"I indicated that the accused was arrested on 17 July; he was charged on the same day. On 18 July he was refused bail. Throughout this period and up until 22 July Mr Godino remained in hospital. Nonetheless, on 19 July investigating police sought to hold a line-up. The accused, through his solicitor, declined to participate. The accused had apparently been photographed after his arrest, and subsequently a photoboard of 12 photos was compiled. Each photograph was digitally enhanced (if that be the term) with a black eye, which, it is asserted, the accused possessed at the time of his arrest. There may be some discrepancy as to which eye was blackened at that time. The photoboard depicts the right eye whilst there is evidence from arresting officers that it was the left eye that was blackened. In itself, that would merely be a matter for forensic attack or comment. On 24 July the photoboard was shown by an Inspector Conolan to the victim Mr Godino. He identified the accused as Rocky (being Photo No. 10). Against this background, I turn to what I apprehend are the relevant submissions. After hearing argument, it seems that both the prosecution and the defence are in agreement that this is a recognition rather than an identification case. The defence argue that as a consequence of that situation, the use of the photoboard, at least in relation to the victim, is unnecessary. Coupled with that submission appears to be the proposition that the court should exercise the discretion enunciated in R. v. Christie (1914) A.C. 545, to exclude that evidence. It was pointed out that the use of the photoboard occurred after the accused was arrested and indeed charged, and consequently the detection process was at an end. As is made clear in R. v. Carusi (1992) A.Crim.R. 52 at pp.64-65 those circumstances cannot be decisive, but are nonetheless relevant factors to take into account in exercising this exclusionary discretion. (See also Alexander v. R. (1981) 1 45 C.L.R. 395.) I should add that the common potential vice of the use of photographs, namely the 'displacement effect' and the 'rogues gallery' phenomenon, would appear to be absent from this photoboard. The former because the victim is merely confirming the identity of a person already known to, and recognised by, him and the latter because there is evidence of a photo taken after the accused's arrest and placed on a board in which all the faces depicted have been subjected to digital treatment. The Crown submission is that this being a recognition case, all that was necessary was the confirmation by Mr Godino that the man known to him was in fact the accused. Other than the production of a photoboard, this could have been done by showing the victim a single photo or, alternatively, could be done at the trial by asking Mr Godino before the jury 'Do you see that man in court?', and obtaining a formal acknowledgment of that fact. I note that the latter course was approved by R. v. Britten (1989) 51 S.A.S.R. 567 at 572. In my view, the Crown submission is essentially correct. In the instant case, little guidance is provided by the authorities which relate to what may be categorised as 'identification cases' in which the accused is a person previously unknown to the victim. Further, the use of this photoboard in the particular circumstances of this case does not attract the forensic difficulties adverted to in the identification cases. I should perhaps add for completeness that in the context of this case the newspaper articles, even if seen by Mr Godino, are not relevant. In my view, the Crown are entitled to use the photoboard and I leave open any argument which the defence may wish to present as to the alternative method proposed by the Crown in this case."