The composition of the Association
8 When the Association was registered in 1964, its Constitution rule was in the following terms:
3 - Constitution
The Association shall consist of an unlimited number of persons employed or usually employed as engineers licensed to undertake, supervise and certify the maintenance of any one or more of the components, items of equipment, and/or systems (including associated equipment) in the airframes, engines, electrical systems, radio systems, and/or instrument systems on aircraft operating within the Commonwealth of Australia, its Territories and/or overseas from the Commonwealth of Australia.
Section 132(1)(c) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) then provided (as the Act had since 1914) that an Association of employees could include not only employees employed in an industrial pursuit(s) but, additionally, officers of the Association who had been admitted as members whether or not they were engaged in the industrial pursuit(s). The Association did not contain a provision in its Constitution rule for officers to be members. In other contexts, that could have legal significance: see Re Building Workers Industrial Union of Australia (1952) 74 CAR 53. Also at the time of registration the rule dealing with resignation and cessation of membership (rule 6) provided that a member could resign by giving three months notice (and paying any outstanding dues) or resign without giving notice if the member accepted employment in industry other than the industry represented by the Association (rule 2 - "... the employment of engineers in the aircraft industry.") Additionally the rule provided for cessation of membership if resignation was effected in accordance with the rule.
9 However the rule also provided (in r 6(2)(c)) that membership would cease if the member was notified in writing by the General Secretary "that he is no longer eligible to be a member of the Association under the conditions of eligibility thereof". It is tolerably clear that this was a qualified purging rule. By that I mean that, under the rules, a member who no longer satisfied the conditions of eligibility could be stripped of their membership (irrespective of the member's wishes) by a notice from the General Secretary. The membership did not cease automatically when the person no longer satisfied the conditions of eligibility. The sub-rule required, as a condition precedent to the membership ceasing, that notice be given. However that condition precedent probably can be described as a procedural formality. The substance of the sub-rule was that membership ceased when a member ceased to be eligible for membership.
10 The rules structured in this way suggested that the Association was intended to be, on registration, an organisation made up of LAMEs and no other membership and, it would follow, that officers of the Association would, like the general membership, also be LAMEs (that is, actually licensed). That the Association was structured this way appears to have been foundational to the decision to approve its registration (a decision made on appeal reversing the decision of the Industrial Registrar to refuse registration). The decision to approve registration was made by Wright J on 20 February 1964. In his reasons for decision (105 CAR 565), his Honour said at 567 - 568:
The appellant is an association whose constitution authorises it to admit to membership persons employed or usually employed as engineers licensed to undertake, supervise and certify the maintenance of any one or more of the components, items of equipment, and/or systems (including associated equipment) in the airframes, engines, electrical systems, and/or instrument systems on aircraft operating within the Commonwealth of Australia, its Territories and/or overseas from the Commonwealth of Australia. As appears later I have attached very great importance and significance to the fact that the holding of a licence is a prerequisite to membership of the Association. (Emphasis added)
And further at 572:
On the question whether the privileges of a licence holder and the responsibilities that go with it indicate a significant distinction between these men and unlicensed engineers I take a view more favourable to the Association than the Registrar apparently did. The need for a licence and the mere possession of one of course cannot of themselves be decisive of the question, otherwise any class of licensed employees, or employers for that matter, would be entitled to separate registration simply on that account; but study of the licensing system, the qualifications for obtaining a licence and the responsibilities carried by a licence holder in exercising its privileges has convinced me that they are factors of substantial industrial significance.
There is, I think, every justification for describing these licensees as sui generis; at least they are so within my experience and reading. The Registrar has amply described the licensing system, its machinery, requirements and objective. The point made by the objectors was that a licence holder is not responsible to his employer in respect of the powers bestowed upon him by the licence, but that the licensing system was introduced as a means of requiring persons to observe their obligations to the Department of Civil Aviation and to securing an acknowledgment of responsibility for work performed on aircraft by engineers. This does not appear to me an inapt description of the situation. In its "Guide to Aircraft Maintenance Engineer Examinations" (Publication No. 35) the Department of Civil Aviation states that air worthy requirements are-
"implemented by means of a licensing system whereby aircraft maintenance engineers are authorised by the Director-General to exercise stated privileges and accept responsibilities directly related to this airworthiness. These engineers act on behalf of the Director-General in ensuring that establishment of approved airworthiness standards are continuously maintained during the operation of every aircraft",
and refers to licensed aircraft maintenance engineers as "in fact representative of the Director-General in maintaining the airworthiness of aircraft". It should perhaps be added that they are not employed by the Department but by aircraft operators.
11 The original rule which I earlier described as a qualified purging rule (r 6(2)(c)) is no longer part of the registered rules of the Association. On the material in evidence (which I understand to be the documentation held by what historically has been described as the Australian Industrial Registry concerning all changes to the rules since 1964) it is not clear when this qualified purging rule was removed. Having regard to this material, the first alteration to r 6 was made in 1967 which appears not to have altered sub-rules (1) or (2). The second alteration of this rule was in 1990 and the documentation set out the pre-existing rule and the altered rule. The 1990 amendment introduced the present form of rule 6. As set out in the documentation, the pre-existing rule did not contain the qualified purging sub-rule which one would have expected unless either the documentation in evidence is incomplete or the Association purported to alter a rule (the form of the rule identified as the pre-existing rule) which had not been earlier approved. The fact that this may have occurred and also its legal significance was not raised at the hearing and it may be the validating provisions of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (s 320 in particular) would deal with any irregularity (if there was one) in procedures adopted to effect the 1990 alteration.
12 However what was argued at the hearing was whether the existing r 6 contains, in part, a purging rule. The rule provides:
6 - Resignation and Cessation of Membership
(1) A member of the Association may resign from membership by written notice addressed and delivered to the Federal Secretary, or addressed and delivered to the officer performing the duties of the Federal Secretary at the Registered Office of the Association.
(2) A member ceases to be eligible for membership if he ceases to be employed:
(a) in or in connection with an industry or industrial pursuit in respect of which the Association has constitutional coverage.
(3) A notice of resignation from membership of the Association takes effect:
(a) where the member ceases to be eligible to become a member of the Association:
(i) on the day on which the notice is received by the Association: or
(ii) on the day specified in the notice, which is a day not earlier than the day when the member ceases to be eligible to become a member.
whichever is later.
(b) in any other cases, a member's notice of resignation shall take effect:
(i) at the end of two weeks after the notice is received by the Association;
(ii) or on the day specified in the notice;
whichever is later.
(4) Any dues payable but not paid by the former member, in relation to a period before the member's resignation from the Association took effect, may be sued for and recovered in the name of the Association, in a court of competent jurisdiction, as a debt due to the Association.
(5) A notice delivered to the person mentioned in (1) above shall be taken to have been received by the Association when it was delivered.
(6) A notice of resignation that has been received by the Association is not invalid because it was not addressed and delivered in accordance with (1) above.
(7) A resignation from membership is valid even if it is not effected in accordance with this Rule if the member is informed in writing by or on behalf of the Association that his resignation has been accepted. (Emphasis added)
13 The Returning Officer advanced an argument (with quite appropriate and proper qualifications and reservations) that sub-rule (2) might be viewed as a purging rule which brought about a situation where a person who ceased to be eligible for membership also ceased to be a member. For my part, I do not think the rule is intended to operate in this way. It is true that the remainder of the rule (that is, the rule apart from sub-rule (2)) broadly mirrors the legislative provisions concerning resignation from membership and that, in this respect, sub-rule (2) might be viewed as anomalous and serving a different purpose. However it is tolerably clear that sub-rule (2) serves the purpose of identifying, for the effective operation of other parts of the rule, what "ceas(ing) to be eligible for membership" comprehends. The sub-rule is, in substance, definitional.
14 It follows from this analysis that notwithstanding the composition of the Association when it was first registered, it is now the position that if a person ceases to be eligible for membership (by ceasing to be a LAME (that is, licensed) or otherwise being comprehended by the Constitution rule (a matter I discuss shortly in relation to the expansion of the Constitution following a decision under s 118A)) that person may nonetheless remain a member unless they choose to resign.