R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Federated Gas Employees' Industrial Union, Ex p

This is an order nisi for a writ of prohibition prohibiting further proceedings on two orders nisi which had been pronounced absolute made by the Arbitration Court, one for an order for compliance with an award and the other for an order for an injunction made in purported pursuance of pars. (b) and (c) respectively of s. 29 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1949. Both orders were made in respect of clause 17 of an award in an industrial dispute in the gas industry made by the Chief Conciliation Commissioner on 3rd April 1950.

Clause 17 consists of three paragraphs in the same form as the paragraphs of the sub-clauses considered in R. v. Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section [1] , a case argued with this case.

The orders absolute of the Arbitration Court have not been drawn up, but their effect may be ascertained from the material parts of the orders to show cause made absolute. One order requires the now prosecutor to show cause why an order should not be made by the Arbitration Court under s. 29 (b) of the Act that the prosecutor should comply with the sub-clause (b) (the second paragraph that is to say) of clause 17 of the award by ceasing to be directly or indirectly concerned in certain bans, limitations or restrictions upon the working of overtime in accordance with the requirements of clause 17 (erroneously called in the order nisi the "said sub-clause").

The other order nisi calls on the prosecutor to show cause why it should not be enjoined pursuant to s. 29 (c) of the Act from committing or continuing a contravention of the said Act, namely the breach by it of sub-clause (b) of clause 17 of the award by being directly or indirectly a party to or concerned in certain bans, limitations or restrictions upon the working of overtime in accordance with the requirements of clause 17. The application for a writ of prohibition in respect of this second order, that for an injunction as under s. 29 (c), is governed by the reasons I have given in R. v. Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section [1] , and may be conveniently disposed of at once. Because, in my opinion, s. 29 (c) relates only to infringements of the provisions of the Act as distinguished from the infringement of the provisions of an award the order made in purported pursuance of s. 29 (c) is bad and a writ of prohibition in respect of that order should issue.

The other order is, however, in my opinion, good and no writ of prohibition should issue in respect of it. The attack upon it was based solely on an interpretation placed on s. 29 (b) which would confine its operation to empowering the Arbitration Court to order the remedying of a past default in complying with an award. The provision, it was argued, does not extend to authorizing an order for future compliance, not even to ordering, as this order may be thought to do, a cessation from a presently continuing breach of an award.

The restrictive interpretation for which it was so contended was founded upon considerations arising from the condition of the Act when s. 29 (b) was first introduced into the legislation, confirmed, so it was said, by the subsequent legislative treatment of the material provisions. Section 29 (b) was inserted in the Act of 1904-1911, though in a somewhat fuller and perhaps better form, as s. 38 (da) by Act No. 18 of 1914. At that time the Act of 1904-1911 contained in s. 48 the following provision: - "The Court may, on the application of any party to an award, make an order in the nature of a mandamus or injunction to compel compliance with the award or to restrain its breach under pain of fine or imprisonment, and no person to whom such order applies shall, after written notice of the order, be guilty of any contravention of the award by act or omission. In this section the term "award" includes "order". Penalty: One hundred pounds or Three months' imprisonment."

It is contended that s. 38 (da), which No. 18 of 1914 inserted, could not have been intended to cover the same ground as the mandamus to compel compliance with the award under s. 48. Therefore, it was said, as s. 48 must be considered to look to future performance, s. 38 (da) must be confined to remedying past breaches or non-observances of awards.

The Act has had a long history and is by no means in its then form and I am not sure that it is permissible to interpret the provision standing, as it now stands, in a different context by reference to its former context. But, even if it be so, the restrictive construction contended for is not justified. Section 48 dealt with awards only and provided a procedure designed to create a punishable offence if there was a further contravention. It also fixed the maximum punishment. Section 38 (da) related both to orders and awards and authorized the making of an order for compliance which, as I take it, would be enforceable under the then ss. 44, 45, 46 and 47. The purposes of the respective provisions differed and I think that there is no sufficient support for the theory that the two provisions might not overlap in their application to infringements of awards.

In any case I find it very difficult to formulate with any precision the restricted meaning which it is sought to place upon the present s. 29 (b), and I do not think the language of s. 29 (b) is susceptible of such a limitation. After it had been decided that the Arbitration Court as then constituted could not be the repository of any judicial power, s. 6 of Act No. 39 of 1918 substituted in s. 48 certain inferior State courts for the Arbitration Court but left s. 38 (da) untouched. Two years later, by s. 21 of Act No. 31 of 1920, the High Court or a Justice of the High Court was added to these tribunals and the scope of s. 48 was somewhat enlarged. In 1926, when the Arbitration Court was reconstituted in a manner making it constitutionally competent to receive judicial power, the Arbitration Court was added to the tribunals in s. 48 by s. 10 of Act No. 22 of 1926. At length, by s. 41 of Act No. 43 of 1930, s. 48 was repealed.

All this appears to me to establish no more than that until 1930 the legislature placed a value on the powers given by s. 48. It was relied upon, however, as confirmatory of the interpretation contended for. But I cannot see how it really aids the argument.

In my opinion the order under s. 29 (b) is within that provision and no writ of prohibition should be issued in respect of that order. I think that the order nisi should be made absolute for a writ of prohibition prohibiting further proceedings upon the order, pronounced by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration on 9th October 1950, making absolute a rule made on 31st July 1950 to show cause why an order under s. 29 (c) should not be made against the prosecutor.

In this case proceedings were instituted under s. 29 (b) and s. 29 (c) of the Act.

It would follow from the reasons which I gave in the former case [1] for holding that the order therein made under s. 29 (c) was invalid that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court to make the order sought under that provision. In the case of s. 29 (b) the order which the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was asked to make was an order in the terms of the award: but, so far as I can see, no order was made under s. 29 (b) which is open to the objection which proved fatal in the case of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. In the present case I think the order nisi should be made absolute so far as it applies to the proceedings under s. 29 (c).

I think the order nisi for prohibition should be made absolute.

The order nisi in this case is for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding with or upon two rules to show cause made by a Judge of the Arbitration Court, whereby the prosecutor was called upon to show cause why certain orders should not be made against the prosecutor under s. 29 (b) and s. 29 (c) of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1949.

Before the order nisi was granted, the Arbitration Court had heard the matter and had announced that orders to be subsequently settled by the court would be made. No order has been drawn up or settled.

Upon the rule to show cause which refers to s. 29 (b), the Arbitration Court has decided to order that the prosecutor shall comply with sub-clause (b) of clause 17 of Part I of the Gas Industry Federal Award by ceasing to be directly or indirectly a party to or concerned in certain bans, limitations or restrictions upon the working of overtime in accordance with the requirements of that sub-clause. The Court has not decided to include in the order a provision such as that which, in the Metal Trades Case [1] , I regarded as unauthorized by s. 29 (b), namely a provision requiring the union to procure the working of overtime by its members without any ban. In my opinion the order is authorized by s. 29 (b).

Upon the rule to show cause based upon s. 29 (c), the Arbitration Court has decided to enjoin the prosecutor from committing or continuing what the rule described as "a contravention of the said Act." This description is followed immediately by the words "namely by the breach by it of sub-clause (b) of clause 17 of section 1 of the above award (i.e. the Gas Industry Federal Award) by being directly or indirectly a party to or concerned in certain bans, limitations or restrictions upon the working of overtime in accordance with the requirements of the said clause". For reasons similar to those I have stated in relation to the order purporting to be made under s. 29 (c) in the Metal Trades Case [1] , I am of opinion that the Arbitration Court has no power under s. 29 (c), but has power under s. 29 (b) to make this order.