While the contention was rejected on the facts, nevertheless, it is clear that the Full Bench accepted that the principles of procedural fairness had application in the proper administration of proposed retirements under s 20 of the TAFE Act.
29 It can be seen that the approach of the Full Bench in Kerrison has been adopted in general in the circular (see the extracts at [21]) so that the Department Head and those exercising delegated authority are required to make the decision to terminate or to adopt some other form of continuing duties but in doing so must proceed upon the basis of the medical opinion provided. The circular contemplates five possible recommendations to be made by the Medical Practitioner, including a recommendation that the employee is presently unfit but will be fit to return to their normal duties; the employee being unfit presently but would be fit to return to modified or alternative duties at a future date or that the employee is "permanently unable" to carry out the inherent requirements and job demands of the position.
30 Doctor Sagar was supplied with the documents required by the circular, including copies of the circular (running to 12 pages) but made no reference to the contents of the circulars. The letter of referral to Dr Sagar indicated that the Office of State Revenue was seeking his independent assessment and advice on Mr Costello's current and future fitness to perform his role as a Revenue Officer and asked four questions (previously set out in para [2]) but in terms did not ask Dr Sagar whether Mr Costello was "permanently" unable to carry out the inherent requirements and job demands of his position as described at p 5 of one of the circulars nor was the Doctor asked to express a view in terms of s 25(b)(i) of the PSE&M Act, namely, whether the officer's fitness or incapacity "appears likely to be of a permanent nature." It will be recalled that the Doctor's answer to the four questions posed to him was that Mr Costello was "no longer capable of performing" the inherent duties of the position and that "there is no reason to believe that he will recover into the foreseeable future." As to what assistance could be rendered in managing Mr Costello's short and long term health issues while undertaking the full range of duties for the position, he regarded that possibility as being "not applicable" without further explanation. In relation to his opinion as to whether Mr Costello should be considered for medical retirement, the Doctor expressed the view that he should be referred for a medical retirement "given his poor prognosis into the foreseeable future." As already indicated, he regarded the applicant's prognosis as being "guarded." In later evidence Dr Sagar explained in using the words "the foreseeable future", it was his intention to express a view that the medical condition was unlikely to change, at least, in the next two years. Curiously, Dr Sagar then stated in his evidence before this Court that, following his conversation with Mr Costello's treating Psychiatrist, Dr Benjamin, he had no reason to believe that Mr Costello's condition would improve in the next two years or indeed, that his condition would improve "beyond that period." None of this was stated in his medical report. It also appears to be at odds with the views later expressed by Dr Benjamin, although those contrary views appeared not to have been accepted by the Appeal Panel.
31 It was Dr Sagar's medical report dated 11 September 2009 and not those later extrapolations that came to Ms Barden as the Director of Management Services who had been delegated the employment functions of the Divisional Head pursuant to the provisions of the PSE&M Act. Her obligation was to act upon the medical advice in dealing with Mr Costello's medical condition and ability to perform duties. Dr Sagar had failed to mention, in terms of s 25(b)(i) of the PSE&M Act, whether Mr Costello's incapacity appeared likely to be of a permanent nature but spoke in general terms about the "foreseeable future". In her evidence to this Court, Ms Barden said the Doctor's use of the terms "foreseeable future" caused her to form the view that Mr Costello's health was unlikely to improve in the next five to ten years and as such, his condition meant that he was permanently unfit. It is implicit in that statement (and confirmed in her oral evidence) that she made no enquiry of Dr Sagar as to what he meant by the term "foreseeable future" and did not ask him to express an opinion as to the likely permanent nature of Mr Costello's incapacity. Bearing in mind that this was a medical opinion, there was no evidence of a medical basis for Ms Barden's assessment that Mr Costello's health was unlikely to improve in the next "five to ten years" - indeed, that range did not adequately reflect Dr Sagar's view. Further, there was no medical evidence stating that Mr Costello's incapacity was likely to be permanent but Ms Barden formed the view that he was permanently incapacitated: applying Kerrison, she was not entitled to form and act on her medical view as she had no training to do so.
32 It is necessary to closely consider the opinions expressed, at various times, by Dr Sagar. In his report he stated that the prognosis was "guarded" and that there was no reason to believe that he would recover in the foreseeable future. Although Dr Sagar could not recollect the conversation with Mr Costello on the day of the consultation, he did not deny Mr Costello's version whereby Dr Sagar compared his condition with a shell-shocked World War 1 veteran who ultimately needed a break of several months and that was usually appropriate. He also told Mr Costello that he did not think he would make a recovery in the foreseeable future and in psychological terms that meant two to five years. He recommended that Mr Costello obtain access to his superannuation and when he was "fully recovered" he should seek another doctor's certificate to say he was fit to recommence work. In Dr Sagar's statement tendered in these proceedings, he expressed the view that Mr Costello's medical condition was unlikely to change in the next two years at least and he had no reason to believe that it would improve in the next two years or beyond.
33 In summary, Dr Sagar had offered views that Mr Costello would need a break of several months and in his report stated that, given the poor prognosis, he would not be fit for the foreseeable future yet told Mr Costello that when he had fully recovered he should seek another certificate testifying to his fitness to resume work and then, in his statement to this Court, said that the condition was unlikely to change, at least, within the next two years and had no reason to believe there would be change in the next two years or beyond. He had also told Mr Costello that his incapacity may continue for two to five years. This mixture of views represents what Dr Sagar may have said if Ms Barden had spoken to him and asked him to clarify the terms of his report where he adopted the expression that Mr Costello would not recover "in the foreseeable future". The varying periods of time referred to by Dr Sagar have then to be considered in the context of his statement to Mr Costello that, when he recovered, he would need to have a medical certificate of his fitness to resume duties. That statement suggests that Mr Costello was open to recovery and therefore could not be said to be likely to be permanently incapacitated for his work. It is entirely possible that a medical assessment of his incapacity could arrive at a conclusion that he would not be fit for the "foreseeable future" but would not necessarily extend to a conclusion that his incapacity was likely to be permanent.
34 The letter of referral to Dr Sagar asked his opinion on the question of whether medical retirement should be considered for Mr Costello. This was the wrong question. Applying the Full Bench judgment in Kerrison (and the terms of the Premier's circular), the ultimate question Dr Sagar should have been asked and he should have attempted to answer was whether Mr Costello's incapacity was likely to be of a permanent nature. That was the question required to be answered by s 25(b)(i) where the officer was found to be incapable of discharging the duties of his position. The failure to ask this specific question and to obtain a specific answer from Dr Sagar resulted in Ms Barden merely applying Dr Sugar's opinion that Mr Costello should be retired. This is confirmed by the Department's letter to Mr Costello dated 16 September 2009 advising him that the Department "intends to act on the recommendation of medical retirement." There was no reference to the terms of s 25(b)(i). The decision to retire Mr Costello, however, was not one for Dr Sagar, but was a discretion to be exercised by the Department Head or an appointed delegate such as Ms Barden. Depending on the answer given by Dr Sagar, Ms Barden may have had to consider a number of possibilities, having regard to Mr Costello's age and the fact that his condition appeared to arise because of his Family Law problems. There was no evidence that he could not perform his duties - the problem was his anger and aggressive behaviour from time-to-time exhibited when dealing with other staff members. Ms Barden might also have been called upon to consider allowing Mr Costello to use his accumulated leave in order to overcome his problems, as suggested by Dr Benjamin. If Mr Costello was to be accorded procedural fairness, a matter conceded to be necessary in the Premier's circular and accepted by the Full Bench in Kerrison, these possibilities would have had to be open to discussion with Mr Costello and his advisors, including his treating doctor. This course might not be the usual way in which a s 25 determination to retire is reached but Mr Costello's "incapacity" arose from his personal and family situations and his resulting psychological/psychiatric condition and undoubtedly that combination presented some difficulties for a medical practitioner asked to state whether the incapacity was "likely to be of a permanent nature."
35 Dr Sagar, with the approval of Mr Costello, consulted Dr Benjamin as Mr Costello's treating Psychiatrist. Their medical reports before the Court show that there was no issue between these two doctors that, at the time of Dr Sagar's interview with Mr Costello, Mr Costello was presently incapable of performing the duties of his office. Having regard to the state of the medical opinion in front of her where no assessment had been made of the likely permanent nature of the incapacity, Ms Barden was required to make an assessment of what might be done with Mr Costello having regard to the fact that he was presently incapable of performing the duties of his office and that he would be so incapacitated for the "foreseeable future" but in circumstances where he had accumulated almost twelve months' leave and was only 48 years old. Having regard to the terms of the circular governing the process at that time, it would have been appropriate for Ms Barden to discuss with Mr Costello and possibly Dr Benjamin whether some treatment might improve his condition during leave of absence for an extended period of sick leave. It is apparent from evidence before the Court if that course had been taken, Dr Benjamin would have informed Ms Barden that it was highly likely that Mr Costello's psychiatric condition would significantly improve once the current Family Law proceedings were finalised and that he may require a six-month period of leave during which his psychological condition would significantly improve with the measures suggested. If effect was to be given to the consultation process set out in the circular and the fundamental need for transparency and procedural justice observed, especially where medical retirement would require consideration to be given to alternative duties, then these discussions with Mr Costello and Dr Benjamin should have taken place having regard to the inexactitude of Dr Sagar's opinion. In any event, the critical decision was one for Ms Barden based upon the medical advice of Dr Sagar and there was nothing in precise terms in that advice that supported a conclusion that Mr Costello would be "likely to be "permanently" incapacitated or that he would be incapacitated for between five and ten years and thus effectively permanently incapacitated.
36 The inadequacies of the Department's process of dealing with referrals under s 25 of the PSE&M Act echo the concerns expressed by the Full Bench in Kerrison about the equivalent provisions of the TAFE Act. While there is much detail in the circular about what the Department should do and what should be sent to the medical practitioner and a good deal of detail provided as to making the decision and handling the termination of an employee, there is very little by way of clear requirements during the process whereby the officer and his advisors (including his medical advisors) might contribute to the process, especially in relation to matters such as looking for alternative duties if available and the use that might properly be made of accumulated leave in permitting the officer to demonstrate that his/her medical condition had improved to the point where continued employment or return to previous duties might be possible. Removal from public sector employment because of personality disorders as in Ms Kerrison's case or a psychiatric condition in Mr Costello's case raise issues of real difficulty and a more transparent and clearly defined process should be adopted that gives a level of participation to the officer during the course of referral and before the matter is submitted for medical opinion. This is especially so having regard to the seriousness of removal from the public sector and where that removal will have a potentially significant impact on the officer's capacity to obtain other employment.
37 The shortcomings in Dr Sagar's opinion, having regard to the terms of s 25 and the guidelines circular and the unjustified view formed Ms Barden, leads to the conclusion that there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of s 25 of the PSE&M Act by failing to determine whether it appeared likely that Mr Costello's incapacity would be of a permanent nature. It therefore follows that the retirement of Mr Costello was invalid and he is entitled to a declaration that a remains a member of the public sector in the position of a Clerk, Grade 5/6.
38 Before concluding the judgment it is necessary to say something about the use of the medical evidence that came into existence after Ms Barden made her decision to retire Mr Costello. Dr Sagar gave an explanation of what he meant by the term "foreseeable future" and his estimate of it extending for two years at least. Mr Costello gave evidence that, at the interview, Dr Sagar spoke of a break from duty of a few months or several months to bring about a recovery. Dr Sagar then extended the period to encompass two to five years. He advised Mr Costello that he could re-apply for employment when he was ready to resume work. Dr Sagar could not recall this conversation but did not deny it. Dr Benjamin had a very different view of Mr Costello's prognosis and thought he could overcome his problems with a break of six months.
39 All of this evidence was tendered without objection although much of it does not directly affect the way in which the decision to retire was reached by Ms Barden. This evidence does, however, serve the useful purpose that the Court can be satisfied that there is utility in making the Declarations sought in that there is a real possibility that some outcome, other than retirement, might eventuate when the provisions of s 25 are correctly applied. Specifically, this later evidence was not used by the Court to call into question the merit of the medical opinion - a subject not available in proceedings of this nature - but to satisfy the necessary query as to whether a different result was a possibility should the Declarations be made as sought by the applicant (see the general approach in Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141).
40 Lastly, in relation to the claim made in the alternative (that Mr Costello was not effectively retired until he had received notice of that decision after the appeal), in view of the decision to grant the primary relief sought it is not, therefore, necessary to deal with his matter. That claim, if granted, would require approximately two weeks' pay to be made to Mr Costello. It should be said, nevertheless, that the terms of the circular operate on the basis that the last day of service will be the date of the decision of the Medical Appeals Panel where the appeal fails. There is no statutory or award provision that requires the last day of service to be the day when a medically retired officer receives the formal documents giving effect to that decision. Counsel for Mr Costello could not identify any other provision that required such a result but relied upon the general appropriateness of such an approach. In these circumstances there is no reason why the terms of the circular should not apply.
41 Having concluded that Mr Costello was invalidly retired there are, however, a number of matters that the parties need to discuss before final orders can be made. Firstly, any orders as to continuity of service and payment of outstanding monies need to take into account money received in other employment by Mr Costello following his medical retirement. Secondly, some consideration needs to be given to Mr Costello's present state of health and whether he is capable of returning to employment or whether there needs to be some further period of treatment as suggested by Dr Benjamin before that step can be taken and whether further leave should be taken. In this regard it is to be noted that a significant factor in Mr Costello's condition was the continuing stress associated with his marriage break up and associated Family Law proceedings. The Court was informed that those proceedings were now concluded and it remains for a medical assessment to be made of his current capacity together with any reasonable requirements of the Department in that regard. It was accepted by Mr Costello that success in this Application would require a re-evaluation of his medical condition. There may well be other matters that the parties need to consider either by way of further orders or by way of practical arrangements that need to be made in light of the decision of the Court and in those circumstances, the matters will be stood over with liberty to have the matter relisted for the making of final Orders.