R v Ioannou

The Facts

1. The facts are agreed and the following is taken from the agreed facts. Sharmilla Gosai is the registered owner and user of a white Range Rover which is referred to in the facts. The vehicle has a push start engine and requires the key to be within a certain distance of the ignition to start. On 19 July 2019, at about 6pm, Ms Gosai parked and locked her Range Rover in the garage in her apartment complex at 1292 Pacific Highway, Turramurra. She took the only key with her to the apartment. At some time between 6pm on the 19th and 8am on 20 July 2019 the offender broke into and entered the garage and stole the Range Rover and drove it away.
2. On Saturday 20 July 2019 at 11am Ms Gosai went downstairs to her garage and saw the garage door was open and her Range Rover was not there. A neighbour told her that at about 8.10am that morning they noticed her garage door open and the vehicle missing. The police were contacted and the incident reported.
3. On Sunday 21 July 2019, at around 9pm, Grupreet Kaur arrived at her home located at 3 Silkwood Grove, Quakers Hill. She parked and locked her Volkswagen Golf on the road outside her house and left her handbag and wallet in the car. Sometime after 9pm that night, and before 5.30am on Monday 22 July, the offender smashed the rear driver's side window of the Volkswagen Golf and took Ms Kaur's handbag and wallet and other items from the car. On Monday 22 July 201 at around 5.30am, Ms Kaur's husband went outside and saw the front and back driver's side doors and the boot of the VW Golf were open. He saw the small rear driver's side window was smashed and there was a brick on the road next to the motor vehicle. Ms Kaur's handbag and wallet containing her New South Wales driver's licence, a Westpac MasterCard, a CBA MasterCard and other personal cards were missing from the car along with an e-tag, GPS and other personal items.
4. When Ms Kaur checked her Westpac and CBA accounts, she noticed that there were unauthorised transactions from earlier that morning. There were on the Westpac card two amounts at the BP St Mary's. They are set out in the facts; they form one of the offences on the Form 1. They all were incurred at a little after 3am in the morning. Then in relation to the Commonwealth MasterCard, there are three amounts which constitute two of the offences on the Form 1, two transactions were at the McDonald's at Kings Park, another at a McDonald's at Doonside and then there was the offence which is the subject of a substantive offence, it was $84.98. The total number of transactions amounted to $380.52.
5. In terms of those transactions, the facts are that the offender attended the BP Connect at St Marys in the stolen Range Rover around 3am. He is seen on CCTV approaching the counter and purchasing cigarettes and a lighter using the payWave function with a Westpac MasterCard. He is also captured on the CCTV driving the Range Rover in the driveway at McDonald's at Kings Park. He uses the payWave function to purchase food using the Commonwealth bank card. He is observed at one point leaving the driveway and parking in the waiting bay area.
6. At around 4.14am a Jason Petkovski leaves the front passenger door of the Range Rover and enters the McDonald's store and collects the food. While inside he used the self-service machine and made a further purchase, totalling $24.85 on the Commonwealth Bankcard. He is seen getting back into the Range Rover. At 5.21am the offender drove the Range Rover through the drive through at McDonald's located at Doonside. He used again the payWave function and the amounts involved I have referred to earlier.
7. The offender is observed to park the Range Rover in the waiting area of that McDonald's and leave the vehicle. He walked to a neighbouring BP Service Station and is again captured using one of the credit cards, the Commonwealth Bank MasterCard, for a transaction of $84.98. He left the service station, went back to the Range Rover and drove away.
8. About 10.55am that same day police became aware of the co-offender Justin Murphy and Mr Petkovski at a car park on Boronia Road and Forrester Road, North St Mary's where Mr Murphy was attempting to change the tyre of the Range Rover. Police commenced aerial surveillance with a helicopter. Police checks confirmed the Range Rover had been reported stolen from Turramurra sometime between 19 and 21 July 2019.
9. Shortly after, while Murphy was changing the front passenger side tyre, the group became aware of the police presence. Mr Petkovski walked towards the direction of St Mary's Leagues Club, while Murphy ran towards the building that was previously Masters Hardware before returning to the Range Rover where the offender now was. The offender got into the front passenger seat and Murphy got into the driver's seat. Murphy drove the Range Rover out of the car park and onto Forest Road. He drove the Range Rover through various suburbs and at some stage whilst driving, the rear passenger tyre began to shred away from the rim.
10. At around 11.09am Murphy and this offender were driving in Luxford Road in Bidwill. Murphy pulled over to the left into a driveway and came to a stop in front of a Holden Barina that had stopped on the left hand side of the road and was being driven by Papatangi Marsters who was wearing an orange high visibility jumper. The offender got out of the front passenger seat of the Range Rover and approached Marsters saying, "Fuck you, fucken give me your car you moron". The offender tried to open the driver's side door of the Barina but it was locked. The offender managed to unlock and open the driver's side door of the Barina, reached down and unlocked Marster's seat belt. He has grabbed Marster's left arm and pulled him out of the car and onto the middle of the road. The offender got into the driver's seat of the Barina - the driver's door. Murphy ran around the front of the Barina and got into the front passenger seat. They then drove away with the offender driving, leaving Marster's on Luxford Road where he was approached by other drivers who had stopped.
11. The offender drove the Barina through the suburbs of Bidwill, Glendenning, Dean Park, Marayong and Kings Langley. He drove in a speeding manner and is seen on PolAir footage driving on the wrong side of the road, crossing in front of oncoming traffic, disobeying traffic signals, entering intersections in a manner that causes other drivers to brake to avoid collisions and mounting roundabouts.
12. While the offender was driving the Barina on Garden Street in Kings Park, a fully marked police vehicle initiated a pursuit with the offender at 11.23am. Police pursued the offender for approximately two minutes but stopped due to the risk to other road users after the offender turned into the intersection at Varlage Road Kings Park and onto the wrong side of the road. The offender continued driving the Barina through the suburbs of Glenwood, Norwest, Seven Hills, Old Toongabbie before entering the driveway of a unit complex on Campbell Parade in Northmead. Murphy left the front passenger side of the vehicle and the offender drove out onto Campbell Parade. Soon after leaving the driveway, the offender lost control of the Barina and collided with a parked truck.
13. Police had monitored and followed the offender via PolAir for approximately 43 minutes prior to that collision. Police assisted the offender from the Barina. He was formally placed under arrest and cautioned. He appeared affected by an illicit drug at the time and he was sleeping on the ground. He was conveyed to Westmead Hospital. Police found the New South Wales driver's licence in the name of Grupreet Kaur on him. He was conveyed to Parramatta Police Station. He declined to participate in a record of interview. A review of the mobile phone that was found on him identified conversations on Facebook Messenger where the offender attempted to sell the White Range Rover, with the earliest reference appearing at 5.30am on 20 July 2019.

Objective seriousness

1. Turning then to my assessment of the objective seriousness of each of the offences. I will do that before I discuss the evidence concerning the offender's mental health conditions which impact upon the assessment of the offender's moral culpability for the offending. There is, in this State, a close connection between an offender's mental health condition, where a condition is found to be causative in relation to the offences and an assessment of the objective seriousness of offences (see Lawson v R [2018] NSWCCA 215 at [35]).
2. Turning then to my specific assessment of each of the offences to which the offender stands to be sentenced. In relation to the break and enter offence in which the Range Rover was stolen; the offence occurred during the night when it was likely that there would have been an occupant of the residence at home, although I note the offence occurred in a garage of an apartment complex. The item stolen, being the vehicle, was clearly one of considerable value. There is no suggestion the garage itself suffered damage or ransacking. The messages ultimately found on the offender's phone suggest there was a financial motivation behind the break and enter. I assess this offence as being well below a notional mid-range offence of this type.
3. In relation to the larceny offence. Clearly the cards that were stolen had some intrinsic value as they were able to be used to obtain goods through the commission of further offences. There appears to be no real planning to the offence and I note the damage done to the car so that the larceny could be perpetrated. I assess the larceny as being towards the lower end of objective seriousness but not at the very bottom of the range.
4. The value of the dishonestly obtain property by deception offence was some $84.98 which involved the use of one of the stolen credit cards to obtain cigarettes and a mobile recharge voucher from a petrol station. The amount involved was limited as was the degree of deception. Objectively that offence is towards the lower end of objective seriousness. The aggravated take and drive motor vehicle offence with a person in it was a serious offence. It was this offender who first approached the vehicle and the driver of it. It was he who used force to remove the occupant of the vehicle, although it would appear that the level of force used was limited. There was no actual threat to the occupant of that vehicle, although there can be no doubt it was a frightening experience.
5. The offence was somewhat opportunistic, however, it was clearly committed in an attempt to evade detection by the police, although I note there is a separate offence of police pursuit. I assess the objective seriousness of this offence as being below a notional mid-range offence but clearly not at the bottom of the range of objective seriousness for such offending.
6. In relation to the police pursuit offence, it appears the actual police pursuit lasted a short period of time, some two minutes and the police stopped due to the risk to other users of the road. The offender was being monitored by PolAir for a longer period of time and was observed to be speeding and driving on the wrong side of the road and disobeying traffic signals. He continued to drive through a number of suburbs and lost control of the vehicle after the co-offender had left it. I would assess the police pursuit offence as being less than the notional mid-range of objective seriousness for such offences, given the short duration of the pursuit. In fact, I have no information as to the degree of speeding the offender engaged in. Clearly though, it remains a serious offence.
7. The offences on the Form 1 are such that they will not have a significant impact upon the sentence that I am to impose on the aggravated take and drive motor vehicle with a person in it offence. The obtain property by deception offences on the Form 1 are for a modest value, and involved the use of the stolen credit cards. The take and drive conveyance without the consent of the owner offence relates to the Range Rover which was the product of the break and enter offence so I must be careful when sentencing not to double punish the offender for the taking of that vehicle. The two drive whilst disqualified offences concern the offender's driving of the Range Rover and the Barina on 22 July 2019, when he was a disqualified driver.
8. The Crown submitted that the police pursuit was committed in company, it was therefore, an aggravating factor under s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Given that the police pursuit offence was committed by driving a vehicle, I do not consider that it is correct to describe such an offence as being committed in company, because someone else was in the vehicle.

The offender's subjective case

1. Turning then to the offender's subjective case. His date of birth is 26 April 1996 so he was 23 years of age as at the date of the offences and is currently 24. He is a relatively young adult offender and the authorities suggest in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, when sentencing a young adult offender, greater emphasis should be placed on rehabilitation rather than general deterrence and denunciation of the crime.
2. The offender has something of a criminal history and this will not be his first sentence of full-time custody. His criminal record commenced when he was a juvenile and his juvenile criminal record includes offences of aggravated break and enter and larceny. As an adult he has served sentences of full-time custody for larceny, escape police custody, possess unauthorised firearm, common assault, damage property, steal from a person, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, breach of an apprehended domestic violence order, intentionally choke a person, police pursuit, goods in custody, custody of a knife in a public place.
3. The offender was released from custody on 16 May 2019 at the conclusion of a sentence. The current offences were committed therefore, a little over two months after being released from custody. His record is such that despite his relatively young age it disentitles him to any leniency here.
4. The Crown submitted the offender's record was an aggravating factor under s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Given the offender's age and the evidence as to his intellectual disability which I will discuss shortly, I do not think his record amounts to an aggravating factor within that provision.

Sentence Assessment Report and psych reports -

1. There are before me a number of reports being a psychological report dated 28 July 2020 by Emma Hubner, a forensic psychologist, a Sentencing Assessment Report dated 24 August 2020, two court ordered reports by Dr Gordon Elliott a forensic psychiatrist dated respectively 19 July 2018 and 14 January 2021 and a report dated 19 February 2021 by Chris North a forensic psychologist. The offender did not give evidence on sentence.

Family background

1. In terms of his family background: The offender told Ms Hubner he was the eldest of three children born to his parents. His parents reportedly separated when he was a young child and he and his siblings remained in the care of his father and his paternal grandparents. He told Ms Hubner that his father used illicit substances. He had little contact with his mother after his parents separated and his mother also used illicit substances.
2. The offender described to the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report a transient lifestyle prior to re-entering custody. That report records that he expressed a willingness to relocate to his sister's home, in order to gain family support upon his release from custody. The author of that report was not able to confirm if he is able to live with his sister.
3. The offender is currently single with no children. He told Dr Elliott that he remains in contact on the phone with his father but otherwise has no community support. Ms North records the offender telling her that his father is currently in a mental health facility.

Education and employment history

1. In terms of his education and employment history, the offender described to Ms Hubner he was struggling academically when at school and said he was diagnosed with an intellectual disability and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. He appears to have had a limited education.
2. In terms of his employment history, the Sentencing Assessment Report records that the offender has held some previous employment in construction and hoped to return to that industry upon his release. In the main he has been in receipt of Centrelink payments in the main since leaving school.

Substance use

1. In terms of his substance abuse, the offender told the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report that he has consistently used methamphetamines on a daily basis and was using, as at the date of the offences, and I note in the agreed facts there was reference to him appearing to be under the influence of illicit drugs when he was arrested. He told Ms Hubner he has never sought or received treatment in relation to his illicit drug issues.
2. In his latest report, Dr Elliott records the offender telling him that when he was last in the community, "I was using a shit load of ice every day". He also told Dr Elliott, consistent with what he told Ms Hubner, that he spent most of his time in the community using the drug ice or committing crime to acquire funds to purchase it.
3. Ms North records that the offender noted when interviewed by her in February this year that he had been on a Buprenorphine maintenance program the last six months in custody but had also used drugs while in custody.

Psychological/psychiatric history

1. In terms of his psychological, psychiatric history, the offender was assessed by Ms Hubner by AVL on 19 January 2020 while being held in custody at Bathurst. Ms Hubner considered the offender presented with limited receptive and expressive language skills and his ability to think conceptually and abstractedly was below that expected for a man of his age. His presentation was thought to be consistent with reports of having been diagnosed with an intellectual disability in childhood. A formal assessment of his intellectual functioning could not be performed by AVL.
2. The offender denied to Ms Hubner any formal history of mental health complications, although he did describe to her chronic low mood, disrupted sleep patterns and decreased motivation in energy levels. He denied current thoughts of self-harm or suicide and Ms Hubner found no overt signs of psychosis. Ms Hubner administered psychometric testing to the offender. The profile produced was suggestive of an individual who presents with instability, unpredictability of mood and behaviour. His scores suggested chronic low mood, alcohol and drug dependence. The offender also had an elevated score for major depression which is suggestive of severe mental illness "such that an individual is unlikely to be capable of functioning effectively within a normal environment". Ms Hubner considered the offender ran the risk of becoming institutionalised.
3. Dr Elliott in his latest report, considered that there was no indication the offender suffered from a major mental illness such as psychotic illness or pervasive mood disorder. Dr Elliott considered that the offender's primary diagnosis was that of a severe substance use disorder, namely in relation to methamphetamine and opioids. Dr Elliott in both of his reports considered that the offender is likely to have a borderline intellectual functioning and perhaps some mild intellectual disability. Dr Elliott in his latest report, also considered that the offender was "indifferent to his offending, accustomed to incarceration and shows little genuine motivation to address his substance use disorders".
4. Ms North expressed the opinion that the offender's likely intellectual disability had impacted on his propensity towards impulsive behaviours including his substance use issues and anti-social behaviour.

Response to supervision if relevant

1. In terms of his response to supervision in the past, the Sentencing Assessment Report records since returning to custody on 23 July 2019 the offender has incurred 11 misconduct gaol infringements, ranging from assault, intimidation, steal and create prohibited goods. The Sentencing Assessment Report also records that the offender has been known to Community Corrections since 2016 and his response to supervision when last on parole was considered poor. The report records that there was non-engagement of external services, continued illicit substance abuse and further offending.

Attitude to the offence

1. In terms of his attitude to the offences; the offender told the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report that his anti-social associates and illicit substance dependence was responsible for his offending. The Sentencing Assessment Report records that the offender expressed regret for stealing the motor vehicle but did not appear to understand the potential seriousness of his offending. He told the author of the Sentencing Assessment Report that he committed the offences in order to obtain funds to fund his illicit drug habit. The Sentencing Assessment Report records that the offender acknowledged that there would be some impact on the victims of the vehicle related offences "however mixed this with self-concern that he is now in custody". He was unable to verbalise any impact the offences may have had on the other victims of them. The offender told Ms Hubner that "I wish I didn't do it" and "sorry to the people I done it to". He expressed similar sentiments to Chris North in her report.

The future and risk of re-offending

1. The offender was assessed in the Sentencing Assessment Report as having a high risk of reoffending. Ms North in her report agrees with that assessment. Ms Hubner considered that his risk of reoffending might be reduced by targeted psychiatric and psychological treatment, including alcohol and drug treatment and if he was able to obtain employment and avoid relationships with anti-social peers.
2. Dr Elliott considered that the offender's "prognosis is poor whilst he displays such an absence of motivation or to engage meaningfully with drug and alcohol services and a mental health plan or a disability support provider".

Imposition of sentence

1. The offender entered pleas of guilty in the Local Court and I will allow him a 25% discount of his sentence for utilitarian value of those pleas.
2. There is limited evidence of remorse here. There is the early plea of guilty and some statements to the report writers consistent with remorse. However, overall, the evidence suggests the offender has little insight into the impact his offending is likely to have had on the victims. His lack of insight is likely to be due in part to his limited intellectual ability.
3. When I have regard to his criminal history, his poor response to supervision in the past and his assessed risk of reoffending, his prospects for rehabilitation are guarded bordering on poor.
4. The offender clearly has a significant issue in relation to illicit drugs. He has also spent a very considerable part of his adult life in custody and the reports that are before me suggest that he is in the process of becoming institutionalised to the custodial environment. For those reasons, I propose to make a finding of special circumstances when fixing the non-parole period. I note the offender spent the whole of 2020 on remand and that since early March until the late part of last year, due to Covid-19, there were no in person visits to inmates in New South Wales. I have had regard to that fact in determining the appropriate sentence to impose.
5. Due to Covid-19 and the restrictions on access to inmates, there is no firm diagnosis before me that the offender has an intellectual disability. However, on the balance of probabilities, the reports that are before me, support a finding that the offender has a mild intellectual disability and that is a finding that I make.
6. The principles in relation to the relevance of a person's mental health to sentencing are well-known. They were summarised in DPP v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194. Essentially they are as follows. Where the state of a person's mental health contributes to the commission of an offence in a material way, the offender's moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently, the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in the sentence. It may also have the consequence that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence, resulting in a reduction of the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed. It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on a person because the sentence will be more onerous for that person, and the length of the prison term or the conditions under which it is served may be reduced. It may reduce or eliminate the significance of specific deterrence. Conversely, it may be that because of a persons' mental illness they present more of a danger to the community. In those circumstances, consideration to specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence.
7. The High Court's decision in Muldrock v R (2011) HCA 39 is particularly relevant when sentencing offenders with an intellectual disability in my view. The High Court in Muldrock considered that it is less likely that it is necessary to show a causal connection between the intellectual disability and the commission of an offence for there to be a reduction in moral culpability for the offending. The reasoning adopted by the High Court in Muldrock was to the effect that a person with even a mild intellectual disability lacks the capacity to reason as an ordinary person might as to the wrongfulness of the conduct, which will in most cases substantially lessen the offender's moral culpability for the offence.
8. The retributory effect and denunciatory aspect of a sentence that is appropriate to a person of ordinary capacity will often be inappropriate to the situation of a mentally retarded offender and to the needs of the community. I have had regard to those principles in sentencing this offender. I consider that due to his intellectual disability, there is some reduction in his moral culpability for his offending.
9. I have also had regard to the principles concerning the relevance of social disadvantage discussed in Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571 by the High Court. The evidence here supports a finding that the offender had a socially disadvantaged upbringing which also to some degree reduces his moral culpability for the offending.
10. Generally, the fact that an offence is committed while an offender is under the influence of an illicit drug is not a mitigating factor. Here, the offender's drug use and its link to the offending must be seen in the context of a disadvantaged upbringing and his intellectual disability. In that regard I have considered the discussion of this issue in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346.

Parity issue

1. There is a limited parity issue that I will need to address in this sentence. The co-offender Murphy was sentenced by Judge Harris on 24 June 2020. Her Honour sentenced the co-offender for the following offences; the taking of the Range Rover without the consent of the owner, the offence of taking and driving a vehicle with a person in it, driving while unlicensed and driving in a manner dangerous. Her Honour considered that the two principal offences fell objectively below a notional mid-range offence.
2. In terms of the co-offender's subjective case. He was a similar age to this offender. He too had a considerable criminal record. Unlike this offender, he committed the offences while on parole. The co-offender had some learning difficulties but did complete Year 10 and there was no finding of intellectual disability. The co-offender had a limited work history and a significant drug problem like this offender. There was no finding that the co-offender had a disadvantaged upbringing. Her Honour allowed a 25% discount for the co-offender's pleas of guilty, found there was genuine remorse and that the co-offender had better than guarded prospects of rehabilitation.
3. Her Honour imposed an aggregate sentence of three years and nine months with a non-parole period of two years and four months. In terms of the indicative sentences, her Honour indicated for the take and drive without consent of the owner offence, an indicative sentence of 12 months. For the take and drive vehicle with a person in it, an indicative sentence of three years and an indicative non-parole period of two years. For the drive in a manner dangerous, an indicative sentence of six months. Her Honour simply recorded a conviction for the unlicensed driver offence.
4. I have had some regard to the sentences imposed by her Honour on the co-offender in relation to the common offences, noting one of them is on the Form 1 here. I have also had regard to the fact that the co-offender committed the offences on parole which is an aggravating factor. There was no finding of an intellectual disability in relation to the co-offender or that he had a socially disadvantaged upbringing.

Sentence

1. The offender has been in custody since 23 July 2019. He served a sentence of two months' imprisonment for two summary offences between 22 July 2019 to 21 September 2019. Having regard to the principles of totality, I propose to commence this sentence from 22 August 2019.
2. I will utilise the aggregate sentencing provisions. If I have not done so, my approach to accumulation and concurrency would have been as follows: The sentences for the larceny and the dishonestly obtain financial advantage offences I consider should primarily be concurrent. A degree of accumulation will be required in relation to the remaining offences, as they in essence involve discreet aspects of criminality and different victims.
3. I have had regard to the objectives of sentencing referred to in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which include the need to impose adequate punishment, general and specific deterrence, protection of the community, denouncing the offender's conduct, recognising the harm done to the victim and the community and rehabilitation of the offender.
4. The break and enter, the aggravate take and drive motor vehicle with person in it and the police pursuit are serious offences. They are also quite prevalent offences. They normally call for significant sentences of imprisonment which reflect appropriate general deterrence. Here, due to the offender's intellectual disability as I have explained, he is less of a vehicle for the expression of general deterrence. His record is such that there is an element of personal deterrence required in the sentence. The maximum penalties, and in relation to the offence under s 154C(2) of the Crimes Act, the standard a non-parole period have been taken into account as legislative guideposts. I have departed from the standard non-parole period due to my assessment of the objective seriousness of that offence and my finding of special circumstances and the offender's intellectual disability.
5. The offender is convicted of the offences to which he has pleaded guilty. I will firstly record the indicative sentences. In determining the indicative sentences and fixing the aggregate sentence, I have had regard to all of the objective and subjective factors I have referred to earlier. The sentences the offender will hear me first announce are what are called the indicative sentences. He will then hear me announce an aggregate sentence which is the sentence with the non-parole period that he will serve. It is not arrived at by simply adding up all the indicative sentences. When announcing the aggregate sentence, I will announce the date it starts from, the date it ends and the date when he is first eligible for parole.
6. The indicative sentence for the larceny offence which is sequence 1, nine months imprisonment. The indicative sentence for the dishonestly obtain property by deception, sequence 7, is three months imprisonment. The indicative sentence for the aggravated take and drive motor vehicle with person in it, having regard to the offences on the Form 1, sequence 9, an indicative sentence of three years imprisonment with an indicative non-parole period of 18 months. Indicative sentence for the break and enter offence, sequence 14, one year and nine months imprisonment The indicative sentence for the police pursuit sequence 17, 12 months' imprisonment.
7. I impose an aggregate sentence of four years and four months imprisonment with an aggregate non-parole period of two years and two months. The sentence commences on 22 August 2019 and expires on 21 December 2023. The non-parole period expires on 21 October 2021. The earliest date Mr Ioannou is eligible to be released to parole is the date of the expiry of the non-parole period which is 21 October 2021, 21 October this year. Whether he is in fact released to parole that day is a matter for the State Parole Authority, which will no doubt take account of his behaviour in prison in determining whether he is released then or on another date.
8. In relation to the two drive whilst disqualified offences on the s 166 certificate, sequences 4 and 1, I record convictions under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. No further penalty is imposed. On each of those offences, I impose a six month disqualification period in relation to his licence.
9. In relation to the police pursuit offence, I impose a disqualification of two years and six months in relation to his licence. All periods of disqualification are to be served concurrently. I note under the Road Transport Act, they do not commence to run until the offender is released from custody.
10. So it is an aggregate sentence of four years and four months with an aggregate non-parole period of two years and two months. It commences on 22 August 2019, expires on 21 December 2023. The non-parole period expires on 21 October 2021. I have simply recorded convictions on the two matters on the 166 certificate.

Orders 1. Impose an aggregate sentence of four years and four months imprisonment. The sentence commences on 22 August 2019 and expires on 21 December 2023. The non-parole period expires on 21 October 2021. 2. Regarding the two offences on the S 166 Certificate: 1. Record convictions under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act for each offence 2. Impose a license disqualification period of six months for each offence 1. Regarding the police pursuit offence: 1. Impose a license disqualification period of two years and six months 1. All periods of license disqualification are to be served concurrently. Under the Road Transport Act they do not commence to run until the Offender is released from custody.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 14 April 2021