35 In seeking to support his submission that there had been a miscarriage of justice, Mr. Craddock relied, first, upon the matters deposed to by the Appellant in his Affidavit and the evidence given by the Appellant on the hearing of the appeal, and, second, on the passage in the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in England in R. v. Turner supra to which I have earlier referred. That passage in the Judgment of the Court delivered by Lord Parker CJ, so far as is relevant, was as follows supra at 326-327:
"Before leaving this case, which has brought out into the open the vexed question of so called 'plea bargaining', the court will like to make some observations which may be of help to judges and to counsel and, indeed, solicitors. They are these:
1. Counsel must be completely free to do what is his duty, namely to give the accused the best advice he can and if need be advice in strong terms. This will often include advice that a plea of guilty, showing an element of remorse, is a mitigating factor which may well enable the court to give a lesser sentence than would otherwise be the case. Counsel of course will emphasise that the accused must not plead guilty unless he has committed the acts constituting the offence charged.
2. The accused having considered counsel's advice, must have a complete freedom of choice whether to plead guilty.
………
4. The judge should, subject to the one exception referred to hereafter, never indicate the sentence which he is minded to impose. A statement that on a plea of guilty he would impose one sentence but that on a conviction following a plea of not guilty he would impose a severer sentence is one which should never be made. This could be taken to be undue pressure on the accused thus depriving him of that complete freedom of choice which is essential …"
36 Although the observation made by McGuire DCJ as to what would occur if the trial were to proceed and the Appellant were to be found guilty may, in the light of the observations of Lord Parker CJ, be regarded as having been unfortunate, I am not persuaded that the Appellant - who bears the onus of doing so - has demonstrated that there has been a miscarriage of justice as the result of the Appellant's plea of guilty having been entered following undue pressure and not because it represented a genuine consciousness of guilt. The passage from the evidence given by the Appellant to the Royal Commission which I have set out above (para. 21 (3)) makes it, in my view, clear that, even before the matter was raised with Judge McGuire in open court following the luncheon adjournment, the Appellant appreciated to the full, first, that if the trial were to proceed there was a very real risk that the jury would find him guilty; and, second, that, if the trial did proceed and he were found guilty by the jury, the probability was that he would receive a full time custodial sentence. The same passage from the evidence given by the Appellant to the Royal Commission also makes clear that before he entered his plea of guilty, it had been explained to him - one assumes, by Mr. Bellamy - that such a plea represented an acknowledgment by him that the heroin which was said to have been found on him was his; and, second, that, having weighed up the various matters to which he had referred in his evidence, he nonetheless decided he would enter a plea of guilty. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the entry of that plea ought not to be regarded as something which had been induced as the result of undue pressure but rather ought to be regarded as a voluntary act on the part of the Appellant.
37 Nor would I regard what has been put forward as fresh evidence as justifying granting the Appellant leave to withdraw his plea and upholding the appeal. In this regard, I note the following: