1 HIS HONOUR: On 14 February 2007 Rabih Abdulrahman ("the offender) pleaded guilty upon the presentation of an indictment charging him with an offence under s 347 of the Crimes Act of accessory after the fact. The maximum penalty provided for this category of offence under s 350 of the Crimes Act is imprisonment for five years. This maximum is to be contrasted with the statutory maximum for accessory after the fact to murder, as to which s 349 provides for a maximum penalty of twenty-five years imprisonment.
2 Pursuant to the same indictment, Ali Diab was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, the manslaughter of Wasiem Amer on 15 May 2005. The assistance which this offender, Rabih Abdulrahman, gave to Ali Diab after the slaying of the deceased and up to 7 June 2005, constituted the foundation of the offence charged against the offender, Rabih Abdulrahman.
3 The Crown presented a statement of facts, to which I shall refer in summarising the objective circumstances of the offence charged against the offender.
4 In May 2005 the offender and Ali Diab were engaged in the illegal activity of supplying drugs. So, too, was the deceased, and there was tension between the deceased on the one hand and the offender and Ali Diab on the other hand arising from competition over their respective illegal enterprises. In the week leading up to the death of Wasiem Amer the offender and Ali Diab were staying at premises consisting of a one bedroom unit at Bexley where B lived. B had been in an earlier relationship with the offender.
5 On the evening of 15 May 2005 the deceased was at those premises at Bexley and was lying on the bed in the bedroom there. When he came to that unit, the deceased informed B that he wanted to stay at that unit and to use it for keeping drugs. He asked B to go and collect Ali Diab. Ali Diab did not respond immediately but he did so later, presenting himself with his brother and other companions. Ali Diab stood behind his brother in the bedroom near the doorway and there was an argument involving the deceased, Ali Diab and his brother. After the argument had proceeded for some three or four minutes, the deceased drew a handgun and thereupon Ali Diab used a weapon in his possession to fire five shots at the deceased who died from wounds inflicted in the shooting.
6 Ali Diab and the offender left the premises after the shooting and stayed for a number of days in premises at Glebe. The offender contacted B, telling her to go to a motel in Artarmon, where, on her arrival, the offender was found to be staying with Ali Diab. At that time Ali Diab still had the weapon used in the shooting in his possession. On the following day, the offender and Ali Diab took B to Newcastle. She was required to remain there with the offender and Ali Diab for three days. Ali Diab and the offender then brought her back to Sydney to a unit at Villawood where B was kept for a further two days. The offender did not try to prevent B from leaving that unit when she succeeded in doing so at a time when Ali Diab was in the shower.
7 It was between 30 May 2005 and 2 June 2005 that police, acting pursuant to a listening device warrant, recorded conversations between the offender and his family at a time when the offender was in hospital being treated for wounds received in an unrelated incident. The offender was heard to tell his mother on three occasions that Ali Diab shot the deceased.
8 In the statement of facts the following agreement was recorded as to the basis upon which the offender, Rabih Abdulrahman, is to be sentenced as an accessory after the fact to manslaughter. That basis is as follows:
"That he knew the offence had been committed by…Ali Diab because he was present in the unit at that time and that thereafter he assisted…Ali Diab. The particulars of this assistance are that after…Ali Diab had committed the offence, [this offender] instructed [B] to come to Artarmon where he and Ali Diab were staying in a motel. [This offender] paid her cab fare and remained with her and…Ali Diab in Artarmon, Newcastle and Villawood at a time when he knew that…Ali Diab required B to remain with them. [This offender] assisted…Ali Diab knowing that Ali Diab's intention was to hinder his [Diab's] apprehension, trial and punishment and intending to assist him in that regard."
9 The offence charged against the offender, viewed objectively, is a serious offence. The offender provided Ali Diab with assistance to hinder his apprehension knowing what Ali Diab had done. That said, however, Mr Button of Senior Counsel was correct to draw attention to the difference in the maximum penalties provided in s 349 for accessory after the fact to murder and in s 350 in relation to accessory after the fact to manslaughter. Section 349 provides for a maximum penalty of twenty-five years imprisonment and s 350 provides only for a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. In my opinion the maximum penalty provided by the Crimes Act for this type of offence pays insufficient regard to the gravity of accessorial involvement in the taking of a human life. I consider the maximum penalty warrants review by the legislature. However, I must sentence the offender in accordance with the statute as it presently stands.
10 Whilst addressing the statutory regime, it is to be observed that there is no standard non parole period for accessory after the fact to manslaughter. Nor, indeed, does Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 make provision for a standard non parole period for the crime of manslaughter. This is unsurprising having regard to the extremely wide variety of circumstances in which that crime may be committed. As to observations in this regard, see R v Blacklidge (unreported, NSWCCA, 12 December 1995) and the judgment of Gleeson CJ, and also R v Forbes [2005] NSWCCA 377 and the judgment of Spigelman CJ at [133]-[136].
11 Mr Button asks me to take account of the history in this matter. The offender was arrested on 31 May 2005 and charged with the crime of murder. Some time prior to the committal hearing in 2006 a different charge was preferred, namely that of being an accessory after the fact to murder. On 22 June 2006 the offender was discharged on that charge and was committed for trial on a charge of concealing a serious indictable offence. However, thereafter an ex officio indictment charged the offender with being an accessory after the fact to murder and on 4 August 2006 he was arraigned before Bell J on that charge, when he pleaded not guilty. A trial date was later set for 12 February 2007. The trial was then adjourned for two days and on 14 February 2007 the offender pleaded guilty to the indictment then presented charging him with the offence for which he is now to be sentenced.
12 I take that history into account and it is of particular importance to note that the offender was in custody, bail refused, between 2 June 2005 and 7 July 2006, a period in excess of thirteen months.
13 Mr Button submitted that the offender is to be regarded as having pleaded guilty as soon as the opportunity to do so presented itself and he submitted that the plea had significant utilitarian effect, avoiding a trial of some days at least. He submitted that in the circumstances the plea should attract the maximum discount of twenty-five percent.
14 I do not accept that this case warrants a twenty-five percent discount. At the outset the offender denied being at the unit at the time of the shooting and the willingness to plead was not indicated in the early stages. Nevertheless, the utilitarian value of the plea that has been entered is to be given due recognition, and is to be reflected in my assessment by a discount of approximately fifteen percent on the sentence that would otherwise be attracted.
15 The offender was born on 11 May 1983. He was brought up in the Hurstville area and left school in year 11 at the age of sixteen. Prior to his arrest in relation to this matter, he abused drugs and alcohol. To the author of the pre sentence report (Exhibit B), he attributed his involvement in this matter to his associates and his alcohol and drug abuse. I note that the author of the report has written that the offender is eligible for and has been assessed as suitable for a periodic detention order. I also note that the offender has signed an undertaking as required by s 66(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2002.
16 The offender does have a criminal record. He has a drug conviction for possession, for which he was dealt with by a monetary penalty. The offender was also sentenced to a term of imprisonment for twelve months for demanding property with menaces but that sentence was suspended conditionally, a condition being that he submit to twelve months supervision by the New South Wales Probation and Parole Service. It is to be noted that the author of the pre sentence report before this Court has reported that the offender's conduct during the relevant twelve month period, which expired in 2003, was satisfactory.
17 Mr Button presented a number of references from family members who have commented upon the improvement in the offender's behaviour since he was admitted to bail in July 2006. Since being granted bail the offender has had employment as a freight delivery offsider and there is a reference from his employer, which is in favourable terms. The material produced by Mr Button and found in Exhibit 1 is favourable, and on the evidence produced I consider that the offender's prospects of rehabilitation are good.
18 There is a psychologist's report. Mr Watson-Munro is the author of that report prepared after an assessment on 13 April 2007. I do not propose to draw on that report in these sentencing remarks except to observe that Mr Watson-Munro considered that the offender's time in custody has had a salutary effect upon him, and this assessment is consistent with the other material in Exhibit 1.
19 I remind myself of the content of s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act and the purposes of sentencing there expressed. There is the need to ensure that the offender is adequately punished; there is the need for deterrence of this offender and others who might be tempted to commit similar offences; there is the need to denounce the conduct of the offender. These, and the other purposes of sentencing expressed in s 3A, require, and have been given, my attention.
20 I have also considered the provisions of s 21A of the statute.
21 There have been relatively few cases in which offenders have been sentenced for being an accessory after the fact to manslaughter in recent times: