R v Alqudsi; Alqudsi v Commonwealth of Australia - [2015] NSWSC 1222 - NSWSC 2015 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWSC

R v Alqudsi; Alqudsi v Commonwealth of Australia

[2015] NSWSC 1222

Supreme Court of NSW|2015-08-21|Before: Adamson J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2015-08-21

Before

Adamson J

Catchwords

252 CLR 168 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 23
238 CLR 1 Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration [2014] HCA 22
88 ALJR 860 The King v Burgess
ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 The King v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121 Theophanous v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 18

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

252 CLR 168 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 23238 CLR 1 Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration [2014] HCA 2288 ALJR 860 The King v Burgessex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 The King v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121 Theophanous v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 18225 CLR 101 The State of New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33233 CLR 307 Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth [2006] HCA 40227 CLR 614 Victoria v The Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 XYZ v The Commonwealth [2006] HCA 25

Judgment (39 paragraphs)

[1]

Introduction

Hamdi Alqudsi (the plaintiff) has been committed for trial in New South Wales for offences against s 7(1)(e) of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth) (the Act). The Crown case against the plaintiff is that between 25 June 2013 and 14 October 2013 he provided assistance to seven men who travelled to Syria to engage in armed hostilities against the government of Syria. It is alleged that he helped the men by providing them both with instructions (which included measures to be taken to avoid detection by security officials) and support to travel from Australia to Syria via Turkey. It is also alleged that the plaintiff acted as a conduit for information between the seven men and his contact in Syria, Mohommad Ali Baryalei.

[2]

Procedural matters

The plaintiff was committed for trial by the Local Court on 21 November 2014. On 27 January 2015 Bathurst CJ granted an exemption under s 128 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) to enable the indictment to be presented in this Court. On 8 May 2015 the plaintiff was arraigned before Johnson J, on seven charges (the criminal proceedings). A not guilty plea was entered in respect of each charge. The first charge on the indictment was that the plaintiff: "Between about 25 June and 14 October 2013, at Sydney, in the State of NSW, did perform services for another person, namely Tyler Casey (also known as Abu Qaqa), with the intention of supporting or promoting the commission of an offence against section 6 of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978, being the entry by that person into a foreign State, namely Syria, with intent to engage in a hostile activity in Syria, in particular, engaging in armed hostilities in Syria."
The remaining charges are in similar terms save for the name of the person for whom services were allegedly provided. In the second charge such person was said to be Caner Temel (also known as Abu Moussa); in the third, Mehmet Biber (also known as Abu Abdul Malik); in the fourth, Muhammad Abdul-Karim Musleh (also known as Abu Hassan); in the fifth, Mahmoud Abed Aboshi (also known as Abu Alem); in the sixth, Amin Mohamed (also known as Abu Bilal); and in the seventh, Nassim Elbahsa.
At the time of the alleged offending, the plaintiff, who was born in Jordan, was an Australian citizen, having attained citizenship on 11 November 1987. Each of the seven persons for whom he is alleged to have performed services was an Australian citizen and was ordinarily resident in Australia.
On 8 May 2015 the trial of the plaintiff in the criminal proceedings was fixed for hearing to commence on 21 September 2015 with an estimate of six weeks.
On 18 June 2015 the plaintiff filed a writ of summons in the High Court against the Commonwealth seeking a declaration that s 7(1)(e) of the Act was invalid (the declaratory proceedings). By notice of motion filed in this Court, he sought a vacation of the hearing date and a stay of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the declaratory proceedings. Subsequently, the plaintiff sought that the criminal proceedings be removed into the High Court. The Commonwealth filed a summons in the High Court for an order that the declaratory proceedings be remitted to this Court. On 20 July 2015 the High Court refused the plaintiff's application that the criminal proceedings be removed into the High Court and ordered that the declaratory proceedings be remitted to this Court.
On 27 July 2015 the plaintiff filed a notice of motion in this Court for orders that the indictment dated 7 May 2015 be quashed, that these proceedings be permanently stayed and that the declaratory proceedings be heard together with the motion to quash the indictment in the criminal proceedings. This Court made orders on 30 July 2015 that the plaintiff's motion to quash the indictment be heard together with his claim for declaratory relief.
The issues in both proceedings were defined by an amended points of claim filed on behalf of the plaintiff on 7 August 2015 and responses filed on behalf of the Commonwealth on 11 August 2015 and on behalf of the Crown (represented by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions) on 12 August 2015. Written submissions were filed pursuant to directions. The Crown in the criminal proceedings adopted the submissions made by the Commonwealth in the declaratory proceedings.
In the course of the hearing, the plaintiff was granted leave to claim the following alternative declaratory relief in the declaratory proceedings: "A declaration that s 7(1)(e) of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth) is invalid insofar as it purports to proscribe the performance of services in Australia with the intention of supporting or promoting the commission of an offence against s 6(1)(a) read with s 6(3)(aa)."

[5]

Sections 6 and 7 of the Act

At the time of the alleged offending, s 7 of the Act, so far as is material, provided: "Preparations for incursions into foreign States for purpose of engaging in hostile activities (1) A person shall not, whether within or outside Australia: . . . (e) give money or goods to, or perform services for, any other person . . . with the intention of supporting or promoting the commission of an offence against section 6; . . . (1A) A reference in subsection (1) to the commission of an offence against section 6 is a reference to the doing of an act that would constitute, or would but for subsection 6(2) constitute, an offence against section 6. (1B) A person shall not be taken to have committed an offence against this section merely because of doing an act by way of, or for the purposes of, the provision of aid of a humanitarian nature. (2) A person shall not be taken to have committed an offence against this section in respect of the doing of an act outside Australia unless: (a) at the time of the doing of that act, the person: (i) was an Australian citizen; or (ii) not being an Australian citizen, was ordinarily resident in Australia; or (b) the person was present in Australia at any time before the doing of that act and, at any time when the person was so present, his or her presence was for a purpose connected with that act, or for purposes that included such a purpose."
Section 6 of the Act relevantly provided: "Incursions into foreign States with intention of engaging in hostile activities (1) A person shall not: (a) enter a foreign State with intent to engage in a hostile activity in that foreign State; or (b) engage in a hostile activity in a foreign State. Penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years. (2) A person shall not be taken to have committed an offence against this section unless: (a) at the time of the doing of the act that is alleged to constitute the offence, the person: (i) was an Australian citizen; or (ii) not being an Australian citizen, was ordinarily resident in Australia; or (b) the person was present in Australia at any time before the doing of that act and, at any time when the person was so present, his or her presence was for a purpose connected with that act, or for purposes that included such a purpose. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1), engaging in a hostile activity in a foreign State consists of doing an act with the intention of achieving any one or more of the following objectives (whether or not such an objective is achieved): (a) the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the foreign State or of a part of the foreign State; (aa) engaging in armed hostilities in the foreign State; (b) causing by force or violence the public in the foreign State to be in fear of suffering death or personal injury; (c) causing the death of, or bodily injury to, a person who: (i) is the head of state of the foreign State; or (ii) holds, or performs any of the duties of, a public office of the foreign State or of a part of the foreign State; or (d) unlawfully destroying or damaging any real or personal property belonging to the government of the foreign State or of a part of the foreign State. (4) Nothing in this section applies to an act done by a person in the course of, and as part of, the person's service in any capacity in or with: (a) the armed forces of the government of a foreign State; or (b) any other armed force in respect of which a declaration by the Minister under subsection 9(2) is in force. . . ."

[6]

The 1987 Amending Act

The Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 1987 (Cth) (the 1987 Amending Act) effected various amendments, including the addition of s 6(3)(aa). It was given royal assent on 16 December 1987. In the Second Reading Speech Senator Tate explained the purpose of the amendments in the following terms: "The underlying purpose of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 is to prevent persons from Australia becoming involved in hostile activity in overseas countries. The purpose of the amendments is to remedy a number of deficiencies in the Act. One such deficiency is that mercenary acts as such are not proscribed unless they involve acts done for specific purposes, those purposes generally relating to acts directed against the government of a foreign country. . . . In addition, two new offences have been created - prohibiting persons from Australia from engaging in armed hostilities outside Australia and prohibiting the use of a vessel or aircraft in preparations for an incursion into an overseas country. . . . Other amendments are designed to meet a number of difficulties in relation to prosecutions under the Act involving the preparation for or incursion into an overseas country. Those . . . amend section 7 of the Act, which prohibits preparations for incursions into an overseas country, to ensure that proof of an offence against that section does not depend on proof of an offence against section 6, which prohibits such incursions by a person from Australia."
I understand the reference to "mercenary acts as such" in the Second Reading Speech to the 1987 Amending Act to be a reference to s 6(3)(aa), which proscribes "engaging in hostilities in the foreign State". As the plain meaning of the section is broader than the term used in the Second Reading Speech, I do not understand Senator Tate as intending to confine the mischief which the amendment was designed to remedy to the acts of mercenaries as defined by the Geneva Convention (see below).
The amendment to s 7 (which became s 7(1A)) referred to in the last paragraph of the passage extracted above was said, according to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill which became the 1987 Amending Act, to have the effect that: "an Australian can be prosecuted for soliciting money or goods for the purpose of supporting the acts of other persons that are done with the object of overthrowing a government outside Australia even if those persons are not Australian and have no connection with Australia."
The 1987 Amending Act also removed the reference to "foreign country" and substituted "foreign State" and redefined "government" to mean the authority exercising effective control, rather than, as previously, the government that Australia had recognised as the lawful government.

[7]

Other provisions of the Act and the Criminal Code

Section 5 of the Act excludes from its operation any act done by a person in the course of that person's duty to the Commonwealth in relation to the defence of Australia.
Sections 8 and 9 of the Act proscribe various kinds of recruitment to engage in armed hostilities in foreign States. Section 9(2) empowers (but does not require) the Minister to make declarations exempting specified armed forces from the prohibition in s 9(1). Section 9(2) provides: "If the Minister has, by instrument signed by the Minister and published in the Gazette, declared that it is in the interests of the defence or international relations of Australia to permit the recruitment in Australia, either generally or in particular circumstances or subject to specified conditions, of persons to serve in or with a specified armed force, or to serve in or with a specified armed force in a particular capacity, subsection (1) does not apply, or does not apply in those circumstances or where those conditions are complied with, as the case may be, to or in relation to recruitment to serve, or the publication of an advertisement containing information with respect to service, in or with that armed force, or in or with that armed force in that capacity, as the case may be."
By reason of s 6(4)(b), acts done in the course of and as part of a person's service in a capacity in or with an armed force which is the subject of a s 9(2) declaration, are not proscribed by s 6(1). The conditions for making a declaration under s 9(2) are not tailored to offences under s 6(1), since all that is required is that the Minister declare that it is in the interest of Australia's defence or international relations that recruitment (as opposed to engaging in armed hostilities) be permitted.
In 2004 the Act was amended to qualify the exception in s 6(4) of the Act and to make provision for "prescribed organisations", which include "terrorist organisations". These provisions were related to provisions in the Criminal Code which were considered in Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307 which is addressed below, both in the context of constitutional fact evidence and in connection with the ambit of the external affairs power.
Section 3A of the Act makes applicable Ch 2 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the general principles of criminal responsibility. In respect of each offence the Crown must prove the existence of such physical elements as are relevant to establishing guilt and also a fault element.
Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code also proscribes various orthodox types of extended criminal responsibility such as attempt (s 11.1); complicity and common purpose (s 11.2); incitement (s 11.4); and conspiracy (s 11.5). Section 11.6(2) of the Criminal Code provides that a reference in a law of the Commonwealth to a particular offence includes a reference to an offence against s 11.1 (attempt), 11.4 (incitement) or 11.5 (conspiracy). This section is subject to express or implied contrary intention. It was not suggested that there was any such contrary intention. Accordingly, I take it to be common ground that the reference in s 7(1)(e) to an offence against s 6 of the Act would include an attempt, incitement or conspiracy to commit an offence against s 6.

[10]

The UN Charter and the principle of non-intervention

The Commonwealth relied on Art 2 of the UN Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force otherwise than in accordance with the purposes of the UN, which are expressed to include, in Art 1.1: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;"
The Commonwealth expressly relied on Art 2.4, which provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
The Commonwealth also relied generally on the so-called "non-intervention" principle by which States are prohibited from interfering in each other's internal affairs, to which Art 2.4 is relevant (although it does not cover the field). The Commonwealth referred to Oppenheim at [122] to support the proposition that a State's obligation not to intervene in another State's internal affairs extended to neither encouraging nor tolerating such interference on the part of others within its territory. The authors of Oppenheim said at 394: ". . . there is little room for doubt [about a State's obligation to prohibit] where the subversive activities of private persons in a state take the form of organising on its territory armed hostile expeditions against another state. A state is bound not to allow its territory to be used for such hostile expeditions, and must suppress and prevent them. Some states have legislation which is wide enough to apply to some aspects of the preparation of hostile expeditions and the recruitment of persons to serve in armed expeditions abroad."
The footnote to the last sentence in the extracted passage includes a reference to the Act. The customary international law was articulated in the following passage from Oppenheim at 396 - 397: "A state's obligation to prevent hostile expeditions from its territory, and itself to refrain, directly or indirectly through organisations receiving from it financial or other assistance or closely associated with it by virtue of the state's constitution, from engaging in or actively supporting subversive activities against another state have often been stated."

[11]

Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly prior to the date of royal assent

The authors of Oppenheim also referred, at 397, to the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (the Friendly Relations Declaration) in which the General Assembly (by General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970)) "Solemnly proclaims the following principles": "The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations . . . Every State has the duty to refrain from organising or encouraging the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State. Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. . . . The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter . . . Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State." [Emphasis added in bold; italics in original.]
The evidence also included the text of several resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. It is not necessary to identify each resolution relied upon. Resolutions 161 (1961), 169 (1961), 226 (1966), 239 (1967) and 241 (1967) were made in response to the conflict in the Congo. The resolutions requested States not only to refrain from the supply of arms to those in that area, but also to prevent their nationals from doing the same, except where authorised by the UN.
Some of these resolutions referred exclusively to "mercenaries", whereas others referred to foreign fighters more generally. For example, Security Council Resolution 161 relevantly: "2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries."
Security Council Resolution 169 (24 November 1961) authorised the Secretary-General to act to remove from the Republic of the Congo "all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the UN Command, and mercenaries".
However, other resolutions, such as Resolution 239, referred only to mercenaries. Its terms included the following: "2. Condemns any State which persists in permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries, and the provision of facilities to them, with the objective of overthrowing the Governments of States Members of the United Nations."
Resolution 239 was reaffirmed by Resolution 405 (1977) in response to unrest in Benin. Resolution 405 was similarly confined to mercenaries, as appears from the following extract: "5. Further calls upon all States to consider taking necessary measures to prohibit, under their respective domestic laws, the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries on their territory and other territories under their control. 6. Condemns all forms of external interference in the internal affairs of Member States, including the use of international mercenaries to destabilize States and/ or violate their territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence."

[12]

The relevance of the meaning of the term "mercenaries"

There was an issue about the meaning of the term "mercenaries" and whether its customary international law meaning differed from the convention meaning. It was accepted that the term, as provided for by the Geneva Red Cross Convention (which entered into force on 7 December 1978, but which had been approved by Resolution 2625 (24 October 1970)), was defined to mean any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated by private gain, which is substantially in excess of the remuneration paid to regular forces; (d) is neither a national or a party to the conflict or a resident of territory controlled by such a party; (e) is not a member of the armed forces or a party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a non-party State as a member of its armed forces.
The plaintiff contended that references in other material to "mercenaries" was confined to those falling within the definition referred to above, of which a salient feature was that the person be motivated by private gain. He observed that there was no suggestion that he, or any of the persons for whom he was alleged to have performed services, were motivated by private gain. He submitted that international concern about mercenaries could not be extended to include concern about foreign fighters generally, or persons described as "terrorists" since such persons did not fall within the definition of mercenaries.
The Commonwealth submitted that the international concern was not limited to persons who were, strictly speaking, mercenaries. It particularly relied on the wording of Resolutions 161 and 169 (set out above) because the categories of persons in respect of whom States were required to arrange immediate withdrawal was not limited to "mercenaries" and also included "foreign military and paramilitary personnel". It contended that mercenaries (even if the convention definition applied) were merely members of the broader genus of "foreign fighters". Moreover, the Commonwealth argued that there was no reason to differentiate mercenaries from other foreign armed persons who were neither authorised by the UN nor belonging to a State's armed forces, since what was at stake was the non-intervention principle which did not involve any particular aversion to foreign fighters who were motivated by financial gain, as opposed to foreign fighters generally.

[16]

The various aspects of the external affairs power

The High Court, in determining the constitutionality of laws said to be authorised by the external affairs power, has addressed the extent of the power by reference to a number of aspects, the importance of any one of which depends on the character of the law sought to be impugned. These aspects necessarily overlap. The external affairs power has been taken to authorise laws: 1. with respect to Australia's relations with other nation States (external relations); 2. with respect to places, persons, matters or things that lie outside the geographical limits of Australia (geographical externality); 3. with respect to matters of international concern (international concern); 4. that give effect to, or implement, recommendations of international agencies of high standing, including resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council (international recommendations); and 5. that give effect to Australia's treaty obligations (treaty).
These aspects do not have constitutional effect: they have been articulated to explain why certain laws fall within the external affairs power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by s 51(xxix). Nonetheless it was not suggested that any novel aspect of the power was required to be addressed in the present case.
The Commonwealth relied on each of the aspects of the external affairs power set out above, with the exception of the treaty aspect, to support the constitutionality of s 7(1)(e). The plaintiff contended that the law, properly understood, fell within none of these aspects. The plaintiff further submitted that neither international concern, nor implementation of resolutions (except to the extent to which they are reasonably appropriate to implement a treaty) are aspects of the external affairs power.
There was a further issue between the parties: the extent to which the principle of proportionality applied to each of the aspects of the external affairs power, with the exception of the treaty aspect in respect of which it was accepted that there was such a requirement. The plaintiff contended that questions of proportionality bear on the international concern, external relations and international recommendations aspect of the external affairs power. The plaintiff relied on a passage in Victoria v The Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 (Industrial Relations Act Case) at 487 (considered below). The plaintiff submitted that, because there was a requirement for proportionality in these aspects of the external affairs powers, the authorities regarding the requirement of proportionality in connection with the incidental power (such as Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79 at 99-100 and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1) were applicable.
The Commonwealth contended that there was no justification in the authorities for importing notions of proportionality into any but the treaty aspect of the external affairs power and that to do so would be inconsistent with the principles of characterisation articulated in Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth and reiterated in Plaintiff S156. Moreover, it did not accept that notions of proportionality were apposite to the incidental power and contended that Davis v The Commonwealth and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills had been overtaken by Theophanous v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 18; 225 CLR 101 and Leask v The Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579.
Although the parties' submissions dealt with each aspect in turn, I propose to address the relevant decisions of the High Court in chronological order in order to place the dicta in context before considering whether s 7(1)(e) of the Act falls within one or more aspects of the external affairs power.

[17]

The King v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936)

The King v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 is an example of a law found to be valid within the treaty aspect of the external affairs power, although the external relations aspect was also considered to apply. Section 4 of the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth) was, by majority (Latham CJ, Evatt and McTiernan JJ), relevantly found to be valid because it conferred on the Governor-General the power to make regulations for the purposes of carrying out and giving effect to the convention for the regulation of aerial navigation signed in Paris on 13 October 1919. The regulations applied to all aircraft flying within Australian airspace, even those which were involved only in air travel that took place wholly within a single State of Australia. However, the particular regulations were found to be invalid since they did not conform to the strict terms of the treaty.
In The King v Burgess; ex parte Henry, Latham CJ, at 643, expressly adopted external relations as an aspect of the external affairs power when his Honour observed that "[t]he regulation of relations between Australia and other countries . . . is the substantial subject matter of external affairs".
Justices Evatt and McTiernan (in a passage relied on by the Commonwealth for the proposition that the external affairs power also supports a law that implements recommendations of international agencies) said at 687: "But it is not to be assumed that the legislative power over 'external affairs' is limited to the execution of treaties or conventions; and, to pursue the illustration previously referred to, the Parliament may well be deemed competent to legislate for the carrying out of 'recommendations' as well as the 'draft international conventions' resolved upon by the International Labour Organisation or of other international recommendations or requests upon other subject-matters of concern to Australia as a member of the family of nations. The power is a great and important one."
Justice Starke referred to the concept of proportionality in the context of the treaty aspect of the power and said at 659-660: "The power is wide in terms, but its limits cannot be transcended. All means which are appropriate and are adopted to the enforcement of the convention and are not prohibited, or are not repugnant to or inconsistent with it, are within the power. The power must be construed liberally, and much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the contracting States in framing legislation, or otherwise giving effect to the convention."
It was not regarded as an impediment to a law being characterised as one with respect to external affairs that it governed the conduct of Australians within the Commonwealth. Justice Dixon said at 668: "Although it [the external affairs power] may enable the Parliament to make laws operating outside the limits of the Commonwealth, it cannot be supposed that its primary purpose was to regulate conduct occurring abroad."
In a passage on which the Commonwealth placed particular reliance, Dixon J addressed the extent of the power to control conduct within Australia at 669: "I think it is evident that its [the external affairs power's] purpose was to authorise the Parliament to make laws governing the conduct of Australians in, and perhaps, out of the Commonwealth in reference to matters affecting the external relations of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth might under this power legislate to ensure that its citizens did nothing inside the Commonwealth preparatory to or in aid of some action outside the Commonwealth which might be considered a violation of international comity, as, for instance, a failure on the part of private persons to behave as subjects of a neutral power during a war between foreign countries."

[18]

The King v Sharkey (1949)

The King v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121 (Sharkey) is an example of a law that was found to be valid within the external relations aspect of the external affairs power. Sharkey was charged on indictment with an offence under section 24D of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for uttering the following seditious words, which were published in the Daily Telegraph: "If Soviet Forces in pursuit of aggressors entered Australia, Australian workers would welcome them. Australian workers would welcome Soviet Forces pursuing aggressors as the workers welcomed them throughout Europe when the Red troops liberated the people from the power of the Nazis. I support the statements made by the French Communist leader Maurice Thorez. Invasion of Australia by forces of the Soviet Union seems very remote and hypothetical to me. I believe the Soviet Union will go to war only if she is attacked and if she is attacked I cannot see Australia being invaded by Soviet troops. The job of Communists is to struggle to prevent war and to educate the mass of people against the idea of war. The Communist Party also wants to bring the working class to power but if fascists in Australia use force to prevent the workers gaining that power Communists will advise the workers to meet force with force."
The definition of "seditious intention" in s 24A included, in (c), "to excite disaffection against the Government or Constitution of any of the King's Dominions". Chief Justice Latham (with whom Webb J agreed), who found s24A(c) to be valid, said, at 137: "The prevention and punishment of the excitement of disaffection within the Commonwealth against the Government or Constitution of any other Dominion may reasonably be thought by Parliament to constitute an element in the preservation of friendly relations with other Dominions."
I reject the plaintiff's submission that these words ought be taken to indicate that Latham CJ (and Webb J) found the law valid only by reference to the external affairs power in conjunction with the incidental power (s 51(xxxix)) or that the words "may reasonably be thought" in the passage above were intended to import the requirement of reasonable proportionality into the core of the external affairs power. I consider that a fair reading of the reasons leads to the conclusion that the incidental power was only relevant to the definition of seditious intent in other contexts. Their Honours found that the definitions of the mental element of the offence of sedition in s 24A(1)(c) (intent to excite disaffection against the Government or Constitution of any of the King's Dominions) and s 24A(1)(e) (to excite disaffection against the connexion of the King's Dominions under the Crown) were authorised by the external affairs power.
Justice McTiernan said at 157 that the expression "external affairs" was wider than "foreign affairs" because it extended to international relations, which "could be affected if seditious offences against the Government or Constitution of another Dominion were committed here with impunity".
Justices Rich and Williams concluded, without explanation, that the provisions were valid. The plaintiff submitted that the basis of a decision must be expressed before reliance could be placed on it and, accordingly, that Rich and Williams JJ ought not be regarded as agreeing with the approach taken by the other judges. However, in the context of the way the argument was put (in the summary at 133) - that the external affairs power extended "to sustaining a Government of another Dominion and its principal institutions" - their Honours' finding that the law was valid is, in my view, to be understood as an acceptance of that submission, which accorded with the basis on which Latham CJ, Webb and McTiernan JJ found the law to be valid.
Justice Dixon, who found parts of s 24A invalid, considered that it was beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth to protect an Australian State against "domestic violence" (in the sense of violence which manifested social unrest but which did not involve the defence of the realm). However, his Honour appears to have accepted (at 149) that s 24A(c) was valid under the external affairs power.
In Sharkey, a majority of the High Court held that a prohibition directed to mere words which, though uttered and published wholly within Australia, had the potential to excite disaffection within the Commonwealth against another nation State was authorised by the external affairs power. The Court did not need to consider whether the law was proportional or reasonably adapted to any particular object.

[19]

The Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975)

In The State of New South Wales v The Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 135 CLR 337 (the Seas and Submerged Lands Case), the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth), which vested sovereignty in the Commonwealth with respect to the continental shelf, the territorial sea and the airspace over it, was found to be valid under s 51(xxix). Although the High Court (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ) was unanimous that the legislation concerning the continental shelf was valid under the external affairs power, there was a range of reasons for the ultimate conclusion. All judges, apart from Gibbs and Stephen JJ, held that the provisions were valid on the ground that they gave effect to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Justices Gibbs and Stephen, in dissent, did not consider the law to be valid in so far as it extended to the territorial sea and the airspace over it.
Three judges, Barwick CJ, Mason and Jacobs JJ, considered the law to be valid in any event on the ground that the external affairs power extended to any matter or thing external to or situated outside Australia, and to persons outside Australia and their activities (the geographical externality aspect). This view of the external affairs power was based, at least in part, on the notion of sovereignty and the need for there to be "no gap in the constitutional framework" (per Jacobs J at 498). While the Australian States can exercise their sovereign legislative power subject to the principle of territoriality, no such limitation was found to apply to the Australian Government. Thus, according to Jacobs J at 498: "Clearly the Crown in the Australian Executive Council and in the Australian Parliament has one bound which the British Parliament has not, for it cannot transgress the Constitution. But subject to that Constitution it in Council and in Parliament has that pre-eminence and excellence as a sovereign Crown which is possessed by the British Crown and Parliament. Exactly when it attained those qualities is a matter of the constitutional history of the British Commonwealth of Nations largely reflected in the Imperial conferences following the Great War. Legal recognition came through the Statute of Westminster 1931 and its later adoption by Australia. Now the Constitution is the only limitation. There is no gap in the constitutional framework. Every power, right and authority of the British Crown is vested in and exercisable by the Crown in Australia subject only to the Constitution. The State legislatures do not have that sovereignty which the British legislature and now the Australian legislature possess. A State can only legislate in respect of persons, acts, matters and things which have a relevant territorial connexion with the State, a connexion not too remote to entitle the law to the description of a law for the peace welfare and good government of the State: see Johnson v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1956] 1 All ER 502 ; [1956] AC 331 at 351-3, 355. The words of s 51 of the Constitution do not import any similar territorial limitation and there now is none in the case of the Australian legislature. The words "external affairs" can now be given an operation unaffected by any concept of territorial limitation. The result is that the Commonwealth, outside the boundaries of the States and subject to any particular constitutional injunctions, may make laws on all subject matters in exercise of its sovereignty."
Although Stephen J did not consider the law to be authorised by the external affairs power, his Honour accepted, at 450, that the external affairs power included "matters which are not consensual in nature, conduct on the part of a nation, or of its nationals, which affects other nations and its relations with them." His Honour referred to passages from Sharkey to provide instances of such "non-consensual matters" that were included within Australia's external affairs and therefore within the external affairs power.

[20]

Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982)

In Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) was held, by majority (Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Brennan JJ) to be valid. The reasons of the judges who comprised the majority differed slightly as to the basis for the law being characterised as one with respect to external affairs.
Justice Stephen (with reference to his judgment in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case referred to above) found the law to be valid on the basis that, because the subject matter was of international concern, it had the capacity to affect Australia's relations with other States (the external relations aspect). His Honour considered that more was required than that the law enacted an obligation which Australia had assumed by treaty (the treaty aspect).
Justices Mason and Murphy found that the external affairs power was broad enough to authorise the implementation of any obligation Australia had assumed by treaty. Justice Mason exposed the fallacy of the proposition that there is any relevant dichotomy between external affairs and internal affairs. His Honour cited The King v Burgess; ex parte Henry as an example of a valid law that was both external (because it carried a treaty into effect) and internal (because it operated substantially within Australia), as well as Sharkey where the law found to be valid exhibited the same duality (internal operation but potential external effect).
Justice Brennan found, similarly, that if Australia undertook a treaty obligation with respect to an aspect of Australian internal legal order, the subject matter of the obligation became thereby (if not previously) an external affair. Accordingly, a law with respect to that subject matter was a law with respect to external affairs. His Honour also referred to Sharkey (at 257) as illustrating that a matter of internal concern can become an external affair and said: "A law defining a crime was supported because such a crime, though locally committed, had the potential to affect Australia's external relations."
Chief Justice Gibbs, in dissent, did not accept that the law was authorised by the external affairs power. However, his Honour cited Sharkey as demonstrating that the external affairs power was not limited to matters external to Australia and could be used to enact a law which regulated "conduct within Australia by Australians". At 191 his Honour referred to The King v Burgess; ex parte Henry and Sharkey as examples of laws where "the law, although operating within Australia, was one with respect to a subject-matter which involved a relationship with other countries". His Honour's reasons do not provide any support for the proposition that Sharkey ought be read as requiring that the external affairs power be qualified by reference to notions of purpose or proportionality.

[22]

Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth (1991)

In Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 a challenge was made to s 9 of the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) which provided that a person who, on or after 1 September 1939 and on or before 8 May 1945, committed a "war crime" was guilty of an indictable offence. An information was laid against Polyukhovich which alleged that between 1 September 1942 and 31 May 1943 he had committed war crimes in the Ukraine, which was then under German occupation. At the time of the commission of the alleged offences there was no Australian legislation in force that purported to make it a criminal offence for an Australian citizen or resident to do such acts in the Ukraine as the plaintiff was alleged to have done.
By majority (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, Brennan J dissenting), the High Court held s 9 to be valid under the external affairs power in so far as it operated upon conduct which took place outside Australia and made that conduct a criminal offence. Accordingly, the law was found to be valid as falling within the geographical externality aspect of the external affairs power.
Chief Justice Mason reiterated the view his Honour had expressed in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case and said, at 528, that the scope of the external affairs power was not confined to Australia's relations with other States or the implementation of its treaty obligations; that it ought be construed with "all the generality that the words admit"; and ought be regarded as extending to matters and things as well as relationships outside Australia. His Honour specifically expressed agreement with the passage from the reasons of Jacobs J in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case set out above. Accordingly, Mason CJ did not consider it necessary to consider whether the law either gave effect to an obligation under international law; implemented a resolution of an international body; or facilitated the exercise of international jurisdiction under international law.
Justice Deane took a similarly broad view of the external affairs power, and on the same basis. His Honour said at 599: "The first thing to be stressed about s51(xxix) of the Constitution for the purposes of the present case is that its reference to 'External affairs' is unqualified. The paragraph does not refer to 'Australia's external affairs'. Nor does it limit the subject matter of the grant of power to external affairs which have some special connexion with Australia. The word 'external' means 'outside'. As a matter of language, it carries no implication beyond that of location. The word 'affairs' has a wide and indefinite meaning. It is appropriate to refer to relations, matters or things. Used without qualification or limitation, the phrase 'external affairs' is appropriate, in a constitutional grant of legislative power, to encompass both relationships and things: relationships with or between foreign States and foreign or international organizations or other entities; matters and things which are territorially external to Australia regardless of whether they have some identified connexion with Australia or whether they be the subject matter of international treaties, dealings, rights or obligations."
Justice Deane referred to the need for the external affairs power to be construed broadly by reason of Australia's status as a "fully independent sovereign State" (at 602). His Honour warned against the creation of a legislative lacuna (at 603), which would result from a narrow interpretation of the external affairs power.
Justice Dawson expressed agreement with the wide interpretation of the external affairs power as extending to all places, persons, matters or things geographically external to Australia (at 636 - 637). His Honour endorsed the approach to sovereignty taken by Mason CJ and Deane J and said at 638: "For although the sovereignty of the Australian nation is divided internally between the Commonwealth and the States, there is no division with respect to matters which lie outside Australia. There the sovereignty of the nation is the sovereignty of the Commonwealth . . . Indeed, any limitation upon the power of the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to matters outside the country would leave a gap in the totality of legislative power which the Constitution bestows upon the Commonwealth and the States. An interpretation of the Constitution which denies the completeness of Australian legislative power is unacceptable in terms of constitutional theory and practice. Apart from express or implied constitutional prohibitions or limitations, it is not to be contemplated that there are laws which no Parliament has the power to pass: [citations omitted.]"
Justice Gaudron's reasons were to like effect (see especially 695-696), as were those of McHugh J (at 712 - 717).
In addition I note what McHugh J said at 716 - 717, which is of particular relevance to the present case: "In my opinion, the external affairs power extends to conduct engaged in in Australia for the purpose of carrying out some object external to Australia. Thus, a law which prohibits persons from doing any act or thing in Australia with intent to overthrow by force or violence a foreign government is a law with respect to external affairs: cf. s24AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Similarly, the external affairs power would support a law which prohibits persons from preparing in Australia for an incursion into a foreign State for the purpose of engaging in hostile activities: cf. s7 of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth). Although the acts which ss 6(1), 7 and 9(1) of the Act penalize were acts occurring within Australia, they were acts which were committed in the course of or for the purpose of events occurring outside Australia. Consequently, ss 6(1), 7 and 9(1), which punish such acts, were validly enacted under the external affairs power."
The plaintiff accepted that if I followed this dictum, I would dismiss the motion to quash the indictment as well as the summons.
Although Brennan J dissented and held that the external affairs power did not support the law, his Honour referred to the reasons of Stephen J in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen which explained why matters of international concern fell within the external affairs power. Nonetheless, his Honour considered that the expression "international concern" ought not be interpreted broadly and said, at 561, that there may be few occasions when the external affairs power is enlivened on the basis of an "international concern" without a corresponding obligation in international law.
In summary, Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth established a broad interpretation of the geographical externality aspect of the external affairs power, in that a majority of judges held that it ought be construed to authorise laws with respect to matters external to Australia.

[23]

The Industrial Relations Act Case (1996)

In the Industrial Relations Act Case the High Court considered a challenge to the validity of a law which affected a domestic subject matter, industrial law. The Commonwealth argued that its legislative power derived from obligations it had undertaken by treaty. Although the concept of proportionality was raised, it was not regarded as being particularly helpful in the context of a decision whether a law ought be characterised as being one with respect to external affairs (487-488).
The majority also expressly agreed with what Dawson J said in Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261 at 326. Justice Dawson there explained that the external affairs power is not a purposive power and that the implementation of treaties falls within the power because it is a subject matter covered by "external affairs". His Honour continued: "And the purpose of legislation which purports to implement a treaty is considered not to see whether it answers a requirement of purpose to be found in the head of power itself, but to see whether the legislation operates in fulfilment of the treaty and thus upon a subject which is an aspect of external affairs."
The plaintiff in the present case placed particular reliance on the following passage from the reasons of the majority at 487 (which immediately followed the extract from Richardson v Forestry Commission) in support of his proposition that the proportionality principle applied to the external relations and international concern aspects, as well as to the treaty aspect of the external affairs power: "In this context, purpose is not something found in the head of power. Rather, it is a test for determining whether the law in question is reasonably capable of being considered as giving effect to the treaty and therefore as being a law upon a subject which is an aspect of external affairs."
I note for completeness that in Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Adelaide City Corporation [2013] HCA 3; 249 CLR 1 at [56], French CJ referred to this test as being "a high threshold test".
The majority also considered that a law can be a valid exercise of the external affairs power, even if it only partially implements treaty obligations, and said at 489: "Deficiency in implementation of a supporting Convention is not necessarily fatal to the validity of a law; but a law will be held invalid if the deficiency is so substantial as to deny the law the character of a measure implementing the Convention or it is a deficiency which, when coupled with other provisions of the law, make it substantially inconsistent with the Convention."
The majority, at 483, expressly approved the dicta of Evatt and McTiernan JJ in The King v Burgess; ex parte Henry at 687, which is set out above, in which their Honours considered that the carrying out of recommendations of international agencies "may well" fall within the external affairs power.

[24]

XYZ v The Commonwealth (2006)

In XYZ v The Commonwealth [2006] HCA 25; 227 CLR 532 a challenge was made to provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which prohibited a person, while outside Australia, from engaging in sexual intercourse (s 50BA), or committing an act of indecency (s 50BC), with a person under the age of sixteen. Section 50AD applied only to persons who were, at the time of the offence, Australian citizens or residents. It is another example of a law that was found to be valid on the basis of the geographical externality aspect of the external affairs power, although it was also found to be a matter of international concern that might affect Australia's relations with other States.
The High Court, by majority, held the provisions to be valid under the external affairs power. Chief Justice Gleeson, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ expressly followed Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth and held that, as the external affairs power supported a law with respect to places, matters or things outside the geographical limits of Australia, the provisions were valid on that basis. At [18], Gleeson CJ described this aspect of the external affairs power as the one "that allows the Australian body politic to exercise the plenitude of power which flows from nationhood and independence."
Justice Kirby (at [124]) considered that so many matters had become "of international concern" that it was not a useful concept because of its potential to destroy federal arrangements. His Honour based his decision that the law was within power on the narrower basis (established by the constitutional fact material) that the subject matter of the provisions was relevant to Australia's external relations with other States through their collective participation in the international organisations concerned, as appears from his Honour's conclusion at [138]: "The participation of many nation states in the activities of such international organisations reinforces the conclusion already reached that the subject of the law is one with respect to the relations of the Commonwealth with nation states other than Australia and thus within s 51(xxix) of the Constitution."
Justice Kirby also treated an argument put by XYZ as concerning proportionality, although it was not put in those terms (see [140] - [147]). Although his Honour's reasons could be read as supporting a requirement of proportionality with respect to the external relations aspect of the external affairs power, I do not regard this as the appropriate reading. It would, in any event, be at odds with the weight of authority which is, for the reasons addressed elsewhere, that there is no such requirement with respect to the external relations aspect of the external affairs power.
The minority view of Callinan and Heydon JJ was that what their Honours referred to as the "geographic externality view", reflected in the judgments of Jacobs and Mason JJ in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case, which were followed and accepted by the majority in Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth, ought be rejected. Justices Callinan and Heydon considered that Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth should be overruled to the extent to which the geographic externality view was a necessary step in its reasoning.
Their Honours also expressed substantial reservations about the utility of "external relations" and "international concern" in the determination of validity under the external affairs power. As to "external relations", Callinan and Heydon JJ at [209] regarded it as questionable whether statements by the executive, that the sexual abuse of children by Australian men in Asia both brought Australia into disrepute and affected our external relations, could establish a "factual condition precedent to a constitutional power to legislate". As to "international concern", their Honours said at [218]: "This volatility, and the elusiveness connected with attempts to define 'international concern', strongly suggest that the international concern doctrine does not exist; for if it did, it would operate antithetically to the rule of law."
Justice Heydon reiterated his reservations about these aspects of the external affairs power in Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 23; 238 CLR 1 at [469] - [474].

[26]

Thomas v Mowbray (2007)

The ambit of the external affairs power was also considered by Gleeson CJ and Gummow and Crennan JJ in Thomas v Mowbray in the context of a challenge to the validity of s 104.4 of the Criminal Code which empowered judicial officers (including Federal magistrates) to impose control orders, including interim control orders, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act. The expression "terrorist act" was relevantly defined to include an action or threat of action with the intention of "advancing a political, religious or ideological cause" and an intention either of "coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country" or part thereof; or "intimidating the public or a section of the public" which includes a reference to the public of a country other than Australia. The court's power to make an interim control order required that the court be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that: 1. making the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or that the person has provided training to, or received training from, a listed terrorist organisation; and 2. each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act.
Chief Justice Gleeson held that the existence of these two criteria meant that the law was supported by the defence power supplemented, where necessary, by the external affairs power. Justices Gummow and Crennan said at [151]: "The pursuit and advancement of comity with foreign governments and the preservation of the integrity of foreign states may be a subject matter of a law with respect to external affairs. In XYZ v Commonwealth, Gleeson CJ noted (with evident approval) that it was accepted that the external affairs power at least includes power to make laws in respect to matters affecting Australia's relations with other countries. The commission of "terrorist acts" in the sense defined in s 100.1 of the Code is now, even if it has not been in the past, one of these matters."
The conclusion that the law was within the external affairs power was arrived at notwithstanding that the conduct that was affected by the control order was, largely, if not wholly, conduct within Australia. At [152], their Honours cited with approval Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3 at 50 where the Supreme Court of Canada described terrorism as a "worldwide phenomenon" in respect of which "preventative or precautionary state action may be justified".
Justices Gummow and Crennan concluded that the law was authorised by the external affairs power and said at [153], after referring to the passage from the Industrial Relations Act Case which expressly adopted the geographical externality aspect of the power: "The legislative scheme in Div 104 of the Code for prevention through the interim control order system of 'terrorist acts' done or threatened with the intention of coercing or influencing by intimidation the government of a foreign country or part thereof or intimidating the public or a section of the public of a foreign country is a law with respect to a 'matter or thing' which lies outside the geographical limits of Australia. The 'matter or thing' is the apprehended intimidation or injury to the government or public of a foreign country."
I do not accept the plaintiff's contention (which, in my view, involved a degree of sophistry) that this statement in Thomas v Mowbray ought be regarded as referring to the incidental power rather than the external affairs power. In my view a fair reading of the reasons of Gummow and Crennan JJ indicates that their Honours were there addressing the ambit of the external affairs power without regard to the incidental power.
The plaintiff accepted that if the dicta of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ were followed, the motion and summons would be dismissed.
The other members of the majority (Callinan and Heydon JJ) did not need to address the external affairs power as they considered the legislation to be valid under the defence power.

[29]

The practical and legal operation of s 7(1)(e)

Notwithstanding the plaintiff's acceptance of the validity of s 6(1)(a), he contended that s 7(1)(e) could not be characterised as a law with respect to external affairs, at least in so far as it purported to proscribe the performance of services in Australia with the intention of supporting or promoting the commission of an offence against s 6(1)(a) read with s 6(3)(aa).
As referred to above, whether s 7(1)(e) can be characterised as a law with respect to external affairs requires a consideration of the practical effect and legal operation of the law: Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth.
The plaintiff placed considerable emphasis, both on what the Crown is required to prove to establish an offence under s 7(1)(e) based on s 6(1)(a) read with s 6(3)(aa), and what is not required to be proved.
For present purposes, s 7(1)(e) criminalises the giving of money or the performance of services by Australian nationals or residents to other persons with the intention of supporting an incursion into a foreign State with the intention of engaging in hostile activities there. In order to prove the commission of an offence against s 7(1)(e), the Crown must establish: 1. That, at the time the services were allegedly performed, the accused was either in Australia (or had been before the performance of the services for a purpose connected with such performance), or was an Australian citizen or ordinarily resident in Australia; and 2. That the accused, relevantly, performed services for another person with the intention of supporting or promoting the commission of an offence against s 6 (which includes, for reasons given above, attempt, incitement and conspiracy to commit the principal offence under s 6).
There was an issue as to the intention that was required to be proved as the fault element of the offence. The plaintiff contended that there were two mental elements required: the intention to give money or perform services; and the intention to support or promote an offence against s 6. The Commonwealth contended that there is only one intention required to be proved: namely that of "supporting or promoting the commission of an offence against s 6". The precise directions to be given to a jury in the trial of an accused charged with an offence against s 7(1)(e) are a matter for another day. Whether the intention is regarded as single, dual or multiple, proof of an offence under s 7(1)(e) requires proof of criteria which link the act of giving money or performing services with a foreign incursion for the purposes of engaging in hostile activities there.
In my view, the fault element required is the single, albeit compound, intention required by s 7(1)(e). I note that this accords with the view expressed by Lasry J (with reference to a charge under s 7(1)(a) of the Act) in R v Mohamed (Ruling No. 1) [2015] VSC 290R. Despite the length of the debate in oral and in writing, I understood the plaintiff's ultimate submission to be that the characterisation of the law was neither determined, nor substantially affected, by the resolution of this question.
I accept the plaintiff's submission that the following matters cannot provide the requisite "external" element to support the validity of s 7(1)(e) since the Crown need not establish any of these matters to prove that a putative offender has committed an offence under s 7(1)(e): 1. That any person for whom the accused performed services, or who benefited from the accused's performance of services, actually entered a foreign State with intent to engage in a hostile activity; 2. That the persons for whom the accused is alleged to have performed services themselves intended to enter into the foreign State; 3. That any physical event outside Australia actually occurred as a result of the alleged performance of services; 4. That the intended hostile activities in support of which the services were performed would be likely to have any particular consequences such as, for example, to advance either the interests of a foreign government, Australia's foreign relations or the defence of the Commonwealth; 5. That entry into the foreign State was imminent or likely or that the putative offender's intention was likely to result in an entry into a foreign State for the specified purpose; 6. That the putative offender knew the essential elements of the hostile activities said to be intended in the foreign State; 7. That the persons to whom the putative offender is alleged to have performed services were themselves Australian citizens or residents (and therefore irrespective of whether those persons could be found guilty of an offence under s 6(1)(a), having regard to s 6(2)); or 8. That any of the requirements for derivative offences such as attempt, conspiracy or incitement were met.

[30]

Whether there is a requirement of proportionality

Proportionality, in the present context, gives rise to the question whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to the particular end or purpose. As referred to above, whether proportionality is relevant to characterisation in the context of the external affairs power was a substantial issue between the parties. Accordingly, I propose to address it before turning to the submissions on the various aspects of the external affairs power.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's submissions to the contrary, I do not discern any support in the authorities to which reference has been made above that any aspect of the external affairs power, other than the treaty aspect, are to be qualified by the principle of proportionality. Although proportionality is regarded as relevant to a purposive power, such as defence, it is not relevant to powers with respect to subject matters such as external affairs and aliens. The following extract from the reasons of Dawson J in Leask v The Commonwealth at 602 - 603 summarises the law: "To introduce the concept of proportionality, whether it be via the notion that a law must be reasonably appropriate and adapted to some end in view or by any other route, is to introduce a concept which is alien to the principles which this court has hitherto applied in determining the validity of laws passed by the Commonwealth Parliament. . . . the test remains one of sufficient connection. If that connection is established, it matters not how ill-adapted, inappropriate or disproportionate a law is or may be thought to be."
Unlike the environmental legislation considered in the Tasmanian Dams Case or the industrial legislation considered in the Industrial Relations Act Case, s 7(1)(e) is not concerned with a matter which has an "external" element solely because the Commonwealth has entered into a treaty in respect of it. Accordingly, "proportionality", which has limited application in the context addressed in the passage cited above from the Industrial Relations Act Case, is of no relevance for present purposes, except to the extent to which the Commonwealth relied on implementation of recommendations of international agencies as an aspect of the external affairs power (the treaty aspect not being engaged in the present case). I do not accept the plaintiff's reading of the reasons of the majority at 487 of the Industrial Relations Case.
It follows from this conclusion that several of the arguments made by the plaintiff must be rejected since they depended on the relevance of proportionality.
First, it is not necessary that I be persuaded that s 7(1)(e) is in fact appropriate and adapted to a particular purpose or object, since it is for Parliament and not the courts, to judge the means by which it proscribes the engagement in armed hostilities in foreign States, and the preparatory steps thereto. That Parliament has chosen a means of criminalising conduct which does not rest on orthodox notions of accessorial liability such as aiding and abetting, or conspiring in the commission of, the principal offence, is not to the point (and would not be determinative even if proportionality were relevant: see Tajjour v New South Wales [2014] HCA 35; 88 ALJR 860 at [81] per Hayne J).
Secondly, the plaintiff's argument that, in so far as Parliament's concern is recruitment, it has addressed that topic in ss 8 and 9 also falls away. Any lack of correspondence between the conditions for making a declaration under s 9(2) and those relating to the elements of an offence under s 6 becomes irrelevant when it is appreciated that proportionality does not apply.
Thirdly, the plaintiff's contention that there is no "need" to give the Commonwealth power to regulate conduct within the territory of Australia because the Australian States have plenary power to do so, would only have relevance if the principle of proportionality applied. The reserved powers doctrine (according to which the ambit of the legislative power of Australian States was relevant to whether a Commonwealth law could be characterised as one with respect to one of the enumerated heads of Commonwealth power), which was rejected almost a century ago in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 (Engineers Case), made the extent of the power of the Australian States otherwise irrelevant to the question whether a law could be characterised as being one with respect to a head of Commonwealth power.
I turn now to consider the four aspects of the external affairs power on which the Commonwealth relies to support the characterisation of s 7(1)(e) as a law with respect to external affairs: external relations; geographical externality; international concern; and recommendations of international agencies.

[31]

Whether s 7(1)(e) is authorised by the external relations aspect of the external affairs power

The authorities referred to above establish that a law that regulates conduct that takes place wholly within Australia can become an external affair if it has the potential to affect Australia's external relations: The King v Sharkey and Thomas v Mowbray. For the reasons given, neither the assessment of purpose nor the requirement of proportionality has any role in the task of characterising a law as being one with respect to external affairs on the basis of the external relations aspect. A matter that concerns Australia's relations with other States is also within this aspect of the power even if it concerns a matter that could have been, but was not, the subject of a treaty (such as extradition, as in Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth).
The authorities considered above provide no basis for limiting the external relations aspect of the external affairs power to those hostile activities which might have the effect of damaging Australia's relationship with the foreign State in respect of which the incursion is contemplated. The selection of friends or foes among the nation States of the world (or the classification of one for one purpose and another for a different purpose) is not a matter for the courts. The power is one with respect to "external affairs" and not one with respect to "the advancement of Australia's relations with particular foreign States".
I reject the plaintiff's submission that, before I could characterise s 7(1)(e) of the Act as being a law with respect to the external relations aspect of the external affairs power, I would need to be satisfied by evidence that the law would have an actual effect on external relations. This is not what Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v The State of New South Wales [No. 2] (1955) 93 CLR 127 at 165 requires. The passage relied upon referred to the dicta of Williams J in Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth at 222 in the context of the defence power, in respect of which different considerations apply because it is a purposive power which expands and contracts by reference to external circumstances in respect of which constitutional fact evidence is generally required. There is no support in the authorities for the proposition for which the plaintiff contended that constitutional validity under the external affairs power depends on "discernible advancement" of Australia's relations with other States: see Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (5th ed 2008, The Federation Press) at 399. The difficulties likely to be associated with a court's making such an assessment is a further (but not the principal) reason for not importing such a qualification into the external affairs power.
I regard the tolerance or acquiescence by a State of actions on its territory for the purpose of supporting foreign incursions, as being inimical to its relationship with other States generally, in the same way as tolerance or acquiescence of the publication of seditious words that tend to incite violence and disaffection against foreign States was found to be in Sharkey. The prohibition (and criminalisation) of such actions under the domestic law (or the failure to do so) has the potential to affect Australia's external relations. By criminalising preparatory acts, s 7(1)(e) is, on its face, intended, and designed, to support the principle of the sovereignty and equality of States as well as the principle of non-intervention. These matters concern Australia's role as a member of the "family of nations" and thus provide a sufficient connection to the external relations aspect of the external affairs power, without the need to have regard to the constitutional fact evidence.
The potential of a law such as s 7(1)(e) to affect Australia's external relations is, however, further demonstrated by the constitutional fact evidence, the effect of which is considered below.

[32]

The effect of the constitutional fact evidence

The constitutional fact evidence established that the duties of States, not to acquiesce in conduct by persons within their own territories that was designed to lead to armed hostilities in other States, was a subject of several UN resolutions prior to the date of royal assent of the Act. The resolutions imposed obligations on States not only with respect to specific conflicts but also, in the case of the Friendly Relations Declaration, generally. Although some of the resolutions referred exclusively to mercenaries, the Friendly Relations Declaration did not distinguish between mercenaries (the convention definition of which would neither include the plaintiff nor the persons for whom he is alleged to have performed services), on the one hand, and the broader genus of foreign fighters (motivated by religion, culture, ideology or some other reason), on the other. The terms of the declaration and its purpose are inconsistent with any such distinction.
Because the matters addressed in the Friendly Relations Declaration were expressed to derive from such fundamental tenets of customary international law as the equality of States and the principle of non-intervention, I regard the prohibition on a State tolerating "subversive, terrorist or armed activities" which "interfere in civil strife in another State" as being a matter not just of international concern (as to which see further below), but also one that affects one State's (and relevantly, Australia's) external relations with other States generally, irrespective of military, political or cultural alliances between particular States.
The material relied upon, including the Friendly Relations Declaration and Oppenheim's commentary, establishes that States are under a duty, in order to comply with UN resolutions, to take steps to criminalise the activities of those within their territory who seek to assist foreign fighters to engage in hostile activities within the territories of foreign States. The Act, including s 7(1)(e), is intended to deter and prevent such activities.
The plaintiff sought to distinguish Sharkey on the ground that the definition of seditious intent in s 24A(c) of the Crimes Act pertained to conduct which might affect a foreign Government (and therefore Australia's relationship with same). The plaintiff submitted that, while Sharkey might support the constitutionality of s 7(1)(e) in so far as it relied on s 6(1)(a) and s 6(3)(a), (c) and (d), it did not support an offence based on s 6(3)(aa). The plaintiff contended that, because an offence based on the definition of s 6(3)(aa) did not require any particular objective at all beyond engaging in hostile activities in the foreign State, it could not be concluded that the conduct would be significant to the interests of the foreign government or, indeed, have any effect whatsoever on external relations.
I accept that there is a distinction between s 6(3)(aa) on the one hand, and s 6(3)(a), (c) and (d) on the other, in that s6(3)(aa) criminalises conduct irrespective of whether it has any discernible effect on the government of the foreign State, whereas s 6(3)(a), (c) and (d) are expressed to criminalise conduct on the basis of such an effect. Section 6(3)(b) is in a different category (which may overlap with s 6(3)(aa)) in that it criminalises conduct which has the objective of causing by force or violence the public of the foreign State to be in fear of death or injury.
I am not, however, persuaded of the materiality of the distinction for present purposes. Although matters directly affecting the government of a foreign State can be seen to fall squarely within the external relations aspect of the external affairs power, it does not follow that matters which do not necessarily directly affect the government of a foreign State do not.
In my view, matters such as: whether the foreign State is friend or foe of the State whose citizens or residents are supporting such forays; and whether the hostilities in the foreign State directly involve the government of such State or are confined to hostilities between non-governmental groups, are immaterial to the vice which the imposition of such obligations is designed to address: foreign support of armed hostilities within a State outside the auspices of the UN or agreement between the governments of the respective States. This is a matter which I regard as engaging the external relations aspect of the external affairs power since it has the potential to affect Australia's external relations. For this reason, there is no basis to distinguish the criminalisation of actions intended to be preparatory to entry into a foreign State for the purposes of engaging in hostile activities (s 7(1)(e), coupled with s 6(3)(aa)), from the criminalisation of words intended to incite disaffection with the governments of foreign States which was found to be within power in Sharkey.
Even if the test as formulated by the plaintiff - that the law "discernibly pursues the conduct of foreign relations" - were (contrary to my view of the authorities) the correct test, I am persuaded that s 7(1)(e) satisfies it for the reasons given above.
The High Court in Sharkey held that s 24A(c), coupled with s 24D, of the Crimes Act was a valid exercise of the external affairs power although it applied to acts that occurred wholly within Australia and criminalised acts which, if not deterred or prohibited, had the potential to affect Australia's external relations. In my view, the decision in Sharkey requires the conclusion that s 7(1)(e) is a valid exercise of the external affairs power.

[33]

Whether s 7(1)(e) is authorised by the geographical externality aspect of the external affairs power

An element of the offence is that the person giving the money or performing the services must intend thereby to support entry into a foreign State which is, in turn, intended to involve hostile activities on the part of the recipient of the goods or services or an associate of the recipient. The "external affair", or matter outside Australia, is the entry on the territory of the foreign State in respect of which activity with the proscribed intention is contemplated.
The plaintiff's submissions on this aspect of the external affairs power were twofold.
First, the plaintiff contended that an offence against s 7(1)(e), particularly when coupled with s 6(3)(aa), is "largely an offence of intention". He argued that since a person's state of mind is "imperceptible, intangible and (in many cases) unknowable", the validity of the law cannot depend on intention because that would involve an unacceptably uncertain criterion of power.
Secondly, the plaintiff contended that the only aspect of s 7(1)(e) of the Act that was "external" was the putative offender's state of mind, which was insufficient to make it a law with respect to external affairs. He argued that the requirement for an external place, matter or thing outside the geographical limits of Australia was satisfied only by tangibles and could therefore not be satisfied by intention. He submitted that an offence against s 7(1)(e) had no greater externality than would an offence of jaywalking while daydreaming of overseas holidays.
The first submission disregards a fundamental principle of criminal law. Generally, a person's state of mind needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt before an accused can be found guilty of an offence. The maxim actus no facit reum nisi mens sit rea (the deed does not make a man guilty unless his mind be guilty) is well established and forms the basis for the presumption that mens rea (mental element) is an essential ingredient of every offence: Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 149 per Reid LJ. In addressing the proof of intent, Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 2 (1979) said at [242]: "General principle. The state of mind which accompanies an act is often of legal consequence as forming an ingredient necessary for the attachment of certain consequences. (1) Criminal intent. The state of mind accompanying a forbidden act is frequently an element material to make the act a crime."
A person's state of mind is generally assessed by reference both to the person's acts and statements, including admissions and communications with third parties. The present case is no exception in circumstances where the Crown case includes tape recordings and transcriptions of what passed between the plaintiff and others in intercepted communications.
As to the second submission, I can discern no basis in the authorities for limiting the geographical externality aspect of the external affairs power to tangibles. Indeed, I regard this submission as foreclosed by the dicta of Gummow and Crennan JJ in Thomas v Mowbray at [153] that the relevant external "matter or thing" was "apprehended intimidation or injury to the government or public of a foreign country".
An offence against s 7(1)(e) is committed if the act of performing the services is done with the objective of supporting an offence against s 6. Thus, although the act might be done wholly within Australia, the associated mental element has an external purpose. The connection with the external purpose is, in my view, neither "remote", nor "fortuitous", nor "insubstantial". By contrast, any connection, in the postulated example, between the act of jaywalking and the exotic reveries of the putative offender at the time could only be regarded as fortuitous.
Nor is it an answer to say that, where the external component on which the law depends for its validity is intention, and the person with the relevant intention is located in Australia, the law cannot be a law with respect to external affairs. Such a proposition is inconsistent with The King v Sharkey. As long as the mental element of the offence, as here, requires a connection with an external matter (providing services with the intention of supporting entry into a foreign State with the intention of engaging in hostile activity there), it does not matter that the putative offender is, at all material times, in Australia or that the services were performed wholly in Australia. Nor does what the plaintiff described as the lack of "real world effect" deprive the prophylactic measures incorporated in s 7(1)(e) of their character as a law with respect to external affairs.
In my view, s 7(1)(e) of the Act is a law with respect to external affairs, in the sense in which that term has been authoritatively understood: namely, to extend to a matter outside Australia. Neither this analysis nor this conclusion requires regard to be had to the constitutional fact evidence.

R v Alqudsi; Alqudsi v Commonwealth of Australia

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