R v Fazlilar

The interview

1. It was agreed that the audio of the 16 November 2015 interview ought to be played on the voir dire. The recording and transcript comprised the evidence on the voir dire.
2. The transcript reflects that, after the officer explained the caution to the accused, he stated he understood the caution and that he did not "want to talk". He was then asked by the officer, "do you understand this conversation is being recorded," to which he replied, "I totally, I totally understand". The following exchange then took place: "Q11 O.K. Mate why have you got this car? A I always have rental cars, I always drive rental cars Q12 Who's been using this car over the last few days? A Over the last few days, oh you know what I'm not going to say nothing. Q13 You're not going to say anything. A You know what, 'cause you know what, it can be understood wrong you know what I'm saying so yeah you know what I mean, that's why. Q14 Well it's a straightforward question. Do you know who's been using the car over the last few days, because it's a rental car, it's supposed to be used by one person who's rented the car, but you're not that person are you? A No. Q15 You told me before that a person called Georgia rented the car. Is that correct? A Yeah that's true. Q16 And where's Georgia now? A She should be home. Q17 And why, why doesn't Georgia have the car? A Well I don't know, she's, I don't wanna like, I don't know if anything with her, you know what I'm saying because it's recorded that you're sayin' so I don't have to talk. Q18 That's all right. A Now you're going to keep asking if there is anything, I don't want to be saying anything. Q19 That's all right, I'll keep asking you questions, you just don't have to answer them. A O.K. I'm not going to answer, just keep asking. Q20 When did you get the car? A Not answering. Q21 No comment. Where were you taking the car today when I pulled you over? A No answer. Q22 No answer. Do you wish to tell me anything at all? A No answer. Q23 O.K. no worries. I'll stop asking you questions if that's the case. A Well yeah you should told me cause I was taking the car to the car rental place. Q24 You were taking it back. A Yeah. Q25 You're taking it back right now. A Right now I'm taking it back because I need to take it back 'cause I didn't make a payment that's why. Q26 It's Georgia who's supposed to be making the payments, she rented the car. A Well she's got to pay. Q27 Someone's got to pay. A Someone's got to pay, you know what I mean. Q28 Do you know where this car was on Saturday morning? A I don't know. Q 29 Do you know who was using this car on Saturday morning? A I don't know, I don't know. Q30 O.K. Do you have anything else to tell me at this point? A Nothing. Q31 O.K. no worries. A I'm just, just in shock right now getting handcuffed in the street and that you know what I'm saying'. …"

The accused's submissions

1. Mr Austin submitted that, when the police officer commented at the start of question 14 that question 12 was a "straightforward question", he undermined the caution he had given, rendering it meaningless. It was not suggested that there was any difficulty with the police officer asking the accused questions after he had indicated that he did not wish to answer any questions. Nor was it suggested that the accused was not properly cautioned. Rather, the submission was that, from question 14 onwards, the caution became ineffective and "in a sense", the accused was no longer cautioned because the comment at question 14 was not consistent with the caution he had previously given.
2. When I raised with Mr Austin the relevance of the fact that, by virtue of the operation of s 14 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) ("LEPRA"), the accused did not in fact have the right to refuse to answer questions as to who the driver of the car was at the relevant time, he submitted that that fact was not relevant to my consideration.
3. Mr Austin submitted that, but for the comment at question 14, the caution was properly worded and would have persisted; it was up to the accused whether he answered each question or not. It was further submitted that the undermining of that initial caution continued to affect anything that the officer said subsequently because he did not "fix" what he said to him in question 14. The officer should have clarified what he said at question 14. The fact that this was a roadside interview and not an interview at a police station was also relied upon in this context.
4. I asked Mr Austin to identify where in the transcript there was any suggestion after answer 18 (after which the accused had acknowledged his understanding that he did not have to talk) that the accused was confused as to whether he had the right to refuse to answer any questions. Mr Austin responded as follows: ".. It is on the basis… [of] that exchange at 14, that even though he had been told by the officer… that he had a right not to answer questions, he [is] subsequently told something that suggests that… he has to answer the question, and, it is my submission that in this particular interview that needed to be clarified before anything else happened, not just a recitation of something in a shortened form of what was given in the caution but, an indication that even the question that he had been told he should be able to answer, he didn't have to answer, and, until that was done, that is what I say undermined the caution, and no matter what the officer said to him, it didn't clear up the situation. It didn't make it clear to him what his rights were any more and that is the criticism. It is obviously purely an argument that is based on the very unusual circumstances of this case. It is not an argument about general principle past the proposition of the right to caution and the fairness in questioning, but that is the nub of ‑ and so it comes down to a determination by your Honour of what happens in the course of the questioning. I accept that. But I don't go on to concede the interpretation that was presented to me."

The Crown submissions

1. The Crown submitted that the accused was properly cautioned and s 139 of the Evidence Act was accommodated.
2. The Crown Prosecutor indicated that he did not rely upon s 14 of LEPRA in resisting the application to exclude the interview. Rather, it was submitted that, from the answer to question 17 onwards, it is clear that the accused understood that he had the right not to answer questions and exercised that right until the officer indicated he did not propose to answer any more questions.
3. It was submitted that, by the end of question and answer 22, it was "abundantly clear" that the accused fully understood his right and, indeed, had exercised his right when he chose not to answer questions 20-22. When, after question 23, the officer stated that he would stop asking questions, the accused volunteered a flow of answers which the Crown seeks to rely on, culminating at answers 28 and 29, about his knowledge of the car and the whereabouts of the car on Saturday morning.
4. The Crown noted that it was anticipated that another Crown witness, Elias Dimarellis, would give evidence that he drove the vehicle on the morning of 14 November 2015. It was submitted that the answers given by the accused that he did not know where the vehicle was at that time would be relied upon by the Crown as lies.

Relevant Legislation

1. Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act provides: "Evidence that was obtained: (a) improperly or in contravention of an Australian law, or (b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law, is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained."
2. Section 14(1)(a) of LEPRA provides: "(1) A police officer who suspects on reasonable grounds that a vehicle is being, or was, or may have been used in or in connection with an indictable offence may do any one or more of the following: (a) require the driver of the vehicle to disclose his or her identity and the identity of any driver of, or passenger in or on, the vehicle at or about the time the vehicle was or may have been so used or at or about the time the vehicle last stopped before the requirement was made or a direction was given to stop the vehicle, …"

Consideration

1. It was accepted that the evidence was relevant in the sense that it could rationally affect the jury's assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. The Crown proposed to rely upon answers to questions 28 and 29 as lies relevant to the accused's credibility. The interview was also relevant to what information the accused had been told by police at that time in circumstances where he subsequently participated in an ERISP on 28 November 2015 during which reference was made to this earlier interview.
2. If the accused can establish that the answers contained in the interview were obtained improperly or in contravention of an Australian law, or in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law, then I must exclude the evidence unless the desirability of admitting it outweighs the undesirability of admitting it. The alleged impropriety was of a narrow compass. It was not suggested that the police officer had failed to properly caution the accused at the beginning of the interview. Nor was any complaint made about the fact that, putting to one side the opening words of question 14, the police officer continued to ask questions even after the accused made it clear he would not be answering them.
3. The application turns on whether the caution was undermined in any way by the officer's comment at question 14 such as to lead the accused to be confused as to what his rights were. It was not accepted by Mr Austin that the transcript records an understanding on the accused's part that he was not obliged to answer questions. Despite this, there was no evidence on the voir dire that the accused was in fact confused regarding the scope of the caution. Thus, the question of whether the accused was confused regarding his right to refuse to answer questions can only be assessed based on the accused's answers as recorded by police.
4. As I indicated to counsel at the time, I am satisfied that it was not appropriate for the police officer to describe question 12 as "straightforward" before he asked question 14, in circumstances where the accused had indicated he did not wish to answer the question. Had the accused not subsequently gone on to acknowledge a few questions later (in answer 17) that he did not have to answer questions, there might have been some force to the argument that the caution had been undermined by the opening words to question 14. The difficulty for the accused's argument is that any lingering doubt is removed once it is noted that the accused then went on to decline to answer questions 18-22.
5. In these circumstances, I indicated to Mr Austin that I was inclined to exclude question and answers 14-18 only. In response, Mr Austin indicated that, if his application to have the entire interview excluded was unsuccessful, he did not want questions 14-18 to be excluded. I acceded to this request.
6. During the hearing of this application, I drew counsel's attention to s 14 of LEPRA and the consideration of that provision in R v Barakat; R v Younes (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1255. Given the joint position of the Crown and the accused that s 14 of LEPRA had no relevance to the fairness of what occurred, I determined this matter solely on the question of whether I was satisfied that there was any impropriety in the interview regarding the caution administered to the accused. I simply note that, despite the caution having been administered to the accused, the police officer in fact had the power to request that the accused answer the questions. If he had exercised that power under s 14 of LEPRA by taking the necessary steps to do so (which he clearly did not), and the accused had refused to answer the questions, he could have been charged with an offence under s 15(1)-(2) of LEPRA.

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