R v Hannah Quinn

Facts

1. I have already found facts for the purpose of sentencing Mr Davis. [7] Most of those facts are not directly relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the offending by Ms Quinn but are indirectly relevant in a way I will describe below, so I propose to include some of them in these reasons.
2. There was uncontested evidence at the trial that as at 10 August 2018 the deceased, Mr McKee, was a gambling addict, a user of crystal methamphetamine ("ice") and a seller of prohibited drugs who needed money urgently. He and a friend, known in the proceedings as Frank O'Connor, formed an agreement to rob some drug dealers in order to obtain "easy money". The two men robbed one drug dealer in his home and later attempted to rob a second. A decision was then made to rob Ms Quinn and Mr Davis.
3. Mr O'Connor knew Mr Davis and Ms Quinn through their mutual involvement in the supply of cannabis. Mr McKee had heard of the couple through Mr O'Connor but had never met them. After a number of false starts, Mr McKee arrived at Mr O'Connor's home in the morning of 10 August 2018 and asked him to drive him to Forest Lodge to commit the robbery. Mr O'Connor drove Mr McKee to the vicinity of Mr Davis' home. Mr McKee had with him a balaclava, knuckledusters, pepper spray, cable ties and an imitation pistol. Mr O'Connor waited in the car whilst Mr McKee approached the premises some distance away.
4. At about the same time, CCTV footage depicts Ms Quinn returning home from the café at 12.24pm. She later stated in her ERISP that as she approached Mr Davis' home, she saw a man outside carrying an ALDI bag who made her feel uncomfortable. I accept her account. The ALDI shopping bag was earlier seen in the possession of Mr McKee in CCTV footage outside Mr O'Connor's home and was later found by police with cable ties in it and a DNA profile matching Mr McKee after he left it inside the premises.
5. Ms Quinn told police that after she entered the premises and gave Mr Davis his breakfast, she began to mention the suspicious man outside whereupon Mr McKee (who was not previously known to her) burst into the premises wearing a balaclava and pointed a pistol at them. This pistol and balaclava were later located near where Mr McKee first fell, with Mr McKee's DNA on them consistent with Ms Quinn's account.
6. Ms Quinn told police that after entering the premises Mr McKee yelled something like "[g]ive me all your fucking money or I'll kill you". Mr Davis told him there was no money, Mr McKee then said something like "people know where your fucking family lives, give me all your money or we will kill your family too". At this time, he had the pistol pointed at Ms Quinn's head. Mr Davis took a few steps back and Mr McKee moved the pistol from Ms Quinn, banged it with something metallic and then punched Mr Davis to the eye with a set of knuckledusters. These knuckledusters were also located near where Mr McKee first fell, consistent with Ms Quinn's version that he had knuckledusters.
7. Ms Quinn's version was supported by other evidence in the Crown case. For example, Mr Davis was observed by a number of eyewitnesses to have a bleeding face as he emerged from his premises. He was later found to have an orbital fracture consistent with being struck to that area with a set of knuckledusters.
8. I accept Ms Quinn's version of what happened up until that point in time. It is consistent with all the other evidence in the Crown case. Ms Quinn was not made aware of that other prosecution evidence before she gave the account in her ERISP.
9. After Mr Davis was struck and fell to the ground, Mr McKee fled. Ms Quinn chased after him screaming very loudly as she did so. As to what happened next, the versions from the eyewitnesses differed but there were commonalities. They all described Ms Quinn to be chasing Mr McKee whilst running very fast and yelling loudly. She was yelling words described variously as "[w]ho are you? Who the fuck are you?", "[w]ho are you, bro?", "[w]ho the hell are you?" and "[w]hat you think you are?". Mr Davis was observed to be running after her with either a sword or a stick at this time and a bleeding face.
10. The eyewitnesses gave varying descriptions of what Ms Quinn did next. I am satisfied that Ms Quinn chased Mr McKee and was able to catch up with him. Mr Davis was running some short distance behind her. None of the eyewitnesses described her ever turning around to look at Mr Davis as she ran. All witnesses described her running very fast and being in front of Mr Davis. She was not carrying anything. Mr Davis was described as being less fit looking and carrying a heavy sword. There is no evidence from any of these eyewitnesses to suggest that Ms Quinn could see or knew what Mr Davis was doing behind her at that time.
11. Before Mr Davis caught up to Ms Quinn, she came into physical contact with Mr McKee. The eyewitness accounts of this interaction differed. Some witnesses describe her grabbing Mr McKee by the shoulder and pulling him to the ground. Mr O'Connor gave evidence that he saw her try to kick Mr McKee but nobody else described that. Mr Rossini Palmer described how after some interaction with Mr McKee she backed away from him. His evidence was that "as the girl was backing away" he saw another man (Mr Davis) come from the same direction that the other two had come from and hit the prone man "on the head". Mr Palmer stated that he (Mr McKee) was on the floor on "all fours" and had been getting up off the ground at this point. After the strike with the samurai sword, Mr Palmer heard Ms Quinn say "what the fuck have you done" before running away with Mr Davis.
12. At the time of the strike, Ms Lynne Charlesworth was upstairs in her home with the French doors open. She heard a woman screaming including the words "no, don't". She then heard this "almighty crack". She described the "crack" as sounding "like a whip cracking. It was very, very loud and very crisp." A few seconds later she heard a sound which was like a body hitting the ground.
13. Thus, the uncontested evidence of eyewitnesses is that Ms Quinn called out words "no, don't" just before the fatal strike and "what the fuck have you done" immediately afterwards. Despite this, she was prosecuted for murder based on the evidence I have just summarised.

Events after Mr McKee was struck

1. It was common ground at the trial that after the blow Mr Davis ran onto a nearby property, stole a car cover from a shed, wrapped the sword in it and left it in the back yard of his unit. He and Ms Quinn then collected an Uber Eats bag containing two mobile telephones, four sets of metal nunchakus, one set of timber nunchakus, a gold coloured air soft gun in a cardboard box, medication for Mr Davis and $21,380 cash. Ms Quinn told police that Mr Davis packed the bag.
2. Ms Quinn and Mr Davis then jumped over a neighbour's fence and ran from the scene until they found themselves at a dead end. They left the Uber Eats bag with the cash and weapons in it in the laneway, entered the nearest house illegally, broke out of it and fled.
3. After Ms Quinn and Mr Davis fled the scene, Mr McKee was able, despite his fatal head wound, to stagger over to a nearby parked car. He then ran 79.8 metres until he collapsed on Minogue Crescent. His ability to keep running is no doubt explained in part by the fact that he had a toxic to lethal dose of ice in his system which he had ingested prior to the home invasion. Mr O'Connor located him where he fell on the road, jumped out of his car to take him away but could see how badly wounded he was and fled.
4. The post-mortem report found that the cause of Mr McKee's death was a sharp force head injury caused by a single slicing/chop wound to the right side of the head extending from the right lateral upper eyebrow to just above the base of the brain and measuring 255mm in length and 21mm in width. The slicing wound went through the skull and the brain and caused extensive associated bone fractures and contusions.
5. Police were called to the scene and the incident received a considerable amount of media attention. Ms Quinn and Mr Davis spent Friday, Saturday, and Sunday booking into various hotels around Sydney and then moving on before they both went to police on the afternoon of Monday 13 August 2018. Much of this is recorded by CCTV footage and hotel and banking records.
6. Ms Quinn did not dispute any of the conduct attributed to her over those days. In fact, she disclosed some of it which was not already known to police when she gave her ERISP.
7. The Crown case against Ms Quinn on the charge of being an accessory after the fact to the manslaughter of Mr McKee by Mr Davis relied upon the evidence that Ms Quinn did the following acts: 1. Ran from the scene with Mr Davis (admitted); 2. Stole the car cover to wrap the sword in company (not admitted); 3. Entered 125 Wigram Road and broke out of the premises (admitted); 4. Booked an Uber to Ms Quinn's residence (admitted); 5. Cleaned up Mr Davis' eye whilst at her premises (admitted); 6. Loaned clothes to Mr Davis (admitted); 7. Checked into the Adina Apartments in the City, paying in cash, and then left (admitted); 8. Booked into the Waldorf Apartment Hotel Pennant Hills (admitted); 9. Booked a taxi to the Waldorf Apartment Hotel Pennant Hills (admitted); 10. Checked into and paid for the Waldorf Apartment Hotel Pennant Hills (admitted); 11. Paid for the telephone calls made at the Waldorf Apartment Hotel (admitted); 12. Checked in alone at the Novotel Hotel (admitted); 13. Collected Mr Davis from outside the Novotel Hotel after she checked in (admitted); 14. Checked out alone at the Novotel Hotel (admitted); 15. Withdrew $500 cash in Wentworthville (admitted); 16. Purchased clothes for she and Mr Davis from Kmart with cash (admitted); and 17. Checked in to the Big Hostel at Kings Cross, paying in cash (admitted).

Ms Quinn's ERISP

1. Although Ms Quinn admits these acts, she did not and still does not admit that when she did them, she did so to assist Mr Davis to evade arrest by police.
2. Ms Quinn told police in her ERISP that after Mr McKee assaulted Mr Davis, he grabbed her handbag. They struggled over the bag, but he grabbed it and fled. Ms Quinn chased him. She described how when she caught up to Mr McKee, she tried to snatch her bag back and he turned around and tried to punch her. She stepped backwards, he lost his footing and he fell to the ground. She then said he "was holding the gun up, up at me and I was just frozen and that's when… Blake ran up and he hit the guy".
3. Although Ms Quinn's account of her interaction with Mr McKee is largely consistent with what was observed by the eyewitnesses, no eyewitness saw Mr McKee pointing a gun at Ms Quinn prior to the assault by Mr Davis and that aspect was obviously not accepted by the jury.
4. As to whether Ms Quinn did in fact chase Mr McKee to retrieve her handbag, the evidence differed. Two witnesses gave evidence that Mr McKee appeared to be carrying a bag: Mr Palmer and Mr O'Connor. Nobody else saw this and in fact Sarah Baker saw Mr McKee put his hoody up with both hands as he left the premises and she did not see any handbag in his hands when he did so. Although the Crown opened that she was chasing after Mr McKee to retrieve what he had taken, [8] he resiled from that position by the time of the closing address.
5. I made no finding on this issue when I sentenced Mr Davis as it was not necessary to do so. I similarly make no finding here. Ms Quinn is not criminally liable for chasing Mr McKee once he fled the premises, so her reasons for doing so are not directly relevant. Despite making no finding on this issue, I do not accept the Crown submission at trial that there is something inherently implausible in the proposition that a victim of a bag snatch would fight back and even chase after an assailant to retrieve their bag. The experience of the courts is that a victim's "fight or flight" instinct is often triggered in such circumstances. Although in hindsight such conduct might be considered dangerous and ill considered, that does not mean that people do not instinctively behave in this way.
6. Ms Quinn's explanation in her ERISP for remaining with Mr Davis over the weekend, before they handed themselves into police, was that she was terrified of the threats made to her by Mr McKee at the time of the home invasion. She thought that persons associated with Mr McKee would come after her as Mr McKee had threatened they would. The jury verdict is inconsistent with that aspect of Ms Quinn's account being accepted.
7. There were two factual disputes to resolve for the purposes of finding the facts on sentence: when it was that Ms Quinn first knew of Mr McKee's death and whether Ms Quinn could still be said to be "assisting" Mr Davis to evade police after they decided to hand themselves in.
8. As to when Ms Quinn knew Mr McKee had died, in her ERISP Ms Quinn told police that after the fatal blow she had "never seen so much blood" and that she "didn't see [Mr McKee] move" after the sword strike. The Crown also relied upon Ms Quinn's statements that "I saw blood. Lots of blood coming from his head I think", "It was the most horrible thing I've ever seen and I just couldn't contemplate what that was", "I knew that he needed [aid] but I was panicked and shocked and I just didn't know what to do". Ms Quinn was thus aware that he had sustained serious injuries.
9. Ms Quinn told police in her ERISP that she was not aware that Mr McKee had died until Saturday 11 August when she and Mr Davis saw or heard of Mr McKee's death on the news. [9] The Crown submitted that Ms Quinn's ERISP should not be considered reliable in this respect. She told police, "I was really upset and I couldn't believe it. I didn't know what to think. Nothing like this had ever happened."
10. A pool of blood and brain matter was found on the area on the road where Mr McKee was struck. This is further evidence to suggest that Ms Quinn might have been aware Mr McKee was dead at the scene. On the other hand, there is also the evidence that Mr McKee got up and ran away. Further, it took Mr O'Connor some time to realise how serious the injury suffered by Mr McKee was when he tried to move Mr McKee to take him to hospital after finding him collapsed on Minogue Crescent.
11. I have had regard to all of this evidence and, although I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Quinn knew that Mr McKee was very seriously injured when she fled the scene, I am unable to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the available evidence that she knew he was dead until sometime the following day.
12. It was submitted on behalf of Ms Quinn that once the decision to see the solicitor was made on Sunday 12 August 2018, any acts by her after that time could not have assisted him to avoid apprehension. Mr Davis gave evidence that on Sunday 12 August 2018 he attempted to contact a lawyer but was told by the receptionist who took the call that they could not come into the office until Monday. [10] He said that he was told not to talk to the police, and that lawyers would talk to the police on his behalf. [11] In cross-examination by Mr Hughes, Mr Davis said that he was told to come into the lawyer's office on Monday before doing anything else. He said that if he had been told at that point to go to police straight away, he would have made a phone call to police to that effect. [12]
13. In her ERISP Ms Quinn explained to police how on the Sunday they tried to see a lawyer but were unable to. She told police: [13] "A: But we couldn't get hold of them. Um, and then I believe, um, um, yeah, I'm not sure, like, us, we decided to go to the lawyer's the next day or an appointment was made or something. I can't remember. But we spent most of Sunday trying to, um, to contact the lawyer, the lawyer. Um, and we couldn't. … A: And Blake made contact with the police that day, um, on Sunday, because we had been advised to, and we had, we want, yeah, we wanted them to know what was going on for us. So he made a phone call and told them that we'd been involved and that we would be coming in."
14. It was common ground that Mr Davis telephoned Glebe Police Station at 11:08am on Sunday 12 August and told a police officer, "we are going to come in and see police tomorrow." This was after he spoke to the lawyer's office.
15. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Quinn continued to assist Mr Davis to evade detection after he had contacted a lawyer's office and then told police that he planned to hand himself in the following day.

Objective seriousness

1. The Crown submitted that Ms Quinn's acts of assistance fell just within the mid-range of objective seriousness whereas counsel for Ms Quinn submitted that the offending was at the very lowest end of the range of objective seriousness for accessory after the fact to manslaughter.
2. The factors to have regard to when assessing objective seriousness were enumerated by Hamill J, with whom Macfarlan JA and Fullerton J agreed, in TT v R [2014] NSWCCA 206. His Honour observed that an assessment of the objective gravity of offences of this type involves a consideration of a number of factors which include, but are not limited to: "(1) The circumstances of the homicide itself. (2) The extent of the knowledge in the accessory of those circumstances. (3) The precise act, or acts, which constitutes the offence of being an accessory after the fact. (4) The length of time over which the offender assisted the principal offender in escaping justice. (5) The extent to which the acts of the offender successfully delayed, or thwarted, the investigation and prosecution of the principal offender. (6) The motivation of the offender in committing the crime. (7) The offender's conduct in being motivated by a sense of misguided loyalty or emotional attachment to the principal offender. This is a circumstance of particular significance in cases where a family member assists the principal offender. (8) The disposal or destruction of a corpse. These cases generally fall at the upper end of the range of criminality for the offence." [14]
3. Both counsel addressed these factors in written and oral submissions. I will deal with each of them in turn.
4. The Crown accepted that the seriousness of the manslaughter offence was relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of Ms Quinn's acts of assistance. I have already assessed the seriousness of the homicide for the purposes of sentencing Mr Davis. [15] I found that it was "a moderately serious case of manslaughter by excessive self-defence but nowhere near as high as that contended for by the Crown". [16]
5. I am satisfied that Ms Quinn was aware of the circumstances of the offence, having been present for the home invasion and the fatal sword strike. Those circumstances include that her boyfriend had acted excessively in killing an intruder who had attempted a home invasion of them.
6. As for the precise act, or acts, which constitute the offence of being an accessory after the fact, they were nearly all admitted by Ms Quinn. I am not satisfied that Ms Quinn was involved in stealing the car cover or concealing the sword. It was never suggested at the trial that she did, the eyewitnesses did not suggest she did and the Crown Prosecutor stated in his closing address that it was Mr Davis alone who did this. Nor am I satisfied that when Ms Quinn washed Mr Davis' eye she was assisting him to evade police. Her boyfriend had been the victim of a vicious unprovoked assault and she simply administered aid to him.
7. As for the length of time over which the offending took place, I do not accept the Crown submission that it stands to be assessed from the time of the fatal blow until Ms Quinn and Mr Davis handed themselves into police. Rather, I am satisfied that her criminality is to be assessed over the period from when she realised Mr Davis had killed Mr McKee until the point that Mr Davis decided to hand himself into police.
8. As for the extent to which Ms Quinn's actions successfully delayed, or thwarted, the investigation and prosecution of Mr Davis, it is minimal. She did help him to move around during that time and he managed to avoid arrest over that period. But it was not suggested by the Crown that any evidence was destroyed or the investigation weakened in any way by her actions which is often the hallmark of such an offence. She did not, for example, conceal or dispose of a corpse. In fact, she did not try to hide any of her actions.
9. Nothing Ms Quinn did during that time was consistent with any intention to avoid apprehension indefinitely. They did not leave Sydney let alone NSW. Ms Quinn made no efforts to conceal her identity. She stuck with her boyfriend at that time out of loyalty and nothing she did over that weekend suggests any plan to indefinitely go "on the run".
10. As for her motivation for the crime, the jury clearly rejected Ms Quinn's case at trial that she undertook the acts because she was still in shock or was hiding out of fear. I am satisfied that, having just suffered this attack by Mr McKee and then witnessing Mr Davis' response, Ms Quinn acted out of a sense of misguided loyalty and emotional attachment to Mr Davis.
11. I am satisfied that, as a general proposition, being an accessory after the fact to an offence carrying a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment and involving the loss of a life is more serious than being an accessory after the fact to a less serious offence such as assault occasioning actual bodily harm in company. Both have the same maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. But this fact cannot and does not mean that all instances of being an accessory after the fact to manslaughter must be assessed as necessarily more serious on that basis alone.
12. The jury's verdict in relation to Ms Quinn is that she is guilty of helping her boyfriend Mr Davis to temporarily evade police in the ways enumerated above.
13. Overall, I am satisfied that the objective seriousness is comfortably below the mid-range of seriousness for offences of this type, but I do not accept Ms Quinn's submission that it is at the very lowest end of the range.

Ms Quinn's subjective case

1. The proceedings on sentence for both Ms Quinn and Mr Davis were conducted jointly on 26 February 2021 and separately thereafter. Ms Quinn's proceedings on sentence were concluded on 23 April 2021. The Crown tendered written submissions on sentence, Ms Quinn's criminal and custodial history, and a table summarising the eyewitness evidence.
2. Counsel for Ms Quinn tendered an outline of written submissions, a letter from Ms Quinn, eight character references, two expert reports, and a confirmation of her application to study at Western Sydney University. The psychological reports comprised a letter from Associate Professor and Adolescent Paediatrician Michael Kohn dated 28 September 2010, and a report from a psychologist, Tim Watson-Munro dated 24 February 2021. On 23 April 2021, further material was tendered including a further letter from Ms Megan Quinn, a letter from Ms Quinn's new employer, two further character references and confirmation of an offer to study primary teaching at Western Sydney University commencing July 2021.
3. The following history was obtained from the report of Mr Watson-Munro.
4. Ms Quinn was born in Brisbane and has two older half-brothers and one younger brother. One of her older brothers is severely physically and intellectually disabled. Her parents separated when she was 4 years old with both parents having had a number of partners over the years since then.
5. Following the separation, Ms Quinn's mother established a relationship with another woman with whom Ms Quinn had a poor relationship. Ms Quinn recounted a history of emotional abuse until the age of 8 and said that she witnessed her mother being physically abused on occasion. As a result of the tensions at home, her oldest brother, with whom she was very close, left home and Ms Quinn did not see him for seven years, until the age of 13.
6. Due to the conflict Ms Quinn experienced in her mother's home, she moved to Queensland to live with her father, and saw her mother on alternate weekends. Ms Quinn described these changes as impacting on her engagement with formal education and her general sense of security. Ms Quinn recalled attending five primary schools and two secondary schools before leaving both school and home at the age of 16.
7. Ms Quinn's father remarried when she was 17 years old and Ms Quinn has a positive relationship with her paternal stepmother.
8. Since leaving school, Ms Quinn has worked in a range of jobs, primarily in the hospitality industry. She commenced studying early childhood education but ceased upon being charged with the current offences, as she was unable to obtain a working with children check. Since being released on bail, Ms Quinn has worked as a cook at a vegan restaurant and a waitress at a café. This employment ceased in July 2020. A letter from Ms Catherine Atkinson dated 19 April 2021 confirms that Ms Quinn recently commenced employment as a part-time cook in Ms Atkinson's café. Ms Atkinson described Ms Quinn as a diligent worker and an outstanding cook.
9. Ms Quinn did not give evidence. Instead she wrote a very lengthy letter to the Court. She expressed profound sympathy for the deceased and his family. I do not propose to summarise her letter, but I do propose to extract portions of it in her own words. Ms Quinn stated: "I don't even know how to begin to express or explain the anguish, torment, suffering, excruciating pain and grief that has plagued my entire being since the catastrophic events that have unfolded from the 10th of August 2018. This never ending whirlpool of emotion I have felt throughout my body is not something I am sure I can articulate in any kind of language I know. ... Every single day I wake up to my very own personal living nightmare in hell. Every day I wake up I remember I'm not living the life I chose anymore and I am in a type of limbo, stuck frozen, where time is irrelevant and makes no sense, each day feels like a week, each week feels like a month, each month feels like year, each year feels like it's been five years. I have been living this way for 31 months. … I do not remember the last time I had a whole night of undisturbed, unbroken and peaceful nights sleep. I have woken up having wet the bed and I have never suffered from incontinence my life. I have woken to my bed sheets in tatters and the confusion I felt was overwhelming. ... My body has forgotten what it feels like to be well rested after sleeping for 8 unbroken hours. Night terrors where I thrash around with hot and cold sweats, waking up crying desperately or yelping out. I fear the mayhem of what this has been causing my mind and body for 31 months. … The depression and anxiety I suffer from has been slowly but surely chipping away, bit by bit, any last morsel of who I was before the 10th of August 2018. It is devastating when you start wondering if it would be easier for everybody if you killed yourself and you can't even see through that to see how wrong that thought is, it just seems natural. When every ledge you stand on, you start wondering if you should just step off it, every truck that passes you on the road, you wonder if you should just step in front of it. Or what about trains, that surely would be an easy way to do it? You start to collect medicine and medications, stashing them away until you have enough that there is no way your body could survive that. I suffer from panic attacks where it feels like I have four walls closing in on me, like I am drowning and suffocating all at the same time. I experience these strange vacant moments where I realise I've just lost a few minutes and I have no idea what I was thinking about. The life I chose in 2018 has been hijacked by circumstances no one could have ever foreseen."

Mental health/ADHD

1. In 2010 Ms Quinn was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"). A report of Associate Professor Michael Kohn dated 28 September 2010 opined that Ms Quinn had "difficulties with cognition consistent with features of mild ADHD." It was further noted that her academic performance and learning had been impacted by low mood, high anxiety and stress. Associate Professor Kohn recommended addressing Ms Quinn's mood issues and supporting stability in the home environment. Ms Quinn was prescribed Fluvoxamine with the potential to trial treatment with stimulants after further stabilisation in her home situation and mood.
2. Mr Watson-Munro opined in his report of 24 February 2021 that Ms Quinn was severely depressed and anxious and noted that she had suffered undiagnosed ADHD until her diagnosis in 2010. Mr Watson-Munro noted that Ms Quinn's ADHD remains untreated. In this regard, Mr Watson-Munro stated that: "Ms Quinn's ADHD has significantly impacted upon her capacity to effectively negotiate her life at times. It would appear at times that she has had difficulty with information processing, consequential thinking and can under emotional duress, act in an impulsive manner. These dynamics appear to have been in train at the time of her offending behaviour."
3. In addition to the diagnosis of ADHD, Mr Watson-Munro opined that Ms Quinn had suffered a range of symptoms "suggestive of features of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" ("PTSD") since 10 August 2018. It was the opinion of Mr Watson-Munro that she required professional assistance for her depressive disorder and anxiety, and that this would be best treated in the community. Mr Watson-Munro assessed Ms Quinn's risk of re-offending as low.
4. Ms Megan Quinn stated in her letters to this Court that she believed Ms Quinn's ADHD had significantly impacted her life, including Ms Quinn's difficulties engaging with formal education and her early drug use. She described Ms Quinn as experiencing reduced impulse control, being volatile and reactive, and prone to disorganised and chaotic thinking.
5. It was submitted on behalf of Ms Quinn that her diagnosis of ADHD should be taken into account as a mitigating factor on the basis that Ms Quinn was not fully aware of the consequences of her actions. [17] The Crown submitted that there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding. Mr Hughes relied upon the expert evidence served and posed the hypothetical question: what other information could be provided on this point?
6. A person's mental condition is relevant to the exercise of the sentencing discretion in a number of ways. I have considered the characteristics of ADHD and to some extent her behaviour that day is consistent with an adult who suffers from that condition. Despite this, given all the other evidence as to the circumstances at that time I am ultimately not satisfied that her ADHD contributed to the commission of the crime in any meaningful way but I am satisfied that it renders Ms Quinn an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence. [18]

Remorse

1. Ms Quinn did not give evidence in her proceedings on sentence but counsel for Ms Quinn submitted that the report of Mr Watson-Munro should be taken into account in relation to remorse. That report stated that "Ms Quinn expressed deep regret concerning the death of Mr McKee".
2. Ms Quinn does not accept her guilt on this charge and, although I am satisfied that she has been profoundly affected by these events and is genuinely sympathetic to the deceased's family, I am not satisfied that she is remorseful that she fled the scene with Mr Davis and assisted him before he handed himself in.

Good character

1. Ten character references, including two letters from Ms Quinn's mother, were tendered in support of Ms Quinn at her proceedings on sentence. I do not propose to summarise them but the picture of Ms Quinn that emerged from them is that of a kind and sensitive person. The letters described Ms Quinn as caring and empathetic towards her family and friends, with a strong desire to help others. Ms Quinn's current and former employers described her as hard-working and trustworthy. Many letters expressed the view that Ms Quinn was a good person for whom the offending was out of character. Several of Ms Quinn's family and friends stated that they strongly believed she would not engage in any offending behaviour in future. I accept the picture painted of Ms Quinn in these character references.
2. Ms Quinn describes that she started using cannabis when she was 14 years old as a way of self-medicating for her undiagnosed ADHD. As at 10 August 2018 both she and Mr Davis were using cannabis daily, although there is no suggestion on the evidence that they had consumed any prior to the home invasion that day. In her letter to the Court Ms Quinn admitted to buying cannabis in bulk to supply more cheaply to friends and stated that Mr Davis' only involvement was to lend her money to do so. Despite this, she continues to deny that the significant amount of cash on the premises was the proceeds of drug dealing.
3. I have already concluded, for the purposes of sentencing Mr Davis that I do not accept that the $20,000 kept as a holiday fund in a drawer in Mr Davis' bedroom was not the proceeds of drug dealing. It was never adequately explained why such a large amount of cash would be withdrawn from a bank account to be kept on the premises at a time when there is clear evidence that a small-time cannabis dealing business was being conducted on the premises. Ms Megan Quinn, in her letters to this Court, expressed her opinion in this regard but those letters have not changed the conclusion I reached when I sentenced Mr Davis.
4. Two witnesses gave evidence at trial of knowing both Mr Davis and Ms Quinn as drug dealers: Mr O'Connor and Mr Hill. This was the motive for the home invasion. There was nothing about what they said or the manner in which they said it that led me to doubt their evidence in any way. Mr O'Connor's evidence was that Ms Quinn and Mr Davis' drug business started small. He stated, "they were Uni students or something and they got big quickly". This has a ring of truth and is not inconsistent with Ms Quinn's admissions.
5. Overall, I am willing to find that Ms Quinn has no history of violence and was of good character until she started supplying cannabis. The fact that she was a heavy user of cannabis and was using that to assist with her ADHD is relevant in this regard.

Rehabilitation/Re-offending

1. I am satisfied that Ms Quinn's prospects of rehabilitation are excellent, and that she is unlikely ever to re-offend. The Crown did not submit otherwise. Despite that, she clearly is a woman with significant mental health issues arising from the events of 10 August 2018 and is untreated for ADHD.

Extra curial punishment

1. Counsel for Ms Quinn submitted that she had suffered extra curial punishment by reason of the media coverage of her trial. In that regard, Ms Quinn included the following in her statement: "The first day I was on bail at my mother's home, media knocked on the front door at 8 AM. I have been stalked by the media and reported on living in Sydney and in the Blue Mountains. The sickness I feel when I see myself and the love of my life plastered across newspapers and news articles overcomes my entire body, throwing me every single time."
2. An example of a case where extra curial punishment was taken into account was by Harrison J in R v Wran [2016] NSWSC 1015 ("Wran"). In that case, the media published details of matters including confidential negotiations with the DPP, extracts from private letters, re-enactments of private telephone calls and other information that could only have been sourced from an improperly obtained copy of the police brief of evidence. His Honour found that the articles "[made] allegations about her criminality, sexual conduct and reputation that ha[d] no basis in fact but from which she ha[d] no ability to defend herself". [19]
3. In the Wran case the media attention was found to be a gross invasion of Ms Wran's privacy and that of her family. It created safety concerns and made Ms Wran a potential target in the custodial environment. In fact, the Crown in that case did not oppose the defence submissions on this issue. That was clearly a very different case.
4. I accept that Ms Quinn's matter has received considerable media attention, but it is not such as to amount to extra curial punishment.

Relevant cases

1. I have considered other relevant decisions concerning this offence. I have been unable to find any similar cases. Significantly, the Judicial Commission statistics indicate that since 24 September 2018 [20] only two offenders have been sentenced for the offence of accessory after the fact to manslaughter. Those two cases are Ferris v R [2020] NSWCCA 325 and R v Aljubouri; R v YA; R v Shaker [2019] NSWSC 180 ("YA"). The facts in those cases highlight the different circumstances in which offenders can be liable for being an accessory after the fact to manslaughter.
2. In Ferris v R [2020] NSWCCA 325, the offender witnessed the principal offender kill someone with a heavy open-handed blow to the head. He assisted the principal by obtaining water to pour on the deceased, who was lying unconscious on the ground. He heard the deceased making "gurgling" and "snoring" noises but made no attempts to render assistance. He walked through a pool of the deceased's blood as he left. He then attempted to conceal the offence by disposing of his clothing and shoes and extensively cleaning his car.
3. The offending took place in the context of an attempted theft of copper from an industrial site (the Form 1 offence). The applicant maintained a false version of events for seven months before disclosing part of the truth. He did not admit to disposing of or cleaning up evidence until 17 months after the offences. The sentencing judge found that the applicant was motivated by a desire to protect himself from implication in a violent crime and a desire to assist the principal with whom he had been jointly engaged in the attempted copper theft. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against his custodial sentence.
4. In YA, the offender was aged 17 at the time of the offence. He was asked by the principal to hire a carpet cleaning machine and bring it to an apartment. YA did so, and upon arriving at the apartment discovered that the deceased had been killed. He then assisted the principal to clean the apartment and provided assistance by removing some of the deceased's property from the room and attempting to destroy it. It was common ground that YA did not know about the principal offence until he arrived at the apartment. The offending behaviour was assessed as having "a moderate degree of gravity". YA's subjective case included a history of domestic violence and drug use from a young age. He also received a discount for his plea of guilty. He was sentenced to a community correction order for a term of 12 months for accessory after the fact to manslaughter.
5. The Crown relied upon the decision in TT v R but that was a very different case again. The offender assisted her mother, the principal, to arrange for the disposal of the deceased's body and maintained a pretence that the deceased was alive and well for over two years, until the deceased's body was found. The offence was found to be at the "very upper end" of offences under s 350 because [21] the principal offence was a homicide involving a very young woman, the offender's acts included both the disposal of the body and perpetrating lies to distract the victim's family and the police, the lies and deception were sustained for over two years and the offender's conduct successfully assisted the principal offender to escape justice for a long period of time. The offender in TT v R was sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years.
6. In the earlier decision of R v Rafael Rodriguez [2012] NSWSC 663 the offender disposed of a knife, knowing that it had been used by his son in a fatal stabbing, with the intention of helping his son to avoid apprehension or prosecution for that offence. The knife had already been washed clean and thus would have had little evidentiary value at the time it was disposed of. The offender had no involvement whatsoever in the principal offence. It was observed that the offender took action "in great distress and with a sense of urgency" to protect his son. It was, however, also noted that, unlike many cases of accessorial liability, the accessory was not under influence of or emotionally dependent upon the principal. Justice Hidden found that while the offender's desire to help his son was understandable, the offence was serious and was calculated to frustrate the administration of justice. His Honour found that general deterrence was a significant factor and imposed a suspended sentence of 2 years imprisonment.
7. Although the principles derived from these decisions have been of assistance, they are factually very different cases. Most of the cases I have considered involve concealing the crime and/or destroying evidence. That makes this case somewhat unusual.

The purposes of sentencing

1. The purposes of sentencing as set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("Sentencing Act") are: (a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) to protect the community from the offender, (d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions, (f) to denounce the conduct of the offender, (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
2. In each sentencing exercise some of these purposes will be more significant than others. I have already found that general deterrence should be given less weight in sentencing Ms Quinn due to her diagnosis of ADHD. Nor is there any significant need for specific deterrence.

The sentence

1. Section 5(1) of the Sentencing Act provides that a court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless it is satisfied, having considered all possible alternatives, that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. The Crown submitted that the s 5 threshold had been crossed, whereas counsel for Ms Quinn submitted to the contrary. Mr Hughes submitted that a community correction order ("CCO") could be imposed under s 8(1) of the Sentencing Act.
2. The Crown did not challenge any of the subjective material relied upon by Ms Quinn but submitted that a CCO was "outside of the range available" to the Court. I take this to mean that I would be falling into appealable error if I did not make a finding that that the s 5 threshold was crossed.
3. Having had regard to the finding of objective seriousness and Ms Quinn's strong subjective case I am not satisfied that the s 5 threshold has been crossed in this matter. I am satisfied that the actions of Ms Quinn were towards the lower end of criminality and her subjective case was strong. I propose to sentence Ms Quinn to a CCO.

The sentence

1. For the offence of accessory after the fact to manslaughter, I make the following orders: 1. The offender is convicted. 2. Pursuant to section 8(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), the offender is placed on a community corrections order for a period of 2 years commencing today, 7 May 2021. 3. The following standard conditions apply for the duration of the order: 1. the offender must not commit any offence; and 2. the offender must appear before the court if called upon to do so at any time during the term of the Community Corrections Order. 1. I impose the following additional condition: 1. a treatment condition requiring the offender to receive treatment for her mental health problems as outlined in the report of Mr Watson-Munro dated 24 February 2021. 1. I direct the offender not to leave the Court prior to signing this Order at the Registry of this Court. 2. I direct the offender to notify the Supreme Court Registry should she change address during the period of this order. 3. I direct that the offender contact Penrith Community Corrections by telephone or email no later than midday next Monday, 10 May 2021.

Endnotes

1. R v Davis and Quinn (No 4) [2020] NSWSC 1800.
2. Sections 24, 350 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
3. R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 377-378.
4. The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27] (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
5. Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [64] (per French CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).
6. McHugh J in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [51], confirmed by the Court in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [26].
7. R v Blake Davis [2021] NSWSC 235.
8. T 72.
9. Q&A 1353-1357.
10. T 1533.
11. T 1535-6.
12. T 1548-50.
13. A 1414-1415.
14. At [15].
15. R v Blake Davis [2021] NSWSC 235
16. Ibid at [72].
17. Section 21A(3)(j) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
18. R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 71 per Gleeson CJ; R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [22] per Spigelman CJ; and R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228.
19. Wran at [76].
20. The commencement date for the sentencing reforms brought in under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Sentencing Options) Act 2017 (NSW)).
21. TT at [20].

Amendments 10 May 2021 - [3] line 1 - "that" added before "she" 10 May 2021 - coversheet correction 12 May 2021 - coversheet correction DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 12 May 2021