Determination
21It has been my observation at various stages of the trial that Mr Feili has appeared to be asleep. Up until Mr Flynn raised his concerns last Thursday, I simply assumed that this was out of boredom or disinterest.
22I accept that there is a possibility that Mr Feili has been falling asleep as a result of fatigue, or being chronically tired as a result of not getting sufficient sleep at night. Dr Allnutt spoke of insomnia being a result of the depressive disorder from which Mr Feili suffers. Dr Westmore does not appear to take issue with that. I accept that evidence.
23I accept also that a contributing cause may well be that Mr Feili is either bored or disinterested, or, as Dr Allnutt put it, he finds it "upsetting to him and he sometimes doesn't want to focus and be there" (T1051.50). For a lot of the time during the trial there are matters being discussed that do not have any direct relevance to Mr Feili, aside from the issue as to whether there was a common purpose of those involved in the disturbance at the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre that is the subject of the charges. There is nothing before me that would indicate he has been asleep when matters of importance to his case were the subject matter. Even if that was the case, there is nothing to indicate that it has not been possible for Mr Feili to be kept apprised by his lawyers of what has been said of relevance to him. The court reporters are providing both a real-time and daily transcript service. No attempt was made to place any evidence before me to the effect that Mr Feili has missed something that is "crucial" to the case against him, or to his defence.
24Dr Westmore spoke of a number of steps that could be taken to overcome the consequential problem of Mr Feili falling asleep in court. Having somebody sitting in the dock monitoring him and attracting his attention if he looked drowsy was one. Having his general sleeping arrangements, or "sleep hygiene" as Dr Westmore called it, reviewed was another. Further, consideration by a general practitioner to prescribing appropriate medication might assist. It seemed from what the Crown Prosecutor told me just before the further evidence of Dr Allnutt on Tuesday 12 March 2013 that some steps have been taken. Whether they will have any ameliorative effect remains to be seen.
25According to Dr Westmore, Mr Feili is motivated to see the trial proceed to conclusion. Neither doctor saw anything that would give rise to concern that he was not genuine in this respect.
26Both Dr Allnutt and Dr Westmore are of the view that if Mr Feili is sleeping through periods of the trial then he is unfit to be tried. The converse, obviously, is that if he is not sleeping through periods of the trial he is not unfit. If Mr Feili makes a concerted effort to stay awake, perhaps aided by the various measures alluded to above, and is successful, then a conclusion that he is unfit is not justified.
27I must say, however, that I am not entirely convinced that a person can be unfit to be tried on account of the person sleeping at times during their trial.
28Fitness to be tried is assessed by application of the criteria referred to by Smith J in R v Presser [1958] VR 45 at 48. Dr Allnutt said in the passage from his evidence extracted above (at [6]) that Mr Feili was "unfit to stand trial ... because he fails on the issue outlined in Kesavarajah rather than Presser". This view was not fully developed in submissions or evidence. But I understand it to be a reference to considering fitness in the light of the expected duration of the trial, especially where the issue is manifested in a psychiatric condition that may become more florid in response to the stressors of the proceeding. I am satisfied that, unless it proves otherwise, the ameliorative measures outlined at [24] are an appropriate response to managing the symptoms of sleeplessness for the duration of the trial.
29There is no specific reference in the Presser criteria (nor in Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230 for that matter) to being able to stay awake and listen to every single word uttered during the entirety of the trial. The closest any of the Presser criteria comes to being relevant to the present situation, at 48, is:
He needs to be able to follow the course of the proceedings so as to understand what is going on in court in a general sense, though he need not, of course, understand the purpose of all of the various court formalities. He needs to be able to understand ... the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given against him ...
30Dr Allnutt confirmed that these were the aspects that gave rise to his opinion as to unfitness (see above at [20]).
31In Clarkson v R [2007] NSWCCA 70, Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) reviewed extensively the law relating to the issue of an accused being fit or unfit to be tried. Whilst it was accepted that the Presser criteria has long been the understanding in the common law of the measures by which fitness to be tried was to be assessed, her Honour's review of authority included the following statements of the general concept:
[130] In Ngatayi v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 1 Gibbs, Mason and Wilson JJ observed that legislation governing "fitness to be tried" had always been interpreted as to raise the question "whether the prisoner has sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature of this trial, so as to make a proper defence to the charge": see R v Pritchard (1836) 173 ER 135 per Alderson B.
...
[132] Their Honours, at 8, said that the test "looks to the capacity of the accused to understand the proceedings", but pointed out that complete understanding was not necessary. Their Honours agreed with the approach taken by Smith J in Presser that the test needs to be applied "in a reasonable and commonsense fashion". Their Honours essentially endorsed the statement of Smith J as to the minimum capacity an accused needed before he could be tried without unfairness or injustice. ... At 9, their Honours reiterated the test to be applied, namely, whether the accused person "is capable of understanding the proceedings at the trial so as to be able to make a proper defence".
[133] The High Court again dealt with the question of fitness to be tried in Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230. ... Again, the Court accepted the test to be applied was one that "looks to the capacity of the accused to understand the proceedings". ...
[134] In Eastman v the Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1; [2000] HCA 29 ... Gaudron J said at [57] that in general terms, a person was fit to plead if that person "has sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature of [the trial] so as to make a proper defence to the charge". ...
...
[142] In R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; [2004] NSWCCA 7, the Court (Mason P, Wood CJ at CL and Sully J) held at [279] that the question of fitness to be tried was to be determined by application of the Presser test:
"The test for determining fitness to stand trial is whether the accused has a sufficient mental state, and intellect, to comprehend the course of the proceedings involved in the trial, so as to follow those proceedings, and so as to make a proper defence. The factors to be taken account have been accepted as being those developed in R v Presser (supra), an authority which has been consistently followed in this State and elsewhere: see for example R v Mailes, R v Zhang [2000] NSWCCA 344, R v Tier (2001) 121 A Crim R 509, and Kesavarajah v The Queen(1994) 181 CLR 230."
[143] In Rivkin, the question of unfitness to be tried arose after conviction when it was established that the appellant had a brain tumour which would have caused frontal lobe dysfunction. Again, the Court referred in some detail to the authorities discussed above, which were adopted as correctly stating the law. The additional consideration in Rivkin was the test to be applied where the question of fitness to be tried is raised after conviction. That is not an issue here. However, their Honours were also considering a question that is relevant here, namely, where a person has a "temporary condition". In that regard, their Honours said at [296]-[298]:
"So far as the present case involves a temporary condition, which was amenable to treatment, and which has since been reversed, so that no current question of fitness arises, it does differ from most, if not all, of the other cases which have attracted an application of the requirements in R v Presser.
The central question which arises, in this respect, is whether a reduction in the capacity of an accused to meet the requirements in R v Presser, but which falls short of denying to that accused the capacity to understand and to follow the proceedings in each of the necessary aspects, is sufficient to constitute unfitness, and to justify appellate intervention, in accordance with the test previously mentioned.
... The test in R v Presser is directed to the minimum requirements for a fair trial. So long as the accused can understand and follow the proceedings in each of its facets, can give appropriate instructions, and can present a proper defence to the charge, he or she is to be regarded as fit to be tried. The fact that the accused may have done so in a better way, had suitable medical treatment or medication been provided, or had that accused possessed greater intelligence or acuity of mind, does not seem to us to be relevant to the question of fitness."
[144] The Court concluded at [301] that the question of fitness to be tried related to the "essential requirements" as stated in Presser.
32I am satisfied that Mr Feili is "capable of understanding the proceedings at the trial so as to be able to make a proper defence". It has not been suggested that he does not have the mental capacity to understand sufficiently what is going on in court, or to understand the substantial effect of any evidence given against him. If he happens to miss any aspect of the evidence that is relevant to him, it must be within the capacity of his lawyers, armed with whatever notes they are taking of the evidence and also with a daily transcript, to inform him of it. Even if it is correct to conclude that Mr Feili has a reduced capacity to meet the Presser criteria, particularly those mentioned above, that does not mean that he is unfit to be tried; he will only be unfit if he is denied that capacity: R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7; (2004) 59 NSWLR 284 at [297]-[301] per Mason P, Wood CJ at CL and Sully J.