16 However, it is necessary to make some additional observations about the implementation of the MOU before turning to formally endorse the 'agreed process'.
17 Since the promulgation of the Wages Policy of the New South Wales Government, the Commission has consistently assisted parties in conciliation and, where agreed, by the 'BlueScope' arbitral process, to resolve differences over the application of the Policy. This has normally involved the resolution of disputes over that part of the Policy which required salary increases over 2.5 per cent be funded by employee related reform measures or cost savings. These dispute resolution processes have not only resolved any industrial discord but have also resulted in a successful implementation of the Policy itself, notwithstanding the sometimes entrenched opposition to the application of the Policy and a lack of complete conformity with the current wage fixing strictures (which may feature as an impediment to the application of the Policy in formal arbitral processes). I refer, in this respect, to the observations of the Full Bench in Crown Employees Award 2008 at [8] and [9]:
Secondly, the consent arrangements in these matters derive not only from compromises reached between the parties by their bargaining or through conciliation processes conducted under the auspices of the Act, but from an acceptance of the Recommendations made by the Commission under s 134(2) of the Act. It must be a corollary of provisions of s 134(2) which permit the Commission to take into account the rejection of a Recommendation in exercising its dispute resolution functions under the Act that it may have regard to affirmative steps deriving from the same source. Here, we think it is incumbent upon us to have particular regard to the Memorandum between the parties because it has as its genesis those recommendations.
There is a further factor involved in this matter which we consider requires particular comment. The Recommendation and the Memorandum which follows it represent an intricate balancing of the respective industrial interests of the Union, its Members and the New South Wales Government. As was emphasised in the Recommendation (at para [4]), a real prospect arising from the failure of the conciliation process would have been that the New South Wales Government's employment reform agenda may not have received attention in the way that it did during the course of the conciliation process, or, ultimately, the Recommendation. Whilst the Structural Efficiency Principle still remains part of the wage fixing principles enunciated by this Commission (see State Wage Case 2008 [336(1)] and at Preamble, Annexure A), those observations must be correct, having regard to the limits of the applications advanced in these proceedings. When seen in this light, the proposed awards have an overwhelming industrial merit (although we do not rule upon the merits of the reform process itself, as that matter is strictly not before us).
18 The origins and underpinnings of the MOU, so described, are instructive, in my view, of the approach the parties should adopt in implementing the MOU and activating the 'agreed process'. The instrument the parties are implementing is a creation of the Commission's dispute resolution process, and not an agreement simpliciter. As a matter of principle, the Commission will require parties to fully give effect to their agreements both in their letter and spirit. However, the genesis of the MOU gives an even greater emphasis to those obligations and requires the parties to diligently ensure the implementation of the MOU within a reasonable period of time.