plaintiff. The offender was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, comprising a non-parole period of 19 years from 1 February 2016 to 31 January 2035 and a balance of term of six years from 1 February 2035 to...
Key principles
The sentencing judge assessed the murder as a serious offence of mid-range objective gravity, committed with a knife in the context of longstanding domestic violence and while...
In fixing sentence, the judge considered the offender's lack of remorse, relevant prior domestic-violence-related convictions, disturbed upbringing, prospects of rehabilitation,...
The judge imposed a 25-year term of imprisonment with a 19-year non-parole period, applying the statutory proportion and finding no special circumstances warranting a departure...
Issues before the court
Assessment of objective seriousness and the circumstances of the murder
Weight to be given to the offender's personal circumstances
Non-parole period and special circumstances
Cited legislation
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Plain English Summary
The court sentenced Gavin De Beyer after a jury found him guilty of murdering his wife. The judge found that he stabbed her in anger during a conflict, in a relationship marked by longstanding domestic violence, but could not determine exactly what happened immediately before the stabbing. The offender was subject to a domestic violence order protecting his wife. The judge considered the murder serious, noted that the offender showed no remorse, and gave limited weight to his childhood exposure to violence. The sentence was 25 years' imprisonment, with a 19-year non-parole period.
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Deep Dive
2,280 words · generated 28/09/2026
What happened
In R v Gavin John De Beyer [2017] NSWSC 1700, Hidden AJ sentenced De Beyer after a jury found him guilty of murdering his wife, Sharon Michelutti. The killing occurred at their home in Riverwood on 1 February 2016. The judge recorded that De Beyer inflicted a single stab wound to her abdomen with a kitchen knife.
The sentencing decision separates what the judge could find from what remained uncertain. The Crown case was circumstantial, and the evidence did not establish what led to the stabbing. The judge found there had been conflict between the couple and that De Beyer stabbed Michelutti in anger. The judge could not find that the act was anything other than spontaneous, nor find that De Beyer intended to kill her. The jury's murder verdict meant the sentence proceeded on the basis that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm (Facts, para 11; Sentence, para 2).
The court placed the killing in the context of a troubled relationship and a pattern of domestic violence. The judge described De Beyer as regularly assaulting Michelutti during arguments, including by throwing things at her, pushing, punching, kicking and head-butting her. The evidence included accounts from their children and a mobile-phone recording of an argument. The judge noted that Michelutti was not physically violent towards De Beyer (Facts, paras 3-5).
An apprehended domestic violence order protecting Michelutti and the couple's daughter was made on 16 January 2016 and served on De Beyer on 23 January. It was in force on the day of the murder. The judge also noted the preceding morning's events, including De Beyer's anger about a lost phone charger and an unanswered attempt to call emergency services from Michelutti's phone. But the judge did not make firm findings about precisely how the call was initiated or whether De Beyer prevented it (Facts, paras 8-11).
After the stabbing, De Beyer wiped the knife, placed it in the kitchen sink, put a bloodstained tea towel in the washing machine without starting it, covered Michelutti's body with a doona, changed his clothes and left. He later went to a police station and said that Michelutti had killed herself. The judge accepted that he had taken steps to conceal his involvement, but did not accept that the evidence established the Crown's full proposed explanation of why he left when he did. The steps were described as “both incomprehensive and largely ineffectual” (Facts, paras 12-15).
The judge imposed 25 years' imprisonment, with a 19-year non-parole period commencing on 1 February 2016. The six-year balance of term was to run from 1 February 2035 to 31 January 2041. The decision was a sentencing judgment, not an appeal or a general ruling on the law of murder.
Why the court decided this way
The judge assessed the offence as serious. The features expressly identified were the use of a knife, the established background of domestic violence, the existence of an order protecting Michelutti, and the absence of anything suggesting provocation by her. The Crown prosecutor and defence counsel agreed that the offence fell within the “mid-range of objective gravity”. The judge adopted that agreed assessment (Sentence, paras 1-2).
The judge did not treat the uncertainty about the precise lead-up to the stabbing as a basis for finding the offence less serious in every respect. Instead, the sentence proceeded on the facts the judge could safely find: a spontaneous stabbing in anger, with an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. The judge did not attribute an intention to kill, but the jury's verdict remained murder. This illustrates the decision's fact-sensitive approach: the sentencing findings were confined to the evidence and did not fill gaps with the Crown's proposed scenario (Facts, para 11; Sentence, para 2).
The personal circumstances offered limited mitigation. De Beyer maintained his innocence and displayed no remorse, and the judge considered that his subjective case “does little to assist him on sentence”. The judge did, however, consider the criminal record in context. Prior convictions for breaches of apprehended violence orders and stalking or intimidation were relevant, but were few and spread across a lengthy period. Other aspects of the record were treated as having no present relevance (Subjective case, para 1; Sentence, para 3).
The judge accepted that De Beyer had a disturbed upbringing and had been exposed as a child to violence perpetrated by his father. The judge gave this only limited weight because De Beyer had not provided an account of that experience and there was no expert evidence about its likely effect on him. The psychiatrist had not found a major mental illness requiring specific psychiatric treatment. The material identified substance abuse as a principal problem and proposed treatment and supervision after release, but the sentencing reasons do not quantify any reduction for those matters (Subjective case, paras 4-9; Sentence, para 3).
Deterrence was important. The judge considered personal deterrence relevant and said that general deterrence “looms large”. Although the judge entertained some hope that De Beyer would not reoffend after a lengthy term in custody, rehabilitation prospects were difficult to assess. The sentence also reflected the judge's conclusion that the statutory proportion between the sentence and non-parole period should apply: no special circumstances warranted departure (Sentence, paras 4-5).
The victim impact statements were received and considered. The judge referred to the grief of the deceased's daughter, brother and mother, and to the practical effects on family members, including relatives taking parental responsibility for children. The reasons describe these statements as giving “texture” to the harm caused by the unlawful taking of a life, quoting McCallum J in R v Halloun as cited in Sumpton v R (Victim impact statements, para 2).
Before and after state of the law
This judgment does not purport to change the law or announce a new test. It applies sentencing considerations to the facts of a particular murder after trial. Its value for legal analysis lies chiefly in how the judge identified the facts that could be found, assessed seriousness, and explained the weight given to personal circumstances and deterrence.
The judgment refers to R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705 and Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162 only in connection with victim impact statements. It attributes to McCallum J in Halloun the proposition that such statements give “texture” to the proposition that unlawful killing harms the community, and notes that the proposition was cited in Sumpton. The decision does not set out broader holdings from either case, so no wider account of their rules or effect can be drawn from this judgment alone.
There is accordingly no identifiable “before and after” change in doctrine in the text. The judge applied ordinary sentencing reasoning as described in the reasons: assessment of objective gravity, consideration of relevant subjective matters, attention to deterrence, and application of the statutory proportion absent special circumstances. The court's reasons do not state a new legal principle about domestic violence, murder, or the treatment of victim impact statements.
A point of particular practical interest is the judge's restrained treatment of uncertain facts. The judge identified the Crown's account of the failed emergency call and the offender's departure as plausible, but did not convert plausibility into a firm finding. The result is an example of sentencing findings being tied to what the evidence supported, rather than to every inference advanced by a party (Facts, paras 10-15).
Key passages with plain-English translation
The judge said: “I am satisfied that there was conflict between the offender and the deceased on this occasion and that he stabbed her in anger” (Facts, para 11). In plain English, the judge accepted the immediate context of conflict and anger, while declining to claim certainty about what had triggered the stabbing.
The judge added: “I could not be satisfied that the stabbing was anything other than spontaneous” (Facts, para 11). This does not mean that the killing was treated as insignificant or excused. It records the limit of the evidence about planning or deliberation. The sentence still reflected a murder conviction and an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm.
On concealment, the judge accepted that De Beyer had taken steps to hide his involvement but considered those steps “both incomprehensive and largely ineffectual” (Facts, para 15). In plain English, the judge found concealment efforts, but did not accept that they formed the complete, deliberate plan proposed by the Crown.
On the relationship history, the judge noted that long-standing domestic violence may not be apparent to outsiders, including family friends (Subjective case, para 13). This observation explained why the evidence of a friend who thought well of De Beyer did not provide strong evidence about his behaviour within the family. It was not a separate finding that every outsider was unaware of the violence.
Finally, the judge said that general deterrence “looms large” (Sentence, para 4). In plain English, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offending and deter similar conduct was a significant consideration. The reasons do not assign a numerical portion of the 25-year term to deterrence or to any other factor.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
Because this is a single-instance sentencing decision, it is more accurate to describe the fact pattern to which its reasoning relates than to treat it as establishing a formal trigger test. Its reasoning is most directly relevant to sentencing after a murder conviction where the killing occurs in a domestic relationship marked by a supported history of violence, and the offender was subject to an order protecting the deceased.
The particular combination here included a stabbing with a kitchen knife, a finding of anger and conflict, uncertainty about the precise events leading to the fatal act, and a murder verdict founded on intent to inflict grievous bodily harm rather than a judicial finding of intent to kill. The judge also had evidence of steps taken after the stabbing to conceal involvement, but treated the scope and purpose of those steps cautiously.
The decision may be a useful comparison where a sentencing court must distinguish established facts from plausible but unproven inferences. It demonstrates that evidence of prior domestic violence and a current protection order formed part of the seriousness assessment, while uncertainty about the immediate sequence of events remained an express limitation. It also shows that an offender's childhood exposure to domestic violence was considered, but was given limited weight on the evidence presented in this case (Facts, paras 8-15; Sentence, paras 1-3).
The judgment should not be read as saying that every murder in a domestic relationship, every stabbing, or every breach of an order attracts the same sentence. The reasons record the agreed mid-range assessment and the particular findings made on the evidence. They do not provide a tariff or a numerical formula for another case.
How later courts have treated it
The judgment text identifies no later cases that considered or applied De Beyer. The material supplied therefore does not establish how subsequent courts treated this sentencing decision. It would be unsafe to infer later acceptance, criticism or limitation from the fact that the judgment itself cited earlier cases.
The two cases identified within De Beyer are R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705 and Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162. They are earlier authorities, not later treatment of De Beyer. In this judgment they appear only in the discussion of victim impact statements. The judge's citation indicates reliance on the quoted proposition about such statements giving texture to the harm caused by homicide, but the text does not reproduce the full reasoning in either authority.
A reliable account of later treatment would require later judgments or a legal database search beyond the materials provided here. On the supplied judgment alone, the sound conclusion is limited: it is a NSW Supreme Court sentence decision dated 7 December 2017, and no later judicial treatment is identified in its text.
Still-open questions
The judgment leaves unresolved exactly what happened immediately before the stabbing. The judge could not determine what led to the attack, why De Beyer had the knife, or precisely how the attempted 000 call was initiated. The Crown's theory that Michelutti tried to call for help and that De Beyer prevented her was described as plausible, but the reasons do not record it as an established finding (Facts, paras 10-11).
The court also left open the precise explanation for De Beyer's departure from the home. The Crown argued that he left because his son arrived and that he otherwise would have dealt further with incriminating items. The judge accepted that the evidence did not establish more than that De Beyer was leaving and encountered his son outside. The judge found concealment steps had occurred, but did not accept the Crown's complete account of their intended scope (Facts, paras 14-15).
The likely effect of De Beyer's childhood exposure to violence was another unresolved matter. The judge accepted the exposure but could not assess its impact in the absence of the offender's own account and expert evidence. The judgment therefore does not establish a general rule about the weight such a background should receive in other sentencing cases (Subjective case, paras 4-9; Sentence, para 3).
Finally, the judgment gives no account of later appellate review or later judicial consideration. It also does not provide a detailed breakdown of how each sentencing factor contributed to the 25-year term. Its reasons disclose the principal considerations and final sentence, but not a mathematical allocation of weight among them.
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Judgment (5 paragraphs)
[1]
HIDDEN AJ: The offender, Gavin De Beyer, has been found guilty at trial of the murder of his wife, Sharon Michelutti, at their home in Riverwood on 1 February 2016. On that morning he killed her by a single stab wound to her abdomen with a kitchen knife. The Crown case was circumstantial, and what led to the stabbing is unknown. However, the incident falls to be understood against the background of their relationship.
[2]
Facts
The offender was 50 years old at the time of the offence and the deceased was 48. They had been in a relationship since their later teens and they married in 2001. They had 5 children, whose ages ranged from 30 to 7 years. At the time of the offence the last of their two children were residing at their home: their son, K, aged 17 years and their daughter, T, who was 7.
Both the offender and the deceased drank alcohol to excess at times, and both used illicit drugs. Over a long period they had regularly used cannabis and taken amphetamines (described in a statement of the offender's sister, Louise De Beyer, as "speed"). It seems that in more recent years they also used methylamphetamine, commonly known as "ice".
The relationship had been a troubled one for many years. They regularly had arguments about a variety of matters: sometimes matters of substance, such as the expenditure of money or the behaviour of the children, and sometimes quite trivial things. It does seem that mutual drug use, and its impact upon the family finances, put a strain on the relationship.
Frequently, during these arguments, the offender would assault the deceased, throwing things at her, pushing her, punching her, kicking her and even head butting her. She was not physically violent towards him. They abused each other, but he would abuse her in particularly virulent terms. This was strikingly demonstrated by a recording of one of the arguments made by the deceased on her mobile phone, which was downloaded by investigating police and was admitted in evidence at the trial (Exhibit T).
This is no more than a brief sketch of the evidence of domestic disharmony and violence from a number of witnesses at the trial, principally that of their son, K and their third child, Kalyra, who was 19 years old at the time of the offence. It was also the subject of handwritten material of the deceased, Exhibit U, which was found after her death.
Despite this consistent conflict, the relationship had endured for roughly 30 years. Louise De Beyer, whose statement to police was read to the jury, was familiar with the relationship of the offender and the deceased from its inception until about 1990, when she had a falling out with her brother and lost contact with them for about 20 years. When contact was resumed the deceased would speak to her about the relationship. In these circumstances Ms De Beyer's knowledge of the extent and nature of their conflict is limited. Nevertheless, it is fair to note her description of them as "a very loving couple in their own funny way."
A neighbour, Lisa El-Zein, who had known the offender and the deceased for a long time and had been a confidant of the deceased, gave evidence of their relationship not being a happy one, particularly in the period from the later part of 2015 to the day of the offence. Generally, however, she agreed in cross-examination that there had been "a degree of up and down" in the relationship.
On 13 December 2015, police were called to the home in the mid-evening after the deceased and the offender had been drinking and arguing. What led to their being called is of no particular significance. Indeed, it appears that it was the offender who called them. What is of significance is that the incident led to an apprehended domestic violence order being made against the offender in the Local Court on 16 January 2016. The protected persons were the deceased and their daughter, T. It was served on him on 23 January. The order was for a term of 12 months and, of course, was in force at the time of the offence.
In the morning of 1 February 2016, prior to the fatal event, the offender had been angry. Kalyra had telephone contact with her mother at about 10am, and she could hear her father in the background complaining angrily about having lost his phone charger. At the time of the stabbing, which appears to have been roughly 40 minutes later, only the offender and the deceased were at home. K had been staying overnight at a friend's place.
Telephone records reveal that at 10.42am a call was initiated to the 000 emergency line from the phone used by the deceased, but did not connect. It was the Crown case that the deceased had attempted to make that call but was prevented from doing so by the offender. It was said to be at that point or shortly thereafter that he stabbed her. There had been conflict of some kind between the two of them and the offender inflicted the wound in a rage. He was said to have prevented the call to 000 because he was conscious of being subject to an apprehended domestic violence order at the time and did not want police to become involved.
This is a plausible scenario, consistent with the evidence, but there is substance in the argument of counsel for the offender, Mr Webb, that there is very limited evidence upon which to form firm conclusions about what happened. As I have said, the evidence does not disclose what led to the stabbing. Nor does it disclose why the offender had the knife, or exactly how the 000 call was initiated. Against the background of domestic violence, I am satisfied that there was conflict between the offender and the deceased on this occasion and that he stabbed her in anger. His use of a knife was exceptional, there being no suggestion that he had ever used one on any previous occasion, but I could not be satisfied that the stabbing was anything other than spontaneous. I cannot find that he intended to kill the deceased but, of course, the jury's verdict conveys that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm upon her.
The offender then set about concealing his involvement in his wife's death. He withdrew the knife from her body, took it to the kitchen, wiped it with a tea-towel and placed it in a kitchen sink with other items to be washed. He put the blood stained tea towel into the washing machine in the laundry, but did not turn the machine on. The deceased was lying on the bed in the main bedroom, which they shared, and he covered her body with a doona. He left the house a little before 11am, having changed his clothes. He had been wearing a distinctive shirt and shorts. The shirt was found by police on the top of the washing machine, and the shorts were never found.
At the time he left the home, K arrived to change his pants before going with two friends to look for work. The offender said nothing to K about the fate of his mother. He merely said that he was going to pick up his car, which he had lent to Kalyra the previous day, and left. He proceeded on foot to Campsie Police Station. There, apparently in great distress, he told police that the deceased had killed herself. This had been the effect of his case at trial: that is, that the knife had penetrated her body by her own act, whether deliberately or accidentally.
It was the Crown case that after the stabbing the offender left the home when he did because of the arrival of K. It was said that he otherwise would have dealt with the knife, the tea towel used to wipe it, and other items in the house tending to link him to the stabbing before leaving. It was put that if he had succeeded in doing so, he might have been able to claim that someone else had entered the house and murdered his wife while he was absent.
This also seems plausible, and is consistent with the appearance of the offender having left the house before completing the process of dealing with items which might have been incriminating. However, there is force in Mr Webb's argument that it assumes that he left the house because he knew K had arrived. It is fair to say that the evidence could establish no more than that he was leaving the house and encountered K outside as he did so. There is no doubt that the offender had taken steps in the house to conceal his crime, but they may not have been as well thought out as the Crown would have it. On balance, I accept Mr Webb's submission that those steps were "both incomprehensive and largely ineffectual."
[3]
Victim impact statements
I received victim impact statements from the deceased's daughter, Kalyra Michelutti, who is now 21 years old, and from the deceased's brother, Steve Michelutti, and her mother, Joan Bush. Kalyra Michelutti read her statement to the court. As one might expect, she was very distressed when she did so but persevered with courage and dignity. All the statements express their grief and outrage at the senseless and brutal death of the deceased, and attest to her love of her children. Steve Michelutti's statement also reveals the "significant distress" suffered by his partner, Sharon, who saw the deceased as "the sister she always wanted to have... ." The statements reveal the enduring effects this tragedy has had upon their lives. This includes Steve and his partner taking on parental responsibility in respect of their nephews and nieces, and Kalyra assuming the burden of care for her younger sister, T.
At the sentence proceedings I expressed my deepest sympathy to the family members in their loss, and I do so again now. I have regard to the victim impact statements as giving "texture to the undoubted proposition that every unlawful taking of a human life harms the community in some way": per McCallum J in R v Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705 at [46] (cited in Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162 at [153].
[4]
Subjective case
The offender is now 52 years old. He has a sporadic criminal history, commencing in the Children's Court in 1979. The only entries of significance for present purposes are several offences of breaching an apprehended violence order and stalking or intimidating with intent (domestic). These entries are infrequent, and appear over periods between 1996 to 2000 and 2011 to 2014.
Also in evidence are a pre-sentence report of Ms Amy Rafalo, Community Corrections Officer, a report of Dr Olav Nielssen, psychiatrist, and a statement of the offender's mother, Ms Barbara Booth. His mother bears that surname following her second marriage, after the termination some years before of her relationship with the offender's father, John Ralston De Beyer.
Ms Booth is now 74 years old. In her statement she sketches the history of the family, including the development of the relationship between the offender and the deceased when they were both in their teenage years. The offender is the eldest of four children, two of whom have died. The picture she paints of his early years is disturbing and, possibly, significant.
She described the offender's father as "an angry man", who physically abused her on many occasions. She said that she had blocked a lot of what had happened in those early years out of her memory, but did recall "certain things". He would hit her in her left eye which, to his knowledge, had been damaged in an accident when she was a young girl, causing a loss of vision. He would beat her up in front of the children, who were terrified and too little to do anything. She said that it was "like he needed an audience." On occasions his beatings were bad enough for her to need hospitalisation, but she was too scared to call the police because she knew that he would beat her up "some more."
She also said that in recent times she was told by her daughter, Louise, about something else which she had blocked from her memory. This was that the offender's father used to be "very heavy handed" with him and would often "bash" him. Any time that the younger children were in trouble for having done something bad, he would beat the offender "as punishment for the other children."
At some stage she and the father separated. It is not apparent from her statement when this occurred, but the offender told Ms Rafalo and Dr Nielssen that he was 6 years old at the time. He and his siblings remained with their mother, although for a period of some years he, his sister and one of his brothers stayed with their maternal grandmother because their mother was spending a lot of time with his other brother, who was seriously ill in hospital. In due course, they returned to live with their mother, and over the whole period, they had some contact with their father on weekends.
[5]
Sentence
Clearly, this is a serious offence of murder. It involved the use of a knife. It was an act of domestic violence, against a longstanding background of violence of that kind. The offender was subject to an apprehended violence order for the protection of the deceased at the time. While the circumstances of the stabbing are unclear, there is nothing to suggest any provocation on the part of the deceased.
As I have said, the offender stands for sentence on the basis that he killed the deceased by a spontaneous act with the intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm upon her. The Crown prosecutor and Mr Webb were agreed that the offence falls into the mid-range of objective gravity.
The offender maintains his innocence and has shown no remorse. His subjective case does little to assist him on sentence. I have referred to his previous convictions for contravening apprehended violence orders and stalking and intimidation. However, it is fair to observe that there are only a few of those convictions over a lengthy period, and that his criminal history otherwise is limited and of no present relevance. I accept that he had a disturbed upbringing. I do take into account his exposure to domestic violence perpetrated by his father when he was a child but, in the absence of any account by him of that experience, and any expert evidence about its likely impact, I can give it no more than limited weight.
It is difficult to assess his prospects of rehabilitation. However, given that he must serve a lengthy term in custody before release on parole and the fact that he would be of an advanced aged when released, I entertain some hope that he would not re-offend in this way. Nevertheless, personal deterrence remains relevant and, of course, general deterrence looms large. I do not find special circumstances warranting a departure from the statutory proportion between sentence and non-parole period. Given the length of the sentence I must pass, that proportion would provide for a substantial period of parole eligibility.
I consider that the appropriate sentence is imprisonment for 25 years. The application of the statutory proportion to that sentence leads to a non-parole period, in round figures, of 19 years. He has been in custody since his arrest on the day of the offence, 1 February 2016.
Gavin John De Beyer, for the murder of Sharon Michelutti you are sentenced to a non-parole period of 19 years, commencing on 1 February 2016 and expiring on 31 January 2035, and a balance of term of 6 years, commencing on 1 February 2035 and expiring on 31 January 2041. You will be eligible for release on parole on 1 February 2035.
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Decision last updated: 07 December 2017
The offender was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, comprising a non-parole period of 19 years from 1 February 2016 to 31 January 2035 and a balance of term of six years from 1 February 2035 to 31 January 2041, with eligibility for release on parole on 1 February 2035.
After the offender and the deceased moved out to live together, it seems that Ms Booth has had only sporadic contact with them. It is apparent from her statement that she was not aware of the problems in the relationship and, in particular, of the offender's pattern of domestic violence.
To what extent the offender was scarred by his childhood experience of domestic violence perpetrated by his father is unclear. Ms Rafalo's pre-sentence report reveals that he "described what appeared to have been a difficult childhood", and he told Dr Neilssen that he had been "neglected as a child." However, neither report records anything said by him about his father's violence. His account of his background conflicts with that of his mother in other respects, which need not be examined. To both Ms Rafalo and Dr Nielssen he maintained his innocence of the murder of the deceased, and gave an account of his relationship with her which is plainly sanitised and which I do not accept.
Dr Nielssen did not find the offender to be suffering from a major mental illness requiring specific psychiatric treatment. His main problem would seem to be substance abuse, and Dr Nielssen recommended counselling and supervision of abstinence after his release from prison. Ms Rafalo described him as a man who "presented as emotionless and detached", and he displayed no remorse about the death of the deceased. She recommended that, upon his release, he be referred to "an appropriate intervention program targeting domestic abuse" and a "suitable drug and alcohol intervention program."
Finally, I received a character reference from a friend of the offender, Mr John Nott, who also gave evidence. The reference was provided with the knowledge of the murder conviction. It records that Mr Nott had known the offender and his family for 12 years, and considered himself a close family friend. It describes the offender as a person of integrity, who did his best to be a good parent and was "always there" for his family. Mr Nott wrote that, although the offender's and the deceased's relationship was "quite volatile", they loved each other and brought up their children as well as they could with the little resources available to them. He added in the reference that he "would not have remained friends if there was any inclination (sic) abuse was being perpetrated against the family, as he knew I do not accept any excuse for violence against women and children."
In oral evidence, Mr Nott presented as an honest and responsible citizen. However, it emerged in cross examination that, apart from a "couple" of occasions when police took out apprehended violence orders against the offender for the protection of the deceased, he was not aware of the extent of the violence he had inflicted upon her. Nor was he aware of issues between the offender and the family, including the fact that other members of the family had taken out apprehended violence orders against him.
Over objection, I admitted a statement of the offender's son, Blake, together with a disc of a recording made on his mobile phone, concerning an occasion in October 2014 when the offender abused Blake from outside his home unit (Exhibit B). That incident needs to be understood in its context and, of itself, I do not see it as of any particular significance. When the disc was played to Mr Nott, he said that it sounded like an argument between the offender and his son. He had no knowledge of its circumstances, but said that he did not know "whether that is a relationship between him and his son."
Of course, it is often the case that long standing domestic violence is not apparent to outsiders, including family friends. The offender may well have exhibited good qualities in his relationship with Mr Nott as a friend, but I can place very little weight upon Mr Nott's evidence about his relationship with the deceased and his family.