3. But, important though a decision of this case might perhaps be for other persons, an enactment of the Queensland Parliament passed since the date of the hearing of this case has, as I read it, made the matter no longer important for the parties to this case. It seems to me to have cut away the ground on which the prosecutor sought to stand. For that reason I think that the prohibitions asked for should be refused. But I do not wish to be taken as thinking that, if the law had not been altered, the prosecutor's argument must have succeeded. Of that I am not satisfied. But, as in the circumstances it seems unnecessary to pass upon a question that has (except in so far as it affects the costs of these proceedings) become academic, I merely make the following observations. A corporation having statutory authority to conduct as an employer an industrial undertaking in Australia has I think power, unless expressly prohibited, to join an industrial organization of employers registered under the Commonwealth Act. To do so can, I consider, fairly be regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon, the statutory duty or authority to conduct the enterprise: see Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway Co. (1880) 5 App Cas 473, at p 478 On this aspect, it seems to me to be generally speaking immaterial whether the corporation's enterprise or undertaking be conducted in the interests of the public, or as a private business for the profit of shareholders: see the Professional Engineers' Case [1959] HCA 47; (1959) 107 CLR 208, and also the remarks of Ungoed-Thomas J., which I adopt, in Charles Roberts & Co. Ltd. v. British Railways Board (1965) 1 WLR 396 The only question then is whether membership of the particular association of employers, the Federation, is beyond power because of the nature of that association. In considering this it is of course relevant to consider the rules of the Federation and the obligations that membership of it may entail. But it seems to me that is not the sole consideration. Doubtless anyone who becomes a member of a corporation, quasi-corporation or voluntary association, does so subject to the contingency that by alteration of its constitution or rules the body may be greatly changed in character. The decision in Thellusson v. Viscount Valentia (1907) 2 Ch 1, is a reminder of that Moreover, without any alteration of its constitution, the body may be able to engage in activities different from, and perhaps only remotely related to, those which had seemed to be its main purpose: see e.g. H. A. Stephenson & Son Ltd. v. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co. [1931] HCA 47; (1931) 45 CLR 476; Anglo-Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green (1961) 1 QB 1 But in the case of an association registered as an organization under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act the risk that a corporation by becoming a member may be involved in activities foreign to its own purposes is lessened by the provisions of s. 140 of the Act, and a right to resign on three months' notice and payment of dues is ensured by the Act (s. 145). And in the present case the Rules of the Federation, cl. 18 (a) (ii), expressly enable some of the members to be relieved from a liability to pay any particular subscription of fees. It seems to me one must assume that this power would be exercised so as not to require the Board to pay any levy or subscription the payment of which would be unlawful on its part or embarrassing to it in the performance of its public functions. It seems appropriate at this point to refer to Lord Wrenbury's observations in the case of the Birkdale District Electric Supply Co. (1926) AC, at p 376, that, as adapted to this case, indicate that if the Board found its membership became oppressive in any particular and went to the committee of the Federation asking to be released from the fetter of its contract, it would be competent it seems for the committee to agree. There was no permanent fetter which put an end to the Board's exercise of its statutory powers. (at p417)