alleged offence due to his persecutory delusions. In my opinion, Mr Jackson will be able to avail the defence of mental illness on a balance of probabilities."
12. It will be observed that Dr Dayalan utilised in that report the language of the common law defence of mental illness as contained in the M'Naghten test. The Act commenced on 27 March 2021, and it is the provisions of that Act which apply to the present proceedings. Accordingly, with that in mind, the legal representatives for the Accused returned to Dr Dayalan, inviting a supplementary report, utilising the language contained in the Act.
13. Dr Dayalan provided a supplementary report dated 16 August 2021, which stated, relevantly: "As detailed in my earlier report Mr Jackson suffers from a chronic psychotic illness namely schizoaffective disorder. At the time of the alleged offence, he had been experiencing persecutory delusions and therefore he would be regarded to have been suffering from a mental health impairment as per the definition in the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020."
14. A little later, Dr Dayalan said: "I have explained in my report dated 15 February 2021 the reasons for opining that Mr Jackson's capacity to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure as to whether his actions were wrong was seriously impaired at the time of the alleged offence due to his persecutory delusions stemming from the mental health impairment. In my opinion, Mr Jackson will therefore be able to avail the defence of mental health impairment on a balance of probabilities."
15. The Crown requested that Dr Kerri Eagle examine the Accused. Dr Eagle had available to her the material which was in existence at the time of her examination of the Accused, which took place on 8 April 2021. In a characteristically thorough and helpful report dated 23 April 2021, Dr Eagle examined the history of the Accused, relevant documentation, including documentation concerning his history of mental health treatment, and then turned to diagnoses with respect to the Accused.
16. Dr Eagle noted (at page 14) that the Accused had previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Dr Eagle considered that he satisfied a diagnosis of "schizophrenia, paranoid type". She stated that he may have a schizoaffective disorder.
17. Dr Eagle observed that the diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder are both chronic psychotic illnesses that are considered neurodevelopmental disorders. She observed that the Accused has experienced recurrent relapses of psychosis characterised by persecutory delusions, auditory hallucinations, disorganised thought form and disorganised behaviours. Dr Eagle explained that the difference between schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder is in the relationship between episodes of mood disturbance and relapses of psychosis. The Accused appeared to have a re-emergence of persecutory symptoms that did not entirely correlate with relapses of mood disturbance. The presence of persecutory delusions appeared to be the prominent feature of his recent relapse. Nonetheless, Dr Eagle explained that the "distinction between the diagnosis is superficial, both being schizophrenia-type illnesses that have a similar natural history and prognosis".
18. Dr Eagle observed that the Accused appeared to have a substance use disorder in remission. I note, at this point, that the evidence does not indicate that the substance use disorder played any part in the events of 21 March 2020 (see s.4(3) at [6] above).
19. Dr Eagle then expressed an opinion, using language consistent with the common law defence of mental illness. However, the opinion of Dr Eagle using that test can be easily modified to assist an understanding by reference to the definition of "mental health impairment" in s.4 and the defence of mental health impairment in s.28 of the Act.
20. Dr Eagle said (page 14 of the report): "In my opinion Mr Jackson was experiencing an exacerbation of schizophrenia, characterised by a relapse of psychosis at the time of the Index Offence. Schizophrenia would be considered a disease of the mind from a psychiatric perspective. The relapse of psychosis experienced by Mr Jackson resulted in persecutory delusions, referential ideas and auditory hallucinations that distorted his perspective and impaired his ability to interpret reality, including events or circumstances as they transpired. Accordingly, I am of the view that Mr Jackson had a disease of the mind that resulted in a defect of reason at the time of the Index Offence."
21. When considering the issue of knowledge of wrongfulness, Dr Eagle said (page 15 of the report): "Mr Jackson's account of events resulting in the Index Offence was that during the period immediately prior to the incident that caused the victim's death, he was afraid that the victim was intending to harm him and considered he may have hurt him by stabbing him. He justified this belief on the basis that he could hear the victim stating 'I'm going to kill ya' repeatedly and on a background of believing that the victim had discussed with another resident, Max, trying to get rid of him. If Mr Jackson's account of the incident is accepted by the Court, I am of the view that it is consistent with the experience of a persecutory delusion and auditory hallucinations, and that it is probable that the delusion and hallucinations impacted on Mr Jackson's mental state to the extent that he feared for his safety, and was unable to reason with a moderate degree of composure as to the moral wrongfulness of his actions at the material time."
22. It may be seen, then, that apart from the evidence of the events of 21 March 2020 themselves, as to which the Court has an agreed factual narrative, there are expert reports from two psychiatrists and one psychologist. Each of the psychiatrists identifies the existence of a mental health impairment which falls within s.4 of the Act, together with the further features of the defence of mental health impairment as provided for in s.28 of the Act. Although Dr Eagle does not use the language of the Act directly, her opinion clearly supports the conclusion that was reached by Dr Dayalan, although there is a superficial distinction in diagnoses which does not affect the conclusion.

Decision Concerning the s.31 Elements

1. I have noted earlier that the requirements of s.31(a) and (b) are established.
2. Having considered the factual and expert medical evidence, I am satisfied that the defence of mental health impairment is established by the evidence. Accordingly, each of the requirements of s.31 have been demonstrated. It is appropriate to return a special verdict in accordance with that section.

Consequential Orders

1. The written submissions provided on behalf of the Accused nominated certain orders, which the parties accepted would be appropriate in the event that the Court returned a special verdict in accordance with s.31 of the Act.
2. Section 33(1) provides for the Court, on a return of the special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible, to make one or more of a number of specified orders. It was acknowledged in the written submissions that the only appropriate order is one under s.33(1)(b), whereby the Accused would be detained for a period and be under management by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
3. I have confirmed with counsel for the Accused that it is accepted that the appropriate order is one under s.33(1)(b) of the Act. In the circumstances of this case, that is a realistic submission. This is not a case where there would be any prospect of the Court considering the conditional release of the Accused, having regard to the totality of the evidence and the gravity of the events which bring him before this Court.
4. I note that s.34 of the Act requires the Court to refer the Accused to the Mental Health Review Tribunal and I will make that order.
5. Before formally returning the verdict and making orders, I should note two things.
6. Firstly, it would be apparent from the narrative contained in this judgment that these were terribly tragic events. Mr Hughes was a well-liked man living in shared accommodation. The Accused is a man who suffers from mental health difficulties and has for some time. Tragically, the two persons crossed paths on this particular day, at a time when, on the evidence, the Accused had severe mental health problems.
7. The Court notes that there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that anything that Mr Hughes said or did played any part in these tragic events.
8. The second thing I should mention is that it is important that the community understands the effect of the special verdict which will be returned shortly and the orders which the Court will make. The effect of the orders will be that the Accused will remain in custody and be held as a forensic patient to come under the supervision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. The statutory scheme surrounding that Tribunal is such that the Accused will not be released until the Tribunal is satisfied that the safety of any member of the public, or of the Accused himself, will not be seriously endangered by his release: ss.29(d) and 84(2) of the Act. His case will be reviewed by the Tribunal as soon as practicable and will be subject to review at six-monthly intervals: s.78 of the Act. If, at some stage in the future, the Accused comes to be released, it may be on conditions, and if any of those conditions are breached, or his mental condition deteriorates to a point where he may be a serious danger to others, the Tribunal may order that he be apprehended and further detained: s.109 of the Act.

Verdict and Orders

1. I move now to the return of the verdict and the making of the orders.
2. On the charge that the Accused, on 21 March 2020 at Croydon in the State of New South Wales, did murder Paul Robert Hughes, the Court returns a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible.
3. I make the following orders: 1. Pursuant to s.33(1)(b) Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020, I order that Terrance Edward Jackson be detained in a correctional facility, or at such other place as may be determined from time to time by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, until released by due process of law. 2. Pursuant to s.34 Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020, the Court refers Terrance Edward Jackson to the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
4. I make the following further directions: 1. The Registrar is to notify the Mental Health Review Tribunal, as soon as practicable, of the making of these orders and is to provide to that Tribunal the following documentation: 1. a copy of the Court's reasons for verdict and for making these orders; 2. a copy of the tender bundle (Exhibit A), which includes the reports of Ms Lucas, Dr Dayalan and Dr Eagle. 1. The Registrar is to notify Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network ("Justice Health") as soon as practicable, of the verdict and orders in this matter and is to provide to Justice Health copies of the following documents: 1. a copy of the reasons of the Court for verdict and making these orders; 2. copies of the reports of Ms Lucas, Dr Dayalan and Dr Eagle.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 04 November 2021