CONSIDERATION
129In considering the evidence and the submissions of the parties, I turn firstly to the issue of the deceased's mental state in the period leading up to his death.
130Ms Parker stated, with some certainty, that she had no concerns about the deceased being at risk of self-harm when she assessed him on 22 July 2012. However notwithstanding her assessment, the deceased was referred to the RIT. Ms Parker explained that such referrals were made only in cases where a risk of self-harm was identified. Given that Ms Parker had no concerns about such a risk, the precise reason(s) why the deceased was referred to the RIT remain, to some extent, unexplained. In any event, and whatever the reason(s), the RIT came to the opposite view of Ms Parker and assessed the deceased as presenting at a risk of self-harm, albeit a low one. That said, the observations made of the deceased by other inmates establish that the deceased interacted appropriately and showed little or no sign of mental instability.
131On or about 30 August 2012 a proposed application for bail by the deceased did not proceed. Despite being disappointed at not being released, the deceased's spirits, according to Mr Clark, remained "reasonably good". I accept Mr Clarke's evidence in that regard. It is generally, if not completely, consistent with the observations made by Ms Caon and Mr Jones on the following day.
132Although Ms Caon noted that the deceased was teary at times, she assessed him as being at low risk of immediate self-harm. I am satisfied that the deceased presented to Ms Caon in the manner that she described - namely relaxed, responsive, appropriately humorous and positive. Those observations are completely consistent with Ms Caon's final assessment of the level of the deceased's risk of self-harm, namely that it was low. Moreover, Ms Caon thought it appropriate to accept the guarantee which she had been given by the deceased that he would not self-harm. There was no suggestion made to Ms Caon that her acceptance of that guarantee was other than soundly based.
133Further, and consistent with the observations of Mr Jones, I am satisfied that the deceased was in a positive frame of mind when he returned to his cell following his interview with Ms Caon. I reject the evidence of the accused regarding his observations of the deceased's demeanour at that time. That evidence is completely inconsistent with the unchallenged observations of Ms Caon which were made only a short time before. What is also significant, is that the observations of Ms Caon and Mr Jones were made only 10-12 hours prior to the deceased's death.
134For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that in the hours leading up to his death, the deceased was in a stable mental state, and that he presented as being at a low risk of immediate self-harm. That presentation is, in my view, is completely at odds with the proposition that he took his own life.
135I am also satisfied that there was a disturbance from within the Pod in the early hours of 1 September 2012. As I have previously noted, counsel for the accused relied (inter alia) on the fact that only a small percentage of the inmates in the Pod were called by the Crown to give evidence. The proposition that there were a total of 64 inmates in the Pod at the time was based upon the plan of the Pod (Ex G). It assumes that each cell was occupied by 2 persons, a matter about which there is no direct evidence. However even accepting that there were a total of 64 inmates within the Pod, the fact that only a small number of them were called to give evidence is, in my view, of limited significance. The more important consideration is what evidence was in fact given by those who were called.
136I have already made note of the fact that some of those persons called had provided accounts to the police which were at odds with the evidence that they gave. For the reasons I have already expressed, that is explicable.
137Further, and although the evidence is not precise, there seems little doubt that there was a gap of some days (perhaps 4 or 5) between the time that the inmates were spoken to by police and the time at which they made their statements. There is also some evidence that, as might be expected, the deceased's death was a topic of discussion in and around the Pod. However, I am unable to accept the submission that all of those inmates who were called participated in such discussions, as a consequence of which their evidence should be regarded as unreliable. As I have noted, some of the witnesses were not cross-examined about that issue at all.
138Further, I am unable to accept the submission made by counsel for the accused that those inmates who were called were unable to identify the deceased's voice, or were unable to pinpoint the direction from which they heard such sounds. Mr Dillon is a case in point. He knew the deceased. He heard a voice crying for help on 5 separate occasions. He was in no doubt that it was the voice of the deceased that he heard. He nominated the direction from which he heard that voice. That direction was consistent with the location of cell 407. The fact that he may have initially told the police that he heard nothing does not, in the circumstances, cause me to reject his evidence.
139Further, whilst the deceased's death might well have been a topic of conversation in the Pod between the time Mr Dillon first spoke with the police and the time he made his statement, and whilst Mr Dillon conceded that he had heard suggestions about the cause of the deceased's death, there is no evidence that he took part in any such discussions, much less evidence that such discussions influenced his evidence in any way. I am satisfied that what Mr Dillon heard were the deceased's cries for help at about 12.30 am on 1 September. Those cries were being made because the deceased was being attacked by, and was struggling with, the accused.
140Mr Morris heard sobbing coming from another cell at about the same time. Mr Turner, his cellmate, described what he heard at that time as "uncontrollable crying" and pinpointed the location of what he had heard as coming from a direction consistent with the position of the deceased's cell. I am satisfied that it was the deceased who was making those noises.
141Mr Jones also heard a distinct scream which he immediately identified as the voice of the deceased. Mr Jones was housed only two cells away from the deceased at that time.
142In all of these circumstances I am unable to accept the submission advanced by counsel for the accused that the evidence called from these inmates suffers from the shortcomings which were suggested. I am satisfied that what was heard at about 12:30am on 1 September were the deceased's cries for help. On the whole of the evidence, including the evidence of injuries to the deceased to which I have referred below, I am satisfied that the deceased was crying for help because at that time he was being strangled by the accused with an electrical cord.
143I am also satisfied, based on the evidence to which I have referred, that the words "oh no Daryl, what have you done?" were words uttered by the accused at or about the time he made the emergency call. For the reasons more fully set out below, I am satisfied that those words represented one of a number of steps taken by the accused to create an impression that the deceased had taken his own life when in fact he had not.
144Having regard to the opinion of Dr Szentmariay, there is no doubt that the deceased died of neck compression. The more pressing question concerns the mechanism by which that neck compression was caused. The Crown case is that it was caused by the accused strangling the deceased. The accused denies any involvement in the deceased's death and submits, through his counsel, that the Crown has failed to exclude the possibility that the deceased in fact killed himself, either intentionally or accidentally. I should say at this point that in my view, the nature of the ligature mark found on the deceased's neck, and the multitude of accompanying injuries which were found to have been inflicted upon his body, tend completely against the proposition that his death was somehow accidental.
145The opinion of Dr Szentmariay concerning the use of an electrical cord to strangle the deceased emerged for the first time in the course of his evidence, although in her opening address Senior Counsel for the Crown had alluded to it. However on the whole of the evidence, the late emergence of the evidence is not a reason to reject Dr Szentmariay's opinion.
146The item which was used to cause the deceased's neck compression must obviously have been present in the cell. The evidence establishes that there was an electrical cord attached to the television within the cell at the time of the deceased's death. The cord was detachable. Dr Szentmariay's opinion, which I accept, was that the shape and pattern of the ligature mark found on the deceased's neck was consistent with the use of such a cord, and inconsistent with the use of the ligature which was found tied around the deceased's neck.
147Further, and to the extent that the Crown must exclude as a reasonable possibility that the deceased died by hanging, Dr Szentmariay's opinion, which I accept, was that the position of the ligature mark found on the deceased's neck was inconsistent with his death having been caused in that way.
148In my view, the whole of the evidence tends completely against the proposition that the deceased took his own life by hanging. The accused agreed that he did not, at any time, see the deceased hanging from anything within the cell. I do not accept the accused's evidence that it was possible for a person, if so minded, to hang himself from the fire extinguisher point. Even if it were theoretically possible to do so, the evidence in the present case runs completely contrary to such a conclusion. I have in mind, in particular, the evidence that when the deceased was found by the accused he was lying on his bed with the blankets pulled up over him. The suggestion that the deceased may have hanged himself from the fire extinguisher point, only to fall supine on the bed with the blankets pulled up over him, borders on the fanciful.
149The injuries which Dr Szentmariay found on the deceased were many and varied. I am satisfied that the rib fracture was not caused in the course of CPR being administered. Despite Dr Szentmariay's acceptance of statistical data as to the occasioning of rib fractures during CPR, his unequivocal evidence was that the present case was not to be regarded as falling within the 30% of cases to which he was referred in cross-examination. The reason for this was twofold. Firstly, having previously seen Ex A, he did not consider that the force which was applied to the deceased by Ms Apap and her colleague was of such a vigourous nature as to be likely to bring about such an injury. Secondly, he pointed out that the site of the deceased's rib fracture was inconsistent with the site at which CPR is applied.
150As I have previously outlined, Dr Szentmariay also found a number of other injuries occasioned to the deceased. Those injuries were widespread. They were found on the face, neck, back, one arm and one toe of the deceased. Perhaps with the exception of the vertical linear abrasions to the anterior region of the deceased's neck, the injuries found at the post mortem examination were generally characterised by one or both of two factors. The first was that they were the result of the application of blunt force. The second was that they were recently inflicted. The petechial haemorrhages, in particular, were considered by Dr Szentmariay to be consistent with a struggle.
151When Ms Caon interviewed the deceased on the afternoon of 31 August 2012 he exhibited no overt sign of injury. He made no complaint of injury, or being in pain. I am satisfied that the injuries of which Dr Szentmariay gave evidence were sustained by the deceased at some time after he returned to his cell on the afternoon of 31 August. Once Mr Jones had left, the only two people in the cell were the deceased and the accused. The nature and extent of the injuries are at odds with the suggestion that the deceased somehow inflicted them upon himself. I am satisfied that they were inflicted by the accused in the course of struggling with the deceased and strangling him. They are, in my view, inexplicable on any other rational basis.
152It was submitted on behalf of the accused that the linear abrasions were consistent with the deceased having scratched himself. However, isolating that particular injury from the others and advancing an alternative theory as to its cause reflects, in my view, an incorrect approach to the assessment of evidence in a circumstantial case: Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [466] cited in Lazaris v R [2014] NSWCCA 163 at [61].
153In the present case, the evidence as a whole is consistent only with the conclusion that the majority of the deceased's injuries were intentionally inflicted upon him by some other person. The linear abrasions to the neck are the obvious exception. In my view, on the whole of the evidence, the only rational explanation for those abrasions is that they represent an attempt by the deceased to remove the ligature whilst he was being strangled. Moreover, the clear and unequivocal evidence is that the accused thought everybody, including the deceased, was intent upon killing him. In those circumstances there is no doubt that the accused had a reason to want to strangle the deceased.
154There is no dispute that the deceased was found by Corrective Services officers lying on the bed to the right hand side of the cell. That was not the bed in which Ms Lennon said she saw the deceased lying on the previous evening. That necessarily brings me to consider the reliability of the evidence of Ms Lennon. In doing so, it should be noted that it was not submitted on behalf of the accused that Ms Lennon had been deliberately untruthful. Rather, it was submitted that she was mistaken as to the position in which she saw the deceased, and that her evidence in that regard was unreliable. The primary basis for that submission stemmed from Ms Lennon's use of the word "wall" to describe what obscured the view to the right upon entering the cell, and her specific denial in cross-examination that what she had described as a wall was, in fact, a shower curtain.
155I accept that Ms Lennon's use of the word wall was not accurate to describe the relevant area. By reference to Ex A, there was a shower curtain in the position referred to by Ms Lennon, not a wall. However the focus of Ms Lennon's evidence was the fact that her view was obscured, rather than what caused that to be the case. It was in that context that she used the word wall to describe what was there. As Ms Lennon explained in cross examination (T36 L43-45):
A "What I'm suggesting is where I'm standing there is something obstructing my view to that side of the cell. I'm calling it a wall because there would be a shower and a toilet on that side (witness indicated).
Q Well you're calling it a wall, but is it in fact a wall or are you unable to say?
A I'm unable to say at the moment".
156True it is that Ms Lennon later denied that what she had described as a wall was in fact a shower curtain. However, what is important is that her evidence about the obstruction of her view to the right was perfectly correct, as was her evidence of the general layout of the cell, including the positions of the beds, shower and toilet. There is no issue that her evidence that she spoke with the accused, and that he refused his medication, was similarly correct. In all of these circumstances, her use of the word "wall" does not lead me to conclude that her evidence of seeing the deceased in bed was unreliable.
157Ms Lennon's evidence about what she saw was clear and unequivocal. Although she did not make a statement until some considerable time later, the effect of her evidence (T37 L48-T38 L5) was that when she became aware of the deceased's death on the following morning she vividly recalled seeing him in the bed. The fact that she would have such a vivid recollection, given what she had learned had happened to the deceased, is in my view perfectly understandable.
158For all of these reasons, I accept Ms Lennon's evidence as to her observation and I am satisfied that when she entered cell 407 on the evening of 31 August, the deceased was lying in the position she designated on Ex B, namely in the bed towards the left hand corner. That was, of course, different to the position in which he was found on the following morning. As I have previously noted, the police, by reference to various belongings within the cell, identified the deceased's bed as the one in which he was found. However, Sergeant McMaugh conceded that this was, in effect, a conclusion drawn from the position of various personal items in the cell, as opposed to any direct observation, such as that of Ms Lennon, of any person occupying a particular bed.
159There is no apparent reason why the deceased, having occupied the bed in which Ms Lennon observed him, may have wished to change beds at some time during the night. I am satisfied that the deceased was moved by the accused as part of an attempt by the accused to give the impression that the deceased had committed suicide. I am also satisfied that having done so, the deceased shouted words to the effect "Daryl, what have you done" at or around the time that he made the emergency call. For the reasons I have set out the accused well knew that the deceased had done nothing to himself. His words represented a further attempt to give the impression that the deceased had taken his own life.
160I am also satisfied that the steps taken by the accused also involved constructing a ligature and placing it around the deceased's neck to give the impression that he had taken his own life. For the reasons I have previously expressed, I am satisfied that the ligature cut from the deceased's neck by officer Trench played no part in bringing about his death. In light of the evidence of, in particular, Mr Dillon, I am satisfied that the death of the deceased occurred about 12.30 am on 1 September. The authorities were not notified until about 2 hours after that. It was in that intervening period that the deceased took the steps to which I have referred. In those circumstances, given the lapse of time, the fact that there were no marks on his hands when spoken to by the police is of no consequence.
161Inherent in the conclusions I have reached is a rejection of the accused's account of what occurred. There is no dispute that the accused lied to Dr Furst when he first spoke with him and I have referred to how that lie can be used. In this regard, it is significant that when giving evidence the accused initially appeared reluctant to accept that he had lied to Dr Furst. When he finally accepted that he had lied, he went on to explain the reasons for doing so. In my view, the only available conclusion is that the accused decided to be untruthful to Dr Furst because that approach suited his own purposes at the time. With these matters in mind, whilst the accused does not have to prove his innocence, there were aspects of his account which were contrary to the evidence and otherwise difficult to accept.
162For example, the accused asserted that he had woken up during the night and had wanted to have a cigarette. On his account, he decided to ask the deceased if he had a match. The deceased did not smoke. In fact, when he saw Ms Caon he complained to her that his principal difficulty was being housed with someone who did. The accused admitted that he was aware that the deceased did not smoke. In these circumstances, the accused's assertion that the deceased somehow "had one of (his) cigarettes" is curious to say the least and there is no apparent reason why the accused might reasonably have thought that the deceased had matches.
163Further, the accused said that having woken up he decided to have a cup of tea. The suggestion that he found it necessary to wake the deceased, at some time after 2:00 am, for the purposes of asking him whether he had a match or could borrow a tea bag, is in my view incredulous. Significantly, these aspects of his account were not peripheral to the issues in this case. They formed part of the fundamental basis of the accused's account of how he came to discover the deceased lying in his bed.
164For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that it was the deliberate act of the accused which caused the deceased's death. In particular, I am satisfied that the accused strangled the deceased to death with the use of a power cord from the television in the cell and that in the associated struggle, he inflicted the injuries to the deceased's neck, face, back, upper arm, rib and toe which were found by Dr Szentmariay. I am satisfied that the linear abrasions found on the anterior surface of the deceased's neck were brought about as a consequence of the deceased struggling with the accused and trying to remove the power cord with which he was being strangled at the time.
165Having strangled the deceased, I am satisfied that the accused took steps to try and create the impression that the deceased had taken his own life. In particular, I am satisfied that the accused constructed a ligature from within the cell and tied it around the deceased's neck, later exclaiming words to the effect "Daryl, what have you done".
166In Stables Hidden J noted (at [32]) that there had been cases in which judges of this Court, perhaps in the absence of an awareness of the decision in Minani, had approached the determination of the defence of mental illness in accordance with the decision in R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1, and had proceeded to determine whether all of the requisite elements of the offence had been proved, before then proceeding to consider the defence. If I were required to adopt that approach in the present case I would find that the accused acted, at the very least, with an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm upon the deceased. That is the overwhelming inference to be drawn from the fact that as a consequence of his mental illness, the accused held a belief that everyone, including the deceased, was trying to kill him. Accordingly, as was the case in Stables, the adoption of either approach leads to the point where I am required to consider the availability of the defence of mental illness.
167In order for a defence of mental illness to be made out, there must be evidence that at the time of committing the act causing the deceased's death the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as to not know the quality and the nature of the act that he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong (see R v McNaghton (1843) 8 ER 718; R v S (supra)). The test was stated by Dixon J in R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 189-190 in the following terms:
"The question is whether he was able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time. Could this man be said to know, in this sense, whether his act was wrong if, through a disease or defect or disorder of the mind, he could not think rationally of the reasons which, to ordinary people make, that act right or wrong?
If, through the disordered condition of the mind, he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure, it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong. What is meant by wrong? What is meant by wrong is wrong having regard to the every day standards of reasonable people."
168In the present case the Crown tendered a report of Dr Yvonne Skinner, Consultant Psychiatrist, who examined the accused on 24 July 2014 and who provided two reports, the first dated 31 July 2014 and second dated 29 August 2014.
169Consistent with the evidence given by the accused, Dr Skinner recorded (inter alia) the following history (Ex W1 at p. 2.9 and following):
"Immediately when he came to prison in June 2012 he thought that the doctors and nurses and prison officers were out to get him, possibly kill him. He was also afraid of other inmates, thinking that they would try to kill him. He noticed that some of the people were of different nationalities and he thought these were from different alien planets. Because he thought he knew about aliens, he thought that they were going to kill him.
Doctors prescribed medication but he did not take it. He said he spat out the medication and when they gave him wafers of olanzapine, he washed his mouth out so that the wafer did not have an effect. He has thought that these doctors were trying to kill him, poisoning him by wafers or by tablets.
When he first was admitted to prison he spent time in Darcy 2 Pod and saw a psychiatrist. He was then transferred to the Mental Health Pod and went backwards and forwards a few times between different Pods. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and the psychiatrist prescribed the medication Solian. The doctor prescribed olanzapine but he was not taking the tablets or wafers."
170Dr Skinner obtained a history surrounding the death of the deceased (commencing at p. 3.4 of Ex W1) which was broadly consistent with the account given by the accused in evidence.
171Dr Skinner noted (at p. 5.8 and following of Ex W1) that a review of Justice Health records established that from the time of his incarceration in June 2012 the accused's history of schizophrenia was noted. She also noted the psychotic episodes had been diagnosed as long ago as November 2006 (at p. 6.7).
172Dr Skinner then expressed the following conclusion (commencing at p. 7.2 of Ex W1):
"Mr Brian Brindley has a long history of substance abuse. He suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which appears to have been diagnosed in about 2006. At the time of his imprisonment in June 2012 he had not been treated with appropriate antipsychotic medications for some months and he had been abusing substances including amphetamines. He reported auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions of being followed and fears that he was about to be killed. He reports that he felt so fearful that he falsely claimed that he was about to self-harm in order to be placed in a single cell which he regarded as more secure. This is supported by the clinical records of Justice Health. Shortly prior to the alleged events he had been in a "safe" cell before he was placed in the cell with Mr Daryl Jones. It appears that he believed his cellmate, Daryl Jones, wanted to kill him, although he had never met Mr Jones before. He said he thought that everyone wanted to kill him.
Mr Brindley has now been treated with medication including injected depo antipsychotic medication and he no longer reports delusions or auditory hallucinations. At the time of my examination there was no sign of any cognitive dysfunction or psychotic phenomena.
In my opinion Mr Brindley has a defence of mental illness for the alleged offences that occurred around the time of 31 August 2012. He suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and at that time had delusional beliefs that he was about to be killed and that Mr Daryl Jones represented a threat to him."
173In her second report (Ex W2) Dr Skinner had the benefit of reviewing additional records, but confirmed her opinion that the accused had the defence of mental illness available to him. Although Dr Skinner did not expressly refer to the criteria in Porter (supra), I have no reason, in light of the whole of her report, to reject her opinion as to the availability of the defence of mental illness.
174Two reports of Dr Furst, Consultant Psychiatrist dated 2 July 2014 and 27 August 2014 were tendered in the accused's case (Ex 1 and Ex 2 respectively).
175I have already made reference to the fact that the accused, on his own admission, gave a false account to Dr Furst at the time of his initial consultation with him. In that regard, Dr Furst recorded the following (commencing at p. 6.1 of Ex 1):
"When asked about the offence in question before the court, Mr Brindley said, "I don't remember nothing Doctor Furst."
On specific questioning, Mr Brindley was able to recall 'knocking up' and telling Department of Corrective Services officers his cellmate [Jones] had hung himself. Mr Brindley said he knew this because "he [Jones] had something around his neck."
He had not slept for days on end at the time, having just been moved from a 'safe-cell' to the cell in question [number 407].
He could not recall saying the sheet was tight.
He said he was "panicking" at the time.
Mr Brindley acknowledged that he still had 'voices' and paranoid feelings on the night of the alleged offence.
Mr Brindley denied being worried about sex offenders, claiming he did not realise the deceased was a sex offender at the time of the alleged offence.
He could not recall telling police he woke up to have a cup of tea.
I note that a blade apparently fell out of his shoe at the Auburn Police Station. Mr Brindley was unable to recall how the blade got into his shoe and could not recall putting it there.
When asked if he injured the deceased in any way, Mr Brindley again said, "I don't remember anything Doctor Furst.""
176 Dr Furst reviewed documents relating to the accused's mental history and noted in particular (at p. 7.3 of Ex 1) that medical records confirmed a history of schizophrenia dating back to at least 2007.
177In terms of the availability of a defence of mental illness Dr Furst reported (commencing at p. 10.2 of Ex 1):
"Mr Brindley has a chronic schizophrenic illness. There was evidence that he was psychotic throughout the majority of 2012 up to and including the time of his arrest in June 2012, especially given his history of treatment resistance.
A review of his Justice medical notes and the police brief of evidence indicates that he remained psychotic at the time of the events in question before the court on 01/09/12. He appears to have been so distressed that he required management in 'safe-cell' conditions, only returning to a shared cell on the day prior to the alleged events.
He apparently heard voices he took to be from aliens, believed that he would be killed, and was suffering from self-referential thinking. It would appear that he also believed his cellmate Daryl Jones wanted to kill him, despite never having met him before.
In my opinion, Mr Brindley was suffering from a defect of reason in the form of paranoid delusions and associated auditory hallucinations that involved the victim at the time of the alleged murder. He has a disease of the mind in the form of a chronic schizophrenic illness. He was probably unable to reason about the wrongfulness of his actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure, despite probably having an awareness of his alleged actions. In my opinion, he has the mental illness defence available to him."
178The circumstances in which Dr Furst's second report (Ex 2) came into existence have already been canvassed. On that occasion the accused provided Dr Furst with a history of the circumstances in which he allegedly found the deceased which was broadly consistent with the account that he gave in the course of his evidence. However, Dr Furst said:
"I remained of the opinion that Mr Brindley is fit to be tried and has the mental illness defence available to him. He probably also has substantial impairment by abnormality of mind open to him as a partial defence to the charge of murder."
179If medical evidence relating to the issue of mental illness is unanimous, it cannot be rejected by a tribunal of fact in the absence of other material which casts some doubt on it: see R v Afele [2014] NSWSC 366 at [68] citing R v Jenkins [1964] NSWR 721; (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 20; 81 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 44 at 51; Taylor v R (1978) 45 FLR 343; 22 ALR 599; R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159; 13 A Crim R 173; Tumanako v R (1992) 64 A Crim R 149.
180In the present case, I constitute the tribunal of fact. There is no evidence which runs contrary to the opinions of Dr Skinner and Dr Furst, and I accept those opinions.
181It follows that the defence of mental illness is made out.