[25] It is often difficult to determine the precise role played in a joint offence by co-offenders who each have an interest in minimising their role and maximising the role of co-offenders. The material before the applicant's sentencing judge, including the remarks of Mullins J when sentencing Cook and Gundersen, make plain that the applicant's role in the offence was at a lower level than that of both Cook and Gundersen. Of the three, Cook was deserving of the heaviest punishment. He was a mature man with a minor criminal history who had committed this offence when on bail for a related offence. Both he and Gundersen were involved in the earlier "dummy run" and were at a higher level of the pyramid of drug distribution. As the learned sentencing judge noted, Gundersen was considerably younger than the present applicant. The applicant's greater maturity was, however, more than counterbalanced by Gundersen's greater level of involvement in the present offending, demonstrated by his participation in the "dummy run". In the circumstances, it hardly matters that Gundersen may not have positively known the illicit imported substance he was transporting was cocaine. Both the applicant and Gundersen had difficulties in their lives at the time they committed this offence, no relevant prior history and promising prospects of rehabilitation. The applicant pleaded guilty to an ex officio indictment (unlike his co-offenders) and like them cooperated with the authorities. As the learned sentencing judge and Mullins J rightly recognised, deterrence is a major consideration when sentencing for offences of this type. The applicant, Cook and Gundersen involved themselves in a most serious attempt to possess a large quantity of imported cocaine. This unlawful and evil international industry wreaks untold havoc with the lives of many. It causes widespread major health problems and feeds organised criminal conduct in both developing and developed countries. Although the difference in the sentence imposed on the applicant when compared to that imposed on Gundersen is not great, in all the circumstances it is sufficient to give rise to a real and justifiable sense of grievance on the applicant's part, as discussed by Dawson, Gaudron and Kirby JJ in Postiglione.[2] The sentencing principle requiring parity with the sentences earlier imposed on Gundersen and Cook and the appropriate balance of the mitigating and exacerbating factors in this case, including general deterrence, required the imposition of a penalty a little less and certainly no greater than that imposed on Gundersen. It follows that the sentencing discretion miscarried.