The offender then went on to say that Wassim Chehade and his brothers were all part of the same "group".
23 The offender was born on 2 March 1978, into a large family, he being the second youngest of ten children. Both of his parents were migrants from Lebanon. His four sisters are all married, living respectfully with their families. Three of his five brothers have served prison sentences for attempted murder. The offender loved, and was loved by, his parents and siblings. He is ashamed of his drug addiction and he feels sorry for his family and for the shame that he has put them through as a result of what he has done.
24 The offender left school at the age of sixteen years, but during his time as a student had shown no interest, and had frequently "wagged" school. After leaving school the offender completed a panel beating apprenticeship over four years and was apparently happy with that job and his boss. On leaving that work he started working for his brother in the tow-truck business but that only lasted five months. The offender worked for another brother in the car detailing business for approximately three months. The offender does not seem to have worked since that time.
25 The offender was having, as I have indicated, relationships with two women at the time of his arrest. One had lasted two and a half years, the other was six months old at the time of his arrest. He spent time between the residence of each of his girlfriends and his home. Whilst the offender seems to have played rugby league in the past, it seems that his only hobby at the time of the arrest was taking illicit drugs.
26 The offender first took heroin in 1996, at the age of eighteen. He smoked marijuana since he was fifteen. The offender has been a poly-drug user since commencing on heroin in 1996 frequently taking other drugs such as Lysergic Acid, amphetamines, ecstasy and benzodiazapines, reporting to Dr Shand in his report, that he financed his drug habit by stealing from others.
27 The offender has a long criminal history, commencing in the Children's Court. He was convicted of offences in the Children's Court ranging from driving unlicensed, excessive speed whilst unlicensed, robbery and aggravated robbery. Since becoming an adult in 1996 he has been convicted of a number of serious driving offences, ranging from unlicensed driver and other offences such as using violence to cause fear, maliciously destroying property, possession of illegal drugs and assault causing actual bodily harm. He was convicted of affray in 1997, for which he served six months periodic detention. He continued to have serious driving offences.
28 On 16 November 2000, at Gosford Local Court he was convicted of malicious damage and imprisoned for three months and similarly convicted and sentenced for three months, for an offence of three or more people using violence to cause fear. On 15 November 2001, he was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which he received a sentence of imprisonment for six months.
29 Although I am unable to find that the offender arranged the meeting with the deceased for the specific purpose of killing the deceased, it is clear that the meeting was arranged, and that it was contemplated by the offender that the killing of the deceased was a possibility.
30 I reject the offender's version of events that he was in some way defending himself against actions by the deceased. There is no evidence before me as to the reason for the meeting, that being a matter entirely between the deceased and the offender.
31 Whatever the reason for the meeting, and whether the killing was pre-planned, I find beyond reasonable doubt that that action of the offender, in firing five times into the body of the deceased, was carried out with the intention of killing the deceased, and in looking at the medical evidences I find the deceased was killed as a result of the bullets fired into his body by the offender.
32 In sentencing, the facts relating to the offence itself, as well as factors relating to the offender himself, must be taken into account. The court must weigh up those objective and subjective circumstances, and any aggravating and mitigating factors that provide the basis for assessing the seriousness of the offence and culpability of the offender.
33 Pursuant to s61 of the Crimes (Sentencing and Procedure) Act 1999 ('The Act'), the court must impose a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, if it is satisfied that:
"The level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence."
34 It was decided in R v Twala (unreported, NSWCCA, 4 November 1994) per Badgery-Parker J (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) at page 7:
"However in order to characterise any case as being in the worst case category it must be possible to point to particular features which are of very great heinousness, and it must be possible to postulate the absence of facts mitigating the seriousness of the crime (as distinct from the subjective features mitigating the penalty to be imposed)".
35 The level of culpability in the offence requires, therefore, consideration of any factors in mitigating the objective seriousness of the crime, such as provocation, but does not include subjective features mitigating the penalty to be imposed; see R v Ibbs (1987) 163 CLR 447 at 451-452, and R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354.
36 I do not consider that this is a "worst-case" category crime, but nonetheless I want to emphasise that I find this to be a most serious crime, a callous, cold blooded crime, acted out in a serious degree of violence and, in effect, with the intention to murdering the deceased, denying that young man the right to live. There is little remorse shown by the offender, evidenced in part by his plea of not guilty, and while he expressed himself in terms of remorse to Dr Shand, Dr Shand made the following comment on remorse by the offender, at page 8 of his report:
"He expressed remorse by several times mentioning "regret" about what he did, but it was not associated with much, if any signs of emotion which I could see as consistent with remorse".
37 In the view of the court, this is more in the nature of self-pity than sorrow for what he did, or remorse, or contrition for his action. Expression of regret may be correct but not necessarily for what was done and the consequences to the victim's family.
38 Section 21A of the Act provides statutory provisions which must also be taken relevantly into account by all sentencing judges when sentencing. They are as follows:
" (1) In determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender, a court must impose a sentence of a severity that is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
(2) For that purpose, the court must take into account such of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court:
(a) the nature and circumstances of the case,
(b) if the offence forms part of a course of conduct consisting of a series of criminal acts - that course of conduct,
(c)the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence, including:
(i) the age of the victim (particularly if the victim is very old or very young), and
(ii) any physical or mental disability of the victim, and
(iii) any vulnerability of the victim arising because of the nature of the victim's occupation,
(d)any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence,
(e)the degree to which the offender has shown contrition for the offence:
(i) by taking action to make reparation for any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence, or
(ii) in any other manner,
(f) the need to deter the offender or other persons from committing an offence of the same or a similar character,
(g) the need to protect the community from the offender,
(h) the need to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,
(i) the character, antecedents, cultural background, age, means and physical or mental condition of the offender,
(j) the prospect of rehabilitation of the offender.
(3) In addition, in determining whether a sentence under Division 2 or 3 of Part 2 is appropriate, the court must have regard to the nature and severity of the conditions that may be imposed on, or may apply to, the offender under that sentence.
(4) The matters to be taken into account by a court under this section are in addition to any other matters that are required or permitted to be taken into account by the court under this Act or any other law.
(5) This section does not apply to the determination of a sentence if proceedings (other than committal proceedings) for the offence were commenced in a court before the commencement of this section."
39 This, however, does not detract from the Common Law provision, that the sentence to be imposed for any crime must take into account the many different purposes which, that sentence is expected to serve: condemnation and denunciation of the offence, the protection of society, personal and public deterrent, retribution and reform; see Veen (No 2) (1987-88) 164 CLR 465.
40 The joint majority judgment of Veen (No 2) of Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ then went on to hold in relation to the purposes of sentencing, at p 467:
"The purposes overlap and none of them can be seen in isolation from the others when determining what is an appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are guideposts to appropriate sentences but sometimes they point in different directions."
41 Public and individual deterrence is a principal objective of sentencing and subjective considerations (with the exception of youth and mental incapacity) made on behalf of each offender, no matter how persuasive, will always be subordinate to the primary duty of the Courts, which is to impose a sentence which must principally serve to deter the further commission of similar crimes: See R v Rushby [1977] 1 NSWLR 594 at 597-598; R v Purdey (1993) 65 A Crim R 441 at 445. In the R v Rushby, Street CJ said at p597, when citing with approval the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the R v Radich, a frequently cited passage, which I repeat:
"One of the main purposes of punishment ... is to protect the public from the commission of such crimes by making it clear to the offender and to other persons with similar impulses that, if they yield to them, they will meet with severe punishment. In all civilised countries, in all ages, that has been the main purpose of punishment, and it still continues so. The fact that punishment does not entirely prevent all similar crimes should not obscure the cogent fact that the fear of severe punishment does, and will, prevent the commission of many that would have been committed if it was thought that the offender could escape without punishment, or with only a light punishment. If a Court is weakly merciful, and does not impose a sentence commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, it fails in its duty to see that the sentences are such as to operate as a powerful factor to prevent the commission of such offences. On the other hand, justice and humanity both require that the previous character and conduct, and probable future life and conduct of the individual offender, and the effect of the sentence on these, should also be given the most careful consideration, although this factor is necessarily subsidiary to the main considerations that determine that appropriate amount of punishment".
42 Retribution for the injury perpetrated by the offender is also an important aspect for consideration in sentencing: See R v Crump (unreported NSWCCA, 30 May 1994) at p 22 per Hunt CJ at CL, wherein His Honour held that it is important that not only the community feel satisfied that the offender receives his just desserts, but also the victims, and in this case the family left behind, are satisfied that justice has been done.
43 These principles of sentencing emphasise the fact that rehabilitation is only one of the purposes of punishment and, as Hunt CJ at CL enunciated in Purdey at 445, will always be subsidiary to the need for a sentence to act as a deterrent to the public, and particularly as a means of retribution for the crime that has been committed.
44 In terms of general deterrence, only aiming to discourage by fear of punishment all persons who may be tempted to commit crimes in general, there is also the factor of specific deterrence directed towards deterring the offender personally from repeating his crime. General principles of deterrence must be adjusted to the individual case if justice is to be achieved in the individual case. In that respect R v Rushby has applied.
45 I have taken into account all the relevant considerations identified in s21A of the Act, together with the Common Law authorities cited above, and generally, I am satisfied, of course, that in accordance with s5(1) of that Act that, having considered all the possible alternatives, no penalty, other than imprisonment, is appropriate; see the R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17.
46 I do not consider that the evidence before me supports the view that, the drugs the offender had taken on the day he murdered Wassim Chehade played a significant part in the murder. The offender was a seasoned poly-drug user, and from the evidence, it is highly unlikely that the drugs he took on the night of the murder, which did not vary from his normal habit, was likely to have caused the alleged amnesia suffered by the offender in relation to the facts of what happened on 1 July 2000, the day of the death of the Wassim Chehade. I do not accept that he had amnesia.
47 In terms of matters that need to be considered under s21A of the Act, I find that whilst the drugs taken by the offender may have had a disinhibiting effect on him, affecting his perception and judgment of the situation, the offender himself admitted that the heroin and the Rohypnol he had taken were more likely to have calmed him down than provoked him to do it. In terms of the matters otherwise to be considered under s21A of the Act, which I set out earlier, I take into account that arrangements for the meeting were made by the offender, that the deceased was a young person and was shot in the presence of his younger brother and a friend in the most reprehensible of circumstances. I also take into account that the offender has shown little or no remorse or contrition for the offence. He is sorry for the harm he caused to his family, which is not necessarily an altruistic feeling. He has made no reparation for the injury. There is a need to deter the offender, as a young man and, indeed, any other similar person, from committing such offences.
48 There is little in the criminal history of the offender that can be said in his favour and there is little in his cultural background or history that mitigates the seriousness of his action. The main matter that can be found in his favour is that he is young, and he will have a large part of his life still ahead when released from the sentence I propose to impose.
49 Notwithstanding the detailed evidence put before me by Dr Shand, and the fact that there is, and I accept as correct, a diagnosis of personality disorder/anti-social, and the history which has been given, I find little prospect of serious rehabilitation of the offender.
50 I must refer to the evidence before me concerning the offender's prospects in terms of rehabilitation. He has not engaged in any drug rehabilitation courses available at the prison in the past. When he has been in prison before he has continued to be a drug user.
51 Dr Shand made the following pertinent points in his report:
"Whether or not he will be a threat to society in the future will depend importantly upon whether he continues to be a drug abuser and drug dependent. It will also be dependent upon a change in his cultural values and his adherence to violence as a means of settling inter-group conflicts. The first test is about his ability to give up drugs in gaol, which I hope will involve monitoring by urine testing. The second test is to see whether he is capable of achieving maturity of personality function along healthy lines rather than on the psychopathic tendencies demonstrated so far. My prognosis for him is not optimistic."
52 These views of Dr Shand I accept.
53 I have taken into consideration all the circumstances of this case, including the objective and subjective facts detailed, and the law involved, and I consider there is little evidence before me, apart from the offender's youth, that are available to me as mitigating factors. I have considered the circumstances of this case and acknowledge that it was not part of a series of crimes.
54 It was put by Mr Stratton QC, on behalf of the offender, that he was, as I have found, a young man of twenty-four, from a large family with no great education or work record, and that he had come to a dead end in his life; that he was a drug addict and part of a group mentality. I accept these submissions. I take into account the offender's youth in the setting of the head sentence and the non parole period.
55 Although it was submitted the offender was dealing with the deceased, who had come toward him in an aggressive manner, I have rejected that view of the facts in the light of the incontrovertible and unchallenged evidence of the bullet wounds sustained by the deceased, nor as I stated above, have I found that the drugs, taken by the offender, played any significant role in the actions of the offender.