R v Griffiths

The relevant facts

1. It should be said at the outset that there was no real dispute at the trial about what happened. The real issue related to the availability of the partial defence of substantial impairment.
2. Mr Love and the offender were previously unknown to each other. The offending occurred at around 6:00 pm on 27 September 2014 in Wharf Street, Tweed Heads outside the Tweed Centro Shopping Complex. Mr Love, a native of New Zealand was then about 48 years of age. He appears to have fallen upon hard times and was homeless, sleeping rough wherever he could find shelter around the Wharf Street area.
3. During the day of 27 September 2014, Mr Love had spent his time drinking with some associates. Not long before the events I am concerned with, they had been moved on by police from another nearby location.
4. The offender was originally from Griffith. He was 38 years old at the time of the offending and had been living in the Tweed Heads area for a number of years. He was then sharing rental accommodation. While living in the Tweed Heads area he had been under the care of a local General Practitioner, Dr Paul Balin who was treating him with a range of prescription drugs for schizoaffective disorder. The medication for this mental illness included anti-psychotic and calmative medications. The offender's symptoms included a fair amount of anxiety and delusions of a persecutory type. He suffered auditory hallucinations. Dr Balin was also treating him for severe neck pain radiating to the back of his head, right shoulder and right arm. The medication for that condition was MS Contin. This is a slow release morphine based pain-killing medication. It is relevant for present purposes because the offender had been persuaded to part with some of that medication to an associate, Mr Shane Ferguson, who he had been spending time with that day. It seems that Mr Ferguson may inveigled some of the offender's MS Contin from him. The offender became anxious about replacing this dose which he would need for his pain management and Mr Ferguson offered to help him try to obtain replacement medication illegally on the street.
5. In the course of this endeavour, Mr Ferguson approached Mr Love and two of his associates unsuccessfully soliciting replacement drugs. While Mr Ferguson was doing this the offender was hanging back nearby. Mr Love, who was highly intoxicated, noticed him and commenced staring at him speaking to him in derogatory language. When Mr Love told the offender to go away in loud and vulgar language, the offender became angry and walked behind Mr Love, grabbing his head, forcibly extending his neck and pushing his thumbs into Mr Love's eyes exerting pressure to cause pain. He told Mr Love not to speak to him as he had.
6. The offender desisted from this assault in response to the remonstrations of Mr Ferguson and Mr Love's associates. He started to walk away but he told police in his recorded record of interview played for the jury, "[b]ut a switch in my head just flicked and I turned and sprinted at [Mr Love] and I've elbowed him as hard as I could". I should say that from his appearance on the audio-visual recording, the offender was then a tall and very strongly built man. He also told the police that after he had started to walk away, "I just turned. I snapped and turned and just ran back and KO'd him". He demonstrated striking Mr Love very forcibly with his elbow. When asked by police how far from Mr Love he was when he started to run back, he said: "10, 20 or 30 metres. Enough to get a good sprint up and have good solid contact". He explained his actions by saying, "I feel like the witches of hell just reached up and got into my decision making capacity and just took control for a few seconds."
7. The offender struck Mr Love with sufficient force to knock him from the bench, where he was sitting, to the ground. He struck his head heavily on the pavement.
8. A specialist forensic pathologist, Dr Dianne Little, gave evidence about the nature of Mr Love's injuries and the cause of his death. In basic terms, Mr Love died on 30 September 2014 while in hospital on the Gold Coast from the effects of a traumatic brain injury due to blunt force trauma to the head.
9. From Dr Little's evidence I would infer that the force of the blow inflicted by the offender on Mr Love caused bruising and abrasion to the right forehead area in association with facial fractures involving his eye socket. There was also a skull fracture running along the base of the skull probably caused when Mr Love's head made heavy contact with the ground when he fell from his seat. In response to the severe trauma, Mr Love suffered subdural haematoma and swelling of the brain. Emergency neurosurgery to release the pressure on the brain was unsuccessful in saving his life.
10. A blood alcohol reading taken on the day of the assault at Tweed Heads Hospital soon after Mr Love's admission provided a reading of 0.327. This may have perhaps made Mr Love more vulnerable to sudden attack than a sober man. From what he told the police the offender may be taken to have been aware of Mr Love's intoxication. It is doubtful, however, that he appreciated the full extent of it.
11. Like the jury, I have no doubt that the severe blow delivered by the offender to Mr Love's head caused his death in the manner explained by Dr Little. Moreover, given the offender's explanation of a switch flicking in his head, or of a brain snap, and having regard to the severity of the blow he inflicted, I have no doubt that at the time he delivered the blow he had the actual intention of inflicting really serious physical injury upon Mr Love. There was no issue that that was so at the offender's trial.
12. I am conscious that some of the statements made by the offender would suggest that he intended to kill Mr Love. In particular, he expressed the belief that Mr Love was dead before his head hit the ground. However, that statement is wrong, as I have said, notwithstanding the severity of the trauma, Mr Love survived for another three days. The comment about Mr Love being dead before he hit the ground is an example of the offender's odd boastful behaviour regarded by the psychiatrists as being a manifestation of an underlying personality disorder of which I will have more to say later. To the extent to which it may be important, I am of the view that the offender's relevant state of mind was the actual intention of inflicting really serious physical injury on Mr Love. The Crown does not contend otherwise.

Victim Impact

1. In every case of murder, the harm inflicted extends beyond the death of the immediate victim to the losses suffered by the victim's family as a result of the death. I have not had the benefit of receiving in evidence family victim impact statements in this case. I assume this is because Mr Love is not survived by immediate family into the class qualified to make a family victim impact statement as there were clearly members of his extended family in court.
2. I fully understand what a powerful emotion grief is. In time one may become reconciled to it, but rarely does one get over it entirely. This effect may extend beyond the immediate family.
3. It is well to bear in mind that a central consideration in sentencing for murder is the sanctity of all human life regardless of the victim's circumstances of life before his or her death. Equality before the law is a fundamental value of our democratic society. This extends to a requirement that the homicide of every victim requires vindication in sentencing whatever the victim's station in life. I will have regard to the unlawful taking of Mr Love's life as an aspect of the loss caused to the whole community by this offending.
4. I offer the Court's condolences to Mr Love's surviving family.

Subjective circumstances

1. The offender was born on 24 May 1976. He was 38 at the date of the offence and is now 42 years of age.
2. It is difficult to get an accurate picture of his circumstances of life because the account he gives of himself is affected by what Professor Greenberg, Dr Gerald Chew and Dr Balin diagnosed as a schizophrenic disorder. This condition manifests itself in part in disjointed and jumbled thoughts. Moreover he has personality disorder traits which, as I have said, manifest themselves in the expression of odd or eccentric ideas of doubtful reliability.
3. It appears that his childhood was somewhat socially deprived. According to his own account, his parents separated when he was five. He continued to reside with his mother who formed a new relationship with a violently abusive man. From about the age of 11 he resumed residing with his father but recounts being subject to sexual abuse between that age and the age of about 15 from a neighbour. There may have been a period when he was a ward of the State.
4. He left school in year 11 and, again according to his own account, fell in with the mafia in Griffith. He told the psychiatrists and the police during his record of interview of an involvement at different times in serious criminal activity, acting as a body guard for a senior mafioso, and then as a police informer. There is nothing in his criminal record suggestive of any involvement in serious criminal activity of this kind.
5. The offender's criminal record is far from extensive. Of some concern are two previous violent offences. However they were committed in the mid-1990s and in about 2004, respectively. There is nothing on his record during the decade preceding the instant offending. The Crown accepts that this record does not suggest an increased need for community protection as a factor relevant to sentencing this offender.

The offender's mental condition

1. By far the most significant subjective factor for sentencing purposes is the offender's mental health issues. There are three aspects: his schizophrenia; his disordered personality traits; and his substance abuse disorder which extends to his use of narcotic prescription pain-killing medication. Of these in my judgment the schizophrenia is the most relevant for present purposes.
2. Professor Greenberg described his symptoms in the following way (199.25T): "… part of his schizophrenic disorder is his disjointed, or just jumbled thoughts. I think, just to explain that, if you look at the police interview, there are parts of the police interview where he starts talking about all sorts of other matters, such as the Calabrese, the Sicilians, the Mafia, he's talking about national security, and these types of disjointed thoughts which have nothing to do with the questions the police are putting to him. So part of his mental processes, as part of his schizophrenic illness, is that he tends to have disjointed or what we call loosening of thought processes, is the technical term, but it basically means incoherence at times."
3. Professor Greenberg later said (205.15T): "… he has a fear of the mafia and the Sicilians and the Calabrese but he regards - that hasn't - he has some thoughts about corruption as well within the police later on when he gets sick in gaol, but at the time he doesn't seem to have that. It's quite a convoluted, disjointed - you know, he talks about conspiracy theories about the twin towers being bombed by the United States of America, and the Bali bombings were caused by the United States, and he has beliefs about aliens and all sorts of really strange, odd, bizarre beliefs, but in schizophrenia the main ones are the paranoia. That's the predominant residual delusion or - that he has."
4. He also told Professor Greenberg about an epiphany he had in jail where he says he saw Jesus in a blinding light like the sun. Jesus spoke to him and explained his situation to him. This apparently occurred at a time when he was not compliant with the medication he had been prescribed in gaol.
5. The offender had been consulting Dr Balin since at least July 2005, amongst other things, for his mental health issues. The initial symptoms were of anxiety and fear. Dr Balin referred him to a psychiatrist. But there is no evidence before me of that psychiatrist's views. Dr Balin made the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder around 5 or 6 years before September 2014 (142.10T). He described the offender's symptoms as follows (132.35 and 132.40T): "… I understand that condition is one of occasional disturbed thoughts and thinking and concepts and beliefs sometimes. Sometimes and more usually it is of persecution type of ideas. But also affects one's mood, how one feels about oneself, about society. It can lead to a fair amount of anxiety and schizoaffective … he certainly had what I considered to be delusions of a persecution nature, leading up to anxiety and fears for his own safety at times. This was a persistent mood of his over the time that I've known him." (sic.)
6. When the offender consulted Dr Balin on 30 September 2014, that is 3 days after his assault on Mr Love, he complained of hallucinating and having unusual ideas. The offender complained of being angry or belligerent and being uncomfortable with those feelings. The doctor reduced the dosage of his previously prescribed anti-psychotic medication, and augmented it with another anti-psychotic with fewer side effects (135.35T). The offender told Dr Balin about the assault on Mr Love saying "I may go to gaol" (138.5T). When the offender consulted Dr Balin again on 7 October 2014 prior to his arrest he told him he felt better on the altered medicine regime, saying "I no longer have paranoia" (139.40T), nor was he hearing any voices. It is important to say here that on no account of his assault on Mr Love does the offender claim to have acted under the impulse of command hallucinations.
7. Having examined the offender on no less than four occasions and having reviewed the offender's record of interview and other material in the police brief, Professor Greenberg came to the conclusion that it was likely that the offender had a schizophrenic disorder (176.10T). And that this condition was an underlying condition giving rise to an abnormality of the mind leading to a substantial impairment of the offender's capacity to control his actions. Professor Greenberg considered that the statements I have referred to above made by the offender to the police indicated a lack of control. He said this (183.30T): "So, one puts it into context, if you have a man here with a serious mental illness, schizophrenia, which is a condition, a neuro-degenerative condition, where he suffers from symptoms of schizophrenia, such as thought disorder or disorganised thoughts and less prominent delusions and hallucinations and I alluded to those odd, eccentric, paranoid sort of thinking about aliens, about the Mafia, about other types of paranoia that he has. So, that's the context. The background is you've got a man with a serious mental illness. In addition, he is also abusing illicit substances and prescribed substances which destabilise his mental state and his mental illness. Schizophrenia is a relapsing psychotic disorder and, obviously, people who are taking illicit substances or abusing prescribed prescription medication, their mental state is not as stable as someone who doesn't suffer from schizophrenia or somebody with schizophrenia who is stabilised on medication, not using drugs."
8. Professor Greenberg was referring to the statements made by the offender to the police that I have set out above, such as the reference to the "switch in his head" and a feeling "like the witches of hell just reached up and got into [his] decision making capacity". This indicated that at the time of the offending the offender had a substantial impairment of his capacity to control his actions which the Professor attributed to his schizophrenia. Dr Chew was of the same view.
9. Professor Greenberg and Dr Chew also agreed that the offender had aspects of a personality disorder and a substance abuse disorder which extended to the abuse of prescription drugs as I have already stated.
10. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the offender's acts which caused Mr Love's death his capacity to control himself was substantially impaired by an abnormality of his mind arising from the underlying condition of schizophrenia. Once again this was not really in contest at the trial.
11. The jury's verdict makes it impossible for me to find that the degree of impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter. That, however, does not mean that it is irrelevant to consider the magnitude of his impairment. The question remains relevant for sentencing purposes. In particular, it affects the question of the offender's moral culpability, and potentially whether he will continue to present a danger to the public upon his release.
12. There is obviously a line of impairment beyond which a jury will be satisfied that a person's liability for murder should be reduced to manslaughter by reason of substantial impairment by abnormality of the mind. Where this line is drawn is a matter for the jury's judgment. It is equally obvious that this offender did not cross that line. However, having heard all of the evidence at the trial and having considered very carefully for myself his presentation during the recorded interview, the content of his answers and the analysis of those matters by, in particular, Professor Greenberg I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the degree of substantial impairment the offender was subject to when the offending occurred was at a level just below the line where ever the jury were inclined to draw it.
13. The Crown has pointed out that on his own account to police the offender was obviously capable of reasoning that he had been insulted by Mr Love and that this required a response. This demonstrated in the Crown's submission that he was not totally impaired in his capacity to control himself. This may be true but it is not very relevant with respect. The relevant question relates to a partial degree of impairment. Total impairment would have engaged the mental illness defence which was never in play here.
14. I think it should also be pointed out that by his preparedness to plead guilty to manslaughter and by confining the trial to the real issue relating to substantial impairment, the offender, and by his counsel Mr Bruce, facilitated the administration of justice. Again, very fairly, the Crown accepted that this was so. I accept the submission of Mr Bruce that the most coherent, if that is the right word given his mental condition, account of what happened came from the offender who fully co-operated with the police after his arrest. This too facilitated the administration of justice. I am satisfied that these are matters which I may take into account in fixing the appropriate sentence for this offence and this offender: s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("Sentencing Procedure Act").

Maximum penalty

1. The maximum penalty for murder is imprisonment for life: s 19A of the Crimes Act. But the Court is empowered to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a specified term instead where appropriate: s 21 of the Sentencing Procedure Act. Under s 61(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, a life sentence must be imposed on a person who is convicted of murder, if the court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence. Accepting that such a decision is a matter for me alone, I record that the Crown have not submitted, serious as this case may be, that this is such a case calling for that maximum penalty. I accept that submission. A life sentence is not called for in this case.
2. Murder is what is referred to as a standard non-parole period offence. The standard non-parole period represents the non-parole period for an offence that, taking into account only the objective factors informing the relative seriousness of the offending, is in the middle of the range of seriousness for the subject offence, here, murder. The standard non-parole period for the murder of an adult is 20 years imprisonment.
3. It is relevant for me to mention these matters because when determining the appropriate sentence for an offence and an offender, the Court is required to bear in mind the maximum penalty and any prescribed standard non-parole period as legislative guideposts indicating the seriousness with which the offence in question is regarded. Sentencing has many purposes, these are: ensuring adequate punishment; crime prevention by deterring the offender and others from committing similar offences; community protection; the promotion of the rehabilitation of the offender; making the offender accountable; denouncing his conduct; and recognising the harm done to the victims of the offending and the general community.
4. The obligation of the sentencing judge is to consider all of the facts, matters and circumstances relevant to the particular sentencing task at hand in what is referred to as an instinctive synthesis to arrive at the appropriate punishment for the offence and the offender.

Objective seriousness

1. A central consideration is the objective seriousness of the offending at hand. From what I have said about sentencing for the crime of murder an assessment of objective seriousness is critical in determining whether a life sentence should be imposed, and, if not, is a central concept in considering whether the prescribed standard non-parole period should be imposed. Objective seriousness is an important general consideration generally because any sentence passed must not be disproportionate either by undue sternness or undue leniency to the seriousness of the offending, objectively assessed. The objective seriousness of the offending is not the same as the moral culpability of the offender, although there will always be a significant overlap between the two concepts.
2. The assessment of objective seriousness is particularly relevant as I have said, for standard non-parole period offences like murder. The High Court of Australia has said that meaningful content cannot be given to the concept of objective seriousness by taking into account the characteristics of the offender. Objective seriousness is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to the offender. It is determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending: Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at 132 [27].
3. As the differing judgments in Yun v R [2017] NSWCCA 317 show there remain questions about the extent to which a mental illness suffered by an offender which, as here contributes to his offending should be treat as an objective factor, on the one hand, or as a matter personal to the offender, on the other. From a practical point of view nothing much probably turns on any distinction in the present case. However, at least generally, moral culpability focuses upon the personal characteristics of the offender which may provide explanations for even serious offending suggesting the offender's culpability is as not as great as the seriousness of the offending might otherwise suggest. Reduced moral culpability may in turn reduce the relevance of specific and general deterrence as factors informing the particular sentence passed on the particular offender. It may make his time in custody more onerous. These are matters that will vary from case to case.
4. The potential significance of an offender's moral culpability in this context was explained by Spigelman CJ in R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 (at [23], Simpson and Blanch JJ agreeing) in this way: "To the extent that mental illness explains the offence… then an offender's inability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or to make reasonable judgments, or to control his or her faculties and emotions, will impact on the level of culpability of the offender, even where the illness does not amount to an excuse at law. As Wood CJ at CL put it in Henry, supra, at [254]: "… the community will readily understand that the offender who suffers from a mental disorder or abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive facilities or emotional restraints, and in some instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or ordered judgments. Almost invariably there is a limited appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act, or of its moral culpability, which although falling short of avoiding criminal responsibility does justify special consideration upon sentencing.""

The sentence in this case

1. The Crown has submitted that I should assess the objective seriousness of the offender's offending as not exceeding the middle range of seriousness. Mr Bruce has submitted that viewed objective this offending is close to the bottom of the range for murder. He referred me to R v Morris [2017] NSWSC 637, Fagan J and R v Neave [2012] NSWSC 229 as examples of low range assessments where the objective facts involved much greater violence than this case. He acknowledged the limited utility of such direct factual comparisons.
2. Matters relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness in this case include the consideration that the offender's conduct involved an act of considerable violence in the early evening in a public place where innocent members of the community were passing, going about the ordinary business of life. Mr Love's conduct may have been somewhat offensive, but it could hardly be regarded as provocative. The fatal blow had been preceded by another act of not insignificant violence in response to the offence which Mr Love had offered the offender. The offender only desisted from this assault because of the remonstrations of the others present. The violence, however, soon escalated because of the offender's inability to control his violent urges which caused him to snap.
3. As I have said, the requisite intention for murder in the present case is an actual intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, and not an intention to kill. This ameliorates the seriousness of the offending to some degree. It is important also to bear in mind that the fatal violent act was spontaneous. There is a complete lack of premeditation betrayed by the facts of the case. The fatal attack involved the infliction of a single blow. This is not a case involving the infliction of frenzied, continuing violence. The suddenness of the attack no doubt caught the intoxicated Mr Love entirely by surprise depriving him of any opportunity to avoid the offender's blow. After striking the fatal blow, the offender again sought to withdraw only to return to rifle through Mr Love's pockets. Again, only the remonstrations of others deterred him.
4. Taking into account the objective factors I have referred to, I would assess the objective seriousness of this offending as falling somewhat short of the middle range of seriousness for offences of murder.
5. I turn then to the question of the offender's moral culpability. I am satisfied in the circumstances of this case that his mental illness does ameliorate his moral culpability for this offending. Although the evidence suggests that around the time of the offending he was, generally speaking, compliant with his medication, it does seem that it was not totally effective in controlling his disease. I accept that the substantial impairment of his ability to control his actions due to an abnormality of the mind resulting from his underlying illness of schizophrenia explains why he offended. Obviously given the jury's verdict it cannot excuse his offending. His description of a switch flicking in his brain and of the witches of hell taking control strike me as honest descriptions of his thought processes when he attacked Mr Love on 27 September 2014. But for the substantial impairment of his ability to control his actions the offending would probably not have occurred. The absence of any prior history of serious offending strongly supports this view. It also supports the conclusion which I have drawn from the evidence that his fantastic accounts of involvement with organised crime and as a police informer are the product of his underlying disease. That his mental illness substantially contributed to his offending also derives some support from the consideration that three days later Dr Balin modified his prescription medication on the offender's complaint of increased symptoms on his then current regime, apparently to good effect.
6. I have given serious consideration to the question whether given this offending the protection of the community requires particular emphasis in the sentence I will pass on the offender. I repeat that the very limited history of violent offending in his past suggests that he does not present a particular danger to the community especially when his condition is well controlled by appropriate medication.
7. I bear in mind that his personality issues would also have affected his thinking at the time of the offending.
8. I am satisfied that the offender's mental condition does markedly reduce his moral culpability for this offending and the appropriateness of specific and general deterrence as an object of sentencing in this particular case. Although his impairment falls short of the level necessary to warrant the reduction in his criminal responsibility, in Wood CJ at CL's words it does "justify special consideration on sentencing" for murder.
9. He has also expressed remorse. When asked by investigating police towards the end of his interview whether there was anything further he wished to say (Question 342) the offender replied "I am deeply remorseful, I am very very concerned about Mr Love's family … I'm just devastated that he had a family and that they have lost him".
10. According to Professor Greenberg, in his professional judgment the offender appears to remain remorseful. He claims to have become more "religiosed" and verbalises strong religious beliefs following his epiphany-like experience while in custody.
11. Notwithstanding his remorse it is difficult to make any assessment at this stage of the prospect of rehabilitation given that must be bound up with the progress of his mental illness and his response to treatment. So far as the latter is concerned, he will not be cured and the best that can be hoped for is that he will continue to be stable on an appropriate anti-psychotic treatment regime. As past experience demonstrates there may be an ongoing need to adjust the prescription regime as his symptoms fluctuate.
12. As I have said, I also think it appropriate to provide some discount for the facilitation of the administration of justice, although in serious cases the amount allowed cannot be great. Nor do I think it helpful to actually quantify this particular factor other than to say I have taken it into account.
13. It is necessary for me to impose a term of imprisonment that will consist of a non-parole period and an additional term. The non-parole period is the minimum term that justice requires the offender to remain in custody for his offending. I have considered whether the statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the additional term ought to be varied having regard to the offender's obvious need for continuing treatment in the community upon his release as an aspect of his rehabilitation. However, the sentence I must impose will allow sufficient opportunity for that to occur even applying the statutory ratio. Moreover, in fixing the sentence I am about to pass I have given full measure to the ameliorating effect of the offender's schizophrenia in the various ways discussed. A favourable adjustment to the statutory ratio to take account of his need for treatment would be, it seems to me, tantamount to double counting.
14. No one should assume, least of all the offender, that his release on parole at the conclusion of the non-parole period will occur as a matter of course. That decision must be made by the State Parole Authority at about the time the non-parole period expires on the basis of all of the information then available to it. Doubtless some part will depend upon the offender's conduct in custody and what he has made of the opportunities that may be provided to him in custody to promote his own rehabilitation.
15. It is appropriate that the commencement of the sentence is backdated to 13 October 2014, the date of the offender's arrest, under s 47 of the Sentencing Procedure Act to take account of time served.
16. The murder of Mr Love is a serious, violent offence to which the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) applies and I am required by law to warn the offender that the provisions of that Act may make him liable to extended detention or supervision after the end of his sentence.
17. Mr Griffiths stand up.
18. By its verdict the jury have convicted you of the murder of Hoani Shaune Love. For this offence I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 16 years with a non-parole period of 12 years commencing on 13 October 2014 and expiring on 12 October 2026 with an additional term of 4 years commencing on 13 October 2026 and expiring on 12 October 2030.
19. You will be first eligible for parole after the expiration of the non-parole period on the 12 October 2026.

Amendments 10 September 2018 - Paragraph [38] last sentence, the words "the jury" added between the words "ever" and "were" DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 10 September 2018