The respondents' submissions
24 It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that, notwithstanding the well-recognised limitations of such material, statistics maintained by the Judicial Commission did not bear out the Crown's contention that the sentences were manifestly inadequate. The statistics reveal 33 instances of the offence of escaping from lawful custody in the period from July 2001 to June 2008. 48% of those offenders received a head sentence of 12 months or less, whilst 47% of offenders received a non-parole period of 6 months (the statistics do not provide for periods of less than 6 months). Indeed, that material prompted the Crown, in written submissions, to candidly observe that "the statistics do not indicate that the principles identified in cases such as Thomson or Pham have been applied".
25 The respondents also placed considerable emphasis upon two particular cases in which the observations in Thomson (supra) had been discussed. Attention was drawn to this court's decision in R v Robinson [2000] NSWCCA 182, in which a Crown appeal against the asserted inadequacy of a fixed term of 6 months which had been imposed for escaping from lawful custody, was dismissed. Foster AJA, with whom Priestley JA and Smart AJ agreed, observed that:
In Reg. v Thomson , (CCA, unreported 21 May 1986), Street CJ said:
"The ordinary level of sentence for what might be called an unremarkable escape could be expected to approximate two years."
His Honour had previously indicated that:
"sentences in the order of six to nine months, whilst not necessarily erroneous, are below the pattern ordinarily to be expected. Judges are not free to disregard the impost of the legislature's prescription of seven years as the maximum. "
It must be noted that, since this decision was given, the statutory maximum sentence has been increased to ten years. However, it should also be noted that in Thomson , a non-parole period of a little under fourteen months was imposed in relation to the head sentence of two years.
I do not consider that Thomson can be regarded as laying down, as it were, a minimum tariff for sentences for escape. Later cases have taken this view. (See e.g. Reg. v Machinroth , CCA unreported 1998). Sentencing statistics placed before the Court indicate that, despite the statutory maximum, it is not unusual for sentences, as low as six months, to be imposed for this offence. There can be no doubt that a sentencing Court should not lose sight of the fact that a strong general deterrent is required to inhibit escape from Centres of Correction especially low security institutions, or from situations of low security (see Thomson and Reg. v Ertl , CCA unreported 7 May 1997). For my part, I consider that it would have been quite appropriate for a longer sentence to have been imposed in the present case. However, the question is whether her Honour's discretion miscarried in the relevant sense.
…
I have come to the conclusion that, her Honour's sentence, although demonstrably low, was not so low as to warrant the intervention of this Court. (paras 26-29, 31)
26 In R v Horne [2004] NSWCCA 8 this Court also dismissed a Crown appeal against the asserted inadequacy of a sentence imposed in respect of an offence of escaping from lawful custody. Bell J, with whom other members of the court agreed, observed:
In R v Robinson [2000] NSWCCA 182 Foster AJA (with whom Priestley JA and Smart AJA agreed) observed that Thomson is not to be seen as providing a minimum tariff for the offence of escaping from lawful custody. A sentence of six months in that case was held not to be manifestly inadequate.
The sentence of eight months' imprisonment imposed in this case was a lenient one. However, in light of the discussion in Robinson I am not persuaded that the Crown can succeed upon a challenge that it falls outside the range of sound discretion. (paras 37-38)
27 It was also submitted by the respondents that the criminality displayed in the present case being "at the lower end of the range" was, in any event, less serious than the circumstances which prevailed in Thomson where the offender had been at large for approximately 3 months.
28 As I said earlier, the Crown made particular complaint about the length of the non-parole period. In structuring the sentences as he did, his Honour said:
In respect of Dates and Hookey the sentences they were serving appeared to be constructed so as to reflect a finding by the then sentencing judicial officer of special circumstances. That finding should be kept in place with subsequent cumulative sentences. In respect of all offenders the sentences are cumulative upon their existing sentences. To those existing sentences are added sentences for the 166 matters. It is important the overall sentences therefore be adjusted by use of special circumstances so at very least a "normal" ratio between the minimum term and the balance of term are preserved. Further, all offenders are young men who will have served extended periods in custody.
Courts are required for young offenders to give weighting to rehabilitation where appropriate. Each of these is desperate for rehabilitation. Each of these offender's prospects at rehabilitation are at best clouded. …
Since each offender is to be sentenced for offences committed whilst out that will be cumulative to the escape sentence, weighting of the sentence for escape on account of offences being committed will be more muted than it would be before such a requirement was imposed.
29 The Crown was critical of that passage insofar as it appeared to suggest that his Honour regarded the need for rehabilitation as the paramount consideration in determining the length of the non-parole period. It was submitted that in doing so his Honour had been distracted from the fundamental task of determining "the length of the minimum period of actual incarceration": R v Simpson (2001) 53 NSWLR 704 [at para 57].
30 For the respondents, it was argued that the primary basis for the finding of "special circumstances" arose however from the need to impose not one, but two sets of cumulative sentences. It is well recognised that such a consideration may of itself constitute "special circumstances": see R v Close (1992) 65 A Crim R 55; R v Simpson (1992) 61 A Crim R 58 and Clare v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 450.
31 Moreover, it was submitted that the sentencing judge was obliged in structuring the various sentences to bear in mind considerations of totality: see Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59; Pearce v The Queen (1988) 194 CLR 610; Johnson v the Queen (2004) 78 ALJR 616. That required his Honour to consider not only the sentence to be imposed for the offence of escaping from lawful custody as well as the s166 offences, but also the sentences which the respondents had been serving at the time of their escape. In giving effect to the principles of totality, it was submitted that it was appropriate that his Honour should moderate the sentence for escaping from custody, particularly given that it was the last sentence in point of time to be imposed.