R v Faumuina
[2024] NSWDC 189
At a glance
Source factsCourt
District Court of NSW
Decision date
2024-05-08
Before
Mr J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (39 paragraphs)
The issue for determination
- I will shortly set out the charges against the accused, the agreed facts and the agreed elements of the charges. I will then briefly summarise the other evidence in the case and explain the limited nature of admissible evidence given by Mr Papa and Mr Lewis. Before doing that, I should record that, with the exception of Count 7, it was common ground between the Crown and the accused that I should find, and I do find, leaving to one side the involvement of the accused and a specific issue relevant to Count 7, that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the various crimes, the subject of the charges, were committed by a group acting pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise. The group included Mr Lewis, Mr Papa, and at least one other individual.
- The only issue left for determination, in the way the case was run and upon those findings, is whether the Crown has satisfied me beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was a party to that joint criminal enterprise.
- There is no direct evidence of that fact, the case is inferential or circumstantial based on a series of primary facts, some of which are themselves sought to be proved inferentially, most of which are accepted but a number of which are the subject of serious contest. It is common ground between the parties that two of those circumstances are "essential intermediate facts" and thus need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There is an issue as to whether a third circumstance relied upon by the Crown is also an intermediate fact, requiring it also to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
- Leaving to one side Count 7 which I will deal with separately, the Crown contends that upon most or all of those circumstances being proved, I ought be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was one of the men involved in the two events, and if he was, I ought be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the charges. On the other hand, the accused contends that I ought not be satisfied of the accused's involvement and, therefore, that I must acquit him of all the charges. More specifically, the accused submits I should not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of two of the three intermediate facts they say are each essential to the Crown case. If the accused is right about that submission in relation to either of those facts, it is common ground that I must acquit the accused on all counts.