8 The Department has filed an affidavit by a Ms Prodigalidad who says she is a public servant and a delegate of the Director-General. Just what is Ms Prodigalidad's seniority or status is left unrevealed.
9 Ms Prodigalidad annexes an extract from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. She says on her oath that article 8 is as follows:
"ARTICLE 8
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity."
10 Ms Prodigalidad then says on her oath, "The Department of Community Services contends that special reasons for changing the child's birth name would arise in only exceptional circumstances to justify a contravention of International Law."
11 It would not seem that Ms Prodigalidad has much conception of International Law or what is legal in this area or what is identity.
12 First, the mere fact that Australia ratifies an international treaty does not make it part of Australian law. Secondly, "International Law" refers to the obligations between nations rather than individual rights. Thirdly, it must be established that a child has an identity before there is anything to preserve. Fourthly, it must not be assumed that a person's identity is fixed at birth and thereafter there can never be any changes. Finally, there is no Australian law, other than perhaps s 101(5) of the Adoption Act 2000, which recognizes identity.
13 Ms Prodigalidad also uses the term "birth name". There is no material to suggest that a person emerges from the womb with a name. Indeed, authority is against the proposition; see eg R v Clark (1818) Russ & Ry 358; 168 ER 844. Until named in a ceremony appropriate under what might be called the lex loci natus to confer a name, the child has no name, Linell, The Law of Names (Butterworths, London, 1938) p 18. In due course, the child will attain a name by reputation.
14 Ms Prodigalidad seems to be saying, on her oath, that a name conferred on an infant by a stranger shortly after birth, without the child's consent marks that child's identity for ever. This just cannot be correct.
15 Ms Prodigalidad then purports to construe a judgment of Campbell J in Re M & S [2004] NSWSC 203. She cites para [29] and then says, "Given this decision by the Supreme Court, it would appear to be inappropriate to change (the child's) given name on the basis that the applicants have chosen to give him another name since the time of his placement".
16 Unfortunately for Ms Prodigalidad, para [29] was dicta in a case under the transitional provisions in which Campbell J actually allowed a change of name.
17 Ms Prodigalidad then swears on her oath the following statement, "Any reference by the applicants to the child by another name has been a clear contravention of Adoption Act 2000, their commitment as demonstrated during the adoption process and clearly is not in the best interests of the child as deemed by international authorities."
18 At this point I should remind the Department that affidavits are for the statement of facts. A person who swears to matters purporting to be matters of fact when she does not know them of her own knowledge, or interprets documents in a way which states as a fact that someone made a commitment when they deny it, is in danger of a charge of perjury.
19 The proper manner of dealing with such matters is to annex documents or reports, or better still, have the person who made the report swear an affidavit, and make all matters of submission and contention in an unsworn document marked "Submissions".
20 The so-called "commitment" is that on 22 November 2001, the applicants attended a Preparation for Adoption Seminar. The evidence as to this seminar is meagre. Ms Prodigalidad (who it would seem did not attend) says it was the practice of the social workers delivering "the training" to raise and discuss the importance of a child retaining his or her birth names as "given names". There is no material to show that they ever did so. One of the so called "trainers" was actually the social worker who gave the reports in this case: up until recently, she referred to the child as Harrison.
21 It is clear from the evidence that comes before the judges of this Court that if the Department considers that the message about its policy is being clearly spread at these seminars, there is poor and inadequate communication, as many applicants are swearing that they did not understand that such message was given. Indeed this makes one uneasy as to whether the seminars are achieving their purpose about adoption generally.
22 I should repeat what has been said before that in uncontested matters and, indeed generally, under s 126 of the Adoption Act, 2000, the court accepts less than the best evidence. However, it endeavours to insist that: