On 18 April 2024 William Pridgeon applied to the Tribunal for a review of a decision made under the Firearms Act 1996 to revoke his Category AB firearms licence. The decision which he sought to be reviewed, being an internal review of a decision made on 13 October 2020, was made on 3 February 2022. There is no dispute that this decision was a decision that was administratively reviewable by the Tribunal under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.
The application for review was required to be made within 28 days of Mr Pridgeon being notified of the decision: r 24 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014. The application to the Tribunal was therefore made more than two years out of time. Dr Pridgeon seeks an extension of time to file the application in accordance with s 41 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NCAT Act). The extension of time is opposed by the Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (the Commissioner).
[2]
Background
Dr Pridgeon held a firearms licence for around 16 years. He was last issued with a licence on 18 July 2017 and, in the normal course, that licence would have expired on 18 July 2022.
On 18 October 2018 Dr Pridgeon was arrested and charged with various offences under the criminal codes of the Commonwealth and Queensland. The charges related to Dr Pridgeon's alleged role in harbouring and/or supporting a woman and her twin daughters who had been removed from the custody of their father in Queensland, contrary to parenting orders made by the Family Court of Australia. His firearms licence was suspended on that day.
Charges under the Queensland criminal code relating to child stealing were withdrawn in September 2020. Two Commonwealth charges were also withdrawn. Two other Commonwealth charges, however, remained on foot. Dr Pridgeon's firearms licence was revoked on 13 October 2020 on the basis that it was not in the public interest for him to hold a licence in light of the charges still against him.
Also after his arrest, on 29 October 2018, the Medical Council of New South Wales suspended Dr Pridgeon's registration as a medical practitioner. Following a review which affirmed the suspension, Dr Pridgeon appealed to the Occupational Division of the Tribunal. On 30 June 2021 the Tribunal upheld Dr Pridgeon's suspension and dismissed the appeal. Dr Pridgeon appealed to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the Tribunal.
Whilst the matter was before the Court of Appeal, the internal review of the decision to revoke Dr Pridgeon's firearms licence was finalised. The decision affirmed the revocation. The decision maker referred to the pending Commonwealth charges and the decision of the Tribunal which upheld the decision of the Medical Council to suspend Dr Pridgeon's registration.
On 14 April 2022 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Medical Council and the Tribunal. The two remaining Commonwealth charges were withdrawn on 8 February 2024.
[3]
Should time be extended for the making of the application to the Tribunal?
The principles relating to consideration of an application to extend time are set out in Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22 at [22]. While the Tribunal has a broad discretion concerning the grant of an extension of time, the relevant factors in considering the exercise of the discretion are:
1. the length of the delay;
2. the reason for the delay;
3. the applicant's prospects of success, in the sense that the applicant has a fairly arguable case;
4. any prejudice suffered by the respondent; and
5. whether strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant.
As was noted in Jackson at [18], in addition to exercising the discretion concerning the grant of an extension of time judicially, the Tribunal must also exercise the discretion having regard to the statutory command in s 36 of the Act that the guiding principle for the Act "is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings".
[4]
Delay and reasons for it
There is no doubt that the delay in the filing of the application, being more than two years, is considerable. The Commissioner contends that there is no reason that Dr Pridgeon could not have applied to the Tribunal within 28 days of the internal review decision and sought to delay the proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal charges. She notes that the application was not made until two years after the Court of Appeal made its decision on the Medical Council matter. It was also not filed until two months after the last of the Commonwealth charges were withdrawn.
Dr Pridgeon states that he could not file this application at an earlier point in time as he was simply unable to establish his innocence until now. He states that it was only when the last of the charges against him were dropped that he was in a position to file this application. Dr Pridgeon refers to being wholly preoccupied with preparing his defence in the criminal matters while working full time and states he did not have the time or resources to apply to the Tribunal until now.
In relation to the fact that he did not make this application until two months after the last of the charges were withdrawn, Dr Pridgeon states that he first asked the Firearms Registry to rescind the revocation of his licence but received no response. He states on 1 April 2024 he applied to the Tribunal but was advised that his payment, which he had sent by express post, had not been received. He then reapplied with the present application. He submits that he has acted as expeditiously as he was able to in making the current application.
In my view Dr Pridgeon's reasons for the delay are insufficient. Other than he was working full time and preparing his defence against the remaining two Commonwealth charges, Dr Pridgeon has not advanced any reason why he did not make an application to the Tribunal at least following the Court of Appeal's judgment, which was handed down some two months after the revocation decision. As the Commissioner points out, Dr Pridgeon could have sought to defer a hearing of the Tribunal application pending the outcome of the remaining charges. That Dr Pridgeon did not, as he states, have the time to apply to the Tribunal until two years later, is not a sufficient reason.
[5]
Applicant's prospects of success
The Commissioner argues that Dr Pridgeon's prospects of success are poor as the proceedings lack any real practical utility. She notes that Dr Pridgeon's firearms licence expired two years ago on 18 July 2022. Even if the Tribunal were to set aside the revocation decision, Dr Pridgeon would not have a firearms licence as there is no existing licence which can be reinstated. The Tribunal also does not have the power to grant Dr Pridgeon a new licence. Accordingly, a decision of the Tribunal to set aside the revocation would have no practical effect.
Dr Pridgeon argues that there is utility in proceeding with a review of the revocation decision. He states that, as it currently stands, the revocation of his firearms licence means he has a "quasi-criminal record" which will last his entire life and follow him around the world. He states that if he wishes to apply for a firearms licence in any country that he chooses to live in, he must declare the revocation of his licence in New South Wales. Dr Pridgeon states that the utility of his application on a personal level is so that he can clear his good name. He states that the Court of Appeal's judgement has confirmed that all allegations made against him were false.
Dr Pridgeon also states that there is utility in having this application dealt with by the Tribunal, as he would appeal from any decision refusing to extend time, which would impose a further time and resource burden on the courts.
The Commissioner states that, if the matter were to proceed before the Tribunal, it would be susceptible to an application for dismissal under s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act on the basis that the proceedings are "frivolous, vexations, misleading or lacking in substance". It was submitted that the lack of utility in the proceedings militates very strongly against the exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time.
In this context the Commissioner refers to Zeitoune v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATOD 59 a decision in which I dismissed an application for review of a security licence which had been revoked in circumstances where the licence had expired while the matter was before the Tribunal. In that matter, after considering a range of decisions of the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel including Davis v NSW Minister for Health [2023] NSWCATAP 211, at [38] I concluded that the expiry of Mr Zeitoune's licence and the lack of any remedy available in the Tribunal proceedings to affect that licence meant that the proceedings lacked practical utility. In addition, Mr Zeitoune had not raised any broader issues of principle which would lead to a conclusion that there was utility in continuing with the proceedings. While, as here, the decision in that case was of great personal interest to Mr Zeitoune, that did not outweigh the lack of utility in the proceedings continuing and the significant resources which would need to be allocated to the matter, notwithstanding the lack of utility. I therefore dismissed the application.
Importantly, the Appeal Panel in Davis said that, given the breadth of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the type of proceedings that are the subject of a dismissal application may be relevant in considering the meaning of the phrase "lacking in substance". At [53] the Appeal Panel stated that a range of findings could potentially justify a conclusion that proceedings are "lacking in substance", including that the proceedings "would be of no practical effect", or that the initiating application was based on an "untenable proposition of fact or law" or was "not reasonably arguable". Furthermore, the Appeal Panel held that, having found that proceedings are lacking in substance, in considering the exercise of the discretion to dismiss the proceedings, the Tribunal is obliged to consider whether permitting the proceedings to continue facilitates "the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings" as set out in the guiding principle in s 36(2) of the NCAT Act.
I accept that the fact that Dr Pridgeon's firearms licence was revoked will remain on his licencing record and it may well be a matter he would be required to disclose to a licensing authority in another jurisdiction. The revocation does not, however, amount to a "quasi-criminal record" as revocation of a licence is an administrative decision made by the Commissioner (and hence subject to review by this Tribunal). The matters that Dr Pridgeon wishes to raise in these proceedings could be raised in any proceedings concerning a new licence in any jurisdiction to which he might relocate.
While I accept that Dr Pridgeon wishes to clear his good name, that, in and of itself, is not a reason to extend time. Indeed, the provisions of the Firearms Act are relevant to public safety and not to the personal interests of any particular applicant. His statement that he would appeal any decision to refuse an extension of time is irrelevant to my consideration of the exercise of the discretion.
As the Commissioner notes, it is entirely open to Dr Pridgeon to make an application for a new firearms licence. That application can then be considered in light of all the material and relevant decisions which have been made in relation to Dr Pridgeon since he was first charged. The resources of the Commissioner, and the Tribunal should a decision not be favourable to Dr Pridgeon, would be better allocated to a live dispute rather than one where the decision would amount to an advisory opinion only. As was stated in Davis at [45], applying what was said in Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWCA 299:
It is no part of the role of this Tribunal to give advisory opinions on issues which have become hypothetical questions or to use resources resolving proceedings the utility of which is either wholly lacking or extremely limited. That would be an improper use of the Tribunal's limited resources.
In my view the lack of practical utility in the substantive proceedings is a strong factor against extending time.
In relation to the broader question of Dr Pridgeon's prospects of success in having the revocation decision set aside, he states that every reason for the revocation of his firearms licence has been shown to be false or has been overturned. He states that the charges against him were always vexatious and malicious and could never have resulted in conviction. He also refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal overturning the decisions of the Tribunal and the Medical Council. He refers to the statements of the Court of Appeal in relation to the term "public interest" as that term is used in the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) which the Court stated should be understood as a reference to the public interest in the protection of the public's health and safety. He also notes that the court pointed out that his guilt was not a foregone conclusion and, at the time his registration was suspended, it could not be said that he had undermined the rule of law.
The Court of Appeal comments were made in the context of considering the meaning of "public interest" under the relevant provisions of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. Those comments are not necessarily apt to a consideration of what is meant by the public interest under the Firearms Act. The concept of public interest under the Firearms Act is an inherently broad one: Kocic v Commissioner of Police (2014) NSWLR 159; Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9. A range of factors may be taken into account including, in addition to character, concerns in relation to public protection, public safety and public confidence in the administration of the licensing system: Constantin v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADTAP 16 at [33].
While the fact that all charges against Dr Pridgeon were dropped would no doubt be a factor in the Tribunal's consideration of the revocation decision, there may also be other matters which would come into play in considering the public interest. I do consider, however, that he may have an arguable case. I am not satisfied, however, that this factor outweighs the overall lack of utility in the present proceedings.
[6]
Prejudice suffered by the respondent
Dr Pridgeon asserts that no prejudice would be suffered by the Commissioner is allowing the proceedings to proceed. However, this is a matter where the Commissioner would have rightfully assumed that, as there had been no challenge to the revocation decision and Dr Pridgeon's licence had expired two years ago, that was the end of the matter. For the Commissioner now to have to expend considerable resources on defending her decision is not insignificant.
[7]
Injustice to the applicant
In the light of all the considerations referred to above, I am not satisfied that the Dr Pridgeon has shown that strict compliance with the rules would work an injustice upon him. This is particularly the case as the proceedings lack practical utility. Dr Pridgeon is not prevented from making a new application for a firearms licence in this or any other jurisdiction or from raising any of the matters he wishes to raise in his favour.
[8]
Conclusion
Overall, I am not satisfied that time should be extended. The delay is extensive and the reasons for it are insufficient. Most importantly there is no practical utility in the substantive proceedings and it would not be in keeping with the guiding principle of the Tribunal for the resources of the Tribunal to be allocated to a matter which lacks utility. This is not outweighed by the strong personal interest Dr Pridgeon has in the proceedings.
[9]
Order
The application for an extension of time within which to make the application is refused.
[10]
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
Registrar
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Decision last updated: 03 September 2024