R v Beutel [1995] QCA 231

The armed robbery in particular was a very serious offence, amply warranting those orders, to which there has been no challenge. The indictment does however show that convictions were recorded, and the basis of the application is that the convictions should not have been recorded.

It is necessary to identify now the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act 1992 which in this case regulated the recording of convictions. That is necessary in order to determine whether the recording of convictions was a discretionary matter, or an automatic consequence of the orders for detention and immediate release.

Section 121(3) of that Act provides that "in relation to a serious offence that is a life offence", the Court may order up to 10 years detention. Armed robbery in company with violence is such an offence. But the learned Judge did not order the 18 months detention alone. He added an immediate release order. That suggests that he may have been proceeding under s.120(1)(f)(ii), which empowers the Court to order up to two years detention "with or without an immediate release order", provided however that s.121 "does not apply". While these orders could have been made under s.121 - because that section applies to serious, life offences, because the term of detention is less than 14 years, and because s.176 gives the general power to add an immediate release order - s.121(4) provides some basis for questioning whether the learned Judge should be taken to have proceeded under s.121.

Section 121(4) provides that s.121 "does not limit a court's power to make an order under s.120". Because the orders made here, detention for less than two years coupled with an immediate release order, are such as are provided for specifically in s.120(1)(f)(ii), whereas s.121(3) makes specific reference only to detention for periods up to 10 years or 14 years, we consider that the learned Judge should be taken to have made his orders "under" (cf. s.121(4)) the previous section, 120(1)(f)(ii), and that that being so, one should conclude that s.121 "does not apply", in terms of s.120(1)(f)(ii).

As mentioned earlier, it has been necessary to identify the section under which the Judge proceeded for this reason. Section 124(4) provides that "if the Court makes an order under s.121 ... and the order is not allowed under s.120 ... a conviction is taken to be recorded". (The order made here, being for detention less than two years, was "allowed" under s.120.) We would read the word "taken" as equivalent to "deemed". On the other hand s.124(3) provides that "if a Court makes an order under s.120(1)(c) to (f) ... the Court may order that a conviction be recorded". In other words, the Court there has a discretion. We consider that that was the situation here.

Our conclusion that the Judge should be taken to have proceeded under s.120 fits in with the position established by s.124. That provides in subs.(1) that prima facie a conviction is not to be recorded against a child offender. The section goes on to deal with particular situations. Referring to s.120, for orders made under subs.(1)(a) or (b), no conviction may be recorded: s.124(2). For orders under s.120(1)(c) to (f) a conviction may be recorded: s.124(3). Referring then to s.121, s.124(4) provides that "if a Court makes an order under s.121 ... and the order is not allowed under s.120 ... a conviction is taken to be recorded." In other words, if the Court imposes a penalty within the more stringent range provided for by s.121, a conviction is deemed to have been recorded. We say the more stringent penalty provided for by that section because the order made, in order to attract the automatic recording of a conviction, must not have been "allowed" under s.120. Now if an order were made for detention for, say, less than 10 years, in the case of a serious and life offence otherwise coming under s.121(3), and that were regarded as an order "under s.121", then s.124 would be left making no provision for the discretionary recording of a conviction. That circumstance would favour then the construction that these subject orders should be taken to have been made "under" s.120(1)(f), in the terms of s.124(3), so that the Court did indeed have a discretion to record a conviction. Otherwise one would be left with the unlikely result that a conviction would not automatically be recorded - s.124(4) not applying - and there would be no discretion to record a conviction specifically granted by the legislation, notwithstanding that such a discretion is granted for orders under s.120(1)(c) to (f), encompassing orders of comparable severity to the ones made here.

In summary, s.121, as relevant to this case, gives the Court power to impose detention orders for substantial periods for serious offences which are life offences. But the Court may nevertheless choose to make orders under the more general sentencing provision, s.120. Proceeding under that section more substantially limits the period of any detention order, and specifically authorises the court's adding an immediate release order (although it should be noted that that power is engrafted on to s.121 in any event by s.176). If the Court makes an order under s.121 which is beyond the range permitted by s.120, in the case of a serious and life offence, then a conviction is deemed to have been recorded. If however, the Court makes the less severe orders provided for by s.120, then the Court has a discretion whether or not to record a conviction.

In this case, one should therefore proceed on the basis that the recording of convictions was a discretionary matter. Was the discretion exercised? The existence and exercise of the discretion were not raised in submissions before the learned Judge, and he himself made no reference to them in what he said. There is no basis for concluding that the Judge turned his mind to the question at all. It may well be, then, that the entry on the indictment was made by a court officer in circumstances where the Judge had not dealt with the issue in court. In these circumstances, the only basis on which we should safely proceed is that the discretion was not exercised. The recording of convictions must therefore be set aside and we should ourselves now exercise the discretion.

While the nature of the armed robbery, which was a very serious offence, weighs in favour of recording a conviction, the very young age of the applicant at the time of the offences weighs much more heavily the other way. It helps to note s.29 of the Criminal Code, which provides in substance that a person under 15 years of age is prima facie not criminally responsible, in the absence of proof that he had the capacity to know he ought not do the relevant act. The applicant's pleas of guilty were of course an admission of criminal responsibility, but at 14 years, his social, moral and emotional development obviously could not be considered to be complete. One should also note s.124(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, which proceeds from the primary position that a conviction is not to be recorded against a child offender. The applicant had no prior criminal convictions, pleaded guilty on an ex officio indictment, fully cooperated with the police from the outset, and has had the disadvantage of an unsettled childhood affected by many family problems. Taking account of all of those matters and the others to which s.125 refers, especially the impact of recording convictions on his prospects of rehabilitation and employment, We would not in this case order that convictions be recorded.

We would allow the application to the extent of deleting the recording of the subject convictions.

I have had the advantage of reading the joint reasons of McPherson J.A. and de Jersey J. I have found the wording of the relevant provisions, namely ss. 120, 121 and 124(4) of the Juvenile Justice Act 1992, puzzling. The language of the last mentioned provision is particularly odd, but what the drafter seems to have had in mind is an order made under s. 121 which could not have been made under s. 120; assuming that is the right interpretation, then the judge had a discretion to exercise with respect to the recording of convictions. The orders made by the judge as set out at p. 12 of the record make no mention of this subject and it seems probable that the entry of a record of the convictions was simply an administrative error.

I agree with McPherson J.A. and de Jersey J. that this is not a case in which convictions should be recorded and concur in the order their Honours propose.