"In the event that my death is unnatural, my direct the investigation to my husband Mark Caleo & Rick Damelian of Rick Damelian Used Cars, P'matta."
- The Crown contended that this representation was admissible pursuant to s 65(2)(c) "through the intended recipient of the representation, Mr Morrissey, who 'otherwise perceived the representation being made' namely, by reading it from the letter, the representation having been made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable": FCWS [9].
- On its face, this would appear to suggest that the evidence of Ms Caleo's representation would be given by way of Mr Morrissey giving evidence of what he read in the letter. Quite clearly that would not be first-hand hearsay. I will proceed on the assumption that the Crown intends to tender the letter itself.
- The Crown submitted that the representation was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that it is reliable (s 65(2)(c)) because it was made on the day Ms Caleo was removing Mr Caleo as a beneficiary in her will and anticipating her unnatural death. It was said to be akin to a "dying declaration" under the common law; unlikely to be the product of fabrication: FCWS [8].
- In contending for admissibility pursuant to s 65, aside from submissions as to the reliability of the representation, the Crown did not submit what fact this representation asserted. In my view, it is incapable of proving the existence of a fact simply because it cannot reasonably be supposed that Ms Caleo intended to assert a fact (aside from asserting something as to her state of mind, perhaps concern that her husband may bring about her unnatural death).
- The hearsay rule in s 59 does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact: s 60. However, the Crown did not contend for admissibility under this provision.
- The Crown submitted that this representation would also be admissible pursuant to s 66A as a representation about Ms Caleo's feelings (of fear for her life) and knowledge (that her anticipated murder was arranged by her husband). Reference was made to R v Clark at [160]-[172].
- The Crown also submitted that it was pertinent that there is evidence that Ms Caleo said to Angela Cheah in early May 1990 that she had said to the accused Caleo, "If you are not happy, get someone to shoot me" and then observed to Ms Cheah, "Mark is capable of this".
- Mr Brady submitted that this representation was not relevant (s 55) in relation to the first murder but may be relevant to the second. However, in either case, it was not a representation about any of the six matters listed in s 66A pertaining to Ms Caleo: FAWS [21]-[22].
- This representation may be taken as a concern by Ms Caleo that her husband might bring about her death. It may be regarded as a representation about her state of mind. It is potentially admissible under s 66A but not s 65(2)(c).
- However, the other evidence available to the Crown will not enable the jury to assess at all whether there was a legitimate and rational foundation for such fear. It might be otherwise if, for example, there was evidence of prior violence initiated by Mr Caleo or the threat of same (as was the case in R v Clark). Ms Caleo's next representation as to her belief that her husband (in some unspecified way) caused the death of her brother might be seen as the foundation. But there is nothing by way of admissible evidence to enable the jury to assess whether there is a legitimate and rational foundation for that assertion either (see below).
- The evidence of Ms Cheah that Ms Caleo said to her husband, "If you are not happy, get someone to shoot me" and that she told Ms Cheah that "Mark is capable of this" does not support admissibility. It may derive from a belief that her husband caused the shooting of her brother, but again there is nothing by way of admissible evidence to indicate a legitimate, logical and rational basis for her having such a belief.
- There is a real danger that the jury could give this evidence more weight than it deserves. The only direction that could be given to overcome this would be to the effect that there is no way of knowing whether there was a proper basis for Ms Caleo to hold this belief and accordingly it should be put aside. This representation must be excluded pursuant to s 137.