R v Hickson

Facts

1. I note that the facts which I find against the offender must be found beyond reasonable doubt but that those found in his favour are to be found on the balance of probabilities. I am not required to sentence the offender on the basis of a view of the facts which is most favourable to the offender, provided that facts found are consistent with the jury's verdict.
2. Mr Skarratt operated what was known as an "away stand" at the Dapto Greyhound Track each Thursday. Operating an "away stand" meant that Mr Skarratt could only take bets on greyhound races held at meetings around Australia other than at Dapto. The stand was a lucrative enterprise. That can be seen from the fact that Mr Skarratt would ordinarily take a float of about $25,000 to the track each Thursday.
3. There was an afternoon meeting and an evening meeting. The afternoon meeting finished about 4:30pm and the night meeting would commence at 7:30pm. Between those times Mr Skarratt, his employees and other bookmakers would have dinner either at the track, at the Dapto Leagues Club nearby or, if they lived close enough, go home for dinner.
4. On the night of 21 December 1989 Mr Skarrat's stand was operated until about 10.40pm. The stand was then packed up with most of the equipment being put into the boot of Mr Skarratt's car. There was a Christmas party at the track that night. Mr Skarratt had rung his wife to tell her that he would be arriving home at about 1.00am. Mr Skarratt left the party at about 11.35pm. He then drove with three of his employees back to Sydney, dropping them off at various places. He then proceeded to his home in The Point Road, Woolwich. Mrs Skarratt had, in the meantime, gone to bed.
5. Mr Skarratt's usual practice was to activate the roller door on the garage from his car, drive into the garage and then lower the roller door whilst he remained in his vehicle. He would get out of the car carrying the betting ledgers from the race meeting, and he would have the takings from the meeting secured inside a specially tailored long pocket in his trousers. He would then go out of the garage through a wooden door which led towards the house.
6. Mr Skarratt was attacked in the garage. In the course of the assault he was stabbed twice. He must have fallen to the ground, because he was dragged across the floor of the garage as the blood smears demonstrated. His car keys were used to open the boot. Blood smears were left on the inside of the boot lid. Shoe prints were left in the blood.
7. Mr Skarratt's wife woke at about 4.00am on 22 December and noticed that her husband was not home. She became increasingly concerned, and rang Mr Skarratt's daughter Victoria Frerer. Ms Frerer asked if Mrs Skarratt had checked the garage. When Mrs Skarratt did so, she saw the deceased lying supine behind his car in a large amount of blood. She ran screaming into the property of her neighbour, Dr Warren Arter.
8. He responded to Mrs Skarratt's knocking on his front door at about 5:45am. He went with her to her house and opened the door of the garage. Dr Arter saw the deceased lying on the floor of the garage. There was a quantity of blood on the floor which appeared to be smeared. Dr Arter felt for the deceased's radial pulse and his carotid pulse but in neither case was a pulse detected. He determined that Mr Skarratt was dead.
9. Dr Arter noticed that Mr Skarratt's shirt was pulled up to about the nipple line exposing the lower part of his chest and abdomen. His jacket had been pulled from the back so that it was completely covering his face and head to the point of his chin. Dr Arter noticed the bookie bags and money lying on the floor of the garage. The bags were all open. He saw that the boot was open with the keys in the lock. The police were then called.
10. The evidence from Detective Sergeant Letchford, who attended the scene later in the morning, was that Mr Skarratt was lying on his back with black tape around his eyes and another piece of tape over his mouth. His feet were tied up with his belt. There were footprints, and betting slips and Mr Skarratt's bookie bags were on the ground. There was a safe with black insulation tape hanging off it but the safe was closed. Approximately $3,000 was found in Mr Skarratt's shirt pocket.
11. The evidence from Tania Morsman was that the offender told her that he had stalked Mr Skarratt for a month or two before the murder, and had followed the deceased from Dapto to his home in Hunters Hill to see where he lived. The offender told her that he intended to rob Mr Skarratt because he needed money to pay for his barrister who had appeared for him in another matter. She also gave evidence that prior to the night of the murder there had been a discussion at her house between the offender and a Timmy Foster about robbing a bookie.
12. Ms Morsman said that after dinner on the night of 21 December 1989 the offender left to go to Dapto. He took with him a bag containing a balaclava, a pair of overalls and a knife which she said was 20-25cm long and looked like a dagger with a brass type of handle. Before the offender left the house he said that he was going to rob the deceased that night.
13. The offender told her when he returned to the house after midnight that there was a struggle with the deceased who was a bigger man and put up a fight. The offender said that he stabbed the deceased in the struggle and twisted the knife when it was in the deceased. He said the deceased was likely to be dead.
14. Ms Morsman said that the offender returned wearing the overalls which had been in the bag. He gave them to her to wash. When she did so she noticed there was a lot of blood coming out of the overalls. She said the offender was wearing the same white sneakers with three stripes that he had been wearing when he left to go to Dapto. The offender told her that it was likely there were footprints in the blood, and she did not see the shoes again after that evening.
15. Robert Hamilton was one of two people who shared accommodation and who sold cannabis to the offender in 1989. Mr Hamilton remembered the offender coming to his premises in late 1989. He could not remember the exact words that the offender said, but the substance of it was that there had been a robbery which had gone wrong and as a result someone had lost their life.
16. Mr Hamilton's flatmate, Michael Cross, remembered seeing the offender on 22 and 24 December 1989. On the first of those days Mr Cross walked into his apartment after finishing work, whilst the offender was walking out carrying a bag in his hand. As he walked out he showed Mr Cross what was inside the bag which were bundles of money rolled up in elastic bands. He said they were hundred dollar bills.
17. A post-mortem was carried out by Dr Liliana Schwarz who concluded that the direct cause of death was due to the combined effects of stab wounds to the chest and multiple blunt injuries. She identified two significant stab wounds. One of these was a wound below the left armpit with three different knife tracks internally, and the other was to the left upper shoulder with two different knife tracks. The tracks are caused when a knife is pulled partially out and then reinserted in a different direction. That is consistent with what the offender told Ms Morsman; that he twisted the knife when it was in Mr Skarratt's body. One of the stab wounds fractured a number of Mr Skarratt's ribs and both stab wounds penetrated his lung causing bleeding into the chest cavity.
18. There were multiple other injuries including superficial incised wounds to the deceased's head, bruises and lacerations to the deceased's body, and defensive wounds to the deceased's hands and arms. Dr Schwarz agreed that, absent the two significant stab wounds, the other injuries would not have been fatal.

Objective seriousness

1. The Crown put its case on three alternative bases. The first was that the offender alone killed Mr Skarratt. The second basis was that the offender was part of a joint criminal enterprise with another person or persons, and Mr Skarratt was killed in the execution of that joint criminal enterprise. The third basis was constructive murder, with the relevant offence being robbery with an offensive weapon where the deceased was wounded.
2. The Crown submitted that the offence falls above the mid-range and into the upper-range of objective seriousness. The Crown submitted that it should be found that the offender intended to kill or at least inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased. The Crown submitted that in having regard to which of these was the offender's intention it was relevant to note that after the offender left Mr Skarratt in the garage he did not call an ambulance or for assistance for Mr Skarratt who was obviously seriously injured.
3. The Crown pointed to a number of matters which were said to be statutory aggravating factors. These included the use of a weapon, the fact that Mr Skarratt was killed in his own home, that there was planning for the robbery, and that the murder was carried out for financial gain. Each of those matters is an aggravating factor under s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the 1999 Act). Although that Act did not come into force until after the present offence, the Act operates retrospectively in relation to consideration of factors under s 21A generally: see Schedule 2 cll 45 and 57 of the 1999 Act.
4. Senior counsel for the offender submitted, first, that the jury's verdict was best explained on the basis of constructive murder. Senior counsel then went on to submit that the offending fell in no more than the mid-range of objective seriousness, noting that the planning involved went to the robbery rather than to the violence, and that many of the factors identified as aggravating in s 21A(2) were either elements of the offending or inherent characteristics of it. In that regard, senior counsel was referring to the use of a weapon and the financial gain.
5. I find that the offender travelled to Mr Skarratt's home with another person with the intention of robbing him but not killing him. I accept the evidence of Ms Morsman and Mr Hamilton that the robbery went wrong in the sense that Mr Skarratt fought back, and that led to the offender assaulting Mr Skarratt particularly by stabbing him with enough force to fracture his ribs and to result in the multiple internal tracking of the knife. The relevant intention must be assessed at the time of the act or acts which caused the deceased's death. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender killed Mr Skarratt intending at least to cause him grievous bodily harm.
6. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was another person present with the offender at the time of the wounding of Mr Skarratt. Ms Morsman gave evidence of the robbery being discussed between the offender and Mr Foster. She said that the offender told her that Mr Foster was going to do the robbery with him. She said that the offender paid Mr Foster money. Mr Skarratt was a much bigger man than the offender. The injuries sustained by Mr Skarratt, the way he was dragged across the floor and the way he was left tied up and gagged all support the presence of another person. I am satisfied, however, that it was the offender who inflicted the stab wounds. He took the knife in the bag. His overalls had a lot of blood in them. He told Ms Morsman that he had twisted the knife when it was in Mr Skarratt's body.
7. I accept the Crown's submission that the objective seriousness of the offending is increased by the use of the knife, the fact that Mr Skarratt was murdered in his own home, and the fact that the robbery was well planned for some time, certainly days and probably months. Although a weapon is often used to commit murder, the offence can be committed without a weapon.
8. Although I cannot find beyond reasonable doubt that the offender went to Mr Skarratt's property intending to wound or kill him, there is no doubt that he went there to rob him. I find that the offender intended to use the knife to threaten in the first instance. I am satisfied also that the offender intended to use the knife if it became necessary to achieve the purpose of robbing Mr Skarratt or if Mr Skarratt fought back. That conclusion is supported by the offender's convictions for violence to that time, as will later be discussed. In circumstances where the murder occurred in the context of a robbery, the murder was ultimately committed for financial gain.
9. I cannot conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to kill Mr Skarratt when he stabbed him. The likelihood is that he stabbed him with the intention of disabling him so that the robbery could be achieved, and the offender and any accomplices could make their escape before Mr Skarratt could raise the alarm. That conclusion seems more likely because of the way Mr Skarratt's body was found, being partially bound and gagged. However, leaving Mr Skarratt in that condition with the wounds inflicted, and without the offender attempting anonymously to arrange an ambulance or other assistance, showed a callous disregard for Mr Skarratt and the likelihood that he might survive the injuries inflicted upon him. That he knew how serious the injuries were which he had inflicted, is clear from his telling Ms Morsman later that night that the deceased was likely to be dead.
10. In my opinion, the offence falls above the mid-range of seriousness.

Subjective matters

1. The offender was born in March 1959 and is now aged 61 years. He is the youngest of four siblings, his upbringing did not involve domestic violence, criminal offending or substance abuse. However, the home atmosphere was strict and regimented, with tough discipline.
2. The offender left school in year 10 and did three years of a boilermaker's apprenticeship. At the age of 18 he became a coalminer, like his father. He worked in that industry for five years until the industry declined. He has since worked in various occupations including boilermaking, labouring, on the wharves, at the steelworks, and running a gardening and handyman business.
3. The offender has two children to his wife Bronwyn and two children from a subsequent relationship with Tania Morsman. The offender told the clinical psychologist John Machlin that he maintained good relationships with each of his children up to the time of his arrest in 2017. However, an affidavit from his son Kaine said that the offender lost contact with the daughters he had with Ms Morsman because, when he and Ms Morsman separated, she moved away and took the girls with her. Kaine said that losing contact with them was very tough on the offender. Over the years the offender made numerous attempts to recommence a relationship with them but those attempts were unsuccessful. Kaine said that in May 2017 he contacted those daughters to arrange a picnic with the offender in an attempt to rekindle the relationship. One of the daughters, Kobi, attended the picnic, but the other daughter did not.
4. The detail in Kaine's affidavit suggests that his account is likely to be correct. It is puzzling, therefore, why the offender would not have told the truth to Mr Machlin about that matter. It causes me to have some reservations about the other uncorroborated information provided to Mr Machlin.
5. The offender formed a relationship with a woman named Leanne in 1998. That relationship continued up to the time of his arrest. She was not permitted to see the offender whilst the offender was held on remand and Mr Machlin said it was not clear if the relationship remains intact. Senior counsel's written submissions say that it does. The matter was not touched on in oral submissions.
6. The offender gave a history to Mr Machlin of social drinking and cannabis use. He denied any history of addiction, and denied having used heroin or other hard drugs.
7. The offender suffered a back injury in the late 1980s as a result of a motorcycle accident. Since that time he has suffered from pain, arthritis and sciatica as well as other ailments which led to him being placed on a Disability Support Pension. In addition, he has a number of other health issues including, osteoporosis, a prolapsed disc, a history of Hepatitis C which has resolved although with ongoing liver problems, pulmonary problems, plates and screws in his ankle, and a positive result on bowel cancer screening.
8. Until 2012 the offender did not have any mental health history. In that year he suffered a broken ankle in an assault, requiring insertion of the plate and screws, and a protracted period of rehabilitation. Mr Machlin noted a report from a report by another psychologist which indicated that the offender suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder from the assault. That PTSD was still symptomatic in 2016 but the offender seemed largely to have recovered from it by the time of his arrest.
9. He was diagnosed whilst in custody in 2018 as suffering a major depressive disorder although one of mild severity. Mr Machlin considered that this diagnosis still applied.
10. The offender told Mr Machlin that he was having a number of problems in prison as a result of his medical conditions. Further, he was intimidated by cellmates and other prisoners. He said the medical treatment he is receiving in custody is inadequate. He believes he is on the wrong medications for his pain and for his depression. It was submitted on his behalf that his physical and mental health issues will make his incarceration more onerous than for other prisoners. These problems are likely to worsen with age.
11. I accept that the offender's age is a consideration, particularly in relation to the non-parole period which is imposed: R v Holyoak (1995) 82 A Crim R 502 at 507-8; R v Neale [2004] NSWCCA 311; (2004) 148 A Crim R 493 at [81]-[85]; R v RLP [2009] VSCA 271; (2009) 213 A Crim R 461 at [39]. I accept that prison will be more onerous for the offender by reason of his age, but more particularly by reason of his health conditions. Those matters will be reflected in a finding of special circumstances, to which I will come later.

The offender's criminal record

1. The offender has a long criminal record extending back to 1973 when he first came before the Children's Court at the age of 14, and extending up to August 2016 when he committed the offence of driving with a high range PCA. The offender's criminal record is relevant for three reasons. The first concerns whether it deprives him of leniency or is aggravating of the present offence. The second reason relates to conditional liberty that he was on at the time of the commission of the present offence. The third reason is its relevance to the question of delay, because he was not charged with the present offence for some 28 years.
2. The offences for which the offender was committed as a young person were break, enter and steal; attempted steal; two counts of malicious injury; and behaving in an offensive manner by street fighting.
3. Offences committed as an adult include a number of counts of possession of cannabis; offences of dishonesty such as having goods in custody, being in possession of money reasonably suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained, disposing of stolen property, and stealing; break, enter and steal; a number of relatively minor street offences; a number of more serious motor vehicle offences such as low, medium and high range PCAs, illegally using conveyances, being a disqualified driver, and driving unregistered and uninsured motor vehicles. There is one offence of knowingly taking part in the supply of a prohibited drug together with possessing a pistol and a prohibited weapon without a licence and a permit, for which the offender was sentenced to imprisonment for four years with a non-parole period of three years.
4. More relevantly the offender has two convictions for common assault, three convictions for assaulting police and six convictions for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
5. In addition to the charges involving the supply of drugs and possession of firearms, the offender has been sentenced to fulltime custody on two occasions for being a disqualified driver, once for assaulting police, once for resisting arrest and once for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
6. In my opinion, the offender's criminal record shows a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law, particularly with regard to violent offending. Senior counsel for the offender accepted that his record entitles him to no leniency. In addition, I consider that it highlights in the present case a greater emphasis on retribution, deterrence and the protection of society.
7. At the time of the commission of the present offence the offender had been sentenced on 30 May 1989 by Judge Moore in the Wollongong District Court in respect of two convictions for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. For one of these offences the offender was placed on a two year good behaviour bond. For the other he was given 18 months periodic detention. It was that periodic detention which assumed some importance at the trial, because the offender denied that the matters reported by Mr Hamilton and Mr Cross, concerning admissions he made about the killing and showing Mr Cross the money he acquired from the robbery, could have occurred by reason of the fact that he was serving weekend detention at that time. It is neither necessary nor possible to determine for sentencing purposes where the truth lay about whether he was in custody that weekend. The jury's verdict is entirely supportable even if they did not accept the evidence of Mr Hamilton and Mr Cross.
8. The important matter for present purposes is that the robbery was both planned over a period of time, with the offender stalking and following Mr Skarratt, and subsequently killing him by intending grievous bodily harm, all of which took place while he was on two forms of conditional liberty for serious offences of violence. That is a seriously aggravating factor.
9. In relation to delay, in R v Blanco [1999] NSWCCA 121; (1999) 106 A Crim R 303, Wood CJ at CL (Bell J and Smart AJ agreeing), said at [16]: The reason why delay is to be taken into account when sentencing an offender relates first to the fact of the uncertain suspense in which a person may be left; secondly to any demonstrated progress of the offender towards rehabilitation during the intervening period; and thirdly, to the fact that a sentence for a stale crime does call for a measure of understanding and flexibility of approach: see, in addition to Todd and Mill , the decisions in Harrison (1990) 48 A Crim R 197 at 198-199 and King (1998) 99 A Crim R 288.
10. The Crown submitted, and Mr Young SC did not disagree, that only the third of these matters is relevant in the present case. I agree with the Crown's submission. In doing so, I would echo what Fagan J said in R v Katsis NSWSC 1890 at [56] (not disapproved on appeal at [2018] NSWCCA 9 at [34]-[35]), that the delay stems from the offender's concealment of his crime, and it is not a delay which can be in any degree attributed to the police, the prosecution or the Court. Nor is there any evidence of uncertain suspense in which the offender was left. The third of the matters referred to in Blanco will be discussed later in these remarks.

Remorse, rehabilitation and reoffending

1. The offender did not give evidence at the sentence proceedings. His evidence at the trial involved a denial of doing other than attempting to rob Mr Skarratt by breaking into the boot of his car when it was parked at the racetrack during the interval between the afternoon and evening meetings, at which time the bookmakers were at dinner. That was the offender's explanation for his blood having been found on the boot lid of Mr Skarratt's car. The jury must have rejected that evidence, not the least reason for which was that almost all of the people, twelve in all, who worked at the race track and gave evidence said that they had never heard of cars being broken into at the track.
2. The offender did not merely exercise his right of silence at the trial. Rather, he gave an account of events that sought to distance himself from the true position as the jury found. He sought to discredit Ms Morsman, Mr Hamilton and Mr Cross to bolster the credibility of his account. The offender has not subsequently renounced his account of the events. In my opinion, that demonstrates a lack of remorse: see Davis v R [2018] NSWCCA 67 at [25]-[32].
3. In Mr Machlin's report the following appears: While he made no admissions in the current assessment, he related to me that he accepts the jury's decision, and he feels "sorry for the victim's family who have been put through this."
4. In a letter to the Court from a chaplain at the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre, the chaplain said this: Terry is accepting of the jury's decision, and feels sorry for the children of the victim, who sat through every day of the entire trial.
5. I do not consider that either of those statements on their face constitutes any remorse for what the offender did to Mr Skarratt. That conclusion is strengthened by the absence of sworn evidence to that effect from the offender. It is for the offender to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that he is remorseful. The matters referred to above lead me to the conclusion that the offender has not shown remorse for what he has done.
6. Whilst rehabilitation may be possible without remorse, the offender's criminal record, extending as it does throughout almost all of his life, leads me to the conclusion that his prospects of rehabilitation are poor and his risk of re-offending is of some considerable concern. The only factor in his favour in relation to those matters is that he will be of an advanced age before he is likely to be released on parole into the community. Studies and protocols which assess the risk of re-offending of violent offenders indicate that, generally speaking, offending decreases as offenders reach later middle age and old age.

Victim impact statements

1. Each of Mr Skarratt's children, Victoria Frerer and Peter Skarratt, read victim impact statements at the sentence hearing. They had both given evidence at the trial because they were contacted by Mrs Skarratt in the early hours of 22 December 1989 when she was unable to find Mr Skarratt. In addition, there was a victim impact statement from Mr Skarratt's widow, now Monika Karpel.
2. Although Mr Skarratt was murdered almost exactly 30 years prior to the offender's trial, it was apparent from their statements that the fact of the murder being unresolved for so long has had an enormous impact upon them. Ms Frerer said that there is a sadness that visits her every day. Mr Peter Skarratt said that his father's death had been a defining part of his life, and not knowing the reason for it had followed him throughout his entire life. Neither of them felt like a victim because, as they said, their father was the victim. Both of them were haunted by the manner of his death. Ms Karpal has suffered severely, with medical and psychological issues as a result of his death. She said that the murder destroyed her life.
3. The Court again extends its sympathy to Victoria Frerer, Peter Skarratt and Monika Karpal and the other members of their families. I hope that the jury's verdict will bring some closure to this tragic event.

Delay

1. I have already noted principles that arise for consideration where a person is being sentenced at a time well after the commission of the offence. I indicated that only the third of those principles was relevant in the present case, and that is because an offender must be sentenced according to the prevailing sentence practices at the time the offence was committed so far as those practices can be ascertained: R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368; [2002] NSWCCA 129; Katsis v R [2018] NSWCCA 9 at [38], [74]-[85] and [91].
2. Senior counsel for the offender provided me with tables of sentences for murder imposed from 1990 to 1995. The tables provided a brief summary of the facts of the cases and other relevant information such as the prior criminal record of the offenders. These tables had been prepared by the Office of the Public Defenders. The purpose of the tables was to provide an indication of the sentencing patterns in the years immediately following Mr Skarratt's murder.
3. I have examined those tables, and I have read and had regard to a number of the cases which involved murder having been committed in the course of a robbery in the victim's own home or premises, including R v Calleja (NSWSC, Slattery AJ, 19 July 1991, Unrep); R v O'Hello (NSWSC, Finlay J, 31 March 1992, Unrep); R v Jerrard (NSWSC, Hunt CJ at CL, 21 December 1992, Unrep); R v Lorenzo [2001] NSWCCA 389; R v Morgan (1993) 70 A Crim R 368; and R v Ryan (1996) 90 A Crim R 191.
4. I rely on these cases, not on account of any similarities between the facts of them and the facts of the present case beyond the murder of the victim in the course of a robbery at their premises, but for providing some assistance as to the range of sentences being imposed for such murders at and around the time of the commission of the present offence. What is apparent from an examination of the sentences in those cases and, indeed, in the table for murder more generally, is that sentences for murder have increased quite considerably in the 30 year period since this offence was committed.
5. That has been accepted at various points in that 30 year period by Grove J in R v Stone [2004] NSWSC 224 at [47]-[50], by Price J in R v Bunce [2007] NSWSC 469 at [93], by Buddin J in R v Smith (No 4) [2011] NSWSC 1082 at [23]-[24], and by the Court of Criminal Appeal in CT v R [2017] NSWCCA 15 at [51]-[52]. Some of the matters explaining that increase relevant to the present offence are to be found in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50 at [117]. There is no doubt that the introduction of standard non-parole periods in 2003 has been a significant factor.

Special circumstances

1. I would find special circumstances in the present case by reason of a combination of the offender's age and multiple health conditions. Those health conditions mean that the Court must focus on the important consideration about whether the offender is likely to die in custody by reason of the sentence imposed: R v Neale at [84].

Deterrence and denunciation

1. There is no doubt that general deterrence is a significant matter to be factored into the sentence where a person is killed in their home as a result of a robbery gone wrong. The victim was a person legitimately going about his business who was ambushed in his own home after arriving home from that business. When, as seems likely, he put up a resistance to being robbed he was beaten and stabbed, and thereafter bound and gagged, and left to die in circumstances where the offender knew that it was likely he would die, but did nothing to raise the alarm in an attempt to save the victim's life.
2. Because the offender is a person likely to engage in violence, as his record before and after this killing establishes, the need for specific deterrence is lessened only by the fact, as I have said, that the offender is likely to be of advanced years by the time he is released to parole into the community.

Sentence

1. The offender has been in custody since 2 November 2017, the date of his arrest. The sentence will commence on that date.
2. In terms of the sentence to be imposed, I am obliged to sentence on the basis of the 1999 Act as it provided prior to the coming into force of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 No 90: Schedule 2 cll 37 and 45 of the 1999 Act. That means I must first set the term of the sentence and then the non-parole period: s 44 of the 1999 Act prior to its amendment by the 2002 Act.
3. Terry John Hickson, I convict you of the murder of Charles Skarratt on 21/22 December 1989. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 22 years commencing 2 November 2017 and expiring 1 November 2039, with a non-parole period of 15 years expiring 1 November, 2032. You will be first eligible for parole on 1 November 2032.
4. I am obliged to warn you that because you have been convicted of a serious violence offence, the State can make an application before your sentence expires to obtain an order against you under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW).

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 03 April 2020