17 The jury would also be entitled to find, from the context surrounding the reference to firearms in the various conversations, that at least a Glock was within the inventory of items to be obtained before Lawrence set out for Port Macquarie. So whatever the enterprise involved, the jury might conclude that, on the Crown case, two of the organisers of the enterprise thought that at least a firearm was a pre-requisite. It may be inferred from the fact that Brokenshire raises the question of whether Lawrence still has a twenty-two while they are discussing what items he, Lawrence needs, that Brokenshire also believed that a firearm was a piece of equipment necessary to carrying out the enterprise in which he was involved.
18 In submissions before me, the Crown has stressed that the references to firearms in the conversations between the alleged co-conspirators are an integral element of the conspiracy and are part of the overt acts relied upon by the Crown to prove both the nature of the conspiracy and the participants in it. This is not a case where the firearms are merely incidental to the Crown case, such as if they had simply been found during a search of the accused premises after arrest. Rather the firearms are spoken about on more than one occasion in the context of preparing to carry out the venture in which these accused were involved. At least one weapon was obtained from the same person who supplied the boat and the phones and who "has to be looked after". The Crown submits that, where the evidence of other criminal conduct is part of the commission of the offence charged, there is no justification for the exercise of any power to reject the evidence. In this regard the Crown has referred to the judgment of McHugh J in Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 633, where his Honour said:
If evidence which discloses other criminal conduct is characterized as part of the transaction which embraces the crime charged, it is not subject to any further condition of admissibility. Evidence which directly relates to the facts in issue is so fundamental to the proceedings that its admissibility as a matter of law cannot depend upon a condition that its probative force transcends its prejudicial effect. No doubt in a criminal trial a judge always has a general discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence. But it is difficult to see how evidence directly related to the very facts in issue can be excluded simply because it reveals other criminal conduct on the part of the accused…………
19 On behalf of the accused it has been submitted that the discussion about, or the possession of, the firearms tells the jury nothing about the venture in which the accused were involved. In particular, it is argued that the use of firearms is not part of the conduct reasonably associated with importing drugs and, therefore, no conclusion can be drawn from the discussions about them in support of the Crown case. In this regard my attention was drawn to Sultana (1992) 74 A Crim R 27 where the possession of a firearm was held to be relevant to proof of the offence of supplying a prohibited drug as it was consistent with the accused having heroin in his possession for that purpose rather than for his own personal use. However, I do not find that decision of any assistance in the present case. It concerned a discretionary judgment made by a trial judge in particular factual circumstances.
20 There is nothing in the judgments of the members of the Court in Sultana that suggests that the possession of firearms is irrelevant to any offence involving drugs other than supply. Nor could it be. Clearly the importation into Australia of any valuable commodity, either legitimately or illegitimately, carries with it the attendant risk that some person may attempt to intervene and steal the item. It would not be unreasonable to expect armed guards to accompany the transportation of any valuable items some distance. So too it might be reasonably expected that persons, who are involved in the importation and transportation of a very valuable hoard of drugs, may consider it necessary to arm themselves. It might, perhaps, be though less likely that persons involved in assisting an illegal immigrant to enter Australia from a sailing boat off the coast of Port Macquarie would need a firearm to protect themselves or the illegal immigrant.
21 It was strenuously submitted that, because it was later determined that the firearms were not necessary for the carrying out of the venture, the discussions about them are irrelevant to proof of the Crown's case or, at least, are unduly prejudicial to the accused. But simply because it is later determined that items initially thought as necessary are no longer needed, it does not follow that the items cannot assist in understanding the nature of the venture to be carried out. It is always on the cards that, as a venture proceeds over time and as circumstances change, items initially thought to be useful prove unnecessary.
22 In the present case the significance of the evidence is two-fold. Firstly, the discussion of the firearms by two persons who, the Crown asserts, are the prime movers in the conspiracy in Australia, is part of the circumstantial case that proves the nature of the conspiracy alleged. Secondly, the evidence of the disposal of the firearms at Telegraph Point at the direction of the accused Diez is relevant to an assessment of his role in the activities being carried out there and his relationship with other persons who, the Crown says, are members of the conspiracy. The evidence, if accepted, supports the Crown's assertion that Diez is a major participant in the conspiracy and a person of authority in the preparations being carried out pending the arrival of The Flaning. It is of course not without significance that the firearms found by police are similar to those being discussed in conversations between Cornwell and Lawrence. The fact that they are at Telegraph Point confirms that the reference to them in the earlier conversations is in connection with the enterprise that was to take place there.
23 In my view the evidence is relevant and highly probative when taken with other evidence in the prosecution case. It is important evidence for the Crown to rebut any suggestion that the persons at Telegraph Point were involved in activity of more minor criminality than that charged, such as a conspiracy to breach the immigration laws in respect of one or two persons aboard The Flaning. It is relevant to rebut any suggestion of the accused Diez that he had no concern in arrival of the boat or the activities of the others, except to help sell it. I cannot see how there is any real possibility that the jury might misuse the evidence to the disadvantage of the accused. It does not simply give rise to propensity or bad character. It is not of some merely tangential significance to which the jury might give too much weight or which might distract the jury from the real issues before them. In the present case, which is concerned with an allegation of an importation of a very large and valuable quantity of illegal drug, it does not seem to me that there is any unfair prejudicial effect of the evidence or that, if there is, it is disproportional to the probative value of the evidence.
24 The evidence should be admitted except that part relating to a .22 with a silencer.
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