Quayle v State of South Australia

The interest 5 The interests which may satisfy the first of the elements identified above have been variously described in the authorities. They need not be proprietary, legal or equitable in nature: Byron Environment Centre Incorporated v Arakwal People (1997) 78 FCR 1 at 7-8. The authorities indicate that the interests affected must be greater than those of a member of the general public, genuine, not indirect, remote, lacking substance, capable of clear definition, and of such a character that they may be affected in a demonstrable way by a determination in the proceedings: Byron Environment Centre at 7; Sumner at [13]; Far West Coast Native Title Claim v State of South Australia (No 5) [2013] FCA 717 at [28]. It has been recognised that traditional Aboriginal rights not necessarily amounting to native title rights and interests may be able to satisfy the requirements of s 84(5): Far West Coast at [32]. See also, Byron Environment Centre at 8, in which Black CJ said that "a person who has a special, well-established non-proprietary connection with land or waters which is of significance to that person" may have the requisite interest. 6 The Adnyamathanha People pointed to two authorities which it said recognised that a traditional interest (which was less than a native title interest) asserted by an Aboriginal group had been recognised as sufficient for joinder. These were Davis-Hurst on behalf of the Traditional Owners of Saltwater v New South Wales Minister for Land and Water Conservation [2003] FCA 541, (2003) 198 ALR 315 and Gamogab v Akiba [2007] FCAFC 74, (2007) 159 FCR 578. It is not clear that Davis-Hurst is an authority of this kind, but I accept that Gamogab is. 7 In the present case, the Adnyamathanha People assert that they have traditional rights and interests (including heritage interests) in the Malyankapa Claim Area which are not native title rights and interests, but which nevertheless co-exist with the native title rights and interests claimed by the Malyankapa. Those rights and interests are said to include: (a) the right to access and move about the area; (b) the right to hunt; (c) the right to gather and use the natural resources of the area such as food, plants and timber; (d) the right to visit, maintain and preserve sites and places of cultural or spiritual significance to the Adnyamathanha People. 8 The Adnyamathanha People say that their rights and interests are not just a matter of assertion: they have already been recognised by the Malyankapa People. They rely in this respect on the determination of native title which they have obtained on land immediately to the west of, and contiguous with, the Malyankapa Claim Area: Coulthard v State of South Australia [2015] FCA 1379. The land which was the subject of the determination in Coulthard is referred to, colloquially, as the Adnyamathanha No. 3 area. Part of the Adnyamathanha No. 3 area had been the subject of an overlapping claim by the Malyankapa People. However, the Malyankapa People withdrew their claim over the overlapping area in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding which they agreed with the Adnyamathanha People on 23 April 2015 (the MOU). 9 By cl 19 of the determination in Coulthard, the Court noted, pursuant to s 87A(5) of the NT Act, that the Adnyamathanha People and the Malyankapa People had entered into the MOU, and that the MOU provided that the Malyankapa People held traditional rights and interests in the Adnyamathanha No. 3 area which were not native title rights and interests but which co-existed with the Adnyamathanha People's native title rights and interests. Clause 19 also recorded that the State of South Australia and the other respondent parties were not bound by the terms of the MOU. 10 In addition to providing for the recognition by the Adnyamathanha People of the traditional rights and interests of the Malyankapa People in the Adnyamathanha No. 3 area, the MOU contained, by a process of cross referencing and incorporation, a statement of reciprocal recognition by the Malyankapa People that the Adnyamathanha People had "traditional rights and interests (including heritage interests)" in the Malyankapa Claim Area which were not native title rights but which nevertheless co-existed with the native title rights and interests they claimed, (cl 2). 11 It is not necessary to recite the full terms of the MOU in these reasons - they are contained in Annexure B to the determination in Coulthard. In summary, however, in addition to the recognition of the rights and interests of the Adnyamathanha People, the MOU contained the following: (a) provision for participation by the Adnyamathanha People in heritage clearance surveys within the Malyankapa Claim Area for the purpose of protecting the traditional cultural interests of the Adnyamathanha People, cll (3) and (4); (b) provision for the Adnyamathanha People to attend and observe (but not participate in) negotiations for any agreement under Pt 9B of the Mining Act 1971 (SA) and for the Adnyamathanha People to have the opportunity to make representations which the Malyankapa People would be bound to take into account in the course of such negotiations, cl (6); (c) provision for the Adnyamathanha People to share in the economic, commercial and other benefits which may result from negotiations concerning an agreement under Pt 9B of the Mining Act, cll (7) to (9); (d) a requirement that the Malyankapa People not take any action to prevent the Adnyamathanha People from exercising rights under s 47 of the Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act 1989 (SA), cl 10; (e) a requirement that the Malyankapa People take all practical steps to ensure that the State and other respondent parties agree to a determination by this Court in favour of the Malyankapa People in relation to the Malyankapa Claim Area which includes an ancillary order referring to the terms of the MOU, and attaching a copy of the MOU as a schedule, cl (11). 12 In these circumstances, the Adnyamathanha People contend that the MOU contains an express recognition by the Malyankapa People that they have an interest of the requisite kind for the purposes of s 84(5) of the NT Act and that the first of the s 84(5) elements is established. Neither the Malyankapa People nor the State, who were the only parties to appear before the Court on the joinder hearing, made any submission to the contrary. 13 I accept that the Adnyamathanha People do have a requisite interest. Given that it was not a matter in dispute, it is not necessary in these reasons to identify all the matters giving rise to that interest, but they include the interest of the Adnyamathanha People in assisting the Malyankapa People to obtain a determination of native title in terms in which their non-native title rights and interests are recognised; their interest in having the Court make an order under s 87A(5) of the NT Act concerning the MOU; and their more general interest in account being taken of their non-native title rights and interests in any determination made on the Malyankapa People's application.

The affectation of the interest of the Adnyamathanha People 14 Despite their acceptance that the Adnyamathanha People have an interest of the requisite kind, the Malyankapa People contended that the evidence did not indicate that the interests claimed by the Adnyamathanha People would be affected in the relevant sense by the determination of native title, and that it was not in the interests of justice for the Adnyamathanha People to be joined as a respondent. More particularly, counsel for the Malyankapa People submitted that the interests of the Adnyamathanha People were not affected in the requisite sense because they (the Malyankapa People) had to date complied with the terms of the MOU and there was no suggestion that they would not continue to do so in the future. 15 Earlier in these reasons I recorded some of the interests claimed by the Adnyamathanha People in the Malyankapa Claim Area. The Malyankapa People are claiming native title rights and interests which may affect the exercise by the Adnyamathanha People of the interests claimed by them. These include the right to access and move about the claim area, the right to regulate access to and use of the claim area by other Aboriginal people in accordance with traditional laws and customs, the right to hunt on the claim area, and the right to speak about the claim area among other Aboriginal people who seek access to, or use of, the lands and waters in accordance with traditional laws and customs (Sch E). 16 In my opinion, the question of whether these interests of the Adnyamathanha People may be affected is not to be determined by an evaluation of the prospect, or lack of prospect, of the Malyankapa People complying with the terms of the MOU. Two considerations at least indicate that that must be so. First, it is possible that, even though the Malyankapa People may comply fully with the MOU, a determination may be made on the Malyankapa application which would not take account of the traditional rights claimed by the Adnyamathanha People. Secondly, the MOU does not bind the State or the other respondent parties. That being so, the Adnyamathanha People have an interest in the MOU being recognised and being made part of a separate order on the Malyankapa claim pursuant to s 87A(5) of the NT Act. 17 These matters are sufficient to indicate that the second element under s 84(5) is made out.

The interests of justice 18 A number of matters bear upon the exercise of discretion involved. These include the evident statutory intention that all parties whose interests may be affected will be before the Court at the one time, whether the interests of the applicant for joinder can be adequately represented by an existing party, the effect of the joinder on the efficient case management of the underlying application, and any prejudice or detriment which the joinder may cause. 19 The Malyankapa People submitted that it was not necessary for the Adnyamathanha to be joined given that they had, by the MOU, accepted the responsibility of protecting the interests of the Adnyamathanha and there was no reason to suppose that they would not honour that commitment. They likened this situation to the circumstances considered by Logan J in Butterworth on behalf of the Wiri Core Country Claim v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 325 and by Kiefel J in Combined Dulabed and Malanbarra/Yidinji Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 1632; (2004) 214 ALR 306. In particular, the Malyankapa emphasised the statement of Kiefel J at [12] that, on an application for joinder, the Court should be satisfied that, without joinder, there would be a real difficulty in the interests of the applicant for joinder being recognised. 20 Butterworth was concerned with the dis-joinder from a native title proceeding of a respondent who was a member of the native title group. Combined Dulabed concerned a claim for joinder by dissident members of a claim group. Circumstances of these kinds involve their own distinct considerations, as persons in these categories may have no entitlement to be joined at all: see Lander v The State of South Australia [2016] FCA 307 at [13]-[20]. In particular, the interest of a dissident member usually corresponds with that of the claimants, even if there is disagreement about the way in which the claim should be managed or progressed. In contrast to that situation, in the present case, the Adnyamathanha People and the Malyankapa People have claims which will correspond in some respects but which may conflict in other respects. This counts against a conclusion that the interests of the Adnyamathanha People will be adequately represented by the Malyankapa People. 21 Next, the Malyankapa People submitted that the joinder of the Adnyamathanha People would undermine their "authority as the protector of native title in the claim area" and would cast doubt on the efficiency of the MOU. These submissions were not elaborated and did not rise above the level of assertion. They overlook that the Adnyamathanha People do not make a claim of native title over the Malyankapa Claim Area, and could not, as a respondent, do so: Commonwealth of Australia v Clifton [2007] FCAFC 190 at [57]-[58]. 22 The Court should be concerned that the joinder of the Adnyamathanha will not affect adversely the efficient prosecution of the claim of the Malyankapa People. However, there is no present indication that there will be such an effect. If that expectation is not realised, there is the scope for a subsequent order of dis-joinder under s 84(8) of the NT Act. 23 In my opinion, the interests of justice favour the grant of the application for joinder.

The identity of the party to be joined 24 The interlocutory application seeking the joinder identified the "Adnyamathanha People" as the party to be joined. This was inappropriate. The "Adnyamathanha People" is not a legal entity and does not have legal personality. It is, as counsel for the Adnyamathanha People acknowledged, the name of a collective of people. Subject to some qualifications which are not presently material, it is only persons or entities with legal personality who can become parties to proceedings in this Court. 25 Counsel for the Adnyamathanha People resisted that conclusion. He contended that the Adnyamathanha People, like other Aboriginal groups and societies, are commonly recognised in native title litigation and pointed to some instances in which the "Adnyamathanha People" have been named as respondents in other native title claims. In answer to questions by the Court as to how any order made against the Adnyamathanha People would be able to be enforced given that the Adnyamathanha People do not have legal personality, counsel answered variously, suggesting, first, that an order could be enforced against the Adnyamathanha Traditional Lands Association (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC (ATLA) which is the prescribed body corporate for, amongst other things, the Adnyamathanha No. 3 area; secondly, that the Adnyamathanha People could call a meeting to address compliance with the Court's order; and, thirdly, that an approach could be made to the firm of solicitors presently acting for the Adnyamathanha People. 26 These submissions illustrate the inappropriateness of the "Adnyamathanha People" being joined as a respondent. An order could not be enforced against ATLA as it is not a party to the proceedings (and could not be a party - see Cheinmora v State of Western Australia [2013] FCA 727; Sumner at [14]). Counsel's alternative suggestions amounted to a tacit acknowledgement that any order of the Court against the Adnyamathanha People would be incapable of direct enforcement. 27 It is the case that there are instances of Aboriginal groups having been named as a respondent in native title proceedings, but it seems that that has occurred without their lack of legal personality being noted. Counsel acknowledged that, subject to one qualification, he could not point to any authority in which the Court had ruled in favour of an Aboriginal group being named as a party to native title proceedings using the collective name of the persons comprising the group. The qualification is the statement of Mansfield J in Sumner at [14]: While incorporated and unincorporated entities may have interests that permit their joinder to an application, entities put forward as representing members with relevant interests do not, by that reason alone, have interests of the sort contemplated by s 84(5) as expounded in Byron at 9-10 (Black CJ) and 43 (Merkel J). (Emphasis added) 28 I do not regard this passage as providing support for the position claimed by the Adnyamathanha People. In the first place, it seems that the focus of Mansfield J's statement was directed to a different matter, namely, that entities representing members with relevant interests do not, by that reason alone, themselves have interests of the requisite kind. It does not seem that Mansfield J was making an observation about the nature of the entity which may claim such an interest. That is to say, Mansfield J was distinguishing between the interests of the entity itself, on the one hand, and the interests of the members represented by the entity, on the other. Secondly, and in any event, it is not apparent that the "Adnyamathanha People" is an unincorporated association in the sense that that expression is ordinarily understood. 29 For these reasons, joinder of the "Adnyamathanha People" as a respondent to the proceedings would be inappropriate. Ultimately, counsel applied to amend the interlocutory application so as to apply, in the alternative, for Ms Janet Coulthard to be joined as a respondent party. As neither the Malyankapa People nor the State opposed that amendment, it was allowed. The parties before the Court agreed that Ms Coulthard is an Adnyamathanha person. I am satisfied for the reasons given above, that she is one of the Adnyamathanha People whose interests may be affected by the Malyankapa application and, accordingly, that it is appropriate to accede to her application that she be joined as a respondent party. 30 The order of the Court is that the application of the Adnyamathanha People to be joined as a respondent to the Malyankapa application is refused but that Ms Janet Coulthard be joined as a respondent. I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice White.

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES SAD 359 of 2015 Respondents Respondent: MUTOOROO PASTORAL COMPANY PTY LTD Respondent: KEN OGILVY Respondent: RAYLENE OGILVY Respondent: G RIECK Respondent: BROSCHUL PTY LTD Respondent: CALPARA PTY LTD Respondent: HAVILAH RESOURCES NL Respondent: CURNAMONA ENERGY PTY LIMITED