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[2003] NSWCCA 109
respondent. Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed by majority. Hidden J would have reduced the sentence on count 4 to 16 years' imprisonment with an 11-year non-parole period, producing a total effective...
The sentencing judge gave no reduction for Daley's guilty pleas because of their timing, his later attempt to withdraw them and his continued challenges to the Crown case. The Court of Criminal Appeal said that this approach overlooked the pleas' utilitarian value, which remained relevant in New South Wales. However, the majority considered that the pleas saved only a limited amount of court time after substantial pre-trial proceedings and that the circumstances of the offending meant no lower sentence should be imposed. The appeal was dismissed. Hidden J would have reduced the sentence.
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2,248 words · generated 30/09/2026
Anthony James Daley applied for leave to appeal against sentences imposed by Simpson J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. He had pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault, two counts of armed robbery and two counts of detain for advantage. A further group of offences was taken into account under s 24 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ([2]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The total effective sentence was 22 years' imprisonment, with an effective non-parole period of 16½ years. The appeal focused on the sentence imposed on count 4, an aggravated sexual assault offence, for which the sentencing judge imposed 18 years' imprisonment and later revised the non-parole period to 12½ years ([3]).
The guilty pleas were entered on 24 May 2001, after lengthy voir dires. The sentencing judge's account, reproduced by Dunford J, described challenges to the admissibility of nearly the whole Crown case, a later adjournment after Daley appeared unrepresented, and an application to withdraw the pleas. Daley gave evidence in support of that application and denied involvement in the offences. The application was refused on 6 February 2002. At sentencing, he also required witnesses involved in obtaining and analysing DNA evidence to attend ([5]).
The sole appeal ground was that the sentencing judge was wrong to find there should be no reduction for the utilitarian value of the pleas ([4]). The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal by majority. Spigelman CJ agreed with Dunford J ([1], [21]). Hidden J dissented, finding the pleas warranted a limited reduction and proposing a lower sentence on count 4 ([22]–[24]).
The Court separated two questions: whether the sentencing judge used the correct principle, and whether the error justified a different sentence on appeal.
First, Dunford J concluded that the sentencing judge had applied a wrong principle. The sentencing judge had considered whether the pleas showed remorse, acceptance of responsibility and willingness to facilitate justice. The Court explained that, in New South Wales, the utilitarian value of the pleas was also relevant. The change in the legal position described in the judgment resulted from the sequence of authorities: Cameron v The Queen was decided by the High Court on 14 February 2002, and R v Sharma was decided by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal on 24 April 2002, two days before sentence was imposed ([10]–[12]).
Dunford J treated Sharma as restoring the approach in R v Thomson and Houlton for New South Wales. Under that approach, the timing of the plea was the primary consideration in assessing utilitarian value, and the usual discount was generally described as 20 to 25 per cent, although the guideline recognised cases where a discount might be higher or no discount might be appropriate ([8]–[11]). The Court therefore held that the sentencing judge's reasoning did not correctly account for the utility of the pleas ([12]).
Second, the Court considered the consequence of that error under s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. That provision, as described by Dunford J, meant the appeal could not succeed merely because an error had been shown. The Court had to be satisfied that another sentence was warranted in law and should have been passed ([16]).
The majority assessed the pleas' practical contribution as minimal. By the time they were entered, the Crown case had been compiled, the case prepared for trial, and issues concerning tendency and coincidence evidence, DNA evidence and identification evidence had been argued and tested in the voir dires. Witnesses had already given evidence ([15]). The pleas nevertheless avoided the need for a jury and meant the complainants were not ultimately required to describe the intimate details of the assaults in evidence ([15]).
The subsequent attempt to withdraw the pleas and the later challenges also formed part of the context for assessing their utility. Dunford J observed that these matters related both to willingness to facilitate justice and to utilitarian value in this case, while noting that the considerations do not necessarily always coincide ([14]). The majority concluded that, despite the sentencing error, the limited value of the pleas and the circumstances of the offences did not justify a lower sentence ([17], [21]).
The majority's result was not unanimous. Hidden J considered the pleas had a more substantial practical consequence because they averted a lengthy trial in which each complainant would have to give distressing evidence. He considered that this warranted some, though limited, benefit and proposed reducing count 4 to 16 years' imprisonment, with an 11-year non-parole period ([22]–[24]).
The judgment sets out a sequence of authorities relevant to guilty-plea sentencing in New South Wales. Section 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 says a court must take into account both the fact that an offender pleaded guilty and when the plea was entered. It says the court may accordingly impose a lesser penalty ([6]). Dunford J emphasised the difference between the mandatory consideration of the plea and the discretionary choice to reduce the penalty: the section does not require a lesser penalty in every case ([7]).
In R v Thomson and Houlton, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal said that sentencing judges should identify that the plea had been taken into account and quantify the reduction. The discount could reflect all matters for which the plea was relevant, including contrition, witness vulnerability and utilitarian value. The judgment records a general range of 20 to 25 per cent, with timing the primary consideration ([8]). It also records that Thomson recognised that complexity or trial duration might justify a higher discount, and that some cases might warrant no discount ([9]).
Cameron v The Queen then addressed the rationale for mitigation for a guilty plea. As summarised in Daley, the High Court identified subjective matters revealed by the plea, including remorse, acceptance of responsibility and willingness to facilitate justice, and rejected a utilitarian rationale based on saving the community the expense of a contested hearing ([10]).
The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal subsequently decided R v Sharma. Daley explains that Sharma treated Cameron as inapplicable in New South Wales, having regard to the wording of s 22 and the legislative history discussed there. Sharma said Thomson should continue to be followed, restoring utilitarian value as a relevant consideration for a guilty-plea discount in this State ([11]).
Daley applied that account to a sentencing decision made shortly after Sharma. It held that the sentencing judge had erred by not allowing for the pleas' utilitarian value, but the appeal still failed under s 6(3) ([12], [16]–[17]). This judgment does not set out subsequent changes to the law or establish how later courts treated Daley. Its account should therefore be understood as the court's explanation of the authorities and statutory provisions before it in 2003, not as a complete statement of current law.
At [7], Dunford J says the Act does not require a lesser penalty in every case where there has been a plea. In plain English, the sentencing judge must consider the plea and its timing, but that does not automatically produce a discount.
At [12], Dunford J says that the sentencing judge proceeded on a wrong principle. This was because the judge's reasons did not give proper recognition to utilitarian value under the New South Wales approach stated in Sharma. The Court's identification of error did not determine the appeal by itself.
At [15], Dunford J describes the pleas as having “some, although minimal” utilitarian value. The practical benefit was that the pleas avoided a jury trial and the complainants giving detailed evidence about the assaults. But much of the Crown case had already been prepared, and contested evidentiary issues had already taken court time and witness evidence.
At [16], Dunford J explains the appeal threshold under s 6(3). The appeal court had to decide whether a different sentence was warranted and should have been passed, rather than simply identifying an error in the sentencing process.
At [17], Dunford J concludes that the facts did not warrant a less severe sentence. The reasoning included the limited utility of the pleas, the attempted withdrawal and the circumstances of the offending described in that paragraph. That conclusion was the majority view.
At [22], Hidden J gives the central point of disagreement. He considered that the pleas had a significant practical consequence because they averted a lengthy trial involving distressing evidence from each complainant. At [23], he also discusses the additional affidavit material, describing it as potentially showing a partial explanation, nascent insight and an early step towards rehabilitation, while cautioning that it was difficult to assess and deserved little weight. At [24], he sets out the sentence he would have imposed.
The remarks of the sentencing judge at [5] are reproduced as part of the procedural history and explain the original sentencing reasoning. They should not be mistaken for the Court of Criminal Appeal's own findings on every factual point. Dunford J expressly corrected the account about the number of victims who gave evidence on the voir dire, while finding that correction of minimal significance ([13]).
Daley is relevant to the analysis of a guilty plea where the timing and procedural history affect the practical value of the plea. The facts the Court considered included pleas entered after lengthy evidentiary hearings, a Crown case already substantially prepared, and significant issues already tested through voir dires ([14]–[15]). The decision illustrates that a plea's utilitarian value may be limited even where it ultimately avoids a jury trial.
The case also addresses a setting where an offender entered guilty pleas but later sought to withdraw them, continued to deny involvement, and made further evidentiary challenges at sentence. The Court treated those events as relevant to assessing the utility of the pleas in this particular case ([5], [14]–[15]). It did not say that an application to withdraw a plea automatically eliminates utilitarian value.
The sentencing appeal context matters. A court may identify an error in the sentencing approach but still dismiss an appeal if the statutory test for substituting another sentence is not met. Here, s 6(3) required the Court to be satisfied that another sentence was warranted and should have been passed ([16]).
Daley should not be read as a universal rule that late pleas receive no discount, or that an attempted withdrawal always means no discount. The majority described the value in this case as minimal after examining its particular procedural history and the offences. It also referred to Thomson's recognition that some cases warrant no discount, but did not remove the need to assess the individual case ([9], [15]–[17]).
The judgment contains no discussion of later cases applying, distinguishing, approving or disapproving Daley. It was decided in 2003 and addresses authorities then before the Court: Thomson and Houlton, Cameron and Sharma ([8]–[12]). On the material provided, it is not possible to describe how later courts treated Daley or to assess its subsequent precedential status.
The decision itself records different outcomes within the Court. Spigelman CJ agreed with Dunford J, who gave the majority reasons for dismissing the appeal ([1], [21]). Hidden J dissented and would have reduced the sentence ([22]–[24]). The dissent helps identify the practical disagreement: the majority focused on how much court work the late pleas actually saved, while Hidden J placed greater weight on the distressing trial evidence the pleas avoided.
For research use, it is important to separate Daley's holding from the broader propositions it recounts from earlier authorities. The discussion of Thomson and Sharma explains the principles the Court applied; it is not evidence about later treatment of Daley. A current account of subsequent authorities is not available from the judgment text supplied here.
The judgment expressly leaves one procedural question unresolved. Dunford J said there was “much to be said” for considering additional affidavit evidence only after deciding whether s 6(3) required another sentence, but found it unnecessary to resolve that issue because he considered the material and concluded it did not affect the appropriate sentence ([18]). Hidden J likewise did not express a concluded view on the issue ([23]). Daley therefore does not decide the proper sequence for considering such material.
The case also recognises, without fully defining, the relationship between willingness to facilitate justice and utilitarian value. Dunford J said the same matters will generally be relevant to both, but that this will not always be so ([14]). The judgment does not provide a comprehensive test for separating the two considerations when they point in different directions.
A further question is how to measure utilitarian value after substantial pre-trial work has already occurred. The majority's assessment turned on the specific hearings, witnesses and evidentiary issues in Daley. The judgment gives no general formula for valuing time saved where some, but not all, trial preparation or evidence has already taken place ([14]–[17]).
Finally, the supplied text does not establish how the principles have developed since 2003. Later legislation and authorities are outside the material available for this analysis. Any current application would require checking the relevant Australian legislation and later case law against the facts in question.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
CITATION : R v Daley [2003] NSWCCA 109 HEARING DATE(S) : 2 April 2003 JUDGMENT DATE : 28 April 2003
JUDGMENT OF : Spigelman CJ at 1; Dunford J at 2; Hidden J at 22 DECISION : Leave to appeal granted, appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS : CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing - multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault - pleas of guilty after lengthy voir dire - application to withdraw pleas - challenge to evidence on sentence - utilitarian value of guilty pleas - willingness to facilitate the course of justice - no discount for pleas of guilty - whether less severe sentence warranted. LEGISLATION CITED : Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, ss 22(1), 24 Criminal Appeal Act 1912, s 6 (3) Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6, 76 ALJR 382 CASES CITED : R v Sharma [2002] NSWCCA 142, 54 NSWLR 300 R v Thomson and Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309, 49 NSWLR 383 PARTIES : Anthony James Daley (Applicant) FILE NUMBER(S) : CCA 60233/02 COUNSEL : RJ Button (Applicant) DML Woodburne (Respondent / Crown) SOLICITORS : DJ Humphreys (Applicant) SE O'Connor (Respondent / Crown)
LOWER COURT Supreme Court JURISDICTION : LOWER COURT 70001/01 FILE NUMBER(S) : LOWER COURT Simpson J JUDICIAL OFFICER :
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL 60233/02
SPIGELMAN CJ DUNFORD J HIDDEN J
Monday, 28 APRIL 2003 R v Anthony James DALEY Judgment 1 SPIGELMAN: I agree with Dunford J. 2 DUNFORD J: This is an application by Anthony James Daley for leave to appeal against the sentences imposed on him by Simpson J on 26 April 2002 following pleas of guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault, two counts of armed robbery and two counts of detain for advantage. In addition, the applicant asked that her Honour take into account pursuant to s 24 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 a number of further offences namely, four counts of aggravated sexual assault, one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault, five counts of armed robbery, two counts of detain for advantage, and one count of indecent assault. 3 The total effective sentences imposed amounted to imprisonment for 22 years with an effective non-parole period of 16½ years. For present purposes it is not necessary to detail the manner in which the sentences were distributed amongst the various counts, except to say that the matters on the Form 1 were taken into account in sentencing on count 4 (aggravated sexual intercourse) in respect of which her Honour sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for a term of 18 years with a non-parole period which was later revised to 12½ years. 4 The only ground of appeal relied on is that the learned sentencing judge was wrong in finding that, in the circumstances, there should be no discount for the utilitarian value of the pleas of guilty. 5 The history of the proceedings and her Honour's reasons for not reducing the sentence on account of the utilitarian value of the pleas were set out in paras [42]-[45] and [50] of her Honour's Remarks on Sentence: [42] "In the ordinary course, an offender who pleaded guilty to an indictment would be entitled to expect a significant reduction in sentence in recognition of his decision to enter such a plea (see Sentencing Procedure Act , s22). There are a number of rationales advanced for this. They include that the plea of guilty signifies an acceptance of responsibility and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice ( Cameron v R [2002] HCA 6; unreported, 14 February 2002); that the victims have been spared the ordeal of recounting, in a public forum, their experiences of sexual assault; and that the plea of guilty may be some evidence of contrition. Neither the first nor the third of these considerations here exists. [43] The offender entered his pleas of guilty at a very late stage, and only after challenging the admissibility of almost the whole of the Crown case, in a voir dire that was conducted over a two week period. A number of the victims were required to give evidence, generally relating to their identification of the offender or of clothing or other items associated with the attacks. True, they were not required to give detailed evidence of the assaults upon them, but they were subjected to cross examination and they lived with the expectation that they would be required to give, in open court, and in the presence of the offender, intimate details of their ordeals - ordeals they have, no doubt, been endeavouring to put to the back of their minds. [44] Finally, the offender's willingness to facilitate the course of justice, as evidenced by the pleas, was short lived indeed. The pleas were entered on 24 May 2001. Sentencing submissions were scheduled for hearing on 23 July 2001. On that day the offender appeared unrepresented, having terminated the instructions of his legal representatives. At that time he claimed to have been pressured into pleading guilty to crimes he had not committed, and sought adjournment of the proceedings to enable him to obtain alternative representation. He was granted that adjournment. The following week, he having obtained alternative representation, I was informed that the offender proposed to apply to withdraw the pleas of guilty. A Notice of Motion to that effect was filed on 15 October 2001. In support of the application, the offender gave oral evidence, during the course of which he repeatedly denied his involvement in the offences. By judgment dated 6 February 2002 I refused the application. The offender has, nevertheless, maintained his position to the present day. Further, in order to found a challenge to the strength of the Crown case, and relevant to the weight to be given to the pleas of guilty on sentence, the offender required the attendance of three witnesses involved in the obtaining and analysis of DNA evidence. In my opinion, that evidence only reinforced the view I had already expressed, when refusing leave to withdraw the pleas, that the Crown case against him was very strong. The offender, therefore, obtains no benefit on sentence by reason of having pleaded guilty to a Crown case which had only slim prospects of succeeding. [45] The offender was well within his rights in taking each of these steps, and his punishment is not to be increased because of his having done so. The history I have outlined is relevant only as throwing light on the extent to which the offender has demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice, an acceptance of responsibility, and the presence or absence of remorse or contrition. I conclude that the offender has failed to show that his pleas of guilty entitle him to any reduction in sentence on any of these bases. … [50] Counsel for the offender argued that, notwithstanding some acknowledged difficulties, the offender is entitled to credit for the utilitarian value of the pleas of guilty. For the reasons I have given, I reject that argument." 6 Section 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides as follows: In passing sentence for an offence on an offender who has pleaded guilty to the offence, a court must take into account: (a) the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty, and (b) when the offender pleaded guilty or indicated an intention to plead guilty, and may accordingly impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed. 7 It is to be noted that whilst the Court "must" take into account the fact of plea and when such plea was entered, it "may" impose a lesser penalty, clearly indicating that the Act does not require a lesser penalty in all cases in which there has been a plea. 8 In the guideline judgment of R v Thomson and Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309, 49 NSWLR 383 this Court said (at [160]) that sentencing judges should explicitly state that a plea of guilty has been taken into account, that the amount of the reduction on account of the plea should be quantified, which may encompass all matters to which the plea is relevant including contrition, witness vulnerability and its utilitarian value, (including where relevant, assistance to the authorities); and that the utilitarian value of the plea should generally be assessed in the range of 20 to 25% on sentence, the primary consideration being the timing of the plea. 9 The Court also said (at [156]-[158]) that particular complexity or trial duration may justify a higher discount whilst in some cases no discount is appropriate at all, including cases where the protection of the public requires a long sentence be imposed or crimes which so offend the public interest that the maximum sentence, without any discount for any purpose, is appropriate, notwithstanding the plea, including cases in which a life sentence can be and is imposed. 10 Subsequently in Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6, 76 ALJR 382 (judgment delivered 14 February 2002), the High Court on an appeal from Western Australia, held that the ratio for mitigation of sentence on account of a plea of guilty was the subjective matters revealed by the plea namely remorse (contrition), acceptance of responsibility, and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice, and rejected the view that the mitigation of the sentence was on the utilitarian basis that the plea had saved the community the expense of a contested hearing. 11 When her Honour came to sentence the applicant on 26 April 2002 she did so on the principles enunciated in Cameron. However, in the meantime (actually two days earlier on 24 April 2002), this Court in R v Sharma [2002] NSWCCA 142, 54 NSWLR 300, in another guideline judgment held that, having regard to the express words of s 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, and also having regard to the Second Reading Speech for the amendments which introduced the precursor of s 22 (namely s 439) into the Crimes Act 1900, the reasoning in Cameron was not applicable to this State, and that R v Thomson should continue to be followed, thereby restoring the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty as the relevant consideration to the discount to be allowed on account of such plea. 12 It follows that, because of the proximity of the dates of these two last mentioned judgments, her Honour proceeded on a wrong principle in determining whether any discount should be allowed in respect of the pleas, holding as she did that the pleas did not demonstrate any remorse, contrition, or acceptance of responsibility, and did not signify a willingness to facilitate the course of justice, as they were only entered after lengthy voir dires, when in practical terms, all other avenues of defending the case were closed to the appellant, they were followed by an application to reverse such pleas and the DNA evidence was challenged on the sentencing hearing. 13 There was also a factual error in her Honour's Remarks on Sentence in that, whereas she said that a number of victims were required to give evidence on the voir dire, in fact only one victim was required whilst another was required to give evidence on the sentencing proceedings in relation to the conduct of the applicant at court. But in my view this error of fact is of only minimal significance to the utilitarian value of the pleas because all the victims lived with the expectation that they might be required to give evidence and that remained the situation beyond the date of the entry of the pleas because of the application to withdraw such pleas and the subsequent application for leave to appeal against the refusal of that application (subsequently abandoned). 14 Generally speaking, matters which are relevant to a willingness of an accused to facilitate the course of justice will be the same as those relevant to the utilitarian value of the plea; but this will not necessarily always be the case. In this case a number of matters, including the history of the case, the lengthy voir dires, the late entry of the pleas, the subsequent adjournment, followed by the application to withdraw the pleas involving the calling of counsel and solicitor who had previously appeared, the appeal against such ruling, and the challenge on sentence to the DNA evidence were all matters relevant both to a willingness to facilitate the interests of justice and also to the utilitarian value of the pleas. 15 However, beyond all this there was some, although minimal, utilitarian value in the pleas in the saving of court time and the avoidance of the necessity for the attendance of a jury; and notwithstanding their justifiable apprehension, the victims were ultimately not required to give evidence concerning the intimate details of the assaults upon them. On the other hand, by the time the pleas were entered, the Crown case had been compiled, the case had been prepared for trial, the Crown case on the issues of tendency and coincidence evidence, DNA evidence and identification evidence had been vigorously tested and argued on the voir dires, which involved witnesses being called to give evidence. 16 Notwithstanding the learned sentencing judge's error, s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 requires this Court to dismiss the appeal unless it is satisfied that some other sentence, whether more or less severe is warranted in law and should have been passed. As observed in R v Thomson there are and will be cases in which, notwithstanding pleas of guilty, no discount is appropriate, including cases where the protection of the public requires a long sentence to be imposed. There will also be cases where the utilitarian value of the plea is so slight as to justify no discount. 17 In my opinion in this case, the minimal utilitarian value of the pleas, followed by the application to withdraw them, and the multiple series of offences extending over a period of almost two years some of which were committed whilst on parole for a previous offence (break enter and steal), a factor not adverted to by her Honour, the use of a knife or similar instrument on five out of the seven victims, and the threat to kill one of them, all render this to be such a case; and that no less severe sentence is warranted in law. 18 So far I have not referred to the additional affidavit evidence that was filed in Court at the hearing, and I consider there is much to be said for the view that, notwithstanding that error has been shown, it is only after the Court has taken s 6(3) into account and concludes that some other sentence should be imposed that regard should be had to such additional material. But, it is not necessary to finally resolve this issue because, having taken the additional material into account, I am not persuaded that it is such as to affect what I otherwise regard as the appropriate sentence for these very serious matters. 19 The matters described by the applicant in paragraphs 4 to 8 of his affidavit and similar matters described in the other affidavit, may in part explain the applicant's conduct, but they cannot excuse it, particularly the attacks on strangers, or the threats and use of knives. 20 I do not regard the applicant's outburst in court on 26 April 2002 as relevant to the appropriate sentence and neither apparently did her Honour. 21 For these reasons, I would grant leave to appeal, but dismiss the appeal. 22 HIDDEN J: I have read in draft the judgment of Dunford J but, after anxious consideration, I find that I am unable to agree with it. Notwithstanding the sorry history of the proceedings, the fact remains that the applicant's pleas of guilty averted a lengthy trial in which each of the complainants would have to have given evidence of a distressing nature. The applicant was entitled to some, admittedly limited, benefit for the utilitarian value of those pleas. 23 On that basis alone I am satisfied, for the purpose of s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act, that a somewhat lesser sentence is warranted. Like Dunford J, I find it unnecessary to express any concluded view about whether the fresh material before this Court should be taken into account for the purpose of the determination required by that subsection. That material is unchallenged, but its significance is difficult to assess and not much weight can be given to it for the purpose of re-sentence. I would be prepared to see it as a partial explanation for the applicant's conduct and as indicative of a nascent insight into the seriousness of his crimes. It might also be seen as the first step in a long path towards rehabilitation. 24 I would reduce the sentence on count 4 to imprisonment for 16 years with a non-parole period of 11 years. This would result in a total effective sentence of 20 years with a non-parole period of 15 years. **********
Last Modified: 05/07/2003 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
R
Daley
Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed by majority. Hidden J would have reduced the sentence on count 4 to 16 years' imprisonment with an 11-year non-parole period, producing a total effective sentence of 20 years with a 15-year non-parole period ([21]–[24]).