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[2003] QCA 503
respondent. Appeal dismissed with costs.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court of Appeal held that the pleaded negligence was sufficiently connected to the particular vehicle to fall within s 5(1)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). The allegations concerned the vehicle's suitability and selection, as well as instructions for operating it. Calling the alleged negligence an unsafe system of work did not remove that connection. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1,752 words · generated 02/10/2026
Gregory Neil Purt was injured on 9 January 1997 while carrying out fruit-fly bait distribution in the Mowbray area. His employer had supplied him with an all-terrain vehicle for that work. The vehicle struck a rock concealed by long grass and rolled over. The appeal concerned liability only, and the judgment addressed whether the pleaded claim fell within the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (the Act), rather than deciding the ultimate factual merits of the negligence allegations.
Purt alleged that the State of Queensland had failed to make a proper risk assessment of the vehicle's suitability for the work, including the risk of a rollover and injury. He also alleged that it failed to institute and maintain a safe system of work by supplying that vehicle instead of an alternative such as a small four-wheel-drive vehicle, and failed to instruct him properly in its safe operation [4].
At first instance, the judge refused Purt's application to strike out the State's pleading that the Act applied. The judge also summarily dismissed the claim on the basis that the alleged negligence was in respect of a motor vehicle [5]. Purt conceded that, if the Act applied, the proceedings were a nullity because he had not complied with the Act's notice requirements before the relevant limitation period expired [5]. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs.
The appeal was confined to the second limb of s 5(1). It was not disputed that the vehicle came within the Act or that the circumstances pleaded fell within s 5(1)(a). The question was whether the alleged omissions were wrongful acts or omissions “in respect of” the motor vehicle for s 5(1)(b) [6]-[7].
Philippides J treated the statutory phrase “in respect of” as requiring a meaningful connection between the alleged wrongful conduct and the particular vehicle. The judgment took that approach from Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) (1989) 167 CLR 45. In that earlier case, the High Court had considered similar wording in the predecessor legislation and described the necessary connection as a “discernible and rational link” between the basis of liability and the motor vehicle. A merely coincidental or extraneous connection would not suffice [10].
The court accepted that this test continued to apply to s 5(1)(b) of the 1994 Act, even though the statutory wording attached “in respect of” to “a wrongful act or omission”, rather than to liability for damages. Philippides J noted there was no suggestion that the test had ceased to apply and accepted the respondent's submission, which relied on Townsville Trade Waste Pty Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Limited [11].
The decisive feature was the content of Purt's own pleaded case. His allegations were not limited to a general complaint that the employer had organised the work unsafely and happened to include a vehicle among the equipment used. They concerned the suitability and provision of this particular vehicle and the instructions given for operating it. The judge considered those allegations to be “the cornerstone” of the alleged liability and found a rational link between them and the vehicle [12].
The court also rejected the idea that describing the conduct as an unsafe system of work necessarily took it outside the Act. A single course of conduct may be characterised in more than one way. On the pleaded facts, the alleged system-of-work failures also concerned the particular vehicle. Philippides J referred to authority recognising that an employer may be liable in respect of a motor vehicle because of a defective work system involving it, and that an alternative basis of liability does not necessarily exclude motor-vehicle-related liability [13]. Jerrard JA expressly agreed that the alleged unsafe system did not prevent the conduct from being in respect of the vehicle [1]. Dutney J agreed with Philippides J's reasons and proposed order [2].
The judgment describes the relevant legal approach as a continuation of the connection test from Technical Products. That High Court case concerned s 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Qld), a predecessor statute. As Philippides J summarised it, the words “in respect of” have a wide meaning, and the connection between legal liability and a motor vehicle is not susceptible to precise definition. But breadth does not eliminate the need for a rational link to the particular vehicle [10].
Purt applied that test to s 5(1)(b) of the 1994 Act. The court accepted that the difference in the immediate object of the phrase, a wrongful act or omission rather than legal liability for damages, did not displace the test [11]. The decision therefore illustrates how the earlier statutory approach was used to assess whether pleaded conduct was vehicle-related under the later Act.
The judgment also addresses overlapping characterisations of alleged negligence. It confirms that describing conduct as an unsafe system of work does not, by itself, make the connection with a vehicle merely incidental. The relevant inquiry remains the substance of the pleaded conduct and its connection to the particular vehicle [12]-[13].
The supplied judgment does not establish that Purt changed or displaced the earlier authorities. Instead, it applies Technical Products and considers Townsville Trade Waste. It refers to other Queensland authorities for the propositions concerning defective work systems and alternative bases of liability [13]. No subsequent judgments or later treatment are included in the provided material, so a broader account of the law after Purt cannot be verified from this source alone.
At [10], the court adopts the requirement for “some discernible and rational link” between the alleged liability and the particular motor vehicle. In plain English, the vehicle must have a real connection to the conduct said to be wrongful. It is not enough that the injury happened to involve a vehicle by coincidence.
At [12], the court says the pleaded failures concerning the vehicle's provision, suitability and operation were central to the alleged liability. The connection was therefore more than incidental. This application is tied to the specific allegations in the statement of claim, rather than a general rule that every workplace vehicle injury falls under the Act.
At [13], the court explains that alleging an unsafe system of work does not preclude the same pleaded conduct from being in respect of a motor vehicle. In practical terms, a work-system allegation and a vehicle-related allegation can overlap. The statutory question is not resolved solely by the label attached to the cause of action.
Finally, the order was to dismiss the appeal with costs [14]. The decision affirmed the first-instance conclusion about the Act's application on the pleaded case. It did not determine the underlying negligence allegations at a trial.
Purt is most directly relevant where a claim involves an injury connected with a motor vehicle and the pleaded wrongful conduct concerns that particular vehicle. Examples reflected in the judgment's allegations include a failure to assess whether the vehicle was suitable for the work, choosing that vehicle instead of an alternative, or failing to instruct the operator about its use [4], [12].
It is also relevant where the same pleaded conduct is described as an unsafe system of work. The decision shows that the description does not settle the statutory issue. The court examines whether the alleged failures themselves have the required link to the particular vehicle [8]-[13].
By contrast, the judgment does not provide a detailed test for every possible workplace accident involving vehicles. It identifies a boundary: a merely coincidental or extraneous connection is insufficient [10]. It does not define that boundary exhaustively, and its conclusion depended on the pleaded particulars before the court. For other fact patterns, the vehicle's role in the alleged breach, the specificity of the allegations and the relationship between the alleged conduct and the particular vehicle would be matters for analysis.
The decision also arose in a procedural context where the application of the Act had significant consequences because of the conceded failure to comply with notice requirements before the limitation period expired [5]. The judgment does not separately interpret those notice requirements or decide any contested issue about their operation.
The material supplied includes Purt itself and the authorities it cites, but no later decisions discussing Purt. It is therefore not possible, on this source alone, to report whether later courts followed, distinguished, limited or otherwise treated the decision.
Within Purt, the Court of Appeal applied Technical Products [10]-[12] and accepted the respondent's submission about Townsville Trade Waste [11]. It also relied on earlier Queensland authorities for the propositions that an employer may be liable in respect of a motor vehicle because of a defective system of work involving it, and that another basis of liability does not necessarily exclude motor-vehicle-related liability [13]. Those relationships describe the reasoning in Purt, not later judicial treatment of Purt.
The judgment also notes that the issue was discussed further in Brew v WorkCover Queensland [2003] QCA 504, heard on the same day [1]. The supplied extract gives no reasons from Brew, so its reasoning and any relationship beyond that reference cannot be analysed here.
The judgment resolves the appeal on the pleadings before it, but it does not define every circumstance in which a connection to a motor vehicle will be sufficiently rational. The line between a genuine connection and one that is merely coincidental or extraneous remains fact-sensitive in the terms of the test adopted from Technical Products [10].
The court did not examine how the test would apply to allegations that concern workplace organisation generally but only indirectly concern a vehicle. Nor did it decide whether other kinds of workplace conduct, not specifically pleaded in this case, would be sufficiently connected to a particular vehicle. The analysis at [12]-[13] turns on the direct allegations about vehicle suitability, selection and operating instructions.
The supplied reasons do not set out the full reasoning in Townsville Trade Waste or the other cited authorities. They identify the propositions for which those cases were relied on, but a detailed comparison would require the relevant judgments themselves. Likewise, the judgment does not provide later case law from which to assess the present status or subsequent interpretation of Purt.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Purt v State of Qld [2003] QCA 503
PARTIES: GREGORY NEIL PURT (plaintiff/appellant) v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (defendant/respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 578 of 2003 / SC No 1 of 2000
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Personal Injury – Liability only
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Cairns
DELIVERED ON: 14 November 2003
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 12 September 2003
JUDGES: Jerrard JA and Dutney and Philippides JJ / Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made
ORDER: Appeal dismissed with costs
CATCHWORDS: INSURANCE – PERSONAL INJURIES – s 5(1)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) – where vehicle provided by appellant’s employer strikes a rock and runs off the road – whether injury suffered by appellant was caused by an act or omission in respect of a motor vehicle / Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 5(1)(b) / Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) (1989) 167 CLR 45, applied / Townsville Trade Waste Pty Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Limited [2000] 2 Qd R 682, considered
COUNSEL: D G Turnbull for the appellant / R J Douglas SC, with K F Holyoak, for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Murray Lyons for the appellant / C W Lohe, Crown Solicitor for the respondent
JERRARD JA: In this appeal I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Philippides J and respectfully agree with her Honour’s reasons and proposed orders. On the appellant’s own pleadings, wrongful acts or omissions by the respondent are alleged to have wholly or partly caused the appellant personal injury, that being personal injury caused by, through or in connection with a motor vehicle; and on the appellant’s pleadings those wrongful acts or omissions were relevantly in respect of the particular motor vehicle he was operating when injured. That those wrongful acts or omissions constituted or evidenced an unsafe system of work does not prevent their being in respect of that particular motor vehicle. This issue is further discussed in the matter of Brew v WorkCover Queensland [2003] QCA 504, heard on the same day as this appeal.
DUTNEY J: I have read the reasons for judgement of Philippides J and agree with her proposed order and her reasons for it.
PHILIPPIDES J: The issue in this appeal is whether on the case alleged by the appellant the injury suffered by the appellant was caused by an act or omission in respect of a motor vehicle for the purpose of s 5(1)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (“the Act”).
The appellant was injured on 9 January 1997 when his All Terrain vehicle provided by his employer for the purpose of distributing fruit-fly baits in the Mowbray area, struck a rock concealed by long grass, thereby rolling over. The appellant in paragraph 8 of the Amended Statement of Claim pleaded that the acts or omissions of the respondent which caused or contributed to the accident involving the vehicle were the respondent’s failure:
(a) to make a proper risk assessment of the suitability of the vehicle for the purposes of bait distribution, including as to the likelihood of a roll over incident and the risk of injury in such an event;
(b) to institute and maintain a safe system of work by supplying the vehicle to be driven, instead of an alternative type of vehicle, such as a small four wheel drive vehicle;
(c) properly to instruct the appellant in the safe operation of the vehicle.
The learned judge at first instance dismissed an application by the appellant for an order striking out paragraph 4 of the respondent’s defence, wherein the respondent pleaded that the omissions alleged attracted the provisions of the Act. The learned judge also found in favour of the respondent on its application to have the appellant’s claim summarily dismissed, on the basis that the negligence alleged against the respondent was in respect of a motor vehicle so that the provisions of the Act applied. (It was conceded by the appellant that, if the Act applied, the proceedings were a nullity, because the appellant had not complied with the notice provisions of the Act before the expiry of the relevant limitation period.)
Section 5(1) of the Act provides:
“This Act applies to personal injury caused by, through or in connection with a motor vehicle if, and only if, the injury –
(a) is a result of –
(i) the driving of the motor vehicle; or
(ii) a collision, or action taken to avoid a collision, with the motor vehicle; or
(iii) the motor vehicle running out of control; or
(iv) a defect in the motor vehicle causing loss of control of the vehicle while it is being driven; and
(b) is caused, wholly or partly, by a wrongful act or omission in respect of the motor vehicle by a person other than the injured person.”
It was not disputed that the Act applied to the vehicle under consideration here, nor that the circumstances pleaded by the appellant fell within s 5(1)(a) of the Act. The only issue of dispute was whether or not the omissions alleged by the appellant attracted the second limb of s 5(1) of the Act.
On that issue the appellant contended, on the basis of the pleaded case, that his injury was not caused by a wrongful act or omission by his employer in respect of a motor vehicle, but rather by a wrongful act or omission in the system of work. The appellant thus argued that the injury was caused by the adoption by his employer of an unsafe system of work and that the only nexus with the motor vehicle was that it happened to form part of the equipment provided by the employer as part of the system of work.
The respondent on the other hand contended that the pleaded acts or omissions of negligence concerned the suitability of the vehicle and the training or instructions given in respect of the operation of the vehicle provided to the appellant and were clearly within s 5(1)(b) of the Act. It was also submitted that the alleged wrongful act or omission need not be exclusively “in respect of” a motor vehicle in order that s 5(1)(b) of the Act apply, so that the existence of another causative factor did not exclude the application of the Act.
In Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office (Queensland)1 the High Court considered the meaning of words in s 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Qld), the legislation which preceded that under consideration here. Section 3(1) of the 1936 Act required the owner of a motor vehicle to affect insurance cover “against all sums for which he … shall become legally liable by way of damages in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury … where such injury is caused by, through, or in connection with such motor vehicle.” It was held that the words “in respect of” had a wide meaning and that the nexus between legal liability and motor vehicle was a broad one, not susceptible to precise definition. However, the majority in Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) stated that in order to establish the requisite nexus between legal liability and the motor vehicle for the purposes of the Act, “some discernible and rational link between the basis of legal liability and the particular motor vehicle” was required.2 A “merely coincidental or extraneous connexion” was insufficient.3
Although in s 5(1)(b) of the Act, the words "in respect of" are prefaced by the words “a wrongful act or omission”, rather than the words “legally liable by way of damages”, there was no suggestion before this Court that the test in ceased to continue to apply to s 5(1)(b) of the Act. Indeed, the respondent submitted to the contrary, relying on I accept the respondent’s submission on that issue.
Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) (1989) 167 CLR 45. ↩
(1989) 167 CLR 45 per Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 47. ↩
(1989) 167 CLR 45 per Dawson J at 51. ↩
[2000] 2 Qd R 682 at 687. ↩
McEwan v Council of the City of the Gold Coast [1987] 1 Qd R 337 at 341; Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland [1990] 1 Qd R 185 at 190, 193; Manning v Taroom Shire Council [1994] QCA 430 at p3 per Pincus JA and Derrington J. ↩
Curtain Bros. (Qld) Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Limited [1995] 1 Qd R 142 at 146; Patullo v Grays Sawmills Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 528 at 532. ↩
Purt
State of Qld [2003] QCA 503
(1989) 167 CLR 45
Appeal dismissed with costs.
In the present case, the learned judge at first instance was correct in finding that the requisite nexus between the respondent’s alleged wrongful act or omission and the motor vehicle was satisfied. The present case cannot be characterised as one where the connexion was merely extraneous or coincidental. On the contrary, the wrongful acts or omissions concerning the provision and suitability of the motor vehicle, and the lack of instruction given to the appellant in respect of its operation, form the cornerstone of the alleged liability. The wrongful acts and omissions alleged to have caused the injury thus point to “a discernible and rational link” between the conduct alleged to have caused the injury and the particular motor vehicle.
The fact the appellant’s case against the respondent alleged wrongful conduct in respect of an unsafe system of work does not preclude the conclusion that the case as pleaded also asserted wrongful conduct in respect of a motor vehicle, such that s 5(1) of the Act applied. Indeed, there is clear authority to the effect that an employer may be liable “in respect of a motor vehicle” because of a defective system of work involving that vehicle.5 There is also authority that a liability in respect of a motor vehicle for the purposes of the Act is not excluded by the existence of an alternative basis of liability, for example, as an occupier or as an employer in respect of an unsafe place of work.6 Accordingly, the learned judge at first instance correctly found that s 5(1)(b) of the Act applied.
The appeal should be dismissed with costs.