Determination
38Section 3A of the C(SP)A sets out the purposes of sentencing as follows:
"3A The purposes for which a Court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows:
(a) To ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,
(b) To prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,
(c) To protect the community from the offender,
(d) To promote the rehabilitation of the offender,
(e) To make the offender accountable for his or her actions,
(f) To denounce the conduct of the offender,
(g) To recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community."
39I have had regard in respect of each offence to the maximum sentence laid down by Parliament, together with the standard non-parole period of 3 years in respect of the offence pursuant to s 154C(1)(a). These are guideposts to be taken into account in considering all of the circumstances of the offending. I also take into account that the offender is entitled to a discount of 25% in respect of the early plea of guilty he has entered to each charge. I am also mindful of the principles of parity, proportionality and avoidance of double punishment set out in Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610 at [45].
40Section 54B of the Sentencing Act was amended by the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard non-parole periods) Act 2013, which commenced on 29 October 2013. It applies to offences committed before the Act commenced pursuant to clause 4 of Schedule 2. It provides as follows:
"54B Consideration of standard non-parole period in sentencing
(1) This section applies when a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for an offence, or an aggregate sentence of imprisonment with respect to one or more offences, set out in the Table to this Division.
(2) The standard non-parole period for an offence is a matter to be taken into account by a court in determining the appropriate sentence for an offender, without limiting the matters that are otherwise required or permitted to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offender.
(3) The court must make a record of its reasons for setting a nonparole period that is longer or shorter than the standard nonparole period and must identify in the record of its reasons each factor that it took into account.
(4) When determining an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for one or more offences, the court is to indicate, for those offences to which a standard non-parole period applies, the non-parole period that it would have set for each such offence to which the aggregate sentence relates had it set a separate sentence of imprisonment for that offence.
(5) If the court indicates under subsection (4) that it would have set a non-parole period for an offence that is longer or shorter than the standard non-parole period for the offence, the court must make a record of the reasons why it would have done so and must identify in the record of its reasons each factor that it took into account.
(6) A requirement under this section for a court to make a record of reasons for setting a non-parole period that is longer or shorter than a standard non-parole period does not require the court to identify the extent to which the seriousness of the offence for which the non-parole period is set differs from that of an offence to which the standard non-parole period is referable.
(7) The failure of a court to comply with this section does not invalidate the sentence."
41There are significant subjective matters which have to be taken into account in respect of this offender's background, his exposure from an early age to a culture of extreme violence, his consumption from an early age of alcohol and drugs and the effect of a lifetime of deprivation on him, including his institutionalisation over large parts of his life. In Bugmy v R, supra, the High Court held:
1. The circumstances that an offender has been raised in a community surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may mitigate the sentence because his/her moral culpability is likely to be less than the culpability of an offender whose formative years have not been marred in that way [40].
2. The effects of profound deprivation do not diminish over time and repeated offending and should be given full weight in determining the sentence in every case [42-44].
3. A background of that kind may leave a mark on a person throughout life and compromise a person's capacity to mature and learn from experience [43].
42The High Court also noted that Aboriginal Australians, whether they live in remote or urban communities, may be subject to the grave social difficulties discussed in R v Fernando (1992) 76 AcrimR 58 and Kennedy v R [2010] NSWCCA 260. I am satisfied that there is ample material establishing the offender's background here. I am therefore satisfied that the offender's recourse to violence in the circumstances here, albeit fuelled by drugs and alcohol, are such that the offender's moral culpability for his inability to control his impulses must be substantially reduced.
43In respect of the objective seriousness of the offences committed on 8 October 2012, this is a question that needs to be considered separately in respect of each offence. However, in respect of the second of those offences, namely, that concerning s 154C(1)(a) which has a maximum penalty of 10 years and a standard non-parole of three years, I have had regard to the offender's submissions relying on R v Barker and R v Matthews, supra. In R v Barker, Howie J (with whom Basten JA and Hall J agreed) referred to factors relevant for consideration in the assessment of objective seriousness of an offence as follows:
"63 It seems to me that for an aggravated offence involving the offender being in company the following factors may be relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence: whether the offence was planned; the number of persons involved in committing the offence and their conduct; the types of threats made; the degree of violence displayed; the number of persons in the vehicle at the time of the offence; the degree of fear instilled in the victim; the period over which the vehicle is used; damage to the vehicle (if not giving rise to a separate charge); the place and time the offence is committed (for example whether at night or in an isolated area); the special vulnerability of the victim; and the motive for the commission of the offence. The list is not intended to be exhaustive. Although counsel referred to the value of the vehicle, I doubt that is a relevant consideration where there is no intention to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle."
44Having regard to those types of considerations here, I accept that the objective seriousness of the offending in respect of that charge was below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of that type, but only just below it. The offence in relation to Constable Jennings would fall into the same category. The other offences are at the lower range of objective seriousness.
45General deterrence is a relevant matter and I must take into account the fact that the offences were committed by a prisoner against two Police officers whilst in Police custody, namely, Constables Fisher and Jennings. The injuries received by Constable Jennings could have potentially been far worse, and the conduct involved other road users including Ms Waldron. I am also mindful that the offences on 7 September 2012 were committed when the offender was on parole.
46I have therefore taken into account, as an aggravating factor, in respect of the offences on 8 October 2012, that in respect of two of those offences the victim was a Police officer (s 21A(2)(a)). I do not find, as submitted by the Crown, that the offences involved a grave risk of death to another person or persons (s 21A(2)(i)(b)). There is no evidence to establish the extent of the risk other than that Constable Jennings suffered the injuries outlined above.
47I have also borne in mind that the relevance of general deterrence of having prisoners escape from Police custody and, to a lesser extent, specific deterrence in respect of this offender for the reasons I have outlined above. I am satisfied that special circumstances have been established here based on the need for the offender to be engaged in intensive programs such as the IDATP whilst he is in custody, and following his release on parole, in respect of rehabilitation for drug and alcohol abuse and violence prevention. For those reasons I would make an order varying the ratio of the non-parole period pursuant to s 44(2) of the C(SP)A.
48Section 53 and s 53A of the Sentencing Act provide as follows:
"S 53 Multiple sentences of imprisonment
(1) When a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment on an offender in relation to more than one offence, the court must (unless imposing an aggregate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 53A) comply with the requirements of this Division by imposing a separate sentence in relation to each offence.
(2) The term, and any non-parole period, set under this Division in relation to a sentence of imprisonment is not revoked or varied by a later sentence of imprisonment that the same or some other court subsequently imposes in relation to another offence.
S 53A Aggregate sentences of imprisonment
(1) A court may in sentencing an offender for more than one offence, impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment with respect to all or any 2 or more of those offences instead of imposing a separate sentence of imprisonment for each.
(2) A court that imposes an aggregate sentence of imprisonment under this section on an offender must indicate to the offender, and make a record of, the following:
(a) The fact that an aggregate sentence is being imposed,
(b) The sentence that would have been imposed for each offence (after taking into account such matters as are relevant under Part 3 or any other provision of this Act) had separate sentences been imposed instead of an aggregate sentence.
(3) Subsection (2) does not limit any requirement that a court has, apart from that subsection, to record the reasons for its decisions.
(4) The term, and any non-parole period, set under this Division in relation to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not revoked or varied by a later sentence of imprisonment that the same or some other court subsequently imposes in relation another offence.
(5) An aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not invalidated by a failure to comply with this section."
49I note that any aggregate sentence must be "just and appropriate" to the totality of the offending behaviour - see Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 63.
50I am mindful that the offences are interrelated in that they involve the consumption by the offender of drugs and alcohol, his arrest in respect of the first sequence of offences on 7 October 2012 and his subsequent detox upon entering custody which led to him committing the second sequence of offences on 8 October 2012. Having regard to the principles of sentencing referred to above and in particular those of totality and proportionality, I propose to aggregate the sentences to be imposed having first assessed the indicative sentences to be imposed in respect of each Count. It is clear that aggregation of sentences pursuant to s 53A must reflect some accumulation of the indicative head sentences - see R v Rae [2013] NSWCCA 9.
51The Court is required to indicate the sentence that would have been imposed for each offence had separate sentences been imposed instead of an aggregate sentence. This provides transparency in the sentencing process.
52Let me indicate in turn the sentences of imprisonment I would have imposed if I was not using s 53A:
A Offences of 7 September 2012
Count 1 - 18 months
Count 2 - 2 years 6 months
Count 3 - 2 years
B Offences on 8 October 2012
Count 1 - 12 months
Count 2 - 3 years with a non-parole period of 1 year and 6 months
Count 3 - 1 year 6 months
Count 4 - 6 months
Count 5 - 2 years 6 months.
53I have also had regard to the fact that in respect of each sequence of offences, the offences arise out of the same circumstances and would otherwise warrant some partial concurrency in sentences.
54I convict you of each of the offences as set out above and pursuant to s 53A I impose an aggregate term of imprisonment. I fix an aggregate non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months. I take into account that as at 6 February 2014 you had been in custody for 6 months and 19 days. That period is now 6 months and 27 days. Your aggregate non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months will therefore commence on 18 July 2013 and expire on 17 January 2017.
55I order an aggregate total term of 7 years to commence on 18 July 2013 and expire on 17 July 2020.
56The Court orders that your parole eligibility date is 17 January 2017.