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[2010] NSWSC 1242
plaintiff. Dong was convicted of murder and sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment, comprising a 17-year non-parole period from 26 February 2009 to 25 February 2026 and a seven-year balance from 26 February 2026...
Price J sentenced Jian Dong after a jury found him guilty of murdering Ming Hai Jiang. The judge rejected Dong's claim that Jiang choked him, finding instead that Dong struck Jiang repeatedly with a hammer, including after he had fallen, and then tried to hide what had happened. The offence was placed in the middle range of objective seriousness: its violence and concealment aggravated it, while the lack of planning and limited provocation connected with the payment dispute mitigated it. The judge also considered Dong's character, remorse, rehabilitation prospects and first time in custody at a mature age. Dong received 24 years' imprisonment, with a 17-year non-parole period.
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2,661 words · generated 30/09/2026
R v Dong is a sentencing decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, delivered by Price J on 4 November 2010. It followed a jury's conviction of Jian Dong for murdering Ming Hai Jiang on 13 January 2009 at North Ryde. The jury convicted Dong on 13 July 2010 ([1]). This judgment records the judge's findings for sentence and the reasons for the sentence imposed; it is not a judgment deciding an appeal.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The dispute arose from renovation work Dong had agreed to undertake at Jiang's property for $4,500. Some work had been criticised, and $1,500 of the agreed sum remained unpaid ([7], [9]). Dong arranged to meet Jiang on the evening of the killing to collect the balance ([11]). Dong's account at trial was that Jiang refused payment, attacked him by choking him, and that Dong used the hammer in self-defence ([13]-[18]). The jury's verdict established that the prosecution had proved murder and disproved self-defence and provocation to the criminal standard, but it did not itself determine every factual question relevant to sentencing ([4]-[5]).
Price J separately assessed the evidence. He found beyond reasonable doubt that Jiang had not attacked or choked Dong. The judge relied on the absence of injury to Dong, the injuries on the backs of Jiang's hands consistent with defensive injuries, Dong's conduct after the assault, and his statements and omissions to Miss Lu and police, among other matters ([19]-[30]). The judge found that Dong struck Jiang at least nine times on the head with a hammer and also struck his hands as Jiang tried to shield himself ([29]). The evidence about the number and severity of the head injuries, together with the blood-spatter evidence, led the judge to find that several further blows were delivered after Jiang had fallen to the ground ([31]-[37]). The judge found that Dong intended to kill Jiang ([38]).
The judge also found that Dong deliberately tried to conceal his involvement. The evidence included moving Jiang's body, placing him in a bath, cleaning blood, disposing of the hammer and fleeing Sydney; Dong was later arrested in Queensland ([21], [23]-[24], [39]-[40]). Price J found that Dong believed Jiang was dead before he placed him in the bath, but did not treat the body-handling conduct as evidence that Dong was indifferent to whether Jiang was alive. Rather, the judge considered the callous treatment relevant to the seriousness of the murder because it was part of an effort to hide the crime ([40], [46]).
The sentence was 24 years' imprisonment, comprising a non-parole period of 17 years from 26 February 2009 to 25 February 2026, and a seven-year balance. Dong was eligible for release on parole on 25 February 2026 ([63]-[65]).
The sentencing task began with the rules for resolving disputed facts. Price J stated that findings against Dong had to be consistent with the jury's verdict and proved beyond reasonable doubt. Matters in mitigation could be established on the balance of probabilities ([2]). That distinction mattered because the judge had to decide factual issues not conclusively resolved by the verdict, including whether Jiang attacked Dong and whether some blows were struck after Jiang fell ([5]).
The judge rejected Dong's self-defence account. The reasons were cumulative rather than dependent on a single item: Dong had no visible injuries; Jiang had defensive injuries on the backs of his hands; Dong did not tell Miss Lu that he had been attacked; he cleaned the scene and moved Jiang's body; and he fled, disposed of the hammer and did not tell police that Jiang had choked him ([19]-[29]). Price J treated the combined evidence as excluding the reasonable possibility of an attack by Jiang ([29]). The judge also found that the killing was not legally provoked under s 23 of the Crimes Act 1900, because the blows were not caused by a loss of self-control induced by Jiang's conduct ([41]).
For objective seriousness, the judge weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The violence was severe: at least nine blows to the head with a hammer, further blows to the hands, and several blows after Jiang was on the ground. Dong intended to kill, and use of the hammer was identified as an aggravating factor ([45]). The concealment conduct also increased seriousness, but the judge expressly stated that Dong was not being punished for reckless indifference to Jiang's life ([46]).
There were countervailing considerations. The murder was not premeditated or planned, which the judge treated as mitigating under s 21A(3)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ([43]). On the balance of probabilities, the judge found that the demanding requirements placed on Dong before the balance was paid contributed to his anger. This amounted to limited provocation for sentencing purposes and mitigated objective seriousness, even though it did not amount to provocation in the legal sense that would displace the murder verdict ([41], [44]). The distinction is important: the judge could consider the circumstances of the payment dispute as mitigation without finding that the statutory provocation defence applied.
The judge concluded that the violence and concealment put the offence slightly above the middle range, but the lack of planning and limited provocation brought the final characterisation to the middle range ([47]). The judge then considered s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, which, as quoted in the judgment, requires life imprisonment where culpability is so extreme that the specified community interests can only be met by that sentence ([49]). Because the offence was not in the worst category and culpability was not at that extreme level, the judge did not impose life imprisonment ([50]).
Subjective considerations also affected the sentence. Dong had no prior convictions and was found to have been a person of good character ([54]). The judge accepted remorse only to a limited extent: Dong regretted the death and acknowledged the loss, but continued to maintain that Jiang had attacked him, so the judge was not satisfied that he had accepted full responsibility for the killing ([55]-[56]). The judge found reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and a low likelihood of reoffending, while giving modest weight to specific deterrence ([57]-[59]). General deterrence remained relevant because the offence was a serious taking of life ([60]).
Price J also found special circumstances because Dong was experiencing custody for the first time at a mature age. Although the judgment noted reservations expressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal about whether first-time custody can constitute special circumstances, the judge considered that this offender would need particular assistance in re-establishing himself in the community ([62]). The mitigating and special circumstances justified some departure from the 20-year standard non-parole period ([1], [62]). The 17-year non-parole period and 24-year total sentence reflect that conclusion ([64]-[65]).
This judgment does not purport to announce a new general rule or alter the statutory sentencing framework. It applies existing provisions and authorities to the facts found at Dong's sentencing. The legal propositions stated in the reasons concern the sentencing judge's fact-finding task, the assessment of objective seriousness, statutory murder sentencing, and the treatment of particular sentencing considerations.
On fact-finding, Price J relied on R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 for the requirement that sentencing findings be consistent with the verdict and that adverse findings be established beyond reasonable doubt. R v Pilley (1991) 56 A Crim R 202 was cited for the balance-of-probabilities standard applicable to mitigating matters ([2]). Those standards framed the judge's resolution of disputed accounts.
On the treatment of the deceased's body, the judge cited Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 and R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315 as authorities supporting the proposition that an offender's treatment of a deceased's body may be considered when assessing the seriousness of the offence ([46]). The court's application was fact-specific: Dong's conduct was regarded as callous and undertaken to hide his involvement, and therefore increased seriousness. The judge expressly limited that reasoning by stating that Dong was not being punished for reckless indifference to life ([46]).
For life imprisonment, the judgment sets out s 61(1) and cites R v Merritt (2004) 146 A Crim R 309 for the proposition that the provision's primary focus is the extremity of the offender's culpability ([49]-[50]). Price J concluded that Dong's culpability did not fall within the worst category of murder ([50]). The judgment also applied R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 in holding that the victim impact statement could not be used to increase the sentence ([61]).
The judgment provides no account of later decisions treating R v Dong. Accordingly, no conclusion about subsequent adoption, limitation or overruling can be drawn from this source alone. Its reported reasoning demonstrates application of the authorities and statutes cited in the sentencing decision, not a documented later change in the law.
At [2], Price J said that sentencing facts must be consistent with the jury's verdict and adverse findings must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In plain English, the judge could not use sentencing to contradict what the jury had decided, and could not resolve disputed facts against Dong unless the high criminal standard was met. The judge also distinguished this from mitigation, which could be established on the balance of probabilities.
At [29], the judge described the evidence as supporting the “only rational inference” that Dong became angry over the unpaid $1,500 and struck Jiang repeatedly. The passage is significant because it explains the cumulative reasoning behind rejecting self-defence. It draws together physical evidence, conduct after the killing, and Dong's statements and omissions, rather than treating any one circumstance as decisive.
At [37], the judge concluded that more than one blow was struck while Jiang was on the ground, while acknowledging that the precise number could not be determined. This illustrates the way the court dealt with evidentiary limits: it made a definite finding about repeated blows on the ground but did not claim precision the evidence could not support.
At [41], the judge found that the acts causing death were not done under provocation for s 23 of the Crimes Act 1900. By contrast, at [44], the judge found that the demands and unpaid balance contributed to Dong's anger and mitigated objective seriousness. Read together, these paragraphs show that a circumstance may be relevant to sentence without satisfying the legal test for a defence or partial defence.
At [46], the judge stated that the treatment of the body could be considered in assessing seriousness, but emphasised that Dong was not being punished for reckless indifference to life. The plain-English point is that concealment behaviour may affect the assessment of the crime, but the judge identified a specific boundary on the reasoning used in this case.
At [47], the judge placed the murder “squarely within the middle range” of objective seriousness after considering both aggravating and mitigating features. That assessment was central to the sentencing reasoning, but it should be read with the detailed findings at [43]-[46], rather than as a label detached from the facts.
At [62], the judge found special circumstances from Dong's first time in custody at a mature age and the particular assistance he would need in re-establishing himself in the community. The judge also acknowledged reservations about that basis in earlier appellate discussion. The passage is an application to this offender, not a statement that first-time custody will always amount to special circumstances.
The judgment is most directly relevant to sentencing after a murder conviction where the jury's verdict leaves factual questions unresolved and the sentencing judge must make findings from the trial evidence. Its reasoning illustrates how physical evidence, witness evidence, post-offence conduct and inconsistent accounts may be considered together when deciding what happened, subject to the criminal standard for adverse findings ([2], [19]-[40]).
It may also be relevant where a sentencing court must distinguish between a legal defence or partial defence and circumstances that can still mitigate the seriousness of an offence. Dong's anger about the unpaid contract balance did not establish statutory provocation, but the judge found that the dispute and demands contributed to his anger and mitigated objective seriousness ([41], [44]). The judgment therefore illustrates the different questions posed by the defence and sentencing assessments; it does not establish that every payment dispute will have mitigating force.
The decision also addresses cases involving repeated violence with a weapon, blows delivered after a victim has fallen, and post-offence steps taken to conceal the crime. Those features were material to the assessment of objective seriousness here ([37], [45]-[47]). The judge's express qualification at [46] is important: the concealment conduct increased seriousness, but was not used to punish Dong for reckless indifference to life.
Finally, the decision may assist in understanding sentencing arguments involving lack of planning, character, prior convictions, remorse, rehabilitation, first-time custody and special circumstances. The weight given to those matters depended on the particular findings about Dong ([43]-[44], [54]-[62]). The judgment does not state that any of these factors will have the same effect in a different case.
The supplied judgment does not identify any later court decision that applied, distinguished, followed or criticised R v Dong. It would therefore be unsupported to describe the case as having a particular later status or influence on the basis of this text.
The judgment itself refers to earlier authorities. It applies R v Isaacs and R v Pilley to sentencing fact-finding ([2]); Knight v R and R v Yeo to the relevance of treatment of the deceased's body ([46]); R v Merritt to the focus of s 61(1) ([50]); and R v Previtera to the use of victim impact statements ([61]). It refers to Clarke v R [2009] NSWCCA 49 in noting reservations about whether first-time custody can amount to special circumstances ([62]). These references show the sources Price J considered, but they do not establish how later courts treated Dong itself.
A fuller account of later treatment would require later decisions not included in the supplied judgment. This deep dive does not make claims about that material.
The judgment leaves some factual matters unresolved. Although Price J found that several head blows were delivered while Jiang was on the ground, the judge could not determine the precise number of those blows ([37]). The pathologist also could not quantify reliably any contribution that drowning may have made to the death ([40]). Those uncertainties did not prevent the sentencing findings made on the evidence, but they remain limits stated in the judgment.
The judgment also records that the jury could have reached its verdict by different reasoning on self-defence and provocation, and that it was open to the jury to accept some aspects of Dong's asserted belief while rejecting the defence ([5]). Price J made independent findings for sentencing, but the reasons do not establish which precise route the jury took to its verdict. The judgment notes a sole jury question and the direction that jurors did not have to agree on the same reasons ([30]).
On special circumstances, the judge acknowledged reservations expressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal about whether first-time custody is capable of constituting special circumstances, but found that it did so on Dong's circumstances ([62]). The judgment does not resolve the broader question for all cases. Nor does it provide evidence of how later courts have treated that aspect of the decision.
The judgment further leaves the weight of each individual sentencing factor tied to the case's particular circumstances. It does not set a numerical formula for balancing the attack's violence, lack of planning, limited provocation, concealment conduct or subjective factors. Its stated outcome follows from the judge's assessment of the entire factual record and statutory framework ([42]-[62]).
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Background facts 7 The background facts leading to the death of Ming Hai Jiang on the evening of 13 January 2009 are largely uncontroversial. The offender had contracted to do renovation work on the deceased's property… The total cost of the agreed works was $4,500 and the work was to be completed on 14 January 2009. The offender employed Mao Long Li and another worker to help with this work. About five days before the deceased's death, Guo Giang Jing, the deceased's father, inspected the work that had been done at the premises and was unhappy with it. The offender was required to rectify one of the doors which was the wrong size. 8 The offender had provided the deceased with a quotation for work to be done at the deceased's home … According to the offender, the deceased had asked him to perform a lot of free work … before he would be given the contract for work … The uncharged work included the sanding and cleaning of floors and the installation of a light switch which had not been included in the agreed works … 9 The day before the murder the deceased had told the offender to clean the … property. The offender replied that cleaning was not in the contract but he would do it for free. The deceased had paid him in cash but $1,500 of the contract sum remained unpaid. 10 On the morning of 13 January 2009, the offender went to the … property with Ai Qin Lu. He looked around the property for unfinished work and hammered down protruding nails. Miss Lu carried out cleaning work which included mopping floors and wiping the bath tub. She helped the offender remove rubbish from outside the house. 11 The offender drove with Miss Lu to the … premises around midday where he found Mr Li and the other worker doing work for Ming Hai Jiang which the offender had not authorised. The offender was angry and abusive to Mr Li, as he considered that Mr Li had obtained the work behind his back. Unbeknown to the offender, the deceased had employed Mr Li to do renovation work at … After arguing with Mr Li, the offender left the … premises. During the afternoon, he rang the deceased telling him he had finished the work and to prepare the last payment. The offender told Miss Lu that he had arranged to meet the deceased at the …premises at about 8pm to collect the remaining payment. 12 When the offender and Miss Lu went to …, the front door to the premises was open. The deceased had been showing Yuezhong Zhang and some others the renovations. Whilst Miss Lu waited in the offender's van which was parked across the road, the offender walked to the premises.
The events at … 13 The critical matters of facts which are to be determined occurred after the offender went to the premises. The offender gave evidence that after the other people left, he told the deceased that the work had been completed and to please have a look around. After inspecting various rooms, the deceased said that the floor was still not clean and nails were still protruding. The offender told the deceased he had employed people to clean it five times and that there were only three protruding nails. The deceased said "that's still not acceptable." 14 The conversation which followed included the offender saying to the deceased, "You asked me to do so many free works for you and then you had given the (contract) to other workers." The deceased replied, "It's up to me…whoever I want to give the work to." He said, "If you carry on then I will call the police." The offender replied, "You want to call the police? Go ahead!" 15 The offender told the jury that as he thought he was not being paid because of a few protruding nails he went back to his van, collected a hammer, returned to the premises and hammered down the protruding nails. The deceased looked at this work and said the nails were okay. When the offender asked for payment, the deceased said that the floor was still not clean and he would not pay. The offender replied that the floor had been cleaned multiple times. When the deceased again refused to pay, the offender said, "If you do not pay then I will destroy my works." 16 The jury was told by the offender that the deceased became annoyed. The deceased said, "If you dare to destroy my work you get the hell out of here." The deceased lunged forward and grabbed hold of his neck. The offender testified that he could not breathe and with his hand pushed the deceased's head with great force to loosen the deceased's grip on his neck but was unsuccessful. He was finding it hard to breathe and was on the verge of losing consciousness. He used the hammer as a last resort because the deceased was choking him. They were both standing up at the time. 17 After that, he lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, he found Ming Hai Jiang was lying next to him and his head was covered with blood. He pushed the deceased but there was neither a reaction nor was he breathing. The offender said that he was completely shocked at the time and did not know what he was doing. He recalled leaving the premises and vaguely remembered driving away with Miss Lu in the van. 18 In cross-examination by the Crown, the offender said that he brandished the hammer randomly as he had wanted to breathe. He said that the deceased had used his left hand to choke his neck and had grabbed his clothes with the right hand. The offender said that he should have some bruising from the choking but he could not see any bruises on himself. He could not recall cleaning the bathroom, nor could he recall running a bath and putting the deceased in it. 19 There was an abundance of evidence, in my opinion, which when viewed together, demonstrates that the offender's evidence as to the circumstances in which he killed the deceased was largely untruthful. The offender made no complaint to Miss Lu that the deceased had attacked him. It was her evidence that after the offender had returned to the van, collected the hammer and walked into the house, she heard one man, who was not the offender, yelling out. She ran to the house, opened the security door, saw a man lying on the ground with blood on his head and the offender was standing. Miss Lu testified that she was so scared and in shock that she sat on the floor and cried. The offender, who was inside the house said, "You either come into the house or go back to the car. Stop shouting". Miss Lu returned to the vehicle. She did not know how much longer it was after that the offender came back to the vehicle but it was a while. She only looked at him once. He was topless but was holding some clothing in his hands. He threw the bundle behind his seat in the vehicle. 20 Miss Lu gave evidence that the offender drove her to Eastwood where her vehicle was parked. He did not say anything about what had happened in the house. She said to the offender, "Regardless of what happened, if you want to go to the police I am happy to accompany you to the police station." The accused said, "Not your business. I know what to do". She could recall saying to him one more time, "Do you want to go to the police station for what [has] happened. I'm happy to go with you and let's talk it through with the police." The offender said, "No, I want to go home too." 21 The offender fled from Sydney that night and was on the run until he was arrested about 65 kilometres west of Richmond in Queensland on 25 February 2009. When the offender spoke to Constable Tong in the recorded conversation (ex H) at the Townsville Watch House on 26 February 2009 he did not say anything about being choked by the deceased. He accepted as being right that he told the deceased if he wouldn't give him the money he would demolish the gyprock. He also accepted that he did not remember how many times he hit the deceased. The questions and answers in the recorded conversation included the following: "P: After that he wouldn't let you demolish the gyprock, and you started fighting, is that what happened?
P: After that you couldn't control yourself, you hit his head.
He told the police officer inter alia that he had panicked, that he had dragged the deceased's body into the bathroom, put water into the bath and placed the deceased in the bath as he wanted to remove finger prints. He said that he threw the hammer off the Gladesville Bridge. He told the police officer that he had stolen a number plate from a discarded car in Adelaide and had placed it on his vehicle. He said that he had thought about giving himself up but was afraid that if he did so, his son "would be chased back to China." 22 The offender told the jury that after he dropped Miss Lu at Eastwood he collected some money and was in a daze at the time. He was in complete shock and was very scared. He did not tell anyone and left Sydney. The offender gave evidence that he did not tell Constable Tong about being choked as he had not slept well and his brain was not functioning normally at the time. 23 The deceased's father arrived at … at around 9pm on the night of the murder. The front door to the premises was locked and the lights were off. When he walked into the bathroom, he saw his son facedown in the bath which was full of water. His son, he said, was immersed in water and blood was everywhere. 24 Forensic evidence given during the trial included Senior Constable Colver's testimony of areas of diluted blood staining on the hallway wall which had been wiped down with something like a wet towel or a rag. Diluted staining and blood in the toilet water, Senior Constable Colver opined, indicated that a person may have washed up or introduced blood into the toilet. Gavin Henderson, a forensic biologist, gave evidence that three of the swabs taken from the mop found in the premises yielded full profiles of DNA that were consistent with originating from Ming Hai Jiang. 25 Dr Orde, the forensic pathologist, conducted an autopsy and described nine injuries to the head of the deceased. The numbering system which the pathologist used had no relationship to the timing or actual significance of each of the head injuries. Injuries 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, Dr Orde considered, were each likely to have been caused by one blow to the head. The three fairly neat semi-circular marks suggested that the complex injury (injury 1) which extended over 37mm in the high central occipito-parietal scalp, was caused by three applications of force. Dr Orde was of the opinion that injuries 2 and 7 were likely to have been caused by either one or possibly two blows to the head. Dr Orde observed that underlying injury 1 there was a depressed fracture of the skull extending over 42mm. As to injury 2, there was a further depressed fracture extending over 27mm. With regard to injuries 5 to 8, which were quite close together, Dr Orde found underlying those injuries another area of depressed fracturing of the skull and some radiating fracture lines. There were multiple areas of bruising to the brain surface, many of which would have been caused by the direct application of force corresponding to the injuries the pathologist had seen. Dr Orde opined that the head injuries themselves could have been fatal to the deceased. He said that both the severity of the injuries themselves and the number of injuries would be entirely in keeping with these injuries having been independently fatal. 26 The deceased, Dr Orde said, would have been likely to lapse into unconsciousness and have bled quite profusely from the head injuries. Dr Orde told the jury, given the severity of the injuries, that it would be unlikely that the deceased would remain standing after receiving more than one or two blows. It was not possible for him to say, however, whether the head injuries were caused whilst the deceased was standing up or lying down. 27 Dr Orde gave evidence of injuries to the left and right hands of the deceased. There was, he said, a gaping semi-circular laceration to the medial aspect of the back of the left hand. He expressed the opinion that this was a blunt force injury similar to those on the deceased's head. There was quite extensive bruising overlying the back of the left hand and there were fractures of the metacarpal bones of the little, ring and middle fingers. Dr Orde observed a superficial laceration overlying the little finger metacarpal of the right hand with a further laceration overlying the far part of the middle finger metacarpal. Over the majority of the back of the hand, most prominently at the little finger side and extending onto the wrist, there was diffuse faint blue bruising and swelling. There was bruising over the back of the index finger of the right hand. Internal examination revealed moderate bruising over the back of the right hand extending over the middle and the left finger metacarpals. The right middle finger had also fractured. Dr Orde also identified what he described as moderate bruising over the wrist and adjacent forearm. Dr Orde expressed the opinion that given that the locations of the injuries to the left and right hands of the deceased were predominately on the back of the hands, they would have been inflicted whilst the deceased was attempting to defend himself from injury. The overall pattern of the injuries suggested so-called "defensive injuries". In cross-examination by Mr Murray, he said that the injuries were non-specific for causation and the scenario put to him by the Crown was no more than a possibility. In further cross-examination by Mr Murray as to injuries to the right hand side of the deceased's face, Dr Orde said that all of these injuries would have been caused by the application of blunt force but were non-specific as to the means of blunt force that was applied. The injuries, he said, would have needed a significant degree of force to bring them about. 28 Yanna Fang, the wife of the deceased, told the jury that her husband had suffered a back injury prior to their marriage in 2006 when he fell while working for Domino's Pizza. He had neck pain as well. She said the fall had caused long-term injury problems for her husband. He had to sleep in a very hard bed or even had to lie on the floor. He could not do, she said, heavy lifting. Either swimming or golf helped with his back condition. 29 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown has excluded as a reasonable possibility that the deceased attacked the offender and grabbed hold of his neck. The only rational inference, (which I draw beyond reasonable doubt) from the combination of:
(i) the offender's upset over the deceased's refusal to pay him;
(ii) what the offender said to Miss Lu when she saw the deceased lying on the ground;
(iii) the dragging of the body of the deceased by the offender away from the front door;
(iv) the filling of the bath tub with water by the offender and the immersion of the deceased's body in the bath tub;
(v) the offender's cleaning of blood off the walls of the house and mopping of the floor to clean up blood;
(vi) the injuries to the left and right hands of the deceased which were predominantly on the back of the hands; (vii) the absence of injury to the offender;
(viii) the lack of complaint by the offender to Miss Lu that the deceased had attacked him; (ix) the deceased's pre-existing disabilities of the back and neck;
(x) the throwing of the hammer by the offender from the Gladesville Bridge;
(xi) the offender's flight from Sydney and being "on the run" which including the changing of the car registration details;
(xii) the absence of anything being said by the offender to Constable Tong during the recorded conversation that the deceased had been choking him
is that the offender became so angry when the deceased refused to pay the outstanding amount of $1,500 that he struck the deceased at least nine times to the head with the hammer. There were further hammer strikes by him to the back of the deceased's hands whilst the deceased was endeavouring to shield himself from the blows. 30 In making this finding, I am mindful that the sole jury question indicates that consideration might have been given by the members of the jury to the reasonable possibility that the offender personally believed for the first or second blows that his conduct was necessary to defend himself. The jury, however, was provided during the summing-up with the standard direction that they were not required to agree upon the same reasons for their verdicts. The shortness of time of the jury's overall deliberation, however, indicates that at the very least most of the jurors found as I have done, that the offender's testimony was largely untruthful. 31 The Crown invited me to find that a number of blows were struck to the deceased whilst he remained standing, however, that some of these blows were to the deceased's hands as he was endeavouring to protect himself. The Crown submitted that I would then find that the deceased fell to the ground, and the offender struck several blows to his head, whilst he was lying on the ground and was almost certainly unconscious. Mr Murray invited me to reject that submission and pointed in particular to Mr Porter's evidence of impact spatter higher up on the wall, which Mr Murray contended indicated a "stand up" fight rather than evidencing a person being struck whilst lying on the ground. 32 Senior Constable Colver expressed the opinion that the blood spatter in the hallway had an origin low to the ground predominantly on the hallway's northern side. The varying spatter sizes being generally between 4mm and 8mm in length was consistent, he said, with a repeated assault using a blunt force implement. During cross-examination by Mr Murray, Senior Constable Colver agreed that it was possible that the blood spatter stringing that he had placed on the tiles as seen in photographs 16 and 17 (ex A) was caused by someone stepping on a pool of blood. He said all that indicated is the direction that the blood was coming from, whether from a hammer or someone stepping on it. He said it could be either of those. 33 Mr Porter's testimony included the area ringed with a black circle in photograph 6 (ex 5) which, he thought, was an important spatter pattern for the reconstruction of the scene. It was a fair distance away from the main area of spatter that Senior Constable Colver was suggesting, which was down lower to the ground. The black circled stains in photographs 7 and 8 (ex 5) in Mr Porter's view came from a higher source than the spatter Constable Colver had been talking about. The highest was about 1.8 metres in height. When cross-examined by Mr Crown, Mr Porter's testimony on this topic included (T394 L 40-50; T395 L 1): "Q. You indicated - and I'll just read straight from your report on page 5, if you'd like to refer to your report as I read it. It's just following paragraph 13 in your report. You said: "I concur with Senior Constable Colver's opinion that the spatter stains are consistent with impact caused by a blunt force injury and that the spatter pattern he described displayed convergence towards an area close to the ground."
A. Yes." 34 And further (T 395 L 22-45): "Q. You then go on to say that: "The spatter pattern he described displayed convergence towards an area close to the ground."
A. I agree with Constable Colver's opinion on the convergence of that stain that was low to the ground, is consistent with a convergence that is fairly low to the ground. I do agree with his view there.
Q. And to put that into the context of this case, you would accept that there was at least one blow with a hammer to the deceased's head while he was lying on the ground?
A. I can't tell whether it was a hammer. The impact stains are consistent with a hammer. I can't say definitely it was a hammer. But the impact was close to the ground, yes.
Q. Is the blood spatter consistent with multiple blows with a hammer whilst the deceased was lying on the ground?
A. --Colver was indicating, that's difficult to tell." 35 It is evident that Mr Porter agreed that the spatter pattern described by Senior Constable Colver was consistent with a convergence that was fairly low to the ground and with at least one blow being struck at a time the deceased was lying on the ground. 36 The testimony of the blood spatter experts, however, is not to be considered in isolation. As I have recounted at [26] above, Dr Orde expressed the opinion that given the severity of the deceased's head injuries, it would be unlikely that he would remain standing after one or two blows. The terrible trauma of all the injuries to the deceased's head speaks plainly of the force used by the offender. 37 The only rational inference to be drawn from the combination of:
(i) The number of the deceased's head injuries; (ii) The severity of the head injuries;
(iii) Dr Orde's opinion that it would be unlikely that the deceased would remain standing after one or two blows;
(iv) The evidence of Senior Constable Colver and Mr Porter,
is that more than one blow was struck by the offender to the deceased's head whilst the deceased was on the ground. I am not, however, able to determine the precise number of blows that were struck at that time. Accordingly, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that after being struck on the head by the hammer a number of times the deceased fell to the ground. As he lay on the ground, the offender struck him on the head with the hammer several more times. 38 The attack upon the deceased was ferocious. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, at the time the offender struck the deceased with the hammer, he had the intention to kill him. 39 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender did not lose consciousness nor does he have the limited recollection of what occurred which he deposed to in his evidence. I am further satisfied to the criminal standard that he did not act irrationally after he believed that he had killed the deceased but deliberately set out to do everything that he could to hide his involvement in the murder. His efforts to clean up the murder scene were partially successful as neither his fingerprints nor DNA were found in the premises and the blood spatter analysis was affected. What he did at the premises and what he said to Miss Lu afterwards in the vehicle reflects a firm determination on his part to escape responsibility for the crime. I reject the offender's evidence that he was shocked out of his mind and did not know what he was doing. I am further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender's disposal of the hammer and flight from Sydney were occasioned by his consciousness of guilt for the murder. 40 The Crown accepted at trial that the offender believed that the deceased had died after the strikes to the head with the hammer. I find as a matter of fact that the offender held a genuine belief that the deceased was dead before he dragged the deceased away from the front door and placed him in the bath. Sadly, it seems that the deceased was still alive as Dr Orde considered that there may have been an element of drowning in the death. The pathologist, however, was unable to quantify the possible factor of drowning in any meaningful sense of certainty or reliability. 41 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the acts causing death were not done under provocation as the blows with the hammer were not the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the offender that was induced by any conduct of the deceased: s 23 Crimes Act 1900.
Objective seriousness 42 As this is an offence to which a standard non-parole period applies, it is necessary to consider where the offence committed by the offender lies on the range of objective seriousness of the offence of murder. The Crown submitted that the offence falls into the middle range of objective seriousness, whereas Mr Murray contended that this murder was lower than the mid-range. 43 It is a factor in mitigation that the murder was not premeditated or planned: s 21A(3)(b) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. 44 I am also satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a cause of the offender's anger was the exacting demands that the deceased placed upon him before the $1,500 was to be paid. To this extent, I find on the probabilities that the offender was provoked by the deceased which mitigates the objective seriousness of the offence: s 21A(3)(c) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The offender's testimony as to the efforts that had been made to clean up the premises was supported by Miss Lu and Mr Li had been employed at the … premises without the offender being informed. The character evidence during the trial by Jian Sun, a former employer, and Zhen Dong, the offender's sister and the offender's lack of prior criminal history, supports a conclusion that the offender was normally a person who got on with others.
45 The ferocity of the attack upon the deceased increases the objective seriousness of the offence. The deceased was struck at least nine times to the head with the hammer, several of those blows being struck whilst he lay helpless on the ground. The offender had an intention to kill. The use of the hammer is a factor of aggravation: s 21A(2)(c) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. 46 The Crown put to me that the offender's behaviour in dragging the deceased down the hallway, leaving him to be found in the bath, turning off the lights, and locking the front door increased the objective seriousness of the offence, albeit at the time he believed the deceased was dead. It is well-established that the offender's treatment of the deceased's body can be taken into account in assessing the seriousness of the offence: Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 at [28]; R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315. I am satisfied that the callousness with which the offender treated the deceased's body in order to hide what he had done increases the seriousness of the crime. I emphasise that the offender is not being punished for any element of reckless indifference to the deceased's life. 47 These matters, to my mind, place the objective seriousness of the offence slightly above the middle range of objective seriousness. When, however, the limited provocation and lack of planning are taken into account, I conclude that the offence is to be characterised as falling squarely within the middle range of objective seriousness. 48 The maximum sentence for the crime of murder is imprisonment for life. A person sentenced to imprisonment for life is to serve that sentence for the term of his natural life: s 19A(2) Crimes Act. Section 19A(3) provides that nothing in s 19A affects the operation of s 21(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act (which authorises the passing of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for life). 49 Section 61(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act provides: "A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person who is convicted of murder if the court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence." 50 The primary focus of s 61(1) is an assessment of how extreme the prisoner's culpability is: see R v Merritt (2004) 146 A Crim R 309 at [52]. I have found at [47] above that the prisoner's level of culpability is not such that his crime falls within the worst category of the offence of murder.
51 The offender was born on 14 July 1962 and is 48 years old. He gave evidence of his background during the trial as did his sister Miss Dong. Further background material is found in the report of Sunny Hong, a psychotherapist. The offender's place of birth was Shen Xian in Zhejiang province in South East China. He testified that he lived with his grandparents for the first seven years of his life. It was the Cultural Revolution at the time and the offender said that they were very poor. When he was seven years old, the offender went to Linhai middle school in the Taizhou area where he completed his primary and secondary schooling. He was not very good at school and described being bullied by other classmates. He said he was a loner with not much interaction with other students. The offender left school at the age of 16 years and commenced working with his father who had a pharmaceutical manufacturing business. He married and his son was born in 1992. The offender said he divorced his wife in October 1995. Following the divorce, his son was in his custody. They both came to Australia in 2000 being sponsored by the offender's parents who had settled in this country in 1994. 52 The offender told the jury that he found being a single parent very hard. He said that since his arrival in Australia he had been working in the kitchen cabinet business, but from 2006 started installing and assembling kitchen cabinets himself. Mr Sun described the offender as being a good worker who had used his initiative to become his own installer. Miss Dong gave evidence of the difficulties, which her brother experienced upon his arrival in Australia, particularly due to his lack of English. Mr Hong in his report, noted the offender's feelings of isolation and loneliness. It appears from Mr Hong's report that the offender remarried in China in 2003, with the intention of his second wife joining him in Australia after a spouse visa was granted but the marriage ended in divorce in 2007. 53 In a letter written by the offender (ex 3), the offender makes reference to experiencing "troubles with [his] sanity which has caused [him] to become an insomniac" and of suffering from chest pain. Dr Bruce Westmore, a forensic psychiatrist, in his report does not identify any psychotic symptoms or psychiatric disorders from which the offender suffers. The psychiatrist organised an MRI brain scan on 8 December 2009 and the result was normal. No other medical reports have been tendered on the offender's behalf. Unsurprisingly, Mr Murray did not submit that the offender suffers from any form of mental illness or medical condition which requires consideration in my sentencing task. 54 The offender does not have any prior criminal convictions which entitles him to leniency: s 21A(3)(e) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. I also find that prior to the murder, the offender was a person of good character: s 21A(3)(f) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. These are mitigating factors which I take into account in determining the appropriate sentence. 55 Mr Murray asked me to find as a mitigating factor that the offender had shown remorse. Mr Murray pointed both to the letter written by the offender (ex 3) and to his testimony during the trial in which he expressed his regret for what he had done, his sorrow and deep remorse for the deceased and his family. Furthermore, Dr Westmore reported that the offender experienced "in a spontaneous way" feelings of regret for his actions towards the deceased and acknowledged the impact upon the deceased's family. Section 21A(3)(i) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act provides that remorse may only be taken into account if: "(i) the offender has provided evidence that he…has accepted responsibility for his…actions, and
(ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his…actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both)," 56 The plea of guilty to manslaughter was a partial acceptance by the offender of responsibility for the deceased's death. He, however, during the trial maintained that he had been attacked by the deceased. It is plain from Dr Westmore's report, which was prepared after the jury's verdict that he continues to contend that the deceased attacked him by choking him around the neck. Whilst I accept that he regrets having killed Ming Hai Jiang and has acknowledged this tragic loss, I am not persuaded on the balance of probabilities that his acceptance of responsibility extends beyond the use of excessive force and that he, at this time, takes full responsibility for the killing. I take remorse, to this limited extent, into account, as a mitigating factor. 57 Another submission for the offender was that he has good prospects of rehabilitation and is unlikely to re-offend. The Crown submitted that the offender's behaviour in destroying evidence and trying to hide from authorities would create concerns in the area of rehabilitation. Furthermore, a troublesome feature, to my mind, in assessing the offender's prospects of rehabilitation is his partial acceptance of responsibility for the death. On the other hand, the offender's prior good character and family support evidenced by the letters from his father and son (ex 4 and ex 5) encourage a positive view of his future prospects. Mr Hong in his report said this (ex 2 p11):
"[The offender] seems to have a compliant and passive personality structure which in his Chinese culture would have been considered to be appropriate as he would be seen to be submissive and compliant to rules and authorities." 58 Dr Westmore expressed the following opinion (ex 1 p 6): "[The offender] continues to receive the support of his family. I would be surprised if [the offender] presents any behavioural or management problems to the prison authorities. In the absence of any other history of him behaving in an aggressive fashion towards others, then his risks of reoffending are probably in the lower range. It would seem that an unfortunate series of events led up to his aggressive outburst." 59 I conclude on the balance of probabilities that the offender has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and is unlikely to re-offend which I take into account as mitigating factors: s 21A(3)(g)-(h) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. By reason of these findings, I give modest weight to specific deterrence. 60 Although mitigated by the considerations which I have detailed, the taking by the offender of Ming Hai Jiang's life is a most serious crime. He was 27 years old when he was murdered. I take into account the need for general deterrence. 61 A victim impact statement was read in court by Yanna Fang, the deceased's widow. The contents of the statement cannot be used by me to increase the offender's sentence: R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76. I acknowledge the grief and distress of the deceased's family and express on the community's behalf its sympathy and compassion for them. 62 Notwithstanding that no submissions were made for the offender as to special circumstances, I find as a special circumstance the offender's first time in custody at the age of 47 years. I am aware that some reservations have been expressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal as to whether the fact that a person is in custody for the first time is capable of constituting special circumstances: see for example Clarke v R [2009] NSWCCA 49 at [12], but it seems to me that in the circumstances of the offender, who has received a custodial term for the first time at a mature age, he will need particular assistance in re-establishing himself in the community. The findings of mitigating factors and special circumstances justify some departure from the application of the standard non-parole period. 63 The offender has been in custody for the offence since 26 February 2009. Accordingly, the sentence will commence on that date. 64 Jian Dong for the murder of Ming Hai Jiang I convict you. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 24 years which is to consist of a non-parole period of 17 years commencing on 26 February 2009 and expiring on 25 February 2026 and a balance of term of 7 years commencing on 26 February 2026 and expiring on 25 February 2033. 65 You will be eligible to be released on parole on 25 February 2026.
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R
Dong
Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 R v Clarke [2009] NSWCCA 49 R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 CASES CITED : R v Merritt (2004) 146 A Crim R 309 R v Pilley (1991) 56 A Crim R 202 R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315
(1997) 41 NSWLR 374
Dong was convicted of murder and sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment, comprising a 17-year non-parole period from 26 February 2009 to 25 February 2026 and a seven-year balance from 26 February 2026 to 25 February 2033, with eligibility for parole on 25 February 2026.