Prinsloo parties' submissions
26 On behalf of the Prinsloo parties, it was submitted that, while the Court has an unfettered discretion in considering questions of costs under rule 7.29, the ordinary principle that costs generally follow the event applies and any costs order should serve the overriding purpose of facilitating a just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible.
27 It was submitted that it would be an extraordinary result if the Prinsloo parties were not only deprived of their own costs, but were ordered to pay Stanton and Qube's costs of the application. This would be a most unfair result given:
(a) the extent of their success in obtaining the orders sought;
(b) their reasonableness in bringing the application only after making reasonable inquiries to obtain copies of the relevant documents;
(c) Mr Stanton's conduct in either evading or ignoring requests for documents;
(d) The reasonable scope of the documents sought; and
(e) Stanton and Qube's approach to addressing the ancillary question of costs has been disproportionate.
28 The Prinsloo parties' submissions did not specifically address why each party should bear its own costs of the application. I have proceeded on the basis that they rely on the same facts as set out immediately above.
29 In support of the proposed contingent costs order, the Prinsloo parties relied upon the following matters:
(a) The likely quantum of any claim that may be brought against Stanton will substantially exceed the costs of complying with preliminary discovery, in which case that order is likely to be unenforceable in practice. It would be an unfair result if the Prinsloo parties were forced to pay Stanton and Qube's costs in circumstances where they may have a bona fide set-off, counterclaim, or cross-demand which can only be vindicated in subsequent proceedings.
(b) Stanton has yet to provide any explanation or defence to the evidence and assertions made by the Prinsloo parties (both before and after the filing of this application). Based upon the complexities and likely future timetable of this case, there will undoubtedly be further facts arising that inform the totality of the circumstances that are relevant to the issue of costs.
(c) No evidence or justification has yet been given for why Stanton, a company based in Western Australia, has no staff there and why evidence relevant to a transaction that took place there is in Namibia. This emphasises the appropriateness of a contingent costs order: if and when proceedings are on foot, Stanton will rightly have the opportunity to put on evidence explaining this peculiarity, both for costs purposes and otherwise.
(d) A contingent costs order will not prejudice Stanton and Qube and will avoid the costs of preliminary discovery being postponed indefinitely. Three points are particularly relevant in this regard:
(i) First, a contingent costs order will promote certainty in this case by mandating that the Prinsloo parties either commence proceedings by on or before 18 December 2015 or pay Stanton and Qube's costs. This will require the Prinsloo parties to act expeditiously, given that documents are only being produced on 2 October 2015.
(ii) Secondly, if the Prinsloo parties do commence proceedings then the costs of preliminary discovery will be treated just as the costs of discovery would have been, thus leaving Stanton and Qube in no better or worse position than they would have been otherwise had the Prinsloo parties commenced proceedings without the information that was necessary.
(iii) Thirdly, if the Prinsloo parties had commenced proceedings without the information sought by preliminary discovery then all parties (and the Court) would have been exposed to the risk of unnecessary and fruitless litigation. Preliminary discovery and a contingent costs order will thus have the effect of avoiding prejudice to all and promoting a just and efficient result.