//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2003] NSWCCA 213
respondent. Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed, leaving the sentences in place.
The sentencing judge was wrong to let the apparent strength of the prosecution case and the delay in sentencing affect the utilitarian discount for Trad's earlier guilty pleas. Those factors do not reduce the public and administrative value of a plea. But Trad's pleas on the joint charges came late, and his earlier absconding had disrupted the sentencing process. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that a 10 to 15 per cent discount was still appropriate. Given the number and seriousness of the robberies, the twelve-year aggregate sentence and eight-year non-parole period were not beyond the permissible range. The appeal was dismissed.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,223 words · generated 30/09/2026
In R v Billy Trad [2003] NSWCCA 213, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal against sentence. The court granted leave but dismissed the appeal. Sheller JA gave the principal judgment, with James J and O'Keefe J agreeing ([60]–[62]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Trad had been sentenced on charges in two indictments, together with additional offences taken into account at his request. The judgment summarises the principal offences as one attempted armed robbery, seven armed robberies and one aggravated armed robbery. Further armed robberies, larceny of motor vehicles, receiving and resisting arrest offences were also taken into account ([6]). The offences included robberies of service stations and convenience stores, many during early morning hours and involving workers on their own.
The sentencing judge described victims being threatened with knives or bars, forced to the ground, and led into storerooms. Some offences involved substantial quantities of cigarettes and phone cards, as well as cash ([19]–[29], [32]–[33]). The sentencing judge regarded the victims as vulnerable workers and said the offences called for severe punishment ([33]–[34]).
The history of the pleas mattered. Trad had pleaded guilty to earlier charges in 1999 and had been committed for sentence on bail. He failed to attend court in March 2000, and a warrant was issued. While at large, he committed further offences. The judgment records his arrest in July 2000 ([4], [13], [16], [30], [53]). The sentencing judge accepted that the pleas to the earlier charges had, in fact, been entered at the earliest opportunity, notwithstanding the later indictment date ([4]).
For the joint-indictment charges, Trad entered guilty pleas on the day fixed for trial, although they may have been indicated during the preceding week. The sentencing judge considered that they still had utilitarian value because the trial was expected to last three weeks. She also referred to the Crown's concession that its case was not particularly strong, particularly against Trad's co-accused ([34]).
The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate term of twelve years, with a non-parole period of eight years. Trad argued that the judge had improperly combined the strength of the Crown case with the utilitarian value of the pleas, and that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive ([43]–[45]). The Court of Criminal Appeal found error in the treatment of the discount, but concluded that the error did not warrant a lesser sentence ([55], [59]).
The central legal distinction was between the utilitarian value of a plea and the separate consideration of remorse or contrition. The judgment treated the utilitarian value as the practical benefit a plea provides to the justice system. In discussing R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, Sheller JA referred to the benefit of saving court time and resources, reducing the preparation burden on prosecution and defence services, and avoiding unnecessary demands on witnesses and jurors ([47]).
The strength of the Crown case does not change those practical benefits. Sheller JA adopted the distinction expressed in Thomson; Houlton: a strong case may affect whether a plea represents genuine contrition, because a plea may amount to a “recognition of the inevitable”; it does not reduce the utilitarian value of the plea ([48]). Applying that distinction, Sheller JA held that the sentencing judge should not have linked the strength of the evidence against Trad on the earlier charges to the utilitarian discount ([51]–[52]).
The judgment also distinguished the utilitarian discount from the effect of delay. The sentencing judge had referred to the considerable delay before the earlier charges came to sentence, including delay associated with Trad's wish to have the matters sentenced together. Sheller JA said this was irrelevant to the utilitarian discount. To the extent that delay had sentencing relevance, it could support leniency rather than reduce the discount ([54]–[55]). In reaching that view, he followed Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59 and R v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267 ([54]).
The error did not end the appeal. The court had to consider whether a lesser sentence was warranted in law under s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 ([55]). Sheller JA identified another relevant circumstance: Trad had absconded after entering pleas and failed to attend when set down for sentence. His actions disrupted the court process and caused inconvenience, including the need to initiate arrest proceedings and the failure of proposed rehabilitation arrangements ([58]). The judgment reasoned that a 25 per cent discount would not be appropriate in those circumstances. This was not because the Crown case was strong or because sentencing had been delayed, but because of the disruption caused by the absconding and the timing of the pleas ([58]–[59]).
The pleas on the earlier charges had been entered early, but the pleas on the joint charges were entered on the day fixed for trial. The judgment referred to Thomson; Houlton for the proposition that timing is a primary consideration in assessing the discount, with earlier pleas generally providing greater utilitarian benefit ([49]–[50]). Taking the timing and absconding together, Sheller JA concluded that a 10 to 15 per cent discount was appropriate ([59]).
On the excessive-sentence ground, the court focused on the totality and objective seriousness of the offending. The sentencing judge had assessed the offending as a series of very serious armed robberies committed against vulnerable workers, and the record included numerous offences across two years ([33], [41]). Sheller JA considered that the judge had given careful reasons and had taken account of Trad's personal circumstances, including his youth, first term of imprisonment, rehabilitation prospects and need for community supervision ([56]). The sentence was therefore not beyond the permissible range.
The judgment presented its treatment of guilty pleas as an application of existing authority, particularly Thomson; Houlton and Winchester v The Queen (1992) 58 A Crim R 345. It did not purport to replace that framework. Instead, it applied the distinction between the utilitarian benefit of a plea and other matters, such as remorse, which may bear on an individual offender's circumstances ([45]–[50]).
Under the framework set out in the judgment, the utilitarian benefit is a public and administrative benefit, not a measure of how strong the prosecution case was. The Crown case's strength may be relevant to whether a plea reflects genuine contrition, but it cannot be used to discount the plea's practical value ([48], [52]). The judgment also records a range of 10 to 25 per cent for the utilitarian discount, while noting that timing and the complexity and length of the prospective trial affect where a case falls within that range ([49]–[50]).
The decision's specific contribution is its application of that framework where an offender, having pleaded guilty, absconds and fails to attend for sentence. Sheller JA held that the resulting disruption to the court process could be weighed in setting the discount ([58]). That reasoning does not treat absconding as a new measure of the plea's utilitarian value. Rather, it identifies disruption to the same justice system as relevant to the assessment of an appropriate discount in the particular circumstances.
The judgment also reinforces that delay should not be used to lower the utilitarian discount where the delay arises from an offender's wish to have matters sentenced together. The judgment says such delay is irrelevant to that discount and may, if relevant, point towards leniency ([54]–[55]). The decision should therefore be read as a fact-specific application of the cited authorities, not as a broad departure from them.
At [48], Sheller JA quoted the distinction drawn in Thomson; Houlton: “A ‘recognition of the inevitable’ may qualify the extent of genuine contrition. It does not qualify the utilitarian value of a plea.” In plain English, a plea made because conviction seems unavoidable may be less persuasive evidence of remorse. But the plea still saves the system the work associated with a trial.
At [49], the judgment identified timing and complexity as considerations affecting the discount. A plea entered early may save more resources than one entered on the trial date. A plea may also save more where the trial would otherwise have involved complex evidence or taken a long time. In this case, the joint charges were pleaded to on the day fixed for trial, although the expected trial length of three weeks meant that the pleas still had practical value ([34], [49]).
At [54]–[55], Sheller JA said the delay in sentencing the earlier offences was irrelevant to the utilitarian discount. The practical point is that the date at which sentencing eventually occurs is not itself a measure of the work saved by the plea. The court also noted that delay can, depending on its relevance, support leniency rather than justify a smaller discount.
At [58], Sheller JA stated that a 25 per cent discount was not appropriate where, after pleading guilty, the offender absconds and fails to attend the sentencing date. The judgment connects that conclusion to wasted court time, the inconvenience of setting arrest processes in motion and disruption to attempts to arrange rehabilitation.
At [59], Sheller JA concluded that “a utilitarian discount of 10 to 15 per cent was appropriate.” This was the case-specific result, based on the timing of the pleas and the disruption caused by Trad's absconding, while setting aside the Crown-case strength and sentencing delay as reasons for limiting the discount.
At [56], Sheller JA held that the total sentence was not beyond the range. The court did not treat the sentencing judge's error on the discount as automatically requiring a reduction. It assessed whether, after correcting for the irrelevant considerations, a lesser sentence was warranted.
The judgment is most directly relevant where sentencing reasons discuss a guilty plea's utilitarian value and also refer to the strength of the prosecution evidence. It makes clear that those matters must be kept separate: case strength may relate to contrition, but not to the system-saving value of the plea ([48], [52]).
It is also relevant where an offender entered an early plea but sentencing was delayed because the offender wanted multiple matters dealt with together. The decision says that circumstance does not diminish the utilitarian discount and may have a different sentencing relevance ([54]–[55]).
A further fact pattern is where a person pleads guilty but later absconds or fails to attend for sentence. The court treated the resulting disruption and inconvenience as relevant to the discount, including wasted court time and the need to set arrest proceedings in motion ([58]). The judgment's conclusion was tied to Trad's circumstances, including the timing of his pleas and the history of failing to appear.
Finally, the decision addresses sentence appeals alleging that an aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive after multiple serious armed robberies. The court considered the number and nature of the offences, their impact on victims, and the sentencing judge's treatment of the offender's personal circumstances ([33], [41]–[42], [56]). It does not establish a numerical sentencing tariff for armed robbery. Its conclusion was that the particular aggregate sentence was not beyond the range.
The supplied judgment contains no account of decisions after 31 July 2003 considering or applying R v Billy Trad. It therefore does not provide a basis for describing later judicial treatment, whether acceptance, limitation or distinction.
What can be identified from this judgment is the authority it itself used. Sheller JA followed Thomson; Houlton on the separation of utilitarian benefit from remorse and on factors affecting the level of discount ([45]–[50]). He also followed Winchester for the distinction between Crown-case strength and utilitarian value ([48], [52]). For the treatment of delay in sentencing, he followed Mill and Fahda ([54]). R v Henry was cited by the sentencing judge in working out the overall penalty ([40]).
Those relationships show how the court located its reasoning in existing authority. They do not establish how later courts have treated Trad. Any assessment of its subsequent history would require decisions not reproduced in the supplied judgment.
The judgment does not specify a general formula for translating the disruption caused by absconding into a particular percentage reduction. It holds that disruption can be considered and concludes that 10 to 15 per cent was appropriate on these facts, but it does not set out a scale for other circumstances ([58]–[59]).
Nor does the judgment decide how to assess every possible form of delay in sentencing. Its statement concerns delay associated with a prisoner's desire to have matters sentenced together, and it says that delay is irrelevant to the utilitarian discount. Other kinds of delay are not analysed in detail ([54]–[55]).
The decision also does not define the boundary between considering absconding as disruption to the justice system and treating it as a separate adverse sentencing consideration. Its analysis is confined to the discount and the court-process disruption described in the case ([58]–[59]).
Finally, the judgment does not provide a later case history, a general sentencing range for armed robbery, or a complete statement of the statutory framework beyond the provisions and sources it cites. Those matters cannot be resolved from this judgment alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
The applicant was sentenced on charges contained in two indictments and six additional offences to be taken into account on the applicant's request. The second of these indictments charged the applicant jointly with one Bill Chahrouk with five counts of robbery armed with an offensive weapon, with six additional offences to be taken into account. The first indictment charged the applicant alone with one count of attempted armed robbery and two counts of robbery. The applicant pleaded guilty to all charges, in summary being one count of attempted armed robbery, seven counts of armed robbery and one count of aggravated armed robbery with a further four counts of armed robbery and two of larceny motor vehicle, one count of receiving and two of resisting arrest to be taken into account as additional offences. The sentencing Judge noted that the victims were usually young people, working alone in jobs that were not particularly well paid and that on all occasions the victims were put in fear, having knives or bars forced into their backs, being forced to the ground, being threatened and being led into store rooms and the like. Her Honour noted that severe punishment was called for for the offences in question. The sentencing Judge acknowledged that the pleas of guilty had a utilitarian value nonetheless because the trial was to last three weeks and the Crown conceded that it did not have a particularly strong case against either offender, particularly Chahrouk. Her Honour considered that the combination of the utilitarian value of the plea and the recognition of the relative weakness of the Crown case gave rise to a discount but no more than a range of between 10 and 15 per cent. The combined effect of the sentences on both indictments was a total term of twelve years with a non-parole period of eight years. It was submitted that her Honour erred in conflating two distinct principles in determining the appropriate discount to apply for the plea of guilty, those being the strength of the crown case against the accused and the utilitarian public benefit derived from the guilty plea. It was also submitted that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. HELD (Per Sheller JA, James and O'Keefe JJ agreeing):
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Crimes Act 1900 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 Justices Act 1902
Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59 R v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267 R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 Winchester v The Queen (1992) 58 A Crim R 345
ORDERS Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL 60079/03
SHELLER JA JAMES J O'KEEFE J
Thursday, 31 July 2003 R v Billy TRAD Judgment 1 SHELLER JA:
On 16 September 2002 her Honour Judge Tupman in the District Court sentenced the applicant, Billy Trad, on charges contained in two indictments, one dated 1 February 2002 and the other dated 11 March 2002. 2 The second of these indictments charged the applicant jointly with one Bill Chahrouk with five counts of robbery armed with an offensive weapon (s97(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 such an offence carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment), the incidents covering a period from 1 June 2000 to 17 July 2000. Both of the accused entered pleas of guilty to these charges on 11 March 2002. This was in a background of an earlier indictment of 15 November 2001, which charged them with some twenty counts, the majority of which were for armed robbery and some for larceny of a motor vehicle. The pleas of guilty to the five counts on 11 March 2002 were entered and accepted by the Crown in full satisfaction of the earlier indictment. However, six additional offences were to be taken into account pursuant to s32 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Each of the accused asked that those six offences be taken into account when sentencing for count 4 in the joint indictment. They were set out in a Form 1 document. Four were for armed robbery and two for larceny of a motor vehicle. 3 The first indictment dated 1 February 2002 charged the applicant alone with one count of attempted robbery armed with an offensive weapon, two counts of robbery armed with an offensive weapon, the first two counts relating to occurrences on 16 July 1999 and the third on 19 March 2000 and each with a maximum penalty of twenty years, and a fourth count of robbery armed with a dangerous weapon which carried a maximum penalty of twenty-five years imprisonment under s97(2) of the Crimes Act. That was alleged to have occurred on 23 March 2000. 4 These four charges were originally before the Court by way of pleas of guilty pursuant to s51A of the Justices Act 1902. The applicant was first arrested in relation to the first two of these offences on 6 August 1999 and given bail. He pleaded guilty on 1 September 1999 and was committed for sentence to the District Court with bail being granted. On 15 October 1999 the proceedings were adjourned to have the applicant placed in a William Booth Programme. The proceedings were stood over for hearing on 20 March 2000. On 19 March 2000 the applicant committed the offence the subject of the third count. He failed to appear in court on 20 March 2000 when his bail was revoked and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Whilst at large on 23 March 2000 he committed the fourth of the offences, the aggravated armed robbery. He was eventually arrested on 27 July 2000 in relation to these two last offences and other intervening offences which were the subject of the joint indictment. He pleaded guilty in the Local Court to counts 3 and 4 and was committed for sentence but bail refused. The sentencing Judge remarked that these four offences came before the court on pleas of guilty on indictment dated 1 February 2002 when they were entered. However, her Honour accepted that this was in circumstances where, in fact, the prisoner had pleaded to all four charges pursuant to s51A in the Local Court but the s51A documents had either been lost or misplaced. Her Honour accepted that these last four pleas at least had been entered at the earliest opportunity in the Local Court notwithstanding that on their face the pleas of guilty on arraignment occurred in February 2002. 5 On those charges the applicant asked that on count 4 three additional offences should be taken into account pursuant to s32 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, one for receiving on 15 December 1999 and two for resisting officers in the execution of their duty, namely two police officers, at the time of the applicant's arrest on 27 July 2000. 6 In summary, the applicant was sentenced on one count of attempted armed robbery, seven counts of armed robbery and one count of aggravated armed robbery with a further four offences of armed robbery and two of larceny motor vehicle, one offence of receiving and two of resisting arrest to be taken into account. 7 The sentences imposed were as follows:
(taking into account the three other offences on the Form 1 already referred to).
4 Head sentence 6 years, non-parole 2 years 27.7.06 26.7.12 (non-parole 26.7.08)
(taking into account six offences on the Form 1 already referred to)
5 3 years fixed 27.7.03 26.7.06 8 The combined effect of the sentences on both indictments was a total term of twelve years to commence on 27 July 2000, the day of the applicant's arrest, with a non-parole period of eight years expiring on 26 July 2008.
Remarks on sentence 9 The sentencing Judge described in summary form the matters she dealt with on the indictment of 1 February 2002. 10 The offence charged under count 1 occurred at the Super Saver Store in Guildford just after 7 pm on 16 July 1999. The applicant produced a knife and demanded that the console operator open the till whilst pointing the knife at that person. The operator could not open the till and the applicant became aggressive and insistent, yelling at her. He climbed over the counter and tried to open the till, whilst continuing to threaten her with a knife. The applicant left the store without obtaining any property when the till would not open. The incident was filmed on surveillance camera. 11 The events giving rise to count 2 occurred about thirty minutes after the events of count 1 on 16 July 1999 when the applicant went into the Shell Service Station in Guildford. A Mr McGarry was working there behind the console. The applicant produced a knife and held it at Mr McGarry demanding money. Mr McGarry did not resist. The applicant pulled a jumper down over his hands, grabbed money from the cash register and walked from the store. A sum of just under $250 in cash was taken in this robbery which was also recorded on surveillance video. 12 As a result of his identification from the videos the applicant was arrested by police when seen on 6 August 1999. He declined to answer questions and when shown photographs from the surveillance videos he denied that he was the person involved. As already indicated he was granted bail when he came before the court and ultimately pleaded guilty pursuant to s51A of the Justices Act. 13 In the meantime, on 15 December 1999 he committed the first of the three offences in the Form 1, which was a receiving offence. At about 10 am on 15 December 1999 the applicant was found to be in possession of twenty-six assorted phone cards which had earlier been stolen from the Ampol Service Station at Granville in circumstances where a male person had robbed the console operator whilst armed with a knife. When the applicant was arrested and found to be in possession of those cards he indicated he knew they were stolen but that he had bought them earlier in the day from Auburn Railway Station. The sentencing Judge observed: "It is unclear, to me at least, how in the circumstances, being on bail for two armed robbery charges, [the applicant] came to be granted bail in relation to that matter, and the evidence before me does not enable me to trace what occurred to this particular charge as it found its way through the Local Courts, but it is a matter which I take into account on sentencing him for count 4 in that February indictment. In the intervening period, whilst he was on bail, pre-sentence reports were being prepared but there were indications that he was not complying with his bail conditions in relation to attending a rehabilitation programme and keeping appointments with Probation and Parole. There was, apparently, no action taken to deal with these breaches of bail conditions and ultimately he failed to appear for sentence on 20 March 2000. He had, in fact, committed the third of the three offences on 19 March 2000 in circumstances where at about 1 am that morning he approached the Mobil Service Station in Rydalmere where Mr Ali Baig was working alone. He gained entry to the shop area and after approaching the counter there pulled the hood of his jacked over his head to conceal the upper portion of his face. He removed a black metal bar from behind his back. He threatened Mr Baig that he would kill him and demanded money. [The applicant] moved behind the rear of the counter and again threatened the console operator with a metal bar. Fearing for his safety Mr Baig opened the cash register. [The applicant] removed a quantity of cash from it and also opened the cash dispensing safe under the counter, removing a tube which contained more money. He then took packets of cigarettes from the display case and left the store. This incident was captured by surveillance video and [the applicant] was positively identified from stills taken from this source." 14 The sentencing Judge observed that it would appear from the terms of the third count, although nowhere in the facts tendered, that the sum of $350 in cash as well as two packets of cigarettes were stolen as a result of the robbery. 15 I must express my astonishment that the applicant on bail for two charges, one of attempted and the other of actual armed robbery, to which he had pleaded guilty, was granted bail when found to be in possession of phone cards stolen from a service station as the result of another armed robbery. My astonishment becomes even greater if it be right that the applicant was not complying with his bail conditions by attending a rehabilitation programme and keeping appointments with probation and parole officers. 16 Four days later on 23 March 2000 the applicant committed the fourth of the four offences in the indictment namely the aggravated armed robbery offence. This occurred at 1 am when the applicant entered the Seven Eleven Store at North Rocks. The console operator, Mr Kandiah, was standing outside the entrance doors and was approached by the applicant and an unidentified co-offender. The applicant entered the shop and selected some items while the co-offender was talking to Mr Kandiah, who then entered the shop to serve the applicant. When he walked past the applicant he was grabbed from behind and forced to the cash register. The applicant held a flick knife to his throat and the co-offender forced a metallic bar into his back. They forced him to open the cash register and demanded money. The attendant was understandably fearful for his well-being and complied and opened the till. The co-offender removed money from the cash drawer and the applicant removed a large quantity of cigarettes from the display shelves. He placed these into a large orange garbage bag. The co-offender also demanded the attendant's wallet from which he then removed a sum of money. The two offenders then left the store. Examination of the display shelves uncovered a fingerprint which was later found to be that of the applicant. 17 According to his statement, Mr Kandiah was in such fear that he was in tears. The offenders told him as they left "Don't call anyone, we will kill you." Mr Kandiah's arm was sore from being twisted and held behind his back by one of them. 18 All the victims of the four robberies were placed in fear as a result of the offences. Mr Kandiah needed to spend a few days away from work to recover. The sentencing Judge accepted from the wording of the fourth count in the indictment that the sum of $240 in cash was stolen during the course of this robbery as well as a quantity of cigarettes. 19 The sentencing Judge next dealt chronologically with the facts in relation to the jointly charged offences. The first of these, the first offence in the Form 1, occurred on 21 May 2000 when the co-offenders together went into the Caltex Service Station at Carlingford just after 6 am. I interpolate that her Honour wrongly referred to this as the BP Service Station at Blacktown but nothing turns on this. There was a twenty-year-old female attendant working there. She was alone. The two offenders pulled up in a brown Laser and entered the shop area. They pulled their jumpers up over their faces. One of them was holding a knife at waist height which had a blade of about 15 to 20 cm. A demand was made for the till to be opened and the attendant was asked the location of cigarettes. One or other of the two offenders emptied the till while the other put a quantity of cigarettes from the office into their vehicle. The console operator was forced to lie face down on the floor with a knife pointed at her abdomen from a short distance away. The offenders left shortly afterwards. During the course of that robbery the offenders took the wallet owned by the attendant, including $20 in cash and her credit cards, and the mobile phone belonging to her. $600 in cash and cigarettes with a total value of about $13,770 were removed. 20 The next offence was that charged in count 1 of the indictment. On 1 June 2000 the offenders went into the BP Service Station at Blacktown just after 6 am. The twenty-year-old male attendant was in the process of setting up the store for service. Each of the offenders was wearing head gear when they entered the shop, one a baseball cap and the other a beanie. One or other went behind the counter, produced a 20-cm-long bladed knife and told the attendant to get onto the ground. Each of the offenders was armed with a knife. Demands were made of the attendant to open the safe but he was unable to do so. He was also asked the location of mobile phone charge cards. The offenders took a quantity of cigarettes and placed them into a garbage bag and left the premises. As a result of this robbery about 1,000 packets of cigarettes were taken with an estimated total value of $10,000. In addition, about sixty pre-paid telephone cards were taken with differing values ranging in total from $6,000 to $30,000. The sum of about $340 was also taken in cash. Neither of the offenders was identified during this robbery because they were disguised. The fingerprint of the applicant was, however, found following the robbery and subsequently identified. 21 The registration number of the car used by the offenders to take them to this robbery was recorded when the attendant followed them outside. It had been stolen from the carpark of a unit complex in Auburn in the early hours of 1 June. When it was ultimately recovered, the quarter window had been smashed and the ignition had been damaged. The larceny motor vehicle, the second offence in the Form 1, was the charge flowing from this occurrence. 22 The next offence was count 2 in the indictment and occurred on 5 June 2000 at the BP Service Station at Auburn. The offenders went there just after 3 am. The attendant opened the doors and each entered. Each had on head gear, one a cream cap and the other a cap and balaclava. One produced a knife which was pointed at the attendant's chest from about 10 cms away. He was told to lie down. He did so because of fear of being injured. The offenders placed packets of cigarettes into a garbage bag. The attendant was forced to open the till and the offenders left driving away in the stolen vehicle already referred to. A quantity of money and cigarettes was stolen but from the material tendered the sentencing Judge was unable to determine either the quantity of property or the amount of money removed. 23 The next offence was the subject of count 3 in the indictment and occurred on 8 June 2000 at the Mobil Service Station at Granville at about 5.30 am. A thirty-year-old male casual attendant was working there alone. His wife and infant daughter were inside the service station with him because of the wife's fear of remaining at home alone. The offenders entered the store and moved to the console and to the male attendant. Each of them had a black bandanna covering the lower part of his face. One or other was holding a knife. He yelled that it was a robbery and the attendant's family moved to the office area. The offenders then removed two garbage bags from underneath their jackets and filled them with almost all of the available cartons of cigarettes. About 120 cartons of cigarettes with a value of approximately $6,000 was stolen. 24 The next offence was the subject of the third offence in the Form 1 and occurred on 25 June 2000 at the Ampol Service Station at Rydalmere. The offenders drove a car up to the service station just after 6 am. A forty-one-year-old male attendant was working alone in the service station. One of the two offenders entered the store first with his face disguised by a balaclava and a baseball cap on his head. He produced a knife and pointed it at the attendant. The attendant tried to reach the alarm but the offender told him to move away. The offender jumped the counter and at that stage the other offender entered the store, also with his face disguised. He yelled for the attendant to get down onto the floor and pushed him down. One or other of the two offenders then carried a number of garbage bags. They led the attendant to the maintenance room, closed the door and placed cigarettes in the bag from the display shelves. They then asked the attendant how to open the two registers. One was open but empty. The two offenders then left the store taking some money from one of the registers. Cigarettes with a value of between $3,000 and $4,000 were stolen together with about $400 or $500 in cash. 25 The fourth offence in the Form 1 occurred on 11 July 2000 at the Shell Service Station at Ryde at 6 am just as it was opening. Again the attendant, a twenty-six-year-old male, was alone opening up the service station for business that day. The offenders arrived in a red Laser and as the attendant entered the shop area one of the offenders followed him, produced a knife and demanded that he get onto the floor. They demanded money from the till. The till was opened and the attendant was asked the location of the cigarettes and the mobile phone cards. Both offenders were in the shop and placed tobacco and other cigarette packets into a garbage bag. The attendant's wallet with $70 in cash, his driver's licence and other personal effects were stolen. Also stolen was about $400 in cash, cigarettes and tobacco products with a total value of about $4,350 with mobile phone cards with a total value of about $250. 26 The next offence was that in count 4 of the indictment and occurred on 14 July 2000 at the Caltex Service Station at Carlingford. This was the same location as that covered by the first offence on Form 1. The offenders confronted the twenty-two male attendant who was arriving at work just before 6 am to open up. Each was at the back door of the premises and had a hat or some other item covering the lower parts of his face. One of them held a knife with a 10-cm blade towards the attendant and ordered him to the ground. They asked the whereabouts of the money and cigarettes. One of the offenders went to the back room and placed the cigarettes into a garbage bag. They turned off the lights and took the contents of the cash register. They also demanded the change bag and the attendant's wallet and searched for cash in them. They drove away in the red Laser. As a result of this robbery about $2,250 was stolen from the service station, an unknown quantity of cigarettes and about $100 from the wallet belonging to the attendant. It was on this count that the sentencing Judge was asked to take into account all of the Form 1 offences. 27 The next offence, count 5 in the indictment, occurred on 17 July 2000 at the Quix Store Gladesville at about 6 am. The twenty-three-year-old male attendant was working there alone. The offenders went to the premises in a red Laser with registration plates UIT 187. They went into the shop, looked around and then returned to the car. After the attendant finished serving a customer in the store they drove into the customer parking area and one approached the attendant from behind and stuck a knife into his back. The knife had a 20-cm blade. The attendant was told to go into the store and turn off the inside lights. He was forced to kneel and the two offenders took cigarettes and lighters from the shop and forced him to open the till. The offenders stole about twenty CDs from the shop. The attendant was directed to open the safe, which he could not do. He was taken by the offenders into the store room and told to lie on the floor. As a result of the robbery about $150 was taken from the register and CDs worth about $600 and an unknown quantity of cigarettes, lighters and confectionary were stolen. The fifth offence in the Form 1 related to the car used in this robbery, which had been stolen some time on 8 July 2000 from Flemington Markets. It was not recovered until early October. Its tyres were flat and rubbish and rotten fruit were found inside. It was uninsured and rendered virtually useless to its owner. 28 Judge Tupman observed: "In relation to the robbery occurring at the Quix Service Station I note that it was the second time that that particular twenty-three year old attendant had been the victim of such an armed robbery within a month. He had been a similar victim about three weeks previously in circumstances where I accept from his statement that these two [offenders] were the same two who had committed the earlier robbery. I also know that one of the original charges in the indictment, dated 15 November 2001, included an armed robbery at this Quix store in Gladesville on 21 June 2000. It appears to be one in relation to which the Crown elected to take no further proceedings as part of a negotiated result which gave rise to the pleas of guilty to five counts, with a further four counts on Form 1. I accept that, no doubt, this particular victim was further victimised as a result of the earlier offence having occurred and whether it be these two [offenders] who committed it or not, the prevalence of these offences in service stations and convenience stores in the late evening or early morning is such that offenders committing such offences could safely assume that these workers, just like bank tellers in the past, have been victims already of such offences and put in fear, such that a repetition only increases and exacerbates that apprehension. It would not be surprising if this was the case with this young man." 29 The last offence, the sixth in the Form 1, occurred on 24 July 2000 when the offenders robbed the Shell Service Station at Blacktown. The nineteen year old female attendant opened up the premises at 5.30 am ready for a 6 am start. The offenders drove the stolen red Laser to the premises. She told the offenders that the shop did not open until six but as she used her key to enter, one or other of the offenders put his hand on her back and told her that it was a hold-up and demanded that she get onto the floor. He was holding a knife. The offenders dragged her up to her feet and forced her to open the cash register. They took money, cigarettes and phone cards as a result of this armed robbery. The sum of about $180 in cash, $2,000 worth of cigarettes and phone cards and other mobile phone kits worth about $100 were stolen as a result of the robbery. 30 At the time of his arrest on 27 July 2000 the applicant was living in a hotel at Lidcombe. The police attended there, making inquiries in relation to a string of service station robberies at the time. They approached the applicant on a landing near a room in that hotel. He struggled with them. He is said to have struggled violently by thrashing his arms and legs and attempting to strike police during the struggle. His actions in resisting that arrest gave rise to the last two offences on the Form 1 in relation to the indictment against the applicant alone. The applicant declined to participate in a record of interview and was remanded in custody with bail refused. 31 The sentencing Judge observed that the jointly committed offences by the two offenders were aggravated by the fact that they were committed in company. That made them more serious examples of armed robberies. Further, so far as the applicant was concerned, all of the jointly committed offences and counts 3 and 4 in the February 2002 indictment were committed either while he was on bail or after a warrant had been issued after he failed to attend the District Court for sentence. 32 The sentencing Judge said that it was clear that all the offences were serious offences committed on vulnerable workers, usually in the early morning when the service stations or convenience stores were about to open. While it was submitted that relatively small amounts of property were stolen her Honour did not accept that. Where the Crown had provided the Court with information about the quantity or value of stolen goods it appeared that considerable quantities of cigarettes and on many occasions mobile phone cards had been stolen. In relation to one of the offences, cigarettes worth about $10,000 and mobile phone cards worth anything between $6,000 and $30,000 were stolen. There were also quantities of cash stolen. In some offences these were relatively small quantities but overall it seemed to the sentencing Judge that considerable amounts of property were stolen. 33 On all occasions the victims were put in fear, having knives or bars forced into their backs, being forced to the ground, being threatened and being led into store rooms and the like. The sentencing Judge said: "These people, working as console operators and attendants, were usually young. They were all working alone and they were all of them doing no more than trying to earn a living honestly doing a job which, no doubt, most of us would find unpalatable and which, presumably, is not particularly well paid. The community expects to be able to attend these services stations and convenience stores at all hours of the day and night but expects to be able to do so safely, without risk that they will interrupt such an armed robbery. Further, it seems to me that people who work in these jobs so that the community can have this convenience, ought to be entitled to expect that they will do so without the risk of being threatened, intimidated and even physically harmed or even killed by people such as these [offenders]. The sentences imposed for such offences should send a strong message that armed robbery offences such as these will be punished severely by the courts." 34 Clearly these remarks made by her Honour were appropriate. Severe punishment was called for for the offences in question. Her Honour turned to the factors to be taken into account by way of subjective circumstances and otherwise. She started with the jointly charged matters where late pleas of guilty were entered on the day of trial, though possibly indicated during the preceding week. She acknowledged that they had a utilitarian value nonetheless because the trial was to last three weeks. Moreover, the Crown conceded that it did not have a particularly strong case against either offender particularly Chahrouk. Her Honour considered that the combination of the utilitarian value of the plea, albeit late, and the recognition of the relative weakness of the Crown case gave rise to a discount but no more than a range of between 10 and 15 per cent. Her Honour then said: "As to the other matters for which I am sentencing Mr Trad, as I have said, they were before the court originally by way of 51A pleas and are thus entered earlier. They are for that alone entitled to a discount. They are both, however, stronger cases against Mr Trad with identification evidence available from surveillance videos and some other evidence. Further, as to all four offences, they only come to be sentenced now after the prisoner has been brought back into custody in July 2000 on warrants after having failed to appear for sentence at the District Court. There has been a considerable delay in sentencing the prisoner in relation to these earlier offences, in part occasioned by the prisoner's desire to have matters sentenced together following his arrest for the subsequent nine armed robberies and pleas of guilty on the day of his trial. For these reason, it seems to me, that the pleas of guilty in those cases, although early and originally pursuant to s51A of the Justices Act and therefore whilst attracting a discount for their utilitarian value and timing, also only attract a discount in the range of ten to fifteen per cent." 35 Her Honour acknowledged that the applicant at the time of sentencing was twenty-two and had been nineteen or twenty at the time he committed the offences. She regarded his criminal history as of little significance or relevance when sentencing him for the offences. She remarked only that they were not his first offence and it was not the first time he had been before a court. She accepted that all offences were committed by him to fund his addiction to illegal drugs and that more probably than not he was actually drug-affected when committing most of them. There had been several pre-sentence reports prepared. One prepared in October 1999 following his arrest for the first two matters indicated a degree of hope for him. Efforts were made to place him in a drug rehabilitation unit but unfortunately he discharged himself from that course. He did not take advantage of assistance and supervision being offered by the probation and parole service and his family and ultimately failed to appear. 36 The applicant had had a good upbringing although marred by the death of his mother when he was only a few months old. He was well raised by his father, paternal grandmother and older brother. Unfortunately he began to associate with a poor peer group after he left home at about eighteen. He started to use illicit drugs. His family tried to help him to overcome this drug addiction but were unable to do so because he was not prepared to take advantage of their assistance. 37 After leaving school in Year 10 the applicant worked as an apprentice mechanic for about two years and then started a lawn mowing business, which lasted for only a few weeks. He did various other jobs for several weeks at a time, which more often than not came to an end because of his drug use. This started with smoking cannabis at about sixteen years of age. He then started to smoke heroin. His family arranged for him to attend rehabilitation programmes at both the William Booth Centre and Odyssey House, both of which he left after staying only a day. When a little older he started to inject heroin. Up to the time he was arrested for the offences he had taken no real steps to overcome his addiction to drugs even though assistance was being provided by his family. Even during the initial period of his imprisonment the trial Judge accepted that the applicant had not committed himself to overcoming his addiction to drugs and did not indicate any genuine remorse and contrition in relation to the commission of the offences. 38 However Judge Tupman accepted that over time that had changed. She found that in more recent times he had taken positive steps towards his rehabilitation. She said: "He is attending Narcotics Anonymous in gaol. I accept that he has withdrawn from using heroin after going into custody and is taking advantage of those courses that have been available to him as a remand prisoner following his arrest in July 2000. His family has remained supportive. He also now has the benefit of a supportive relationship with a young woman who was a friend as a child but who distanced herself from [him] when he started to use drugs. She has re-established contact and been to visit him in gaol. She has apparently agreed to marry him on his release. She was an impressive witness who was not herself involved in any illegal activities nor drug activities. I accept that she too will operate as a positive rehabilitative factor." 39 The sentencing Judge regarded the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation as relatively good and accepted that he was currently well motivated towards rehabilitation. However, this was entirely dependant on his remaining free of illegal drugs. The Judge sounded a note of caution surrounding his prospects of rehabilitation given the opportunities that he had taken and failed to use properly in the past. She observed that this was his first gaol term. He was young and it would be a gaol term for a relatively lengthy period. She accepted that as a result the applicant would need assistance both whilst in gaol to overcome his drug addiction and would also need a relatively lengthy period of supervision in the community on this release with particular attention to his drug addiction. Her Honour took into account the psychiatric opinion that he suffered from depression and drug dependency which were said both to be in remission. These matters would also need to be addressed by way of supervision and counselling on his release from custody. 40 Taking into account what had been said in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 at 380 and following and the circumstances surrounding the applicant and the offences her Honour concluded that the appropriate overall penalty of imprisonment would be about three years for the first two offences committed in 1999, within increasingly lengthier sentences for each of the following seven offences, particularly so for the aggravated armed robbery offence committed on 23 March 2000 and the offence count 4 for which the additional four armed robberies were to be taken into account. 41 The sentencing Judge said that there must also be taken into account the circumstances of aggravation relating to the applicant, even with his lesser previous criminal record, lack of previous imprisonment and relative youth. She observed that the applicant could face accumulated sentences of over forty years with a non-parole period of over thirty years. Such a sentence would of course be excessive in the circumstances. Her Honour said: "For Mr Trad, however, it seems to me that the total criminality, taking into account his own circumstances, should reflect in an overall term of imprisonment of twelve years with a non-parole period of eight. … It seems to me at the end of the day in relation to the prisoner Mr Trad that anything less than a non-parole period of eight years in totality would not reflect the objective seriousness of committing thirteen armed robbery offences over a period to two years." 42 Her Honour went on to find that there were special circumstances for adjusting the non-parole period, namely the fact that this was his first gaol term, his youth, the need for a lengthy period of supervision in the community and the fact of accumulation to other terms. On this basis her Honour imposed the sentences that I have already set out.
Application for leave to appeal 43 By his submissions, the applicant accepted that there was no doubt that the number and nature of the offences required condign punishment. There were two grounds of appeal:
A. Her Honour took irrelevant material into account in determining the quantum of the discount to be applied because of the pleas of guilty.
B. The aggregate of the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. 44 It was submitted that the proceeds from each of the offences were relatively "modest" amounts of cash, cigarettes and other items usually stocked by those businesses. Her Honour did not so regard them, nor would I. No complaint was made, however, about her Honour's assessment of the offences. They were, individually and collectively, very serious. It was conceded that the sentencing Judge's treatment of the subjective material was unexceptional and no complaint was made. So far as the discount for the joint offences it was conceded that 10 to 15 per cent was within the sentencing Judge's discretion. 45 Ground A was directed to the passage quoted in para 34 above which led her Honour to apply a discount in the range of 10 to 15 per cent for the utilitarian value of the pleas to the four offences in the 1 February 2002 indictment. Her Honour was said to have conflated two quite distinct principles and this gave rise to error. In that passage her Honour had said that the matters were to be treated as being before the court originally by way of the s51A pleas. For that alone they were entitled to a discount on the basis of her Honour's acceptance that each of the pleas had been entered at the earliest opportunity. This accords with what was said by Spigelman CJ in R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 in a judgment with which the other four members of this Court agreed. At 411-2 Spigelman CJ said: "115 There is considerable force in the proposition that the combination of utilitarian elements with remorse and witness vulnerability involves the addition of incommensurable factors. The benefits to the criminal justice system as a whole, which flows [sic] from a plea of guilty, particularly an early plea of guilty, are not related to the circumstances of the offence or to the conduct of the offender. Such benefits flow from an act by the offender that is not directly related to any of the multifarious objectives designed to be served by the sentencing process: deterrence, rehabilitation, punishment, etc. Rather, they are a collateral benefits [sic] for the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a whole, which require acknowledgement of some character by way of an incentive, so that the benefits will in fact be derived by the system. 116 The element of remorse which is said to be reflected in a guilty plea and the benefits to witnesses, particularly victims, are of a different quality. Remorse is directly concerned with the circumstances of the offender and may have significant implications for other objectives of the sentencing process. First, genuine remorse would indicate that the element of personal deterrence does not need to be given weight in the particular case. Secondly, it indicates that the prospects of rehabilitation are good. These are sentencing matters pertaining to the individual case, not advantages to the administration of criminal justice." 46 A little later at 412 (para 122) his Honour observed that the public interest served by encouraging pleas of guilty for their utilitarian value was a distinct interest. 47 At 414 (para 131) the Chief Justice said: "Every part of the complex web of interconnected participants which comprises the criminal justice system will be improved if a greater number of early pleas could be achieved. The benefits include: · Reduce congestion in court lists and permit courts to plan the use of limited resources without overlisting and avoiding the waste of trial court time. · Reduce the waste of the limited resources available to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Public Defender and legal aid, both by the direct saving of time spent on preparing cases that do not proceed and by the indirect saving of reducing the number of cases not reached due to overlisting. · Reduce the waste of time of witnesses, amongst whom police constitute the largest single category, in preparing to give evidence and, in many cases, appearing on the day of trial. · Reduce the waste of time of jurors who are needlessly assembled for trial." 48 At 416, para 137 the Chief Justice referred to what Hunt CJ at CL said in Winchester v The Queen (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 in relating the strength of the Crown case only to the contrition element of the leniency in sentencing which a plea of guilty affords an accused. Spigelman CJ said: "In my opinion his Honour was correct to link the question of the strength of the Crown case only to the issue of contrition or remorse. A 'recognition of the inevitable' may qualify the extent of genuine contrition. It does not qualify the utilitarian value of a plea." 49 Having reviewed the extent of discount allowed in cases in New Zealand and other States, the Chief Justice at 418, para 150, said that all these cases referred to a discount that did not involve any separation of utilitarian benefits from other considerations. In his Honour's opinion, the appropriate range for discount for the utilitarian benefit was from 10 to 25 per cent. There were, however, two circumstances which would generally affect the appropriate level of discount in a particular case: "(i) The time at which a plea is entered. A plea entered at committal has a more significant utilitarian benefit than a plea entered at first listing, which in turn has the greater benefit than a plea entered at the beginning of trial. (ii) The complexity of the issues about which evidence will have to be gathered and adduced affects the value of the plea. The greater the difficulty of assembling the relevant evidence and the greater the length and complexity of the trial, the greater the utilitarian value of a plea. The top of the range would be expected to be restricted to pleas at the earliest possible opportunity and should not be given, save in an exceptional case, after a matter has been set down for trial. A discount towards the bottom of the range is appropriate for late pleas, for example, on the date fixed for trial unless there are particular benefits arising from the prospective length and complexity of the trial. (418 paras 154-5) 50 The Chief Justice acknowledged, at 418, para 157, that there are circumstances in which the protection of the public requires a long sentence to be imposed so that no discount for the plea is appropriate. In concluding his judgment at 419, para 160, the Chief Justice remarked that the primary consideration in determining where in the range of discounts for utilitarian value the particular case should fall was the timing of the plea. 51 In that part of the remarks on sentence of which the applicant complains, her Honour, having referred to the pleas being entered at the earliest opportunity, went on immediately to remark that by contrast with the counts in the later indictment the cases in the 1 February 2002 indictment were stronger cases against the applicant. 52 The applicant was positively identified from surveillance videos in relation to three of the four counts. In relation to the fourth the applicant's fingerprint was located at the crime scene and clothing was found at his residence that had been worn by the offender. On the authority of Winchester, to which I have referred, and R v Thomson, this was not a consideration that should have been linked to the utilitarian discount. 53 The next part of the remarks on sentence challenged referred to the four offences coming to be sentenced "after the prisoner has been brought back into custody in July 2000 on warrants after having failed to appear for sentence at the District Court". This is a reference, albeit oblique, to the facts that after pleading guilty to the first two offences on 1 September 1999 and having been committed for sentence with bail granted, the applicant absconded, failed to appear for sentence on 20 March 2000 and was finally arrested on a warrant with some resistance on 27 July 2000. During that intervening period he committed the remaining offences on the two indictments and the offences he asked to have taken into account. 54 Judge Tupman next said that there had been a considerable delay in sentencing the prisoner in relation to the earlier offences, in particular occasioned by the prisoner's desire to have matters sentenced together following his arrest for the subsequent nine armed robberies and pleas of guilty on the day of his trial. As was pointed out in argument, that was irrelevant to any utilitarian discount and to the extent that it had any relevance it would entitle the applicant to a degree of leniency; Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59 and R v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267 (31 August 1999) particularly at para 19. Thus, from saying that for the early pleas alone the applicant was entitled to a discount, Judge Tupman had gone on to refer to the strength of the Crown case, to the delay caused by the applicant absconding and to the considerable delay flowing from the applicant's desire to have all the matters sentenced together. Having done this, her Honour said: "For these reasons, it seems to me, that the pleas of guilty in those cases, although earlier and originally pursuant to s51A of the Justices Act and therefore whilst attracting a discount for their utilitarian value and timing, also only attract a discount in the range of ten to fifteen per cent." 55 The first and third of the three topics referred to in this passage are irrelevant to the utilitarian discount and should not have been taken into account. To the extent that the sentencing Judge took them into account she erred and I must consider whether some other sentence less severe is warranted in law and should have been passed; s6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. I shall come back to the second topic. It is convenient to deal with this after referring to ground B of the appeal. 56 As to ground B of the appeal, the objective seriousness of the offences for which the applicant was being sentenced is quite obvious from the brief account her Honour gave of them. Her Honour gave careful reasons for the sentences she imposed. In particular, she said that in her mind the total criminality taking into account the applicant's own circumstances should reflect in an overall term of imprisonment of twelve years with a non-parole period of eight. In my opinion, it is impossible to suggest that this total sentence was beyond the range. As her Honour said, a non-parole period less than eight years in totality would not reflect the objective seriousness of committing thirteen armed robbery offences over a period of two years. In fixing the non-parole period, her Honour bore in mind that it was the applicant's first gaol term, his youth, the need for a lengthy period of supervision in the community and the fact of accumulation to other terms. 57 The central point of the application is that in fixing the sentences for the 1 February 2002 indictment her Honour should have allowed a discount for utilitarian value of 25 per cent. In particular, since all the sentences were fixed sentences this would have a consequence in terms both of the total term on both indictments and the non-parole period of eight years. In my opinion, there are good reasons why this adjustment should not be made. 58 Account must be taken of the disruption to the court process and to the administration of law caused by the applicant's absconding. It is true that an occurrence such as the present one is not mentioned in R v Thomson as part of the complex web of interconnected participants which comprises the criminal justice system. That is not surprising. In the passage in R v Thomson that I have quoted, the Chief Justice referred, amongst the benefits to be achieved by early pleas, to the reduction of the waste of the limited resources available to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Public Defender and Legal Aid and of the waste of time of witnesses including police witnesses. A discount of 25 per cent is not appropriate where, after pleading guilty, the offender absconds and fails to attend on the date set aside for sentencing. The court time wasted and inconvenience of setting in train the process of arresting the applicant, not to mention the waste in the abortive attempt to arrange some rehabilitation process, are factors which must be weighed in determining what the discount should be. 59 Putting aside any consideration of the strength of the Crown case and of the delays in sentencing when determining the utilitarian discount and bearing in mind the time at which the pleas of guilty were entered and the disruption and inconvenience caused by the offender's absconding, a utilitarian discount of 10 to 15 per cent was appropriate. In my opinion, the individual sentences imposed and the resultant total sentence and non-parole period her Honour set were warranted in law. No lesser sentences should have been passed. 60 I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal. 61 JAMES J: I agree with Sheller JA. 62 O'KEEFE J: I agree with Sheller JA.
Last Modified: 08/05/2003 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
R
Billy TRAD
CITATION : R v Billy TRAD [2003] NSWCCA 213 HEARING DATE(S) : 15 July 2003 JUDGMENT DATE : 31 July 2003
CATCHWORDS : Criminal law - Sentencing - Guilty Plea - Utilitarian Value - Relevance of other factors - Strength of Crown Case - Armed Robbery - Whether sentence manifestly excessive Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 LEGISLATION CITED : Crimes Act 1900 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59 R v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267 CASES CITED : R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 Winchester v The Queen (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 PARTIES : Billy Trad - Applicant Crown - Respondent FILE NUMBER(S) : CCA 60079/03 COUNSEL : T J Golding - Applicant D Howard - Crown SOLICITORS : D J Humphries - Applicant S E O'Connor - Crown
(1988) 166 CLR 59
(1999) 46 NSWLR 346
(2000) 49 NSWLR 383
Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed, leaving the sentences in place.