And that such an approach to cumulation will lead to some arbitrariness in the determination of the relevant periods was also recognised by Ormiston, J.A. in Coukoulis where his Honour noted[9] that such an approach necessarily leads to some "ad hoc reasoning and arbitrary conclusions".
9 In my view, the sentencing error for which the appellant contends has not been made out. The cumulation orders were not arbitrary in the sense that there was failure by the judge to give proper consideration to what should be the appropriate periods of cumulation in respect of the corresponding sentences. It seems to me that his Honour approached this aspect of the sentencing task in accordance with the principles to which I have referred. Thus, the learned judge first imposed an appropriate sentence in respect of each of the 24 counts.[10] His Honour then sought to produce an appropriate total effective sentence by making the impugned cumulation order. It is true that, on one view, it would have been preferable had his Honour identified groups of counts or offences, as suggested by Ormiston, J.A. in Grabovac as I have mentioned earlier, and then ordered cumulation by reference to such groupings. If his Honour had adopted that course, it may have been more apparent that he had given consideration, as between the groups of counts, to the appropriate periods that should be cumulated. But I consider that it is plain enough that his Honour effectively did just that. The learned sentencing judge obviously concluded that, in broad terms, a greater period should be cumulated from the more serious offences than the lesser ones, although, as between the counts within each group, the period of cumulation would be the same. As is apparent from the Table, the sentences vary in length, depending on the seriousness of the offence, from one month to the maximum of 18 months, and his Honour's formula produced different periods of cumulation in respect of different groups of sentences. That his Honour's approach involved some degree of arbitrariness is unsurprising and, as I have said, by itself did not constitute sentencing error as was recognised in Coukoulis and, by inference, in the other cases to which I have referred.
10 In the circumstances, I consider that this ground should fail.
11 I would also reject the appellant's next ground, namely, that his Honour erred in converting the value of the funds into current dollar value. Under cover of that complaint, it was first said that the process adopted by his Honour for converting the value of the funds was speculative. In my view, however, it is plain that his Honour used a reliable source - the Reserve Bank - for obtaining the relevant conversion figures. In any event, it is plain that the conversion was undertaken only to obtain a broad understanding of the relevant difference in the value of funds stolen. Secondly, it was asserted that sentencing practices have changed between the date of the offence and the date of sentence so that it could not properly be said that the penalty for an offence measured in today's dollars should be the same as the penalty for stealing the equivalent value in yesteryears' dollars. Importantly, however, his Honour did not seek to place himself in the position of a sentencing judge at the time of the offence. I also note that it has not been demonstrated that the sentencing practices with respect to offending of this nature have changed over the period in question, and moreover the appellant's then counsel did not contend for such a change in practice during the hearing of the plea in mitigation. In any event, the conversion of the value of the stolen amount to its current monetary terms merely enabled the court to have a better understanding, at the date of sentence, of the gravity of the offence committed a decade or so ago and the impact of the crime on the victims.
12 Finally, it was submitted for the appellant that the sentence, including the non-parole period, is manifestly excessive and that the learned sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to a number of identified mitigating factors. It is convenient to dispose first of the last complaint. I consider that there is nothing on the face of his Honour's sentencing remarks that indicates that there was failure by the judge to accord those mitigating factors due weight. I also consider that the alleged error cannot be inferred from the sentence given that, as I have noted and as I explain briefly below, I do not consider that it is excessive as claimed by the appellant.
13 The offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty are serious offences, each of which attracts, as I have noted, a maximum custodial sentence of 10 years. The appellant's offending conduct was also grave, given that it involved large sums of money, deceit of people who relied on him and gross breaches of trust. The victim impact statements make plain the extent of deceit that he practised on them and the devastating effect that this had, and continues to have, on them financially and personally. It would have been obvious to him that they would experience at least significant financial loss and great personal distress by reason of his fraudulent conduct. Moreover, the principles of general deterrence, denunciation of the offending conduct by the court and the imposition of just punishment assumed considerable importance in the sentencing disposition.
14 It is true that many mitigating factors operated in favour of the appellant. They included the early plea of guilty, following an early admission, his remorse, his seemingly lawful life in the United States, the hardship that he will have to bear whilst in gaol given that his sick wife lives in the United States, the fact that he has no family or friends in Melbourne, and the long period of delay between when the appellant was "located" by the police and the disposition of the matter. His Honour took all these and other relevant matters personal to the appellant into account in the sentencing disposition, and, contrary to the appellant's contention, was entitled to assess the relevant value of his plea of guilty in the context of his having fled the jurisdiction in order to avoid the consequences of his fraud.
15 Mr Croucher emphasised that this was an unusual case calling for the exercise of mercy, particularly since incarceration will work hardship not only on the appellant but also on his sick wife. But I consider that his Honour took that fact into account when sentencing the appellant, and I can see no error in the exercise of his Honour's discretion, which means that this Court has no power to interfere with it. In the circumstances, I consider that the sentence is within relevant range.
16 Mr Croucher has said all that could be said for the appellant, but**,** for the above reasons, I consider that the appeal should be dismissed.