must be determined on its own facts. I prefer to classify the seriousness of driving whilst under disqualification on broader grounds. 1. The disqualification power is a vital weapon in the armoury of courts of summary jurisdiction. Magistrates, amongst their many responsibilities, judicially administer statutes such as the Traffic Act which are designed, not only to regulate traffic, but to combat the appalling toll of killed and injured on our roads. 2. It is only an effective weapon if it is strictly enforced, but such orders are, by circumstance, difficult to supervise and enforce. 3. The only practical method of obtaining maximum compliance with such orders is to ensure that those subject to such orders understand that the consequences of a breach will almost inevitably be grave and imprisonment must, in this regard, be the general sanction." 17. In that case the appellant had previously been convicted by the same court less than two months previously of driving whilst having a blood alcohol concentration of 170 milligrams and had been fined $250 and disqualified from driving for 9 months. 18. His Honour concluded his judgment at page 13 by saying:- "Keeping the principles I have referred to well in mind I am not persuaded the sentence should be varied. The offence must, in my view, be punished by imprisonment and the interest of justice would not be served by suspending the sentence in whole or part." 19. The third authority relied upon by counsel for the appellant is an unreported decision of Nader J. in Yunupingu v Holland in proceedings No. 7 of 1984, delivered on 27 November 1984. In that case the appellant appealed against the severity of the sentence. He had been convicted on 13 December 1983 of driving a motor vehicle whilst having a blood alcohol concentration of 180 milligrams and also of driving whilst disqualified. For the latter offence he had been sentenced to 6 weeks imprisonment and disqualified for a period of 15 months. The appellant had some three months earlier been convicted of driving while having a blood alcohol concentration of 150 milligrams. He was then fined $350 and disqualified for a period of 12 months. His Honour, after dealing favourably with fresh evidence called in support of the appellant, said at page 72 of the transcript:- "The proper approach to cases of this kind is well expressed in Smith v Torney, an unreported decision of Muirhead J. of 12 July 1984. Despite the evidence adduced on this appeal, I see no basis for interfering with the sentence imposed by the learned magistrate. I do not think he was in error in passing the sentence, and I am not persuaded by any evidence adduced on the appeal that the sentence should be interfered with." 20. These cases all go to show the consistent attitude adopted by this Court in relation to an offence of this nature and to indicate that unless exceptional circumstances exist, a term of imprisonment is almost inevitable. 21. I therefore becomes necessary to examine whether or not exceptional circumstances exist in the present case. Counsel for the appellant submitted that there was none. He submitted that it was not necessary for the respondent to drive in the circumstances. The offence occurred at 2.45 p m. There was no reason why the respondent could not have left his vehicle outside the hotel and got other transport home. There was no risk of his losing his vehicle or anything of that sort. He contended that the respondent's actions constituted a blatant disregard of the law. 22. Mr Jones for the respondent submitted that the learned stipendiary magistrate had not erred in law and that he had not wrongly exercised his discretion. He challenged the appellant's contention that there had been a blatant breach by pointing out that the learned stipendiary magistrate had in terms effectively discounted this by saying in passing sentence:- "... that your spouse had an accident and you were not intending to drive, and you did drive, of course, but it wasn't one of those action when you initially decided to flout the law, you were wanting to assist her. I'll take those set of facts that are unchallenged; I'll take that and hold that in your favour. So that prevents your from going to gaol." 23. Mr Jones cited the case of Cobiac v Liddy [1969] HCA 26; (1968) 119 CLR 257 for the proposition "that to succeed on appeal one must demonstrate that there was either an error of law or that there was a wrong miscarriage of discretion." Mr Jones did not elaborate upon that case except for saying, in effect, that in the present case there had been a proper exercise of discretion based on the learned magistrate's acceptance of the respondent's reasons for driving which, in the magistrate's view, did not constitute a flagrant breach of the law. 24. Although Cobiac v Liddy (supra) deals with the review of a magistrate's discretion, the principles of the law relating to an appeal against sentence are laid down in the earlier case of Cranssen v The King [1936] HCA 42; (1936) 55 CLR 509, per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ., at pp 519-520: See also R. v Tait and Bartley 24 ALR 473; Harris v The Queen [1954] HCA 51; (1954) 90 CLR 652 and Conwell v Kelly (Kriewaldt J.) (1951-1976) NTJ 407, all of which are cited by O'Leary J. (as he then was) in Matan v Ruehland (unreported decision of this Court delivered on 15 October 1984, at pp 7-8). 25. Mr Jones further submitted that it was not open to the Crown to dispute the fact that the respondent's spouse had met with an accident unless evidence was called to discount that fact and he cited in support Georgeff v Samuels (1976) 14 SASR 384. 26. As I understood the submissions of counsel for the appellant, there was indeed no challenge to this fact but, on the contrary, even accepting it, it did not alter the fact there there had been a flagrant breach of the respondent's duty to comply with the order of disqualification. 27. With respect to the learned stipendiary magistrate, I am of the opinion that he allowed sympathy to outrun discretion by regarding the accident, which befell the respondent's de facto wife, to provide the reason for deciding against imprisonment. On the view of the facts most favourable to the respondent, he was bound to accept the fact that this lady had had an accident of some sort in front of the hotel, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But, after all, it had happened at an hotel where there was undoubtedly ample opportunity to phone for a taxi or to resort to other public transport. There was no suggestion that the respondent was reacting to a state of emergency such as might have been the case had the lady needed urgent medical attention and needed to be rushed to hospital and there was simply no-one else to get her there. The respondent clearly and deliberately took the chance of not being detected. Accordingly, he must have realised that he was breaking the law and defying the order of disqualification made only a little over six months previously. On this basis I am of the opinion that the learned stipendiary magistrate erred in considering that this was not a deliberate breach of the order. In my opinion it clearly was. By his very act of deliberately driving the vehicle, the respondent showed contempt for the order of disqualification and that, in my view, is enough to amount to flouting the law according to the ordinary usage of the English language. In this way, I am of the opinion that the exercise of the learned stipendiary magistrate's discretion miscarried. At best, the fact of the de facto spouse's accident might, in the proper exercise of discretion, go in aid of a reduction of the period of imprisonment which might otherwise be imposed in order to distinguish the case from one where the conduct was devoid of any explanation at all. 28. I do not consider that this is a proper case for the application of the Criminal Law (Conditional Release of Offenders) Act both in the light of the pronouncement of this Court in the cases which I have cited and of the facts and circumstances of the present case. 29. Mr Jones, in his submissions before the learned stipendiary magistrate, and repeated before me, alluded to the observations of Bray C.J. in Locke's Case (supra) at page 301 which I quote:- "It is sufficient for the present purposes to say that, in the case of an ordinary bond under the Offenders Probation Act the offender, if he breaks the bond, is liable to be sentenced for the original offence but the nature and duration of that sentence is not known in advance and the court in imposing it can legitimately take into account any mitigating circumstances relating to the breach of bond. The bond breaker will not necessarily be sent to gaol for his original offence. In contrast, in the case of a suspended sentence the operation of that sentence is automatic on the defendant being brought before the

court and proved to have broken the bond, either by committing some other offence or by failing in any of its other conditions. The court in such a case has no discretion. It must decree the automatic operation of the suspended sentence. Anyone released under a suspended sentence therefore knows, or ought to know, that the sword of Damocles hangs over his head and that only his continued good behaviour and observance of the bond can prevent his automatic incarceration under the suspended sentence." 30. It should be noted, however, that the Offenders Probation Act of South Australia is materially different from its Northern Territory counterpart especially in relation to the consequences of a breach of a so-called suspended sentence. I draw particular attention to sub-sections (5) and (6) of s.6 of the Northern Territory Act, which, by reference back to sub-sections (2A) and (3) of s.6 empower the Court (inter alia) to exercise the very same powers of conditional release of the offender under s.5(1) as was made by the Court originally. (Compare my extempore remarks on sentencing in R. v Golley on 13 December 1986). Hence, the operation of the so-called suspended sentence in the Northern Territory, in contra-distinction to the position obtaining in South Australia, is not automatic. 31. In respect of the first count, I allow the appeal and order that a fine of $600 be substituted for the fine of $200 imposed. In default of payment of the fine, I order that the respondent serve 24 days imprisonment. In all other respects the conviction and order is affirmed. 32. Consonant with the authorities which I have cited, I am of the opinion that a term of imprisonment should have been imposed in respect of the second count. In all the circumstances, therefore, the appeal will be allowed and I substitute a term of 1 month imprisonment in lieu of the fine imposed in relation to the second count, but in all other respects the conviction and order of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction is affirmed.