Determination
38In respect of the offence in Count 1, for an offence pursuant to s 154C(2) of the Crimes Act 1900, I find, having regard to all of the circumstances of the offending, that the objective seriousness of the offence here fell below the mid-range of objective seriousness of offending for such an offence. However, it was still serious offending and just below the mid-range of objective seriousness.
39With respect to the offence in Count 3, pursuant to s 95(1) of the Crimes Act 1900, I find that the offending was within the lower range of offending for such of offence. The victim suffered physical injuries from which he had recovered within a period of two weeks. He was personally vulnerable by virtue of him having been previously been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) which had amplified the psychological impact on his life of the violence perpetrated on him.
40I have also had regard to the victim's impact statement tendered by the Crown (exhibit A) and the impact that these offences have had on both the victim's physical and psychological state. I note that there is no medical evidence against which to assess the victim impact statement, however, it is clear from the manner in which the victim gave his evidence that the offences have had a substantial impact on him. I have therefore taken the victim's impact statement into account, but I make it clear that I have done so not to aggravate the offender's culpability.
41I have had regard to the maximum penalty in respect of Count 1 of 14 years imprisonment and the standard non-parole period of 5 years imprisonment, and the maximum penalty in respect of Count 3 in the Indictment of 20 years imprisonment. These are guide posts which I take into account in the sentencing process.
42I accept the Crown's submission that the offender was engaged in a joint criminal enterprise. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence that the offender and his co-offender agreed to carry out that joint criminal enterprise and therefore that each is equally guilty of the crime, regardless of the part played by each in its commission - see R v Cotter [2003] NSWCCA 273 at [87]. It is therefore inappropriate to assess, with any degree of precision, the role played by the offender in the criminal enterprise - see R v Hoschke [2001] NSWCCA 317 at [18]. It is, however, relevant to refer to the particular conduct of each participant with a view to identifying the level of culpability for which each must be sentenced - see R v Sukkar [2011] NSWCCA 140 per Davies J at [36].
43In respect of joint criminal enterprise, Latham J, (with whom Whealy JA and Harrison J agreed) said in KR v R [2012] NSWCCA 332 at [19]:
"19 What emerges from the statements of sentencing principle is that the participants in a joint criminal enterprise are equally responsible or liable for all the acts in the course of carrying out the enterprise, by whomsoever they are committed, yet a particular participants level of culpability stands to be assessed by reference to his/her particular conduct.
20 Such an approach is consonant with the distinction in law between an offender's responsibility for criminal conduct and his/her culpability. They are relevant at different stages of the criminal process.
21 Criminal responsibility, and therefore liability to punishment, attaches to a person who voluntarily and intentionally performs those acts constituting an offence. 'The concurrence of will and physical and the concurrence of intent and physical act suffices to attract criminal liability': R v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 at [72], per Barwick CJ.
22 Culpability, on the other hand, is concerned with the assessment of an offender's moral responsibility for the offence. As such, it assumes liability for the offence and focuses upon aspects of the offender's conduct and his/her subjective circumstances in order to determine the appropriate degree of punishment: R v Merritt (2004) NSWCCA 19; R v Henry & Ors (1999) 46 NSWLR 346."
44These principles were adopted by Bellew J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Adams J agreed) in Manly v R [2014] NSWCCA 59 at [143].
45Consistent with those principles, the culpability of the offender here, given his involvement in inflicting the violence upon the victim, was greater than that of his co-offender.
46Further, the offender here has a lengthy criminal record which has to be taken into account.
47In Veen v R No. 2 (1998) 164 CLR 465 at p 477 the plurality said:
"The antecedent criminal history of an offender is a factor which may be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed but it cannot be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence. The antecedent criminal history is relevant, however, to show that the incident offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience to the law. In that case retribution, deterrence and protection of society may all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted."
48It is clear from the offender's antecedent criminal history here that he falls within the latter category of case.
49The subjective features here, as outlined above and set out in exhibits 2 & 3, do not warrant a finding of extra curial hardship on behalf of this offender. The fact that he will be required to spend his time in protective custody is, however, a matter that should be taken into account in arriving at an appropriate sentence. I find that the fact that the offender was on bail awaiting sentence in respect of the three matters with which he was charged in July 2011, is an aggravating feature to be taken into account. A further aggravating factor is that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt there was a degree of planning involved, involving an agreement between the offender the his cooffender to carry out the offence. This is supported by the offender saying to the co-offender, "Haven't you done it yet? I'll do it".
50I do not find that special circumstances are made out pursuant to s 44(2) of the C(SP)A so as to warrant an alteration of the ratio of the usual non-parole period to the head sentence.
51I do, however, find that the offender is entitled to a discount on sentence for the assistance provided by him to the investigating authorities up until the date of his sentence hearing. I find that he is entitled to a further discount on penalty for the continuing assistance that he is providing the authorities. However, I note that that assistance has not extended to any undertaking by him to give evidence at any future trial. In the circumstances, the offender is entitled to a discount of 15% on sentence in respect of the past assistance provided and 10% on sentence in respect of any future assistance, a total of 25%.