R v II
[2008] NSWSC 325
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2008-04-09
Before
Fullerton J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (9 paragraphs)
Background 1 At approximately 11:55pm on Friday 9 June 2006 four young men, each with their faces obscured and wearing latex gloves, entered the public bar of the Whitehorse Hotel on the Princes Highway at St Peters. Three of the men were armed with a shotgun, a knife and a meat cleaver respectively. The fourth man had a bag for the express purpose of carrying away the proceeds of the robbery. The patrons and the manager of the hotel were subjected to physical violence and threats of physical violence in the course of being robbed of money and other items of personal property. 2 II (the offender) drove the four men from an apartment at Rosemont Street Punchbowl to St Peters that night knowing that they intended to rob the Hotel and/or its patrons, and with the intention of assisting them to make good their escape after the robbery. The four men alighted from the car in a street near the Whitehorse Hotel and made their way on foot to the hotel. The offender remained in the car at that location to await their return. Having regard to the location of the hotel relative to where the offender dropped off the robbers and where she remained awaiting their return, I am satisfied that there was some degree of pre-planning on the part of some of those involved in the robbery and, in so far as this offender is concerned, that she must have been party in a limited degree to those arrangements a short time after she left Punchbowl driving the car she had borrowed from her cousin. I will have something further to say about her role in the robbery, and the significance of an assessment of her role for sentencing purposes, later in this judgment. 3 Despite the fact that the men had weapons with them in the car from the time they left Punchbowl, and that they took the weapons with them as they left the car to make their way to the hotel on foot, it is accepted by the Crown that this offender was unaware of that fact prior to the robbery, as distinct from coming to learn of it after the robbery as she drove the men from the area. For that reason, she is to be sentenced for the offence of robbery in company as provided for in s 97(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 without any reference to the fact that the robbery was committed by the four men with weapons (one of them a dangerous weapon as defined) rendering them liable for the offence of armed robbery contrary to s 97(2). The offence to which she has pleaded guilty carries a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment in contrast to a maximum penalty of 25 years for the offence of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon. 4 The victim of the offence was Mr Ken Jankievski, the manager of the Hotel. The amount of $2500 was specified as the money taken from him. The offender has also asked me to take into account 11 additional offences of robbery in company itemised on the Form 1 in accordance with s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Each of these offences accounts for either money or personal property taken from the patrons of the hotel comprising a total of $4205 in cash, four mobile phones, a watch, a cigarette lighter and a number of wallets. 5 The circumstances in which this offender entered a plea of guilty to the charge of robbery in company warrant some brief elaboration. 6 On 10 March 2008, this offender was jointly indicted with the four men to stand trial on one count of murder and a further count of the armed robbery of Mr Jankievski. All five accused entered pleas of not guilty to both counts. The deceased was a patron of the Whitehorse Hotel who, along with a number of other patrons, pursued the robbers from the hotel after the robbery. On approach to the car in which the offender was waiting as arranged, at least two of the robbers were tackled to the ground by the patrons. A fight ensued in the course of which the deceased was fatally stabbed. 7 On 7 April 2008, at the end of the Crown case, I directed the jury to acquit each of the accused on the charge of murder by reason of the fact that the Crown had no evidence capable of satisfying the jury that the act causing death was a deliberate or voluntary act of one of the accused. Defence counsel were then invited by me to confer with their clients over the luncheon adjournment as to the remaining count of armed robbery. Relevantly, Ms Rigg of counsel who appeared both at the trial and on sentence, reserved the offender's position until the following morning indicating that the Crown was being asked to consider a lesser charge in full discharge of the indictment. 8 On 8 April 2008, the offender was re-arraigned. She pleaded not guilty to armed robbery but guilty to robbery in company. The Crown accepted the plea in full discharge of the indictment. 9 The Crown conceded that despite the late plea it was nevertheless of some utilitarian value since it could not be gainsaid that the Crown case against this offender on the charge of armed robbery (or even the statutory alternative charge of robbery in company) was overwhelming. While she freely acknowledged in a lengthy and detailed record of interview with police on 11 June 2006, the day of her arrest, that she drove the young men to St Peters and that she dropped them off knowing that they had said that they were going to rob the hotel, she maintained that she did not believe they were serious and the full import of their intentions were only obvious to her after the robbery. Her plea is also redolent of remorse although in the absence of her giving evidence in the sentence proceedings it goes no further than that. 10 The weight that attaches to the plea of guilty in these circumstances in my view warrants a discount on sentence of 10 per cent. This is consistent with an established line of authority that accords some leniency to a person who pleads guilty to a less serious offence because of the utilitarian value in the plea in circumstances when the plea is entered well after the person is charged and where the lesser charge is substituted by the prosecuting authorities (see for example R v Young [2003] NSWCCA 276 at [11]).