Pye v Metropolitan Coal Company Limited [1934] HCA 9 - HCA 1934 case summary — Zoe

CTHHCA

Pye v Metropolitan Coal Company Limited [1934] HCA 9

[1934] HCA 9

High Court of Australia|1934-07-01|Before: McTiernan JJ, Starke J

At a glance

AI case summary

Result

appellant. Appeal allowed; order of Supreme Court discharged; case remitted to Workers' Compensation Commission with answers to questions stated; respondent to pay costs of appeal and Supreme Court proceedings

Key principles

The words 'other than a disease caused by silica dust' in the definition of 'injury' in section 6(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1929 (NSW) constitute a true exception...
Where statutory language creates an exception to a general liability, the onus of proof rests upon the party seeking to rely upon that exception (the employer) to establish the...
The worker is not required to prove affirmatively that the disease was not caused by silica dust; it is sufficient to establish a disease arising out of and in the course of...
The legislative history demonstrates that the silica dust exception was inserted to avoid duplication of benefits where special provision for silicosis existed under the...

Issues before the court

Whether the onus of proof lies upon the worker to establish that a disease contracted by gradual process was not caused by silica dust, or upon the...

Plain English Summary

A coal miner claimed compensation for lung disease caused by dust at work. The law said workers could claim for diseases contracted gradually at work, 'other than a disease caused by silica dust.' The employer argued the worker had to prove his disease wasn't caused by silica dust. The High Court disagreed: the silica dust provision was an exception to the employer's liability, so the employer had to prove the disease WAS caused by silica dust to avoid paying. Since there was no evidence about what was in the dust, the worker won.

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Judgment (101 paragraphs)

[1]

THE METROPOLITAN COAL COMPANY LIMITED . = " : s RESPONDENT.

[2]

[54]

from a disease caused by silica dust. Harvey A.C.J. was of opinion that the legislation did not cast upon the worker the burden of negativing silica dust as the cause of his disease. I agree in this - opinion. I have had the opportunity of reading the judgments prepared by my brothers Evatt and McTiernan and am in general - agreement with their opinions. But as I find myself disagreeing with the majority of the Supreme Court I shall state shortly the - grounds upon which my opinion is based. I do not think that the form in which the provisions are cast, i.e., the structure of the legislative enactment, determines whether a qualification is to be treated as a condition which must be negatived by the party relying upon the enactment, or as in the nature of a special or particular ground upon which the party resisting the application of the enact- ment may exclude himself from its operation. Of course, form must be regarded in ascertaining the intention of the statute, but the substantial nature of the provision and the principle upon which it proceeds cannot be disregarded. Although the decision in Morgan v. Babcock & Wilcox Lid. (1) relates to the defeasance of a liability by matter subsequently arising, it illustrates the need for attending to the substance of the enactment. We have in the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1929 a general law for compensating injury including disease arising out of and in the course of employment. In the Workmen's Compensation (Silicosis) Act 1920 we have a very special provision dealing with a special cause of disease occurring in special industries. The intention of the Legislature is clear, that a worker who comes within the purview of the special provision shall not also have the benefit of the general. The general provision includes disease with injury. It must arise out of and in the course of the employment, but, except in so far as the precise cause of the disease aids in deciding whether it did so arise, its exact cause is of no consequence. It is enough to prove that the disease was con- tracted in a manner which makes it an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. But, ifa disease which answers this description in fact is caused by silica dust, the disease, because of its cause, which for all other purposes is beside the point, falls outside the general statute. In other words, the statute introduces

[94]

definition of injury in sec. 6 (1). The principal object of the Act is to entitle a worker who is disabled from earning wages by a cause connected with the employment to receive compensation from the employer during the period of such disablement and to make provision for securing and enforcing that right. Where a worker receives an injury in the ordinary sense of the word the connection between the cause of disablement and the employment, necessary to found the disabled worker's right to compensation, is expressed by the words "arising out of and in the course of the employment." The definition of "injury" cannot be neatly written into sec. 7, which is the section whereby the worker's right to compensation is enacted. The words "arising out of and in the course of the employment" are in themselves a complete statement of what is a reasonable and necessary foundation of the worker's right to com- pensation. The words " other than a disease caused by silica dust " appended to the definition of injury would, if intended by the Legislature to be incorporated as part of the operative provisions creating the worker's right, introduce a different and strange criterion. These considerations suggest that these words are not part of the enactment creating the worker's right but a separate statement of an exceptional case in which the right granted by the Act will not be enforced. The word "disease" as part of the definition of " injury " is to be written into sec. 7 merely, as I read the Act, to assimilate the provisions relating to compensation for disablement due to disease with what is enacted with respect to the right of a worker who has sustained injury in the ordinary and natural sense of the word, and in that collocation means a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment whether of sudden onset or of such a nature as to be contracted by a gradual process. That is the criterion upon which the Act intended that the right of a worker disabled by disease should depend. It follows that the phrase "other than a disease caused by silica dust," which is appended to the definition of "injury," should not be construed as a limitation of what is intended to be within the purview of the enactment whereby the right to compensation is enacted. The effect of this phrase therefore, is that it states a ground of immunity from the resulting liability which, subject to other defences, is imposed upon the employer.