THE FACTS
4 QAD creates and licenses enterprise resource planning (ERP) software (QAD Software). The software has been marketed under different names. QAD Inc is the only applicant which seeks relief.
5 In 1991, SPC Ardmona Operations Ltd (then named SPC Ltd and later named Sale Proprietary Co 2 Limited (SaleCo 2)) acquired a perpetual and, from the licensee's perspective, non-transferable licence for the QAD Software from QAD.Australia Pty Ltd (QAPL) (the Licence Agreement). The Licence Agreement was assigned by QAPL to QAD Australia Pty Limited (QAD Australia) in around 1998 and was subsequently amended and updated. The Licence Agreement has remained non-transferable so far as the licensee is concerned. At times relevant to the issues in these proceedings, SaleCo 2 was using QAD Enterprise Applications 2008 Standard Edition (QAD 2008 SE) as its ERP software. SaleCo 2 was also paying QAD for maintenance and support services and had so paid up until 31 July 2019.
6 There was ultimately no dispute that QAD Inc is the owner of copyright in the object code and source code of the QAD 2008 SE software.
7 The cross-respondents, which include Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd, and which are referred to collectively in these reasons as CCA, conducted a business involving the processing and selling of agricultural food products under brands including "SPC" and "Goulburn Valley" (SPC Business). The SPC Business produces canned fruit, vegetables and other food products in regional Victoria. It was acquired by CCA in 2005. CCA held all the shares in SPC Ardmona Limited (which changed its name to Sale Co 1 Limited (SaleCo)). SaleCo owned the SPC Business. SaleCo owned all the shares in SaleCo 2 which held the QAD licence.
8 In May 2018, QAD made a recommendation to CCA that it upgrade the QAD Software to the 2017 Enterprise Edition. The recommended upgrade was "signed off" by SaleCo's Head of IT, Mr Llewellyn, but needed to be approved by Amatil's Chief Financial Officer (CFO). That approval was not forthcoming because consideration was being given by Amatil to selling the SPC Business.
9 On 4 September 2018, Mr Read (according to his email, QAD's Executive General Manager for Australia and Japan) emailed Ms Watkins at Amatil, referring to the "aged ERP infrastructure" and stating that QAD had "found significant platform risks plus opportunity to make financial and labour savings" that would improve profit and "build stability for the future". In cross-examination, Mr Read agreed that he was wanting to sell to Amatil, at an early stage of its consideration of the sale of the SPC Business, the proposal to upgrade SaleCo's ERP infrastructure and that this might be achieved before the SPC Business went to market and would make the business more attractive.
10 In response, Ms Watkins indicated that the Amatil CFO (Mr Martyn Roberts) was aware of the issues and would follow up if he considered it was warranted. Mr Read emailed Mr Roberts on 12 September 2018, forwarding the emails between him (Mr Read) and Ms Watkins, and stating that he wanted to meet. Amatil was not evidently interested because it did not respond.
11 In March 2019, Mr Rifai - who was the Managing Partner or Executive Chairman of Perpetuity Capital Pty Ltd and became the Managing Director or Executive Chairman of SPC when it was incorporated on 10 May 2019 - became aware that the business and assets comprising the SPC Business were for sale.
12 Mr Rifai considered the SPC Business would be a profitable investment. He commenced the due diligence process, looking at the data room which was progressively opened. Within a couple of weeks he became aware that the SPC Business was running QAD 2008 SE as its ERP software.
13 The QAD Software was critical to the SPC Business continuing to operate. The QAD Software enables manufacturing companies to integrate and manage critical data and support internal business processes, such as sales orders and inventory management, procurement, manufacturing planning and control, service and support project management, distribution and finance. Mr Rifai was aware that the SPC Business could not function without the QAD Software. Mr Rifai accepted in cross-examination that, before signing the business purchase agreement under which SPC purchased the SPC Business its assets on 3 June 2019 (BPA), he had read the Licence Agreement. He knew that the licence could not be assigned or transferred without QAD's consent and he knew that there was a risk that QAD would not consent.
14 On 29 April 2019, Mr Bloom (according to his email, QAD's Victorian State Manager) emailed Mr Read stating that he had met with the owners of the SPC Business and that he expected to know the new owner within a few weeks with the deal between the seller and new owner being finalised by the end of June 2019. Mr Bloom stated:
It's likely that the SPC Operations company that owns the QAD licenses [namely SaleCo 2] will not continue...this means a license transfer at minimum. Our position would be that the new company [ultimately SPC] should go Cloud and do a Lift & Shift. We can't really discuss it until we know the buyer.
Whilst we wouldn't leverage Nathan as part of the process I suspect that Stefan [deHaar] might position that a transfer as passive revenue. I would argue different given our investment in [SaleCo 2] and that we would work on positioning Cloud. We will need to work hard to build a relationship with the buyer to ensure an ongoing relationship.
15 On 3 June 2019, SPC and various CCA entities executed the BPA. The completion of the sale was agreed to be 28 June 2019: cl 5.1 BPA. The terms of the BPA are referred to later in these reasons, particularly in the context of the cross-claim. It is sufficient for present purposes to record that, by the BPA, SaleCo sold and SPC (and related entities) acquired the SPC Business for $40 million plus or minus certain adjustments (having a floor and cap of plus or minus $10 million).
16 On 13 June 2019, Mr Bloom (QAD) sent an email to Mr Llewellyn (SaleCo) referring to a discussion the week before and indicating that a transfer would cost approximately $520,000 with annual maintenance of approximately $200,000. The email then stated:
Cloud would be similar to what we have previously quoted, approx $755,000/year. I suspect we can work on the Cloud number to make it more competitive with the transfer on the first year.
Given this, the first year cost is similar in both options but Cloud delivers a lot more value.
We had previously proposed an upgrade but would likely do a lift & shift initially. This would get you to the cloud quickly by moving your current environment as-is. We can then upgrade at a later time. A key focus should be the cost savings and business benefits that we identified during the Q-Scan and preparation of the business case last year.
17 On 14 June 2019, an "IT Transition Meeting" took place between CCA and SPC. Mr Rifai attended that meeting together with consultants engaged by SPC and representatives of CCA. Mr Rifai stated that the QAD Software was discussed in the meeting, but not as the primary topic. At the meeting, he expressed the view that the QAD Software was not fit for purpose. By the time of the meeting, Mr Rifai was concerned about the "functionality" of the QAD 2008 SE software and thought that it was not "fit for purpose" although not "useless". Mr Rifai wanted to "limp along" with the QAD Software in the SPC Business until he had time to assess what he wanted to do with it and how long that would take.
18 Mr Levy of Kidder Williams, a corporate advisor engaged by CCA, reported to Mr Mitchell of CCA that Mr Rifai had said that "MFG Pro [QAD 2008 SE] is useless and not fit for purpose".
19 On 21 June 2019, Mr Read from QAD spoke with Mr Jason Bennett who I infer was representing SPC's interests (he being a Partner of Perpetuity Capital of which Mr Rifai was Managing Partner). I infer that the conversation was about the transfer of the Licence Agreement. Mr Bennett sent a message to Mr Rifai, telling Mr Rifai to speak to Mr Read.
20 On 21 June 2019, QAD (by Mr Stefan deHaar, the Senior Vice-President, Asia-Pacific) emailed a letter addressed to SaleCo 2, Amatil and SPC. The letter drew to the attention of the addressees the fact that the assignment or transfer of the Licence Agreement required QAD's consent and offering to provide that consent if three conditions were met. The letter included:
As a professional courtesy I am writing to make you aware of a licensing issue arising from the pending purchase of the business and assets of [SaleCo 2] by [SPC]. I understand that [SaleCo 2] has questioned the terms under which [SaleCo 2] may transfer the 1991 Software License Agreement (and software licenses granted under that contract) to another entity in connection with the purchase of [SaleCo 2] by [SPC].
Section 9 of the contract states that any assignment or transfer requires the prior consent of QAD Australia Pty Ltd ("QAD"). QAD has offered to give its consent if the following three conditions are met:
1. [SPC] shall deliver its irrevocable purchase order for a transfer fee in the amount of AUD 424,392 (excluding GST), together with a maintenance fee in the amount of AUD 177,816 (excluding GST) for the year starting July 1 2019, all as detailed in the attached quote. The maintenance fee includes a credit for one month of maintenance prepaid by [SaleCo 2] for the year ending July 31 2019. These fees shall be paid within 30 days of QAD's invoice.
2. [SaleCo 2] and [SPC] shall execute a License Transfer Document (in the form to be provided by QAD) to transfer the licenses from [SaleCo 2] to [SPC]. Further, [SPC] shall execute an Order Document (in the form to be provided by QAD) reflecting the transfer fee. Further, [SPC] shall execute a new License and Maintenance Agreement (in the form to be provided by QAD) to govern the licenses going forward.
3. These conditions must be fully met on or before the closing date of the purchase of [SaleCo 2] by [SPC] - which we understand will be June 28, 2019. If these conditions are not met by the closing date (and in any event no later than June 30, 2019) then QAD's offer to permit the license transfer under the above terms shall be automatically withdrawn and void, and in such event [SPC] will be required to purchase new licenses from QAD.
I recommend that [SaleCo 2] and [SPC] confirm this arrangement immediately so that we can prepare the necessary documents for signature in time to help [SaleCo 2] and [SPC] avoid missing the deadline set forth above.
21 On 24 June 2019, Mr Darren Read sent an email to Mr Rifai, attaching QAD's letter of 21 June 2019. Mr Read's email stated:
Congratulations on your purchase of SPC [being a reference to the SPC Business owned by SaleCo and being sold to SPC].
The last few months have been understandably challenging for SPC and we are delighted that they now have clarity regarding their future. QAD has been a strategic partner to SPC and CCA for a number of years, we are an incumbent ERP and services provider. Last year, we were engaged to advise on the future of ERP to SPC and CCA...I'd like to share these findings with you....
In the last few months, a number of our clients have been acquired and we have been able to assist them in hitting their transition off obligations and ensuring they make the correct technology decisions that allow future flexibility for the businesses and the private equity firms involved.
We have been trying to get hold you of [sic] via phone, I spoke briefly to Jason recently. Attached is a letter regarding the software licence obligations. For completeness, I have also emailed Alison and Martyn at CCA and Reg at SPC.
I am in Sydney this week and I'd like to take this opportunity to sit down and discuss with you, can you please confirm your availability to meet this week.
22 Mr Rifai understood from the 21 June 2019 letter that QAD was not taking a position about who needed to pay but rather was "simply saying this is the offer and this is what needs to happen".
23 After Mr Rifai had seen the letter, Mr Rifai spoke to Mr Read. They had a short conversation in which Mr Rifai said to Mr Read to "send me what you want to tell me in writing" and "I will discuss it with [Amatil]." After the conversation with Mr Read, Mr Rifai told Mr Levy that he had spoken to Mr Read and said that he, Mr Rifai, would get back to Mr Read. G+T, acting for CCA, wrote to Herbert Smith Freehills (HSF), acting for the SPC parties, stating:
We understand that Hussein [Mr Rifai] has already had discussions with QAD Australia Pty Limited regarding the attached letter [being the 21 June 2019 letter], and that those discussions are ongoing.
24 G+T asked HSF what SPC proposed to do in relation to QAD. There was no evidence of any response from G+T or SPC.
25 On 25 June 2019, Mr Rifai spoke with Mr Llewellyn, the Head of IT of SaleCo. Mr Llewellyn then sent an email to Mr Rifai stating:
As discussed here are the modules of QAD we use and also the contact details for the GM and Account Manager
26 On 26 June 2019, Mr Read called Mr Rifai to discuss the 21 June 2019 letter. According to Mr Read, whose evidence I accept, Mr Rifai stated that he needed four weeks to digest the information and requested an extension of time to reply to Mr deHaar's letter. Mr Read stated, and I accept, that he said he was happy to grant an extension, provided that Mr Rifai agree to a face-to-face meeting to discuss a way forward. Mr Read accepted in cross-examination that Mr Rifai stated that he considered the ERP was outdated and needed upgrading. Mr Read also accepted that he said he could help with an upgrade and QAD could credit any transfer fee against the new ERP system.
27 By this point in time, SPC and QAD were in negotiations. Subject to what is referred to below at a meeting on 27 June 2019, there was no evidence that CCA was involved in any negotiations with QAD at this time or that CCA was requested by SPC to have any significant involvement.
28 At 8:39pm on 26 June 2019, Mr Rifai sent to Mr Levy an agenda for a conference call the next morning which included "QAD $660,000 bill" to the "IT" items part of Mr Rifai's list of outstanding actions or issues.
29 At about 8:30am on 27 June 2019, a conference call between CCA and the SPC "transition team" took place. In cross-examination, Mr Rifai said he could not recall the words spoken in the teleconference. In his affidavit, he had stated that he said that CCA would need to deal with the payment of $600,000. Mr Brandt, a director and (at least from 4 May 2020) company secretary of SPC, gave evidence that Mr Rifai stated, on either the first or second call on 27 June 2019, "something about Coca-Cola needing to assist with resolving the problem, or to take care of the issue, or something of that nature". I do not accept that Mr Rifai said that it was for CCA "to take care of the issue" given Mr Rifai had wanted to deal, and was dealing, with QAD in relation to the transfer of the Licence Agreement. Whatever was said by Mr Rifai, it is also unlikely that it was to the effect that CCA was responsible for the amount demanded by QAD. If he had said something to that effect, the suggestion is likely to have been recorded in some contemporaneous document, or there would have been some further discussion about the issue. It also sits uneasily with the fact that the only negotiations which were occurring at that time were between SPC and QAD. It is more likely that, to the extent Mr Rifai said something along the lines of what Mr Brandt recollected, it was that CCA might need to provide some assistance in resolving the issue, but that whatever was said fell short of suggesting that the issue was CCA's responsibility or that CCA was liable to pay the transfer fee.
30 In any event, the words spoken cannot affect the proper construction of the BPA, or SaleCo's obligations. The words spoken are relevant for other reasons, associated with the copyright part of the case.
31 Later on 27 June 2019, after the first teleconference and before the 7pm teleconference, Mr Read emailed Mr Rifai confirming that, if Mr Rifai agreed to meet him on 4 or 5 July 2019, QAD would extend the QAD letter deadline from 30 June to 31 July 2019. The email stated:
Following our recent discussions, this is to follow up on my June 24 email with the attached letter from Stefan. Yesterday you outlined your view that the current ERP set up is not fit for purpose. As you are aware, QAD understands your concern on the same as referenced in the proposal we sent to SPC in April 2018 that was then endorsed by SPC. I believe you have reviewed this as part of your due diligence.
To move forward, we propose a meeting at your offices next Thursday July 4 or Friday July 5. If you agree to go forward with this July 4/5 meeting then we agree to push back the deadline mentioned in point 3 of Stefan's letter from June 30 to July 31st.
I ask that you please let me know by the end of this week whether you wish to schedule the July 4/5 meeting.
Good luck tomorrow, its [sic] a historical day for you all and I hope all goes well.
32 Mr Rifai decided to defer consideration of what to do about the QAD Software until after completion based on what he understood from this email and Mr Read's earlier phone call. Mr Rifai added the words "Deferred invoice" to the entry "QAD $660,000 bill" in a revised agenda for the teleconference that evening and sent the revised agenda to Mr Levy.
33 A second conference call took place at about 7pm on 27 June 2019. During that call Mr Rifai told the representatives of CCA that QAD had agreed to defer the invoice for four weeks until Mr Rifai had met with them and that the QAD issue would not delay completion.
34 Mr Rifai responded to Mr Read's email on 28 June 2019 indicating Mr Read should contact Ms Murray to arrange a meeting and that he, Mr Rifai, would be in Melbourne and was happy to meet there. Mr Rifai said he could remember saying that he had spoken to QAD and that he thought he had found a way forward so that the QAD issue did not hold up completion. The way forward was that QAD would wait for the month if Mr Rifai met with them during the following week. Mr Rifai also gave evidence that Mr Mitchell said something along the lines of "So we can put [a] tick on this item in your completion list" to which Mr Rifai responded: "Yes. Andrew and his ticks. Let's move on."
35 Mr Rifai did not say during that teleconference that QAD and the transfer fee was CCA's problem. He just "told them what happened".
36 Completion of the BPA occurred on 28 June 2019. The Licence Agreement was not assigned to SPC and SPC continued to use the software. I accept that Mr Rifai considered SPC could lawfully use the QAD 2008 SE software until 31 July 2019 without securing a formal transfer of the Licence Agreement.
37 Although Mr Rifai was on some occasions equivocal in his evidence on the issue, and sought to justify use of the software by reference to certain provisions of the BPA, I am satisfied that he knew, at least before completion on 28 June 2019, that SPC could only obtain rights under the Licence Agreement if QAD agreed to transfer the Licence Agreement to SPC and that QAD could refuse to do so. He knew that QAD had not agreed to transfer the Licence Agreement and that QAD required payment as a condition of its consent to transfer. Mr Rifai initially accepted that CCA could not compel QAD Australia to provide its consent but later stated he thought that CCA could compel QAD to provide its consent through a commercial deal.
38 Mr Rifai's stated that he considered CCA was responsible for payment to QAD to secure QAD's consent to a transfer of the Licence Agreement. I am not satisfied that Mr Rifai genuinely thought this was the case at the time of the relevant events. Rather, the probabilities favour that Mr Rifai considered that it was arguable that CCA was responsible under the BPA to secure the transfer of the Licence Agreement (including paying a fee if necessary), but that it was more likely that SPC was responsible for payment of any amount required by QAD for its consent. That conclusion is suggested by the objective facts including the course of negotiations between SPC and QAD and the absence of any serious contemporaneous or sustained demand by SPC for CCA to pay the transfer fee. Mr Rifai was no shrinking violet. He would have demanded CCA pay, at the time of the events and in certain terms, if he genuinely thought they were so obliged.
39 In any event, I am satisfied that Mr Rifai knew that - irrespective of whether SaleCo or SPC was responsible for the transfer fee - SPC could not use the QAD 2008 SE unless it secured either a transfer of the Licence Agreement or QAD's consent to SPC using the software. As mentioned however, I accept that, as at early July 2019, Mr Rifai thought he had QAD's consent to SPC using the software until 31 July 2019.
40 Mr Rifai agreed that, immediately before completion, SPC had no assurance that SPC would obtain a licence, but he had to weigh the risk of QAD not consenting to the transfer of the Licence Agreement with the fact that $2.7 million might be lost if SPC failed to complete.
41 Representatives of QAD (Mr Read and Mr Bloom) and SPC (Mr Rifai and Mr Selva Nithan Thiruvankarasu, SPC's incoming CFO) met on 5 July 2019 in SPC's boardroom in Melbourne. Mr Read stated that he reiterated that the Licence Agreement was not transferable. In his first affidavit, Mr Read stated that neither Mr Rifai nor Mr Thiruvankarasu stated that they considered CCA was responsible for payment of the transfer fee and neither of them stated that they considered SPC could operate the QAD Software without a licence. In cross-examination, Mr Read accepted that Mr Rifai told him that he did not consider that SPC was liable to pay the transfer fee and that he understood that Mr Rifai was saying that someone else needed to pay. Whilst I accept that Mr Rifai may have said this, I do not accept that Mr Rifai genuinely believed CCA had an obligation to pay the transfer fee. It is likely Mr Rifai considered SPC was responsible for the transfer fee if SPC wanted the Licence Agreement transferred to it.
42 Mr Read accepted that he thought it might not be a simple decision for Mr Rifai to decide what to do in relation to the ERP software given that Mr Rifai had only recently come into the business. Mr Read accepted that he expected that SPC would be considering other service providers, in addition to QAD. Mr Read stated, and I accept, that he said at the meeting that SPC had until the end of July to consider the proposal regarding SPC's ongoing use of the software.
43 Consistently with my conclusion that SPC had assumed responsibility for negotiations with QAD because Mr Rifai considered SPC was the most likely entity responsible for any transfer fee payable, Mr Rifai did not report to CCA about the 5 July 2019 meeting or any of the subsequent meetings with QAD. Mr Rifai stated in his evidence that CCA was kept abreast of what was going on, but there was no direct evidence which established any pertinent communication in that respect. Mr Rifai never spoke to CCA about QAD or the Licence Agreement after 27 June 2019. There was no evidence of any contemporaneous request for assistance or contribution, less still any demand for payment. I do not accept that CCA was kept informed of what was going on in terms of negotiations between SPC and QAD.
44 Mr Read described his position during July 2019 as follows:
[W]e needed to emphasise to the customer that they were unlicensed, using the software unlicensed, but for that period [until 31 July 2019]. We would - as long as we were having discussions with them, understanding that our software was integral to their business, we felt it was the right thing to do to have dialogue with the customer and not force the issue which, you know, - - -
Yes?--- - - - could have meant them not having to use the software, which would have had serious implications to the business.
And when you say "unlicensed" you mean that they hadn't signed a transfer?---Correct.
45 On 12 July 2019, Mr Read met with Mr Fotia, who was then employed as SPC's Sales and Operations Planning Manager, which involved co-ordinating the activities and processes relating to sales forecasting and supply planning. SPC's IT Manager had left in mid-July 2019 and Mr Fotia informally assumed many of the responsibilities relating to IT operations until about September 2019 at which time Mr Michael Zarb was hired as SPC's Head of IT. In November 2019, Mr Fotia became SPC's Head of Strategy Planning & Execution. Mr Fotia gave evidence that he was put in charge, in July 2019, of finding new ERP software. This could be an upgrade of QAD 2008 SE or software from a different supplier.
46 Mr Fotia said he had a conversation with Mr Read on 12 July 2019 in which Mr Read stated that QAD "will hold the lawyers back as long as SPC can show QAD that SPC are making progress on upgrading its ERP software". Mr Read recalled the conversation generally, stating that he informed Mr Fotia about the one month extension until the end of July, but denied making any comment to the effect asserted by Mr Fotia.
47 On 17 July 2019, Mr Bloom emailed Mr Fotia referring to the extended deadline to the end of July and stated:
I appreciate that arriving at a conclusion by the end of July is unlikely but if we can show progress and map out the process and timing into August then we should be ok.
48 The terms of this email suggest that Mr Read may have said, at the meeting on 12 July 2019, something along the lines stated by Mr Fotia in his affidavit and I accept, on balance, that something to that effect or similar was said. Mr Read's inability to recall the words spoken, stated as a denial that the words were said, does not reflect adversely on his credit; it merely reflects a different recollection of the meeting.
49 On 31 July 2019, the extended deadline to accept the offer which QAD had made in its 21 June 2019 letter passed without SPC accepting the offer.
50 On 1 August 2019, Mr Fotia delivered a presentation to Mr Rifai titled "Project Insight - ERP Replacement: Overview". The objectives of the meeting were to "align on timeframe to execute ERP replacement", to "endorse preferred ERP solution partner" and to agree to key actions for the next four weeks. The presentation noted that all options would take at least 12 months to implement. There were four options referred to, the first two being provided through Fusion 5 Business Solutions: (1) Option A: Microsoft Dynamics 365 "multi-stage"; (2) Option B: Oracle - JD Edwards "single stage"; (3) Option C: QAD "finance first"; (4) Option D: QAD "full replacement".
51 The presentation noted that the first two options provided a cost-effective solution but that the QAD Software ("MFGPro") would need to remain operational during transition. One of the costs referred to in relation to the first two options was $660,000 referred to as the "MFGPro Claim", being a reference to what QAD had stated it required in order to consent to a transfer of the Licence Agreement (representing a transfer fee and payment for a year's service and maintenance).
52 The options were ranked in the presentation in the following order of preference:
(1) Microsoft Dynamics 365
(2) Oracle - JD Edwards
(3) QAD - "full replacement"
(4) QAD - "finance first"
53 The presentation recommended proceeding with Option A, namely Fusion 5's Microsoft Dynamics 365 "multi-stage" solution. A key action item was: "Negotiate a licensing & maintenance term for MFGPro with QAD (& related parties)".
54 In light of Mr Rifai's view that QAD 2008 SE was not fit for purpose, it is clear that SPC would not continue with that software. The chances of SPC not moving to a new provider or upgrading QAD were negligible.
55 From August to October 2019, there were various further meetings between QAD and SPC representatives. There were meetings on 22 July 2019, 29 August 2019, 3 September 2019, 11 September 2019, 12 September 2019, 14 October 2019 and 24 October 2019. There were also various phone calls and emails passing between representatives of the two companies during this time. For his part, Mr Read did not feel the need to "force the issue", on the basis that QAD had written the 21 June 2019 letter and that he had sent the 27 June 2019 email.
56 Mr Zarb attended interviews at SPC for the role of Head of IT in August and September 2019. He gave evidence of a conversation with Mr Rifai in his second interview where they exchanged the following words:
Hussein: Our current ERP software is very old. We want to consider whether there is something better out there to trigger change and support growth in the business.
[Zarb]: Sure. I have implemented similar systems from both an IT and team management perspective.
57 On 17 September 2019, after attending his third interview, Mr Fotia made a presentation to Mr Zarb about SPC's ERP selection options. Mr Zarb stated words to the effect:
I think you should consider Microsoft Dynamics 365. I have a lot of experience with it and can speak to its benefits. It would be helpful if I had time to review the options put forward by Joseph, especially in respect to my experience with Microsoft Dynamics 365.
58 The presentation, probably being the one delivered to Mr Rifai on 1 August 2019, factored in as a cost "MFGPro Claim" of $660,000.
59 On 4 November 2019, Mr Read emailed Mr Fotia and Mr Zarb. The email suggested a meeting that week in Melbourne and stated:
Joseph, as you know, SPC assets were acquired (6 months ago). Since then QAD software is being used unlicensed. It has been brought to our attention that parts of the business are being sold and conversations are taking place about potentially transferring licences again. This type of activity will lead to the QAD legal team getting involved again to protect QAD's interest and assets, Im [sic] sure you understand.
60 Mr Fotia then forwarded the email to other SPC representatives stating:
FYI - QAD are not relenting on the status of the licenses…
At present, Kate is working with the transition team on solutions that will not require the new KY owners requiring access to MFG during the transition period.
Michael & I will present options for resolving the QAD license issue as part of the ERP recommendation.
61 Mr Rifai said he was not made aware of these emails. Nevertheless, I conclude that Mr Rifai knew at all relevant times that QAD required SPC to pay for the transfer of the Licence Agreement if it wanted to use the QAD 2008 SE software.
62 On 25 November 2019, Mr Read sent an email to Mr Rifai. The email stated (emphasis added):
I hope your recent travels have been productive.
We understand that there are meetings taking place in the next couple of days regarding the ERP selection process.
I feel it an appropriate time to clarify QADs [sic] position. QAD has met with SPC many times in the recent weeks and months as you evaluate your options to take the business forward. It would appear that there are numerous solutions being considered through consultation with Fusion5 and with some input from PrimeQ/Accenture. Both are credible Oracle partners who interestingly have differing views on the way forward with Oracle ERP, I appreciate this has raised concern about the long term roadmap and potential costly re implementations.
It is our strong belief that QAD is the best fit for SPC. We certainly share SPCs [sic] view that we are lowest risk position and best positioned to get things done. We believe the demonstrated technical advancements and the supplied food & beverage references have all been very well received.
Our intention is to reduce the licence fee/transfer to $0 as long as an agreeable solution/agreement is forthcoming. We are aware that our discounted implementation costs are very competitive. We are also keen to offer flexibility regarding our subscription pricing in the forms of free months during the first couple of years. We believe this would help the business with transition and transformation costs.
As requested by yourself in July, QAD has been very patient. You asked us to give you 4 weeks to review your options and we have given 5 months. It's now in everyone's interest to move forward. We hope to continue our relationship which has lasted for many years.
My diary is free on Tuesday from 3pm for us to discuss. I will be basing myself in Melbourne today and Tuesday and can return on Thursday if required.
63 On 27 November 2019, Mr Rifai wrote to QAD, by email to Mr Read, stating:
Dear Mr Read,
Arrangements between Shepparton Partners Collective Operations Pty Ltd and QAD Australia Pty Ltd
We refer to our recent discussions with you to transfer your existing licence agreement with Sale Proprietary Co 2 Limited, formerly SPC Limited (ACN 004 077 105) (Seller) [SaleCo 2] from the [SaleCo 2] to Shepparton Partners Collective Operations Pty Limited (SPC OpCo) [SPC], being the recent purchaser of the SPC business.
We have reviewed your Software Licensing Agreement, dated 27 August 1991, and the Customer Support Software Agreement, dated 20 August 1998, (together the Agreements) with [SaleCo 2].
The Agreements do not allow [SaleCo 2] to assign or transfer the benefit of the Agreements to a third party, nor do they allow QAD Australia Pty Ltd (QAD) to require payment to transfer the software license to a third party.
Whilst we are willing to discuss a suitable customer support arrangement with you, [SPC] is not required to pay, nor is it willing to pay, any amounts to effect a transfer of the Agreements from [SaleCo 2] to [SPC]. [SPC] is not contractually obliged with QAD to pay any such amounts (as a contract does not exist between these two entities).
Further, under the business sale agreement between (amongst others) [SaleCo 2] and [SPC], [SPC] is specifically not contractually obliged to pay any amounts to any third party when transferring/assigning a contract. To the extent that a contractual obligation exists for [SaleCo 2] to pay any such amounts to QAD, we suggest that you direct this discussion to [SaleCo 2].
For the reasons set out above, we will not discuss the payment of a fee to QAD to effect an assignment/transfer of the Agreements/relevant licence(s). However, as already mentioned, we are willing to discuss a suitable customer support arrangement with you over the coming weeks.
64 Mr Rifai stated that he wrote the letter without being aware of the content of Mr Read's email of 4 November.
65 Mr Read responded to Mr Rifai's letter later that day indicating that "QAD Legal" refuted SPC's position, forwarding an email from QAD Legal which included the comment that SPC's "unlicensed use … constitutes infringement of QAD intellectual property rights".
66 On 3 December 2019, Mr Zarb made a presentation to the SPC board which the board accepted. The presentation recommended Fusion 5's Microsoft Dynamics 365 solution. It recorded: "600k QAD Claim needs to be accounted for".
67 On 10 December 2019, QAD's lawyers, King & Wood Mallesons, sent a letter to SPC referring to Mr Rifai's letter of 27 November 2019 and SPC's "unlicensed use" of QAD's software. The letter stated that "since the purchase [SPC] has been using the software without a licence" and that "[SPC] requires a licence to use the Software".
68 The letter set out, under the heading "Options for resolution", the following:
As discussed on our call, there are a number of options available to resolve this issue. These are detailed below. For your information, QAD prices its software and services on a "per user" (sometimes called a "per seat") arrangement, depending on the number of users. We understand that [SPC] has approximately 220 users, and the figures below are calculated on that basis. If there are more or less than 220 users, then the numbers below will change.
• Option 1: Purchase of a new licence for the Software to allow [SPC] to continue to use the Software. QAD is prepared to backdate this licence to 1 July 2019 at no additional charge. QAD requires that [SPC] enter into a maintenance contract with QAD for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, and this arrangement can be renewed each year if [SPC] so wishes. For this option, QAD would charge [SPC] the regular list price that is charged to other customers in Australia as if [SPC] was a new customer. Cost: A$1,147,041.50, per the enclosed QAD quote.
• Option 2: The same arrangement as option 1, except that QAD is prepared to recognise that [SPC] acquired the business from [SaleCo 2], and is therefore willing to make a special deal for licence and maintenance which takes advantage of the fact [SaleCo 2] was a prior customer. Cost: A$680,210.19, per the enclosed QAD quote. This option is open for acceptance until 20 December 2019 only.
• Option 3: The same arrangement as option 2, but QAD is willing to apply the licence fee and prepaid and unused maintenance fee as a credit against a qualifying cloud arrangement that it entered into between QAD and [SPC] on or before 31 January 2020. A "qualifying cloud arrangement" is one that has a minimum initial term of two years, a 220-user subscription level at QAD list price, and is covered by a standard QAD Cloud Services Agreement. We recommend contacting QAD's commercial team to discuss this option in greater detail
The pricing above includes GST.
69 On 20 December 2019, SPC's lawyers, Chedid Storey Legal responded, denying any infringement of copyright. The letter stated that the seller had the right to use the software and was holding that right on trust for SPC, pending the assignment of those rights to SPC. The letter also stated:
As I am also a lawyer, I feel it is necessary to say that your client does not have an express right under the QAD Agreement to demand repayment of the license fee to assign the license to a third party. In our view, it would be implied that your client would have to act reasonably when considering its consent to assign the license. That said, it really is a matter to be ventilated between your client and [SaleCo] because, even if your client is entitled to recharge a license fee, from [SPC's] perspective, the cost would be borne by [SaleCo]. I am also mindful that the parties would like to resolve the issue amicably and so it is not important to articulate every issue.
70 These proceedings were commenced by the applicants on 28 January 2020.