R v Danzey

Grounds of appeal

1. The appellant appeared for herself. The appeal proceeded on the material that was before the magistrate with no application to lead fresh evidence. The appellant provided two documents, one document headed "appeal grounds" and the other headed "appeal submissions" both dated 29 January 2024. The appeal hearing occurred on 2 February 2024.
2. It assists to identify the issues in the way consistent with Lunney by reference to the appeal grounds document. The grounds are not numbered but will be dealt with sequentially. The grounds themselves do not always differentiate which of the offences a particular ground relates to, or whether they all relate to both matters. In brackets the charge that appears relevant to the ground, or both, is indicated.
3. The first asserts that the magistrate did not apply fairness because she made reference in the transcript to the day being police Remembrance Day. That passage cited by the appellant is at page 56 line 35 of the transcript. (Both). Those remarks were made in the course of sentencing the offender and do not form part of her reasoning in her assessment of the evidence. The remarks do not suggest bias, but rather, made in the course of sentencing, are a comment on the need to enforce provisions of the type being considered. There is no substance in this ground.
4. The second ground is that the magistrate placed no weight on the exculpatory evidence raised in cross examination. (both).
5. The third ground is that the magistrate placed no weight on the fact that a citizen has a right to question police powers without it being considered hindering; (hinder).
6. The fourth is that the magistrate failed to take into account that it was necessary for the appellant to stand up and go inside the door to her home to prevent her dog from being shot. (hinder).
7. The fifth ground challenges the intimidation conviction on the basis that there was no intention to intimidate. This goes to a factual matter as to what was said by the accused to her dog with the Crown case being that she was threatening to let the dog out of the unit. (intimidate)
8. The sixth ground is that the magistrate did not take into account the subjective characteristics of the dog (intimidate).
9. The seventh ground was that the magistrate relied on hearsay evidence of police as to the scene of the allegations in preference to what is said to be clear footage of the incident on body worn video. (both).
10. The eighth ground is that there were different versions of the transcripts of the body worn video. It is difficult to see how this could be a basis for appeal. (both). The evidence is what is heard on the video and the transcripts are simply an aide.
11. The ninth ground is that because the body worn videos were allegedly being turned off an assessment of the situation was difficult. The ground has a "?" at the end of the sentence but it seems to be suggesting that the officer alleging intimidation in fact turned off his camera. (intimidation / both).
12. The tenth ground is that the magistrate based her findings on assumptions and opinions of the police rather than the facts which seem to amount to a ground similar to the sixth ground. (intimidate / both).
13. The 11th ground is that the magistrate gave no weight or ignored the excessive nature of the force used by the police during the arrest. (hinder). This ground goes on to assert that arrest is the last resort and that the arrest was unnecessary. Query where that takes the commission of the offence if the arrest, which I assume is a reference to the appellant's arrest by reason of the reference to excessive force, happens after the alleged offences being appealed. (hinder / both).
14. In what will be referred to as the 12th ground, it is asserted that mens rea has not been established; that the appellant was under duress when she stood up to put her cigarette out and protect her therapy dog. The ground continues that the mere presence of a dog regardless of breed does not constitute intimidation. (intimidate).

The DPP case

1. The following summary of the case is taken from the transcript. By consent the Court attendance notice was amended so that the intimidation charge was of intimidation of only one officer and not two.
2. The charges were: 1. Between 9:48 AM and 10:05 AM on 15 December 2022 at Ballina the appellant intimidated Constable Frazer, a police officer while he was executing his duty. 2. That at the same time and place the appellant hindered four named officers while in the execution of their duty.
3. In the prosecutor's opening the particulars of the intimidate charge was a threat to let a dog out of the premises and onto the police. In respect of the hinder the whole of the circumstances of the police attendance and dealing with the appellant were relied upon. Specifically it is alleged that when Sgt Bright said that they were going to enter the premises to arrest the person inside, the appellant, who was outside, stood up and tried to stop Sgt Bright from entering.

The evidence

1. In the evidence of Constable Frazer, he stated that they had attended the appellant's premises because police had received a report of somebody slingshotting projectiles towards a motor vehicle. The attending officers had a photograph by the time they attended the appellant's premises, which is where the person of interest for the slingshot matter was understood to be located.
2. The body worn video was played. I have had the benefit of seeing that video also. In respect of the dog it can be seen inside the premises with the appellant initially. Constable Frazer can be heard to say words to the effect of "you let the dog out and I will Taser it" and there was no response by the appellant to that statement, rather she just continued speaking. Shortly after she then in an almost playful tone says to the dog "who's that" which was hardly an attack order. The almost immediate response of Constable Frazer however was to say that if the appellant opened the door he would spray the dog right now.
3. There then follows what at best could be called a tedious debate as to police powers of arrest reflecting ignorance on the part of all involved. It was wrong of the police to say that they can arrest somebody for the purpose of investigating; it was also wrong of the appellant to say that in the circumstances there was no right of arrest. An express power of arrest under section 99 of LEPRA is where it is necessary to ascertain a person's identity, though in fairness to the appellant the police did not state that as the basis for the proposed arrest at this time. It is only after the alleged act of intimidation that the police asked the gentleman inside the premises, Mr Kuhn, for his name.
4. In a later body worn video when Sgt Bright has arrived he explains that they are going to arrest the person inside and the appellant is certainly not cooperative. The body worn video clearly shows Sgt Bright standing in front of the appellant who is sitting in a chair in front of the doorway to the unit and also in front of what might be called a porch which has a step down to the area where the appellant is seated. At a certain point the officer says to the appellant "go and get him now" and then says "we're coming in one way or another". The appellant replies "you're not taking him". Sgt Bright then moves to his left so to the right of the appellant to pass her and, I would infer, to go on to the porch with the intent of entering the premises. As he is doing this the appellant again says "you're not taking him no '', and rises from her chair lurching to her right into the path of Sgt Bright. In the scuffle that then follows she can also be heard to then say "I was going inside to get him". That is plainly not so; it is contrary to her own words "you're not taking him" and contrary to her actions, which were to plainly get in the officer's way. It is also contrary to her version of events (from the bar table, and put to Sgt Bright at T31; the appellant did not give evidence) at the hearing where she maintained she was moving to ash her cigarette. The magistrate rejected that version as to ashing the cigarette. In that regard I would note that some distance to her right and certainly more than an arm's length is a table on the porch on which there is a small dish which may be an ashtray. However in the preceding minute or so of talking to Sgt Bright the appellant can be seen to repeatedly be ashing her cigarette onto the ground by flicking it with her thumb. Even without that it is patently obvious from the video that she was seeking to lurch or move into the way of the officer to prevent him from going about the arrest of Mr Kuhn inside the premises.
5. There was cross examination of Constable Frazer, Sgt Bright, Constable Lloyd and Sgt Ahrens.
6. From their evidence I note the following largely emerging from the cross examination: 1. Constable Frazer said that the threat relating to the dog was when the appellant pointed at the dog and said "who's that" in the way I have outlined above. The appellant then said if I open the door there's going to be trouble which he said led him to believe the appellant was going to let the dog out. When it was put to Constable Frazer that meant it would result in her reporting the matter to the ombudsman and professional standards he said that there was a gap between her saying that. 2. At T10 the officer said that he felt intimidated at the time he pulled out his Taser which I would infer is the reason he did pull out his Taser. He also said he was intimidated when the appellant pulled back the curtain and said "who's that" to the dog and although it may not be clear that she pointed at the officer, based on the BWV he was the officer then engaging with the appellant and closest to the door, and is plainly the person being referred to. 3. When asked what his problem with the dog was at T 11 the officer said "at the time and you're pointing at me saying "who's that" and I'm looking at a rottweiler, in my experience as a police officer I'm not led to believe that every rotweiler is going to be friendly and sit at my feet especially when the owner is pointing at me saying who's that? who's that?". 4. Shortly after when asked why he thought the dog was going to attack he said because of the way she was speaking to the dog and the size of the dog led him to feel intimidated that the dog was about to get out and chase him off the property. 5. I would also note that when the door is ultimately opened Constable Frazer was cautious in his approach to the door and had capsicum spray at the ready should the dog attack, consistent with a fear of the dog. The officers acted reasonably because when the door was opened it was apparent the dog was not going to attack and there was no need to harm the dog and no spray was used.

Charge of intimidation.

1. The magistrate found the offence of intimidation under section 60 made out for the following reasons: 1. There had been a period of sustained argument between the appellant and the police leading up to the dog incident relied upon. 2. She had repeatedly refused entry to the premises. She said in the course of this "this is why you people get shot". 3. She pointed to her dog, a rottweiler. Whilst the evidence is accepted that this is in fact an assistance dog, that is not something that she made known to the police. Rather she pointed to the dog and said "who's that '' with Constable Frazer being on the other side of the door perhaps 3 or 4 m away. 4. The appellant says "if I come out you're in big trouble" the magistrate found that prior to saying "you're in big trouble" the appellant pointed to the dog. 5. For those reasons the magistrate found the question of intention on the part of the appellant was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
2. As to Constable Frazer actually being in fear of his safety the magistrate found this was made out by his reaching for the OC spray and then later drawing his Taser. He also gave this evidence in his statement which was tendered and formed part of the evidence.
3. On the question as to whether this occurred in the execution of the officer's duty the magistrate found that he had credible information as to the use of a weapon to intimidate somebody by the occupant of the premises whose identity was unknown but for the address. The slingshot, which was the weapon in question, had been found. The suspect would not exit the premises nor would he give his name though I would add here that he was not actually asked for his name until some time into the period of engagement with police. The magistrate notes that the defendant obviously knew the man inside but would not give his name though I do not understand that to be one of the particulars of hinder. The magistrate held that the officer had the power pursuant to the LEPRA to arrest Mr Kuhn to establish his identification and to arrest without warrant for having committed an indictable offence.

Charge of hinder

1. The magistrate noted the submission of the appellant that she turned away from Sgt Bright and not towards him. That submission was rejected. The magistrate supported this by noting the appellant stating "you're not taking him" just before Sgt Bright started to move when she said it again. Based on the body worn video the magistrate was satisfied that the appellant only got out of her chair to offer physical resistance which was the culmination of the verbal exchange of "you're not taking him no".
2. Her Honour noted the questioning concerning cigarettes. She rejected this on the basis that the only table appeared to be on the appellants left, not her right. Even if that be wrong it was plain the magistrate considered that what she saw in the body worn video was in her words a culmination of the verbal exchange and that her actions constituted a hindrance.

Consideration of appeal grounds

1. The appeal points that the appellant relies upon have been set out above. They will be addressed seriatem shortly. In oral submissions the appellant made the point she did not say she would let the dog out and that is a given. The appellant argued that the police were plainly not intimidated based on the fact that they came towards the door. She limits her conduct to simply saying to the dog "who's that" without any move on her part to open the door. She pointed to the contradiction of the police telling her to open the door at the same time not to let the dog out. With respect those two actions are plainly not mutually exclusive as she can appropriately deal with the dog and open the door by putting it on a lead, or simpler still, hold it.
2. She argued that in order to be a hinder it needs to be a substantial hindering. She maintained her version of events that she was trying to use an ashtray and made reference to the fact that she was calm and was being yelled at that the dog would be shot.
3. Returning to the intimidate she says it could not be shown that she intended it.
4. With respect none of these arguments have any substance. They are arguments answered by the magistrate's reasoning set out above.
5. In the appellant's written submissions she relied on the cases of Leonard v Morris [1975] 10 SASR 528 and Fleet v District Court. No part of these judgements were highlighted,and no reference was given for the case of Fleet. Leonard is authority that it is not necessary for the accused to know that the person being hindered was in fact a police officer. That is certainly not the factual situation here. The appellant's argument is apparently based on the notion that because she was entitled to question the police about what they were doing, which is undoubtedly the case, that that somehow provides a defence. If that questioning ultimately results in conduct that constitutes intimidation or hindering it is no defence at all to that conduct.
6. The appellant makes the point that arrest is a last option and makes reference to section 10 of LEPRA. That section is referred to below and is not a section which gives a power to arrest but rather gives a power to enter premises.
7. With all due respect to the appellant there are parts of her written submissions that simply do not make sense as they are referring to parts of the body worn video which are not properly identified. Suffice to say that she maintains the dog did not react throughout the incident. I accept that. Just what consequence that has is not stated though presumably the point sought to be made is that it shows the dog to be docile; on the other hand it could simply be waiting for the door to open or for some command. In my view it is not a matter which detracts from the factual analysis of the magistrate.
8. The appellant says it is implausible to believe Constable Frazer was intimidated. Looked at in isolation there is perhaps some merit in that; the idea that a police officer would be overly concerned by the situation that he faced may on one view be considered unlikely; that is not the issue. The facts show that he truly was intimidated and there was conduct of the appellant which showed that she was seeking to make reference to the dog in a way that showed an intent to intimidate.
9. The appellant makes reference to the fact that after saying "if I come out you will be in trouble" is to be read with her reference to going to the authorities. Even accepting that may be so it does not detract from her earlier conduct engaging with the dog.
10. She complains that the police are antagonistic, sarcastic and intimidating. She relies on this to show that they were not intimidated. The evidence establishing intimidation has been set out above. At the same time the behaviour of both the police and the appellant was far from admirable. The police conduct needs to be seen as being reactionary to the appellant's own antagonistic, sarcastic and indeed intimidating conduct.
11. The appellant relies on the fact that the body worn video was turned off as to show that Constable Frazer was not intimidated. She also claims that she was not informed she was under arrest for intimidation. Lastly she says that there was an admission by Constable Frazer that he did not include all evidence in his statement but there is no reference to what evidence she is talking about. None of these matters are expanded upon. There is no need for her to be told that she is under arrest for intimidation because at the time of her arrest she is being arrested for hindering. The charge of intimidation has plainly been laid later.
12. The final few submissions make reference to the need for the hinder to be substantial. In my view, allowing for that to be so, the lurching into the path of the police officer to prevent an arrest satisfies that requirement. There is then a submission referring to the table on the right-hand side of the appellant. She says that this is indeed an ashtray. I refer to this fact below but in my view it does not assist the appellant. It is also plainly contrary to what is clear to see on the BWV to suggest the appellant is turning away from the police; she turns precisely into the path of Sgt Bright.
13. Turning then to the grounds of appeal identified above. The first ground was the allegation of bias which has been dealt with at the beginning of these reasons.
14. The second ground seems to be a summary of the various matters just discussed as to so-called "exculpatory evidence" "raised in cross examination". Such factual matters that have been raised have been considered above. They do not assist the appellant.
15. The third ground is the point as to her right to question police powers. There is no dispute about that in this case and it too has been dealt with above.
16. The fourth is another factual point asserting that it was necessary for her to stand up, I infer in respect of the hinder matter, in order to go inside her home. With all due respect to the appellant this is simply fanciful.
17. The fifth ground challenges the finding of intention to intimidate and this too has been referred to above.
18. The sixth ground is to say the magistrate did not take into account the subjective characteristics of the dog. With respect that is part of the reason why the intimidation could occur because the police, to the knowledge of the appellant, had not been told by the appellant anything about the dog and dealt with it on the basis that it appeared to be a rottweiler. There is no evidence as to the characteristics of such a dog of an expert nature and all that can be relied upon is the concerns expressed by the police officers which in my view whilst perhaps not overly robust are nevertheless reasonable.
19. The seventh ground asserts the magistrate relied on hearsay evidence. This seems to be a reference to whether or not the appellant said she would let the dog out but the case has proceeded on the basis that she did not say that; if that be wrong because there was reference to it in the magistrates reasons, then for the purposes of of this appeal the conclusions reached are on the basis that those words were not expressly said, as conceded by Constable Frazer.
20. The eighth ground complains that there are different versions of the transcript of the body worn video. That may be in some ways confusing but the magistrate heard the video for herself just as this court has.
21. The ninth ground is to refer to when the body worn videos were turned off. As a matter of procedure I agree with the appellant that this is not satisfactory. Particularly concerning is the fact that the body worn video at the time of the arrest of the appellant was focusing on a blond brick wall. It is to defeat the purpose of body worn cameras if at the time a citizen, here the appellant, is being arrested the police go to the effort of focusing on a blond concrete wall rather than the arrest. Yet of the two offences there is no relevance as to that arrest occurring and so it takes the matter no further.
22. The tenth ground asserts that the magistrate did not determine the matter on the facts but rather on the assertions of the police. With respect as the summary of the magistrate's reasons shows above this is plainly not the case.
23. In the 11th ground it is said the magistrate gave no weight to the excessive force used by the police during the arrest presumably of the appellant as opposed to Mr Kuhn. By that time both offences had been committed. I do not consider that the arrest of the appellant upon her acting in a way that led to the charge of hinder is relevant to the commission of the preceding offences. Further apart from making the assertion that it was excessive there is no other submission made.
24. The 12th Crown was that the mens rea of both offenses had not been made out. As to the hinder offence, it is said the appellant was under duress when she stood up to put her cigarette out and protect her therapy dog. It is not clear what is meant by duress. The reference to protecting her dog would seem to be part of the argument that what the appellant was doing at the time was not getting in the way of Sgt Bright but rather standing up so as to enter into her home. On her argument, once she had finished putting out her cigarette, she intended to move to the door to protect her dog. This argument fails for the reasons stated by the magistrate and referred to by me below but in short because it is so obvious that she is simply getting in the way of the officer to prevent him entering the premises to affect the arrest of Mr Kuhn.
25. As to the intimidate offence ground 12 asserts the mere presence of a dog does not amount to intimidation. Even accepting that to be so, what was involved here involved more than the mere presence of the dog.

Determination of appeal

1. The transcript does not record the submissions made by the parties at the Local Court. In her Honour's reasons she did consider the question of whether what occurred was in the execution of the police duty. The magistrate found at at T 53.10 that the police had a power to arrest Mr Kuhn. This is relevant more to the hinder charge because that alleged offence occurs as the police are moving towards the entry to the premises to affect the arrest of Mr Kuhn. On the facts as found the magistrate stated that there was a power to arrest to establish the identification of Mr Kuhn and to arrest him for committing an indictable offence.
2. In the statement of SC Frazer he states at par 8 that he was trying to establish Mr Kuhn's identity at the 5 min 13 sec mark of his BWV. In the cross-examination of SC Frazer, and indeed of all the four police officers by the appellant, at no stage was it put to them that they did not have the power to arrest Mr Kuhn, nor that what was stated by SC Frazer was not the case. There is no issue raised as to the legality of the arrest of Mr Kuhn, and hence really no issue as to whether the officers were acting in the execution of their duty in that regard. There was some suggestion that there was an issue as to the arrest of the appellant (see eg appeal ground 11) however there is no doubt that arrest was lawful as it was carried out at the time to prevent the continuation of the hinder.
3. In addition to not being the subject of any cross examination in the Local Court, none of the written submissions, the oral submissions nor for that matter in the grounds of appeal does the appellant take any issue as to whether at the time of the hinder (or for that matter the intimidation) that the police were acting other than in the execution of their duty.
4. The point in making reference to the presentation of the appellant's case in this regard arises from having reviewed the evidence that was before the magistrate. The BWV shows there was at no stage any reference by SC Frazer to identification being his purpose in seeking to arrest Mr Kuhn prior to the hinder occurring. On my review of the evidence, it would appear that the police at the time that the alleged hinder occurred were executing their duty on the basis that they had a power to arrest Mr Kuhn because he had committed an offence and for the purpose of investigation. At no time prior to the hinder did the police say that the basis of the arrest was to identify Mr Kuhn. Indeed based on the body worn video evidence at 9:54 AM they said he was under arrest for an indictable offence. At that time it was also said they relied on section 99 subsection "1" "a" "b" in an almost comical response. At 9:56 AM it was said that it was for the purpose of investigation. At 10 AM, so before the hinder Mr Kuhn was asked "what's your name by the way". To which he replied "none of your business". 10:08 AM and after the hinder they stated the arrest was for intimidation and malicious damage.
5. The police undoubtedly had the power to arrest Mr Kuhn to identify him but it does not seem, based on the BWV, that they were acting on that basis at the time of the alleged hinder. It might raise an interesting point of law as to whether if the police affect an arrest acting on an impermissible basis, but they do in fact at that same time have a power of arrest that they are not acting on, the arrest is lawful, though NSW v Robinson [2019] HCA 46 at [104] suggests not.
6. However this point was not taken at first instance and it has not been argued on this appeal.
7. Bearing in mind the nature of this appeal which although in one sense is fairly broad in looking at whether the magistrate arrived at the right answer, the appeal must be determined within the bounds of how the case has been conducted. Neither in the Local Court, nor on this appeal has the point just alluded to been taken. The lack of any cross examination in the Local Court as to the basis of the arrest of Mr Kuhn shows the appellant was not running a case reliant on the point identified above. For the point to be taken, there would in effect need to be a further hearing before the Local Court to allow for the challenge to the evidence of SC Frazer and other relevant officers, which did not occur in the Local Court. The point identified above is therefore put aside.
8. There is therefore in this appeal no issue as to the execution of duty. That issue would seem in any event to arise only in respect of the hinder charge and not the intimidate charge because the police were lawfully making enquiries at the time that occurred.
9. Approaching the matter in the way required of a section 18 appeal I have considered the evidence that was before the magistrate and determined for myself, in line with the above review of the evidence, what I consider to be the correct outcome. In doing so I have taken into account that the magistrate had the benefit of seeing the witnesses give their evidence. I would also note that she had no advantage over this court in respect of viewing the body worn video which was the central evidence in the case.
10. As will be apparent from the canvassing of the grounds of appeal, the facts and the magistrate's reasons, the appeal should be dismissed. There are however some matters on which I am not in full agreement with the magistrate.
11. In respect of the intimidation charge I would note the following: 1. The tone of voice used by the appellant when she said "who's that" to the dog was very soft and gentle. It was far from the tone of someone seeking to sic a dog on a person. 2. Yet before that happened the SC Frazer had said that if the dog was let out he would Taser it. He was plainly concerned by the dog and although a playful tone is used it is obvious the appellant is playing up to this fear. Notably she did not at any time tell the officers that the dog was her assistance dog. She did not indicate that there would be no need to Taser the dog because it would not attack them. In the environment of hostility that prevailed, the playful tone was reflective of the relationship between the appellant and the dog, not of her intentions to the police officers. After the words were spoken the officer again said that he would spray the dog if the door was opened. He was plainly fearful of the dog. When the door was ultimately opened he approached with caution with his capsicum spray at the ready, consistent with the fear that he appeared to have of the dog. There is no doubt in my mind that he was intimidated and the only real question is whether that was the intention of the appellant. Whilst there is the playful or gentle tone used towards the dog identified above, when the circumstances in which this occurs are considered and the reference to the dog in this way at that time and the absence of any attempt by the appellant to allay the concerns of the officer I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was her intention to intimidate him by way of her conduct with the dog. Certainly this is not a serious example of intimidation of a police officer but the conduct is sufficient to make out the elements of the offence. 3. In reaching this conclusion I have come to a different view than the magistrate as to the intention of the appellant when she said there would be trouble if she had to open the door. I consider it the reference to a complaint to the Commissioner was made by her shortly after and I am not satisfied that was a reference to letting the dog out. This is of course not a matter that needs to be established beyond reasonable doubt but rather is one of a number of facts from which the appellant's intention could be inferred. Even without this consideration I would still reach the same result as the magistrate.
12. In my view the magistrates' reasons are plainly correct in respect of the hinder charge. The view I formed looking at the material afresh with no less than advantage in respect of looking at the video than the magistrate is set out above at paragraph [26].
13. The only factual difference I would note as between myself and the magistrate is that there was indeed a table to the right-hand side of the appellant but there is no way that she was trying to ash her cigarette. That is self-evident from a viewing of the video and her actions in the previous minute or so of repeatedly ashing her cigarette onto the ground. Of course the fact that she had ashed her cigarette on the ground does not mean she was not later seeking to ash it elsewhere, but that is not what she was doing.
14. There is also one legal aspect on which I differ to the magistrate. Sgt Bright stated confidently in the Local Court proceedings that his power to arrest came from section 10 of LEPRA which the magistrate appears to have accepted. Section 10 provides no such power. Section 10 expressly provides for the authorisation of police to enter into premises for the purpose of affecting an arrest. The power to carry out that arrest is found in section 99. In this case section 99(1)(a) is plainly satisfied as they suspected on reasonable grounds that Mr Kuhn had committed the offence of using the slingshot. That is the first limb of the section with the second limb being that there needs to be a reason as set out in subsection (b). There is nothing about an offence being an indictable one which authorises the making of an arrest, though it was the case prior to the amendments to LEPRA in 2013. The other possible bases for arrest have been discussed above.
15. Nothing turns on this point as there is no challenge to the police being in the execution of their duty.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 February 2024