R v Davis

SENTENCE

This is the sentence judgment in the matter of Cameron Davis. The offender is before the Court for sentence following his pleas of guilty in the Local Court to two offences as follows:
Sequence 3 is an offence that between 22 June and 27 July 2022 he used a carriage service to transmit a communication with the intention of making it easier to procure a child who he believed to be under 16 years of age to engage in sexual activities with him. This is an offence contrary to s 474.27AA(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment.

Sequence 4

Sequence 4 occurred on 19 July 2022. It was after CEIU16 had ended an earlier conversation saying she needed to collect the child from school. At about 3.25pm the offender initiated a conversation with CEIU16 who said that her daughter was asking who she was talking too. He asked if she would put the child onto the chat line and had the conversation which appears at para 15 between the offender and a person who called herself Gracie, who the offender thought was the nine year old daughter of CEIU16. There was general conversation which appears to have lasted for a very short period, but the offender asked her specifically if her mother had shown her his penis and also whether she wanted to see it again. She replied "okay" and the offender sent a picture of his hand holding his penis. That would appear to be the subject matter of sequence 4, an offence of transmitting indecent material by a carriage service to a recipient who he believed to be under 16. They are then the relevant facts for both offences before me for sentence.
At about 8.30am on 27 July 2022, the day after the last chat between them, police stopped the offender in his car whilst he was driving in Kensington. He was arrested and cautioned. He engaged in an electronic interview and denied the allegations. They seized two Apple iPhones in his possession, one of which was a personal phone and the other was a work phone. The facts do not indicate whether one or the other of those phones was the one he used to talk to CEIU16 on 22 June 2022, but I infer more probably than not, it was his personal phone that was used. Both phones were examined, and neither was found to contain any child abuse material. The same day, police executed a search warrant at his home and seized a number of electronic items. None of them contained any child abuse material.
On the basis of these facts, I now turn to assess the nature and circumstances of the offending pursuant to s 16A(2)(a) and in particular assess, the objective seriousness of this offending. I accept as a general proposition that all sexual offences involving children are serious and that much is reflected by the maximum penalty of 15 years for the first offence and 10 years for the second. Online predatory sexual offending is hard to detect, and children are vulnerable to this. For that and other reasons, general deterrence is a matter acquiring significant consideration in sentences for offences of this type. Here, there was no real child involved but if that had been the case, that would have operated to increase the objective criminality. I accept from the decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, R v Gifford [2016] NSWCCA 302 that the fact that there was no real child involved does not amount to a mitigating factor.
Further, in offences of this type, I accept that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, an immediate term of imprisonment is ordinarily warranted which is clear from the decision of R v De Leeuw [2015] NSWCCA 183 and the fact that there was no real child does not exclude imprisonment as a sentencing option. However, the fact that there was no real child involved, decreases the overall objective criminality of the offending, even though the sentencing principles of denunciation, punishment and general deterrence remain important. The fact that there was no real child involved however, does not reduce the offender's moral culpability in general terms because he believed that he was communicating with or about a real nine year old child and so, subject to other evidence, specific deterrence is also important.
A number of specific matters inform the objective seriousness of these two offences. For sequence 3 they include the following: 1. This was not just a one-off conversation between the offender and CEIU16 but went on for just over a month on six separate occasions. Whilst it did extend over a month, and was not just a one-off conversation, neither is it a particularly lengthy period of time often seen in offences of this type. It is, however, regular contact, albeit not in my view, frequent. There was a gap before 19 July 2022 when there was no contact at all and it was in fact CEIU16 who then found the offender and recommenced the conversation. The offender was certainly persistent in his requests that CEIU16 tried to engage a child in sexual conduct with him. But equally so, CEIU16 was persistent in her several demands that he was serious in his desire to have actual sexual contact with the child and not just engaging in fantasy or role play, and also frequently asking him to explain in greater detail what he wanted to do. 2. The intended sexual behaviour which was being sought was gross sexual contact and suggested that the child would be involved in sexual activity which involved both the offender and her mother. It was specific in content and was encouraging CEIU16 to persuade her daughter to engage in acts which would to an extent, amount to oral sexual intercourse with the offender or to engage in acts which would amount to sexual touching. These are very serious offences which, if committed in New South Wales, might give rise to very serious terms of imprisonment. So, the nature of the intended sexual activity was very serious. 3. There was no gradual build-up by the offender to the introduction of sexual contact with a nine year old child. Whilst it was CEIU16 who introduced the possibility of his engagement with her nine year old daughter, in a mother daughter situation, the offender immediately took it on board and made all the suggestions that he did including sending CEIU16 a picture of his penis, asking and expecting that it would be shown to the child. 4. It was the child's mother who the offender was purporting to groom, with the intention of engaging in sexual activity with the child. The bond between mother and child is important and every child should expect that this bond will not be breached by a parent allowing someone else to engage in sexual activity with them. Acting with the intention to compromise that significant bond, and therefore breach the trust that ought to repose between child and mother, is a relevant factor informing objective seriousness. 5. The matters to which I have referred, to an extent, increase the objective seriousness. The fact that it was not a real child decreases the objective criminality. Further, I accept there was no sophisticated planning, nor sophistication at all, in the offending and no evidence of any steps taken by the offender to ensure his anonymity. He apparently used a telephone number capable of being traced to him, used his real name, and sent a real photograph of himself on the first occasion. 6. The offender was 45 and thought that the child whose sexual activity he was attempting to procure was only 9. This is a factor which is relevant to an assessment of the offender's moral culpability because he believed the child, whose sexual conduct he was attempting to procure was not only a child but a relatively young child, only 9, and he was a 45 year old grown man.
Section 474.29AA of the Criminal Code Act 1995 provides for a number of mandatory factors to be taken into account when sentencing for offences under Subdivision F, which includes both of the offences here. This section mandates the Court, when determining the appropriate sentence for such offences, to take into account the age and maturity of the person in relation to whom the offence was committed and in particular s 494.29AA(1)(b) provides as follows: "If that person was under 10 when the offence was committed - that fact as a reason for aggravating the seriousness of the criminal behaviour to which the offence relates."
The Crown argues that the fact that the fictitious child here was 9, thus under 10, operates as an aggravating factor which should increase the sentence for each offence. It is argued on behalf of the offender that this subsection should not be read to make the fictitious child's age a mandatory aggravating factor for both of these offences because it cannot extend to sentences involving fictitious children.
The Crown argues that s 474.29AA should be read to extend to such circumstances because of the provisions of s 474.28(9A) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Section 474.28 is a section entitled "Provisions relating to offences against this subdivision." It is a section which in my view, in large part, sets out the basis for criminal liability for these offences and some specific provisions regarding evidence. Sections 474.28(9) and (9A) specifically deal with the situation involving a fictitious person who is the subject matter of the range of offences covered by the subdivision and in fact, removes from any consideration about criminal liability, the fact that the person is a fictitious person. They provide for liability in offences brought pursuant to s 474.27A and s 474.27AA and specifically provide that the fact that the child is a fictitious person does not prevent criminal liability extending to the offender.
On behalf of the offender, it is argued that s 474.28 as a whole is a section relating to liability and I accept this to be the case. Subsection (9A) is thus a provision that deals with the fault element necessary to prove one of the relevant offences where there is a fictitious child involved.
Section 474.29AA is a provision relating to sentencing. I do not accept that s 474.28(9) or subs (9A) has any part to play in a construction of 494.29AA(B). The harm that this mandatory circumstance of aggravation seeks to deal with is that sexual offending against children is rendered more serious the younger the child is, and as per the Explanatory Memorandum, a sentence for an offence where a victim or intended victim of a sexual offence is under 10 will amount to an aggravated version of that offence, namely that is something for which the sentence should be longer, simply because of the young age of the child and the increased harm suffered by such a young child.
The fact that that is the purpose of this added provision, it seems to me, militates against its being extended to fictitious persons, unless a specific provision were added to s 474.29AA , which could have been and is done in relation to other provisions of the relevant legislation, to the effect that it extends to fictitious persons or to circumstances where the offender believed a person was under 16 or, relevantly, under 10. If I am wrong in that construction, the impact here, in any event would be very minor, if at all as an aggravating factor, for the very reason that there was no real child and what is more, in this case, it was the police who introduced the fact that the child was under 10. I do not propose to treat the fact that the fictitious child was under 10 for either of these two offences as a matter which aggravates the criminality and therefore, should increase the sentence.
However, taking all of those matters into account, sequence 3 is a relatively serious instance of this offence, albeit somewhat reduced because it is not a real child. It is around the middle of the range in terms of objective seriousness on my finding.
Sequence 4 is a less serious offence because it is a one-off instance of using a carriage service to transmit indecent material to a person that the offender believed was under 16. However, it was in the context of an ongoing attempt to procure this child through the agency of her mother, that is by grooming the mother. This is not an offence of grooming the child however. It could have been brought in that way, but it was not. It is an offence of sending the child indecent material simpliciter, not the more serious offence of sending with the intention of grooming the child. In reality, whilst this is a separate offence, it was committed during the course of the more serious offence of grooming the mother. It is a separate offence but not in its own terms as serious as sequence 3.
There will be a sentence for sequence 4 but there will be some partial accumulation to take into account the total criminality involved. Many of the other factors relevant for consideration of the objective seriousness of sequence 3 are equally relevant for sequence 4, including the age of the child, the relative age of the child and the offender and other matters.
In addition to determination of the objective seriousness of the offending, other matters relevant to determining the nature and circumstances of the offending are that there were no other images or other instances of child pornography found on either of the two phones that the offender was using or on any of the other devices seized.
I now turn to some of the other matters to be considered pursuant to s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914. There was no actual victim of the offences and therefore, no actual injury, loss or damage or any impact on any victim which needs to be considered.
The offender, as previously stated, pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity which gives rise to both the utilitarian value and also indicates a willingness to assist the interests of justice. It was a strong case against him however, given the nature of the police operation involved. However, none of the undercover officers needed to be called and it has meant that a trial has been avoided and members of the public and members of the Court have been spared having to listen to the details of the conversation between the offender and CEIU16 and to view the images. These are important aspects assessing the utilitarian value of the pleas of guilty here.
The offender, I accept, has expressed genuine remorse and contrition. The evidence is from his partner who gave oral evidence, his adult daughter and other family members via the three psychologists reports tendered and more particularly a letter he has written to the Court. From those sources, I accept that he is genuinely remorseful for having committed the offences and is contrite about having done so, his pleas of guilty and the actions he has taken towards his own rehabilitation since his arrest are further proof of his remorse and contrition.
I now turn to consideration of the character antecedents and similar of the offender. He is now 47 and has no prior criminal record. He is thus a person who is entitled to have this good character taken into account when sentencing and there is no evidence that he used that good character or standing in the community to aid him in committing this offence. This good character, however, is of more limited weight in matters such as this and perhaps even more so in this case where he told CEIU16 that he had had an ongoing interest in similar matters for five years. Whilst this does not operate as an aggravating factor and he cannot be sentenced for offences other than that with which he has been charged, it does operate to reduce the weight to be given to his lack of criminal convictions and good character as a result.
There is a forensic psychology report tendered from Ms Anita Duffy which I accept. A large proportion of the matters referred to by way of background are supported by evidence given by his partner or details in letters written by his family members, all of which were tendered without objection. He was adopted as a baby and discovered that fact when he was about ten. His adoptive parents, according to his report, were strict but fair. He grew up largely in Sydney's northern beaches. He did not have strong relationship with his parents after leaving home as an adult and has had only minimal contact after being charged.
He has been in a stable de facto relationship with his partner for 26 years and they have two daughters, aged 20 and 13. The younger daughter was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder when aged six and is a recipient of a treatment plan funded by NDIS. Before his arrest, he was engaged in sales and marketing but has been unemployed since July 2022. He was initially in receipt of Centrelink benefits but now has a NDIS plan with disability support, after his own diagnosis with autism spectrum disorder, following his arrest for these offences.
He had a secondary education, largely in Sydney. He was quiet at school and was bullied between Years 8 and 10. After leaving school, he did mainly sales jobs and seems to have had a relatively strong work record until his arrest. After he was arrested, his partner referred him for assessment for autism spectrum disorder which occurred on 2 March 2023. There is a report from psychologist Ms Claudia Giezen of that assessment. Her opinion in her report of April 2023 was that he appeared to present with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder which has been firmed up since then and which I accept to be the case. A treatment and support plan was recommended by her which has been undertaken by the offender.
I accept that he falls into the category therefore, of a person who was suffering from a mental health condition at the time he committed the offences, namely autism spectrum disorder, although it was not diagnosed until later. I accept from his partner's evidence that this was not just a convenient diagnosis after arrest, something which the Court frequently sees but in fact that he had demonstrated exactly the sort of behaviour on which the ASD diagnosis is based for all of the years that she had known him. She had tried to have him assessed well before but was dissuaded by his adoptive family who I accept in fact blamed her for the younger daughter's autism and denied any issues. I accept that he had been suffering from this condition for many years, but it was not diagnosed until after his arrest.
I accept Ms Duffy's opinion that the problems, that are part of autism spectrum disorder, in social perceptions and difficulty in discerning the implications of what he was saying, played at least some part in the fact that he committed these offences and that he had a propensity to be led by others.
Further the fact he was involved in online communications without other non-verbal cues meant that his autism spectrum disorder played a part in his commission of the offences because the other non-verbal cues that might otherwise had been available were not present to operate as some sort of break on his behaviour. That having been said, I do not accept what the offender apparently told Ms Duffy, namely that he was dragged along and kept talking. That appears in para 48 of her report. It seems to me that that is not the genuine flavour of most of his conversations with CEIU16, albeit it that the undercover operative did in fact frequently direct the conversation. It was the offender however, who continued to come back to the topic of showing her daughter the photo of his penis and it was he who sent the photograph of his penis to the person who he thought was a nine year old girl.
I accept that at least some of his offending was directed to his own sexual gratification, albeit that the autism spectrum disorder played some part. The fact that he sent two pictures of his erect penis during the course of these discussions makes it virtually impossible to make a finding that there was at least not some sexual gratification involved in his commission of the offences. I do accept Ms Duffy's opinion however, that at least some of his involvement in the chat room was a function of social isolation and loneliness at the time, in part connected to his autism spectrum disorder and occurring at a time when his partner was occupied or preoccupied with the transition of their younger daughter into mainstream school which made her unavailable for him and thus made him more isolated.
Since his arrest, he has undertaken treatment, accessed psychological and OT assistance and his family has become well and truly aware of his situation and provided him with support and he is, I accept, showing growing insight and self-understanding. Ms Duffy is of the opinion on an actuarial risk assessment, undertaken using the Static-99R tool, that he is below average risk of reoffending in a similar way and that the ongoing treatment and family support operate to lower the dynamic risk factors otherwise apparent by her use of the Stable-2007 tool.
I accept overall that the offender's risk of reoffending is relatively low based on these assessments and also taking into account his demonstrated rehabilitation, lack of prior convictions despite his age and admitted previous interest and his insight into his offending. His prospects of rehabilitation, in my view, are good for the same reasons. He is a somewhat lesser vehicle for general deterrence because of his, at the time, undiagnosed mental health condition. This reduces his moral culpability to an extent, albeit that there still needs to be a strong message of general deterrence sent.
The need for specific deterrence here is considerably reduced because of the treatment he has already undertaken and will continue to undertake if he is free in the community. In a recent report from psychologist Ms Green, one of the psychologists who conducted the original assessment dated September 2023, I accept that he has completed at least 52 sessions with her or others in her practice. I accept from her report that he has demonstrated commitment to therapy goals and that both the offender and his family have noticed progress towards his goals, especially a decrease in maladaptive coping behaviours. His partner and others have made similar observations.
He was approved for a NDIS plan in June 2023 for a period of 2 years which will mean that if he is available to undertake them, this treatment plan will continue in the community under the auspices of that NDIS plan.
If the offender is required to spend some part of his sentence in full time imprisonment, there will be an adverse impact on members of his family which is a factor to be taken into account pursuant to s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914. That evidence is given from his partner and his father-in-law. His partner does not drive and so he drives her to the work she does as a community support worker, apparently providing in-home support for people with disabilities. His father-in-law is suffering from cancer, and he has been providing transport for treatment for him and other assistance. Their 13 year old daughter as previously stated, suffers from a series of conditions including ASD, ADHD and generalised anxiety disorder. He provides support in the house for her therapy and helps with other aspects of her care. These are matters to be taken into account but of themselves, would not necessarily mean that full-time custody, is not appropriate. They are, however, matters to be added to the mix, pursuant to the general provisions of s 16A(2).
In determining the appropriate sentence, I have been referred to a number of what are said to be comparative cases, both on behalf of the Crown and the defence. Those to which I have been referred by the Crown include Chenhall v R [2021] VSCA 175. It seems to me there is very little if anything in common with that case and matters before me. It involved multiple offences, multiple real persons contacted, guarded prospects of rehabilitation and more serious offending.
A further comparable case referred to by the Crown is Burton v R [2020] NSWCCA 127. It is different to some extent, namely that the contact was for a longer period, more than one person was involved but it was only fantasies that were the indecent material that was transmitted. What was transmitted was explicit but was explicit descriptions of sexual fantasies. He also was facing two other serious charges. A s 474.27A offence was a schedule offence. He was young with no prior criminal history, but he had no psychiatric issues. He was found to lack insight, his rehabilitation was not good and there was a period of full-time custody imposed.
The third case referred to by the Crown was R v Kristensen [2018] NSWCCA 189. That too was a different case to the one before me, involving multiple girls, aged between 11 and 15 over a period of eight months. They were real children and there were 10 of them. He was aged between 32 and 33. He had no prior convictions and the only basis of a successful appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was that no proper discount had been given for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty. Nonetheless, it was a more serious case than the case before me.
The defence have referred me to two sentencing decisions of judges of this Court, one of them is the decision of R v Ebejer [2020] NSWDC 475. Again, this was in relation to a s 474.27A offence which was a schedule offence, but he had three substantive matters. He was 19, it was a fictitious person involved to whom the material was transmitted who was alleged to be 14. He sent an image of his erect penis. Their ages were relatively similar but some of the substantive offences were more serious. His prospects of rehabilitation were good. The more serious Commonwealth offences were dealt with by terms of imprisonment with an immediate recognizance release order.
The other decision to which I have been referred on behalf of the offender is R v Hare [2020] NSWDC 127. This also involved a fictitious person to whom material had been transmitted who purported to be 14 and the offender was 29 or 30. It was a case in which he had also been subsequently diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and he demonstrated a relatively young actual age. There were a number of offences for which he was sentenced. He was ultimately sentenced to a term of imprisonment by way of aggregate sentence of 15 months but ordered to be released on a recognizance release order immediately.
I now then turn to the appropriate sentence, taking into account all of those matters. It seems to me that a term of imprisonment is the only appropriate outcome for both matters. There should be some partial accumulation for both sentences. I use as a starting point for sequence 3, a period of 2 years which I reduce by 25% to give rise to a term of imprisonment of 18 months. The relevant starting point for sequence 4 is 4 months less 25% giving rise to a term of imprisonment of 3 months. I propose to impose an overall aggregate sentence of 20 months with some partial accumulation, taking into account totality.
There was an argument raised on behalf of the accused that it would be open to the Court to impose a sentence to be served by way of intensive corrections order (ICO) for sequence 3. That would not be available for sequence 4. Ultimately, I have concluded that even though the sentence overall is one of less than 2 years, it is not open to impose an ICO for sequence 3.
On behalf of the accused, it was argued that those Commonwealth offences which are excluded from consideration of an ICO are set out in s 67 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. These include offences which fall within the definition of prescribed sexual offences. Section 67(2)(e) sets out those offences contrary to the Criminal Code Act 1995 which fall within that definition. That includes sentences for offences contrary to s 474.27A where the victim was under 16 and so catches sequence 4 here. There is no specific reference to offences contrary to s 474.27AA, which is the first and more serious of the offences here.
Without diminishing the lengthier oral submissions made on the issue, as I understand the argument bared down to its bones, it is that in the absence of specific reference to s 474.27AA in s 67(2)(e), it would mean that an ICO would be available for those offences.
I am not in fact persuaded that this argument is made out. There are two reasons for that. One, s 67(1)(g) provides that no ICO is available for an offence that includes an intention to commit an offence, otherwise prescribed, which would be a prescribed sexual offence.
The second, and perhaps more significant reason, I accept is that s 20AB(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 requires the Court to examine the sentencing powers available in New South Wales, for what are described as corresponding cases, in determining whether or not an ICO is available when sentencing for a Commonwealth offence.
Specifically, s 20AB provides that the Court may pass a sentence in respect of a person convicted in a participating State if, after examination pursuant to s 20AB(1)(b) under the law of that State, the court is empowered to pass such a sentence in corresponding cases. That is a paraphrase of that provision.
I accept the Crown submission, in their supplementary submissions, that corresponding offences to those for which I now sentence this offender are to be found at s 66EB of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which include an offence of procuring a child for sexual activity, s 66EB(2), and grooming a child, s66EB(3) and that these offences, specifically in the terms of that section, extend to fictitious persons. These are both corresponding cases for which an ICO sentence would not be available in New South Wales.
For that combination of reasons, I do not accept that an ICO is available for sequence 3 and it is specifically not available for sequence 4 because of the provisions of s 67 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
The issue then is whether or not it is open to deal with this sentence, a 20 month aggregate sentence, as otherwise argued on behalf of the offender, namely the imposition of the sentence with an order for immediate recognizance release, or whether it is necessary to impose a period of immediate imprisonment by way of a recognizance release order for a period of time.
That consideration has caused me much thought and is a troubling matter and I am conscious of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v De Leeuw [2015] to which I have already referred. It was however, a much more serious cases than the matter before me with actual child pornography as I understand it, amounting to something like 32,000 images.
There is one other matter I take into account in determining whether or not it is appropriate to regard this case as exceptional and deal with the matter by way of immediate recognizance release order and that is, the likely impact of full-time custody on the offender.
I accept that if he were in full-time custody, he will not receive any treatment whilst in prison and that includes no treatment by way of sex offenders' treatment, which I accept from the report of Ms Duffy and also what is known to the Court, that that would not be made available for a person who, like him, is sentenced for online sexual offences.
I accept Ms Duffy's opinion that he is likely to deteriorate if in custody full-time and that his autism spectrum disorder and inability to read social cues appropriately, will make his time in prison onerous and likely to significantly interrupt his ongoing rehabilitation.
All of the factors to which I have already referred in relation to these offences, namely his post-arrest diagnosis of what was a pre-existing mental illness, what he has undertaken to deal with that, the impact on his family and the impact on him should he be required to spend time in custody full-time, means in my view that this case can be seen as exceptional. It is a short sentence and thus any effective time in prison will be even shorter. His family will be adversely impacted, he will deteriorate, and I accept his partner's fear about actions he may take in those circumstances. Overall, whilst I accept that it is perhaps a borderline case for such a determination, I have concluded that it falls into the category of exceptional case and I will be making an order that he be released immediately on a recognizance release order, which I will set for a period of 2 years on condition that he continue to undertake treatment for autism spectrum disorder as suggested by psychologists Direct Focus Solutions. The recognizance will be in the nominal sum of $500.
The offender is convicted for both offences. I indicate the sentence for sequence 3 is a term of imprisonment of 18 months. I indicate for sequence 4 the term of imprisonment is 3 months. The aggregate sentence is 20 months commencing today. Pursuant s 19AC of the Crimes Act 1914 he is to be released forthwith on a recognizance release order with a security of $500 and on the following conditions pursuant to s 21B of the Crimes Act 1914: 1. to be of good behaviour for a period of 2 years from 12 December, 2023; and 2. be subject to the supervision of a probation officer appointed in accordance with the order; and 3. obey all reasonable directions of the probation officer; and 4. not travel interstate or overseas without the written permission of the probation officer; and 5. undertake such treatment or rehabilitation programs that the probation officer reasonably directs; and 6. continue with treatment for autism spectrum disorder with Direct Focus Solutions as suggested by them.
Now I know that the legislation requires me to explain the sentence to the offender. This always seems somewhat curious to me because I think that's probably what I've been doing for the last hour, but nonetheless, that means that I have ordered a sentence of 20 months which is a term of imprisonment. I've ordered that there be a recognizance release order immediately and that that is for a period of 2 years. That contains general provisions including what would be expected, namely that the offender be of good behaviour for 2 years, that if he breaches that condition that he is likely to be called up and would probably go to gaol. It is a promise to be of good behaviour and there is also a condition that he continue the treatment with Ms Giezen or Ms Green or whoever it is the psychologist, for his autism spectrum disorder but the main thrust of it is that the recognizance release order is for a period of 2 years from today and all things being equal, he will stay out of gaol provided he doesn't breach the terms of that bond.

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Judgment (6 paragraphs)

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