1 This is an application for review of a reviewable decision made under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 ("the Act") refusing the applicant full access to a file created and held by the former Special Branch of the respondent and documents in other files created and held by that Branch relating to the applicant during the period from about 1972 to 1997, when that Branch was disbanded by the respondent.
2 The applicant made an application for access to the Special Branch file specifically relating to the applicant on about 6 April 1999 (exhibit 1, attachment A) under section 17 of the Act. Under section 16 of the Act, a person has a legally enforceable right to be given access to an agency's documents in accordance with the Act. On the face of the standard form application ("Form Four" as published by the respondent) the applicant applied for "his" Special Branch file. However, by way of a four-page attachment to his application dated 30 March 1999, he sought a significant number of other documents in addition to his own file.
3 Due to the apparent failure of the respondent to determine the applicant's freedom of information ("FOI") application within the time provided for in the Act (s 24 of the Act, 21 days) there occurred a deemed refusal of the applicant's FOI application (s 24(2)). The applicant then made an application for internal review in about May 2000. On 22 December 2000, the respondent's FOI officer, Inspector Robert Koopman, made his determination under the Act on the applicant's application (exhibit 1, attachment B). The officer decided to release a substantial proportion of the original file of the respondent relating to the applicant (referred to by the respondent as the applicant's "personal dossier") and to not release some whole pages and some passages and words or numbers on other pages. The applicant was thereby given an "expurgated" copy of his dossier. This decision is the reviewable decision before the Tribunal.
4 The applicant's personal dossier is a file of about 172 pages (in numbered folios). Unfortunately, the decision of Inspector Koopman did not, on its face, purport to determine the applicant's claim in relation to the other documents he sought in addition to his own personal dossier. At a planning meeting conducted by the Tribunal with the parties attending on 18 June 2001, it was revealed that the issue of the identification and claimed FOI status of the additional documents had been discussed by the parties, that the respondent's officers had identified about "four more boxes" of documents relevant to the applicant's FOI request and it was agreed by the parties that those documents and the reconsidered decision of the respondent's FOI officer (to release them in part and to claim exemptions for the remainder) were to be included as part of the decision under review before the Tribunal. The lengthy proceedings that followed were conducted on this basis.
5 At the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant appeared for himself and the respondent was represented by counsel instructed by an in-house solicitor of the respondent. On the first day of the hearing, 27 June 2001, the respondent's counsel tendered a number of boxes of documents as having been located and which were claimed by the respondent as exempt and which should not be released to the applicant. A further box of documents was produced and was released to the applicant at the hearing by the respondent's officers. As it transpired, during the course of the hearing, after the Tribunal was taken to each of the documents in some detail, numerous other documents from the disputed documents were released to the applicant by the respondent.
6 The Tribunal was informed that of the 172 page personal dossier of the applicant, about 121 partial or complete pages had been released to the applicant by the respondent's FOI officers. Of the other documents (which came from a variety of places and files within the former Special Branch), there were about 1,299 pages, of which about 332 partial or complete pages were released to the applicant. The remaining pages, passages and words are the disputed documents in these proceedings.
7 The initial FOI determination and the internal review decision relied on numerous exemptions set out in Schedule 1 of the Act. Ultimately, at the hearing, the respondent primarily relied on a number of exemptions based on a number of the clauses of Schedule 1, namely, documents affecting law enforcement and public safety (clause 4(1)(b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (h) and 4(3)(b), the personal affairs exemption (clause 6), the internal working document exemption (clause 9), the confidentiality exemption (clause 13), the operations of agencies exemption (clause 16), and, documents exempt under interstate FOI legislation (clause 21).
The Evidence
8 There were a number of affidavits, statements and a substantial amount of documentary evidence tendered during the course of the Tribunal hearing. I have set out as Attachment A to these reasons a brief description of those documents, each of which I have read. Those styled "confidential" were directed by the Tribunal to be, until further direction, confidential documents and not to be disclosed to any person other than the respondent or his officers and representatives or a Tribunal member properly constituted to hear the matter. At a number of points during the course of the hearings, and on the application of the respondent, the proceedings were conducted in the absence of the applicant and the public. It was in these sessions that the representative for the respondent read the confidential affidavits, adduced further evidence, made submissions and took the Tribunal through each of the disputed documents, one at a time. The transcripts of those confidential sessions were each the subject of a similar confidentiality order.
9 Notwithstanding that by operation of section 61 of the Act, the respondent bore the evidentiary burden of establishing that the original determination was justified, the applicant relied on a substantial volume of evidentiary material. Most of it went to the particular interest he asserted in the documents and the reasons he would like to have access to them. The respondent, in essence, accepted that much of the disputed material in fact related directly to the applicant and that the applicant was very interested in seeing it. However, the primary reason the applicant stated he wanted access to the documents was so that he could inspect the material with a view to using it in his proposed application to the Supreme Court of NSW under sections 474D & E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) with a view to, ultimately, causing an inquiry to be undertaken and his seeking to have a number of his past convictions overturned. He suggested his s474 application was at an advanced stage of preparation and he was waiting for the inclusion of the disputed material in order to complete and lodge it. He tendered a copy of his draft application (exhibit D, which is about 78 pages in length). In addition to wishing to see the disputed material for this purpose, the applicant also put to the Tribunal that he simply wished to see the material as he was curious to see what was in it, particularly as he considered it primarily related to his personal affairs.
10 In his detailed letter dated 30 March 1999 which accompanied the original FOI application, the applicant set out with some degree of specificity the nature of and categories of documents he sought in his FOI application that would assist him in relation to his s474D application. During the course of the hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant whether he could provide a more easily understood list of materials in respect of which he sought documents from the respondent agency. He provided such at the hearing on 10 July 2001 and it became exhibit M. I should say that during the course of the hearing the primary officer of the respondent who gave evidence on its behalf, Detective Senior Sergeant Trevor Bowen, indicated that he had looked for documents of the kind set out in the letter of 30 March 1999 and as described in exhibit M and he did not identify any documents or things that would fall within the terms or scope of what has been sought by the applicant that has not already been given to the applicant through the process of releasing documents to him under the FOI Act or in police briefs made available to him over the years in connection with his criminal proceedings. For my part, I can say that having read all of the disputed documents myself, it is not apparent to me that any of the documents fall within the material described in exhibit M as sought by the applicant or that any of them would assist his proposed Supreme Court application.
11 Having regard to the way in which I propose to determine the matter, I do not consider that it is necessary to set out for the purposes of these reasons for determination each of the matters in which the applicant has stated a particular desire to see the disputed documents. Each category of documents he seeks is plainly set out in the said exhibits he tendered and is identified and explained in very great length in his written submissions each filed with the Tribunal. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to indicate that he has sought significant material relating to four convictions that occurred in 1986, 1987, 1991, and, 1994. In addition to, or in relation to these convictions, the applicant also seeks material concerning certain, what he calls, informants or alleged informants and information in relation to certain former officers of the Special Branch whom he considers corrupt. Much of the evidence adduced by the applicant was in the context as set out in the third paragraph of his letter accompanying the original FOI application where he said:
"It is a matter of public record that I have had an acrimonious relationship with Special Branch going back to 1984. Thereafter, various criminal prosecutions were launched against me, in which that agency played both an open and a covert role. In particular, my relationship with the last Commander of Special Branch was venomous. I state this to indicate to your [FOI] Unit - and any other police officer who may become familiar with this FOI application - that the present application relates directly to overturning criminal convictions won against me by Special Branch. There is hence a proper public interest in any citizen labouring to overturn convictions set by illegal and/or improper conduct."
12 By way of background to the applicant's FOI application, it is significant to note that by media release dated 9 March 1999 (exhibit 9), the NSW Premier announced that, notwithstanding its exemption in clause 4(3)(b) of Schedule 1 the FOI Act, people were to be given access under the FOI Act to their "own files" from the disbanded Special Branch of the New South Wales Police Service as a matter of discretion under the Act (see the general discussion of this unit in Rittau -v- Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2000] NSWADT 186). The said press release did not promise unqualified access to a person's own files. It said, inter alia :
"Access under FOI ensures the privacy of those applying for their own files while protecting the identities of third parties such as informants who must remain anonymous for security reasons…"
13 According to the evidence of the respondent's Local Area Manager, Jodie Camden, which I accept, the Special Branch was disbanded in 1997 and the VIP Security Unit created in its place. This unit later became the Protective Security Group of the respondent's police service.
14 It is not seriously contested by the parties, and in any event, the respondent's evidence and my own reading of the disputed documents establishes, that the vast bulk of the subject documents are Special Branch documents within the meaning of section 4(3)(b) of the FOI Act which provides:
" Documents affecting law enforcement and public safety
(3) A document is an exempt document if it is a document that has been created by:
(a) the Information and Intelligence Centre of the Police Service or the former State Intelligence Group, or
(b) the Protective Security Group of the Police Service, the former Special Branch of the Police Service or the former Bureau of Criminal Intelligence."
15 Accordingly, the bulk of the documents are exempt documents pursuant to clause 4(3)(b). As that clause resides in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act they are also "restricted documents" within the definition of that expression in section 6 (1) of the FOI Act. The Tribunal has considered the issue of restricted documents in a number of cases including, Rittau -v- Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 186 at [39] to [42], Kennedy -v- Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 39. Ekermawi -v- Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 27 and Cerminara -v- Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 95. Restricted documents are in a special category in the scheme of exempted documents set out in the FOI Act as they are marked by Parliament as having particular sensitivity to government.
16 As to the very few disputed documents that are not documents properly said to be created by the Special Branch within the meaning of clause 4(3)(b), it is contended by the respondent that those documents are also restricted documents by way of the operation of other sub-paragraphs of clause 4, or, in the alternative, it is put they are each restricted or exempt documents within the meaning of other clauses of Schedule 1 identified earlier in these reasons.
17 The applicant adduced evidence from a number of witnesses and gave evidence himself.
18 The first witness for the applicant was his former wife, Jane Emma Quantrill. She affirmed an affidavit on behalf of the applicant (exhibit E). The essence of her evidence was that for a long period of time in the past (in 1989 and 1990), she considers she was an informant for the Special Branch in relation to, inter alia, certain activities of her former husband. She said that as the applicant regarded himself as a "political activist", he was then aware that he was a person of interest to the Special Branch. Part of Ms Quantrill's evidence was taken in closed session of the Tribunal, on the application of the respondent. I made certain orders directing that the transcript not be made public until further order of the Tribunal. On the basis of her evidence, the applicant sought to have any material relating to her contained in the disputed documents, if there is any such material, released to him.
19 Although there was a lot said or suggested by the respondent about the motives of Ms Quantrill in giving her evidence, for example, it was suggested that the applicant held something over her in order for her to present favourable evidence on his behalf, I accept her evidence. However, I do not consider that her evidence advanced the applicant's cause in any relevant or significant fashion. Merely because a person believes or asserts that person was an informant is normally, without more, an insufficient basis on which a police agency or a Tribunal standing in its shoes may then confirm or deny the person's assertions to be true. Confirmation of the identity and status of an informer by the police or the Tribunal is totally different to an assertion by a person that person is or was a police informer. The law places great weight on the continued protection of the identity of an informer in most cases (except where it is necessary to establish the innocence of an accused person at a criminal trial; see, eg, R v Abdullah [1999] NSWCCA 188). Accordingly, I do not accept her evidence assists the applicant in any substantial way.
20 The second witness for the applicant was Shane Watson Rosier, a witness in one of the four criminal prosecutions concerning the applicant. In his written (an appendix to exhibit A) and oral evidence, he gives factual evidence that seeks to support many of the factual matters asserted by the applicant.
21 Mr Rosier applied in 1999 for a copy of his own Special Branch file from the respondent under the FOI Act and a copy of his "voluminous" file was delivered to him by the respondent. He testified that he made the file available to the applicant (Ts, 29 June 2001, pg 39) and provided the applicant with copies of some of these documents, some of which the applicant has, in turn, tendered in these proceedings.
22 The applicant gave oral evidence in these proceedings, in addition to relying on his affidavit (exhibit A). He submitted himself to extensive cross-examination over several days.
23 The applicant has long been what he styles a "political activist" in Australia. He is a member of, and former chairman of an organization styled Australian National Action. He said it was registered as an Australian political party and he encourages other persons to sign on as members as well (Ts, 10 July 2001, pg 16) He describes himself as a "prolific" writer (ibid, page 15) and he publishes a substantial amount of "political" material he has written on the internet. Some of it was tendered to the Tribunal during the hearing.
24 The applicant gave evidence in cross-examination about other occasions on which he had attempted to obtain some of the very documents the subject of these proceedings by way of the issue of subpoenas to the respondent in NSW courts over many years. He was refused each time by decisions of those respective courts upholding the respondent's claim for public interest immunity or on the ground that there was no legitimate forensic purpose in providing access to the said documents (see, eg: R v Saleam [1999] NSWCCA 86; and Saleam v R (1989) 16 NSWLR 14).
25 In addition, the evidence of Detective Senior Sergeant Bowen for the respondent establishes that at least four earlier FOI applications had been made by the applicant seeking, in part, some of the documents now sought in the original FOI application before the Tribunal (exhibit 5). Each of those applications had been determined and in part refused by the respondent and the time for further processes or appeals under the FOI Act had passed.
The Mosaic Effect
26 A most significant part of the respondent's case is an argument known as the "mosaic effect" (which is referred to in Anne Cossins, Annotated Freedom of Information Act New South Wales, 1997, LBC, Sydney at pp 137-138 & 273-277 and is the subject of the Full Federal Court decision in Department of Community Services v Jephcott (1987) 15 FCR 122). The argument is, in brief, that, as a factual matter, the applicant or a person or persons on his behalf is undertaking a systematic approach to the making of numerous FOI Special Branch applications for the purpose of and with the ultimate aim of him putting the pieces together and discovering significantly more than he is otherwise entitled to. Such information sought to be impermissibly discovered by the applicant through his implementation of this process includes the name or names of informants of the respondent or information from which those names might be likely identified and other operational information that would not normally be made available to the applicant.
27 Detective Senior Sergeant Bowen gave detailed confidential evidence concerning this alleged mosaic effect (confidential exhibit 6) on behalf of the respondent. I accept him as a person very familiar with the Special Branch files of the particular kind relating to these proceedings. He has significant experience in the Police Service in working in commands specifically focussed on addressing politically motivated violence issues (exhibit 5). In his confidential affidavit (exhibit 6) he set out the depth of his considerable experience in this regard. In a non-confidential affidavit (exhibit 14) he set out his concerns, which I accept, and I am content to set out in these reasons for determination. He referred to at least four named persons each related to or associated with the applicant who had each made FOI applications for their respective Special Branch files. He said:
"It appears to me that there has been an orchestrated application process under the FOI Act for access to former Special Branch records from people associated with Mr Saleam and linked to a group called National Action.
The NSW Police Service and I share concerns that the applicant in these proceedings and his associates have attempted through FOI legislation to obtain and collate information and intelligence held on them by the Police Service for reasons other than what the FOI Act intended. Through this means, the exemption provisions under FOI could be circumvented. This is what is known as "the mosaic effect".
It is my opinion that James Saleam and several of his associates, through FOI processes, are attempting to obtain the depth of knowledge held by the NSW Police Service concerning themselves, the methodology by which it was obtained, and the identity of informants, through multiple FOI applications. The end result, by this circular method, means the applicant would, in effect, obtain information which would be a breach of confidences; would likely allow the applicant to recognise that particular persons have assisted the police; the nature and extent of that assistance; and the police knowledge and response to that information."
28 In his oral evidence, the applicant responded to this evidence. He said (Ts, 29 June 2001, pg 46):
"I would say that certainly many people associated with me have made applications. Some of these people have informed me that they intended to do so and I have spoken with them regarding receiving copies of any documents released to them. Copies have indeed been passed to me and I have viewed many files. I would add, for the record, some of the people who have showed me their files were not members of National Action. They showed me their files for other reasons, one person's case historically only."
29 As to the alleged "methodology" of an FOI applicant obtaining the identity of informants, as described in Detective Senior Sergeant Bowen's evidence above, the applicant said ( ibid , p47):
"I can't … say that is necessarily untrue either. In fact, certainly once it became apparent with the release of Mr Rosier's file which contained, to my satisfaction some quite remarkable points, that in conversation with others who were applying I suggested very strongly they should do it forthwith."
30 He then said ( ibid ):
"… I believe that with certain limitations, I am a person capable of doing that act."
31 I agree with the submissions of the respondent's counsel, that the present case is a graphic example of the mosaic effect in action. To the extent that it is relevant, I consider that the applicant is plainly undertaking a systematic approach to the use of the FOI Act in order to identify and (in some cases, he would say) to confirm his suspicion as to the true identity of police informants. Accordingly, the vast bulk of the disputed material comprises restricted documents under the category of clause 4(1)(b) of Schedule 1 of the Act. That clause relevantly provides:
"4(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected: …
(b) to enable the existence or identity of any confidential source of information, in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law, to be ascertained, …"
32 In making this determination, I am mindful that ordinarily, the applicant's motive in making an FOI application is not relevant. The Act provides access as of right (see, eg: Humane Society International Inc. -v- National Parks & Wildlife Service [2000] NSWADT 133 at [26]-[31]). However, as the Full Federal Court considered in Jephcott's Case (at page 126), consideration of motive in cases such as the present is permissible.
33 I therefore determine that the whole of the disputed documents are restricted documents and exempt documents as former Special Branch files within the meaning of clause 4(3)(b) and by reason of clause 4(1)(b).
34 The respondent raised a number of other alternative grounds as I was taken to each of the disputed documents during the lengthy hearings in confidential session. For the purposes of my determination, if I am wrong about my determination covering the whole of the disputed documents based on clause 4(3)(b) and by reason of clause 4(1)(b), I would consider each of the alternative grounds were made out by the respondent as argued and set out in the Attachments to these reasons for determination. In other words, the Tribunal is satisfied on the evidence and submissions of the respondent that the original determination of the respondent is the correct and preferable decision and that the documents are therefore properly determined to be restricted and/or exempt under the Act. Attached to and forming part of these reasons for determination is the Tribunal's record of decision in relation to each document in these proceedings. In Attachments B & C, the Tribunal's determination is recorded in the right-hand column. The other columns are self explanatory.
35 In these reasons for determination, the Tribunal is not permitted to describe or refer to any exempt material with such specificity as might cause it not to be exempt. I have generally adopted the descriptions of the documents as given to me by the respondent and which is reproduced in the Attachments. I consider they are sufficient and proper descriptions in the circumstances of a decision that is to be published. A fuller description of each disputed documents is contained in the confidential exhibits, which shall remain confidential.
36 While I do not expect the applicant to fully appreciate the Tribunal's reasoning, as it is not permitted to disclose it in so far as it relies upon the confidential oral and written evidence and my reading of the disputed documents themselves, I have no doubt that, on a careful reading of the documents alone, it is clear on the face of the documents that these alternative grounds for exemption relied on by the respondent must be made out.
37 I have considered whether the documents might be released in an expurgated or further expurgated fashion pursuant to section 24(4) of the Act. However, I do not consider there is any scope for deleting any further material from the disputed documents so as to cause their release to the applicant.
The Section 25(1) Discretion
38 As to whether the Tribunal should release any of the restricted/exempt documents as a matter of the Tribunal's discretion in section 25(1) of the FOI Act (see, Mangoplah Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Great Southern Energy [1999] NSWADT 93 at [76] to [85] referred to as the "override discretion"), I do not consider the restricted or exempt material should be released as a matter of the Tribunal's section 25(1) discretion. While the applicant has made out a very good case that he is extremely interested in the documents, and he can already work out what some of them might contain, I do not believe there are any documents there at all that would assist him in his proposed Supreme Court criminal inquiry application. In any event, I consider that overall, the restricted and exempt documents are reasonably necessary for the further administration of the law in NSW (see, eg: Rittau's case at [67] and [68]).
39 The reviewable decision is affirmed. The confidential exhibits are to be made available to the respondent agency for collection by it forthwith.