Alleged Factual Errors
69 Mr de Wijn identified three significant factual findings that he contended were inconsistent with the evidence, as follows:
(i) the evidence did not establish that Spotlight's employees were informed in any meaningful sense that a trustee and a separate trust fund had been established, or that any contribution exceeding $1 million had been made to secure the employees' entitlements (at [102]);
(ii) under the post-1997 Scheme annual bonuses were not due and payable until they were declared and paid as a consequence of the profits earned in the preceding year (at [104]); and
(iii) there was a discrepancy between the amounts required to secure payment of the 'Reserves' and the $15 million contribution, thus suggesting a non-commercial purpose for the payment.
70 Mr de Wijn criticised the first finding, on the ground that the primary Judge had misconstrued a statement in the overheads used by Mr Fraid in his presentation to employees, to the effect that 'the Bank is being started with approximately $1,000,000'. Mr de Wijn pointed out that there was unchallenged evidence that Mr Fraid had told employees that Spotlight had set aside sufficient moneys in a separate fund to enable payment of bonuses, including reserves, for the succeeding few years.
71 There is no inconsistency between the unchallenged evidence and the finding made by his Honour. Mr Fraid did not claim in his evidence that he told employees that any more than $1 million would be contributed to the 'fund' nor that he told them about the trust structure that was to be established for the post-1997 Scheme. The primary Judge quoted (at [36]) a passage from Mr Fraid's evidence which indicates the limits of the information communicated to Spotlight's employees:
'[MR DAVIES:] You don't indicate anywhere, do you, in your description of the Stern seminar that as part of what was being recommended [was] that a trust be set up along the lines of the incentive trust?--- No, the purpose of that was to secure the future bonuses, the reserves, et cetera, which was recommended by the Stern proposal.
I see, so that the Stern proposal recommended securing a fund?--- They recommended deferring payments.
Did it recommend a fund?--- I don't recall a specific recommendation on that.
Well, there is a difference, isn't there, between deferring payments and securing a fund?--- There is a difference. We wanted to satisfy the staff that those deferred payments would be secured.
Because you could defer payments without adopting a trust structure, couldn't you?--- In theory, but we could also risk losing the trust of our staff.
And would you just explain how one is connected with the other - that answer is connected with your previous answer?--- Well, if we say to our staff, "You've got a thousand dollar bonus. We're going to give you $333 today. Trust us, you'll get the rest eventually" - that's not the way we like to operate. We would like staff to know that we have put those funds aside for those future payments.
HIS HONOUR: But the way the deed works by giving a complete discretion to the directors is exactly that - "We're giving you this now and trust us to give the rest later"?--- But what we told the staff was that in fact we were putting away funds for that purpose.
Did you tell them how much or you just said, "We're putting away funds for the future"?--- We said "funds for the future". It was couched in general terms.
MR DAVIES: And you could have created a reserve within Spotlight Stores' accounts itself to set aside the funds, could you not?--- I don't know.
Did you discuss that aspect with anybody around 30 June?--- I don't recall discussing that alternative, no.
Document MFI1 is a document that you gave your employees at the August 1997 conference. Is that so?--- Yes.
Where in that document is it that they are informed that a trust fund is set up for the payment of bonuses?--- These are actually overhead slides as you can see in abbreviated dot point form. Each of these points were discussed and there was a lot of information that was given to the staff that wasn't in these overheads.
…
When you prepared the overhead slides it didn't occur to you that a critical aspect of what the employees might want to know is the fact that a trust had been set up?--- I don't think our employees would know the difference between a trust and any other entity. I don't think that - it is a fairly technical, I think, distinction from an employee's point of view, and they just wanted to know if part of their bonus was being held over, that should anything happen to Spotlight, they would get the money …'
72 In my view, the evidence justified his Honour's unwillingness to find either that Spotlight's employees had been informed of a separate trust fund or that they had been told of a contribution greater than $1 million. The statement that $1 million had been used to start the 'Bank' could only have been understood by employees as a reference to an unspecified fund, the nature of which was not made clear to them.
73 As to the second finding criticised by Pridecraft, it was not strictly accurate for his Honour to imply that bonuses would be paid as a consequence of profits earned. In theory, bonuses could be declared to some employees even if the company made a loss and 'Reserves' were still payable (subject to the trustee's overriding discretion) even in loss-making years. However, it is clear that his Honour was aware of these facts, since he had previously referred expressly to the disadvantages of the pre-1997 Scheme as including the absence of any entitlement to a bonus in any year in which the company made a loss.
74 His Honour's comment (at [104]) was made in the context of a finding that Spotlight's substantial business did not create a real risk of default and that
'[i]n any event, the evidence did not suggest that there were any expected future liquidity problems that made the prepayment of five years' annual bonuses an appropriate measure.'
The comment amounted at most to no more than a slip which had no significant bearing on his Honour's reasoning.
75 The attack on the primary Judge's third finding rested on a misunderstanding of the point his Honour was making. Mr de Wijn correctly observed that the actual payments over the first five years of the post-1997 Scheme totalled about $9.7 million and that, as his Honour found, the total of employees' Reserves at 30 August 2002, was $5.3 million. The two sums more or less equalled Mr Berry's projection as to the amounts required to pay or provide for bonuses over the five year period. According to Mr de Wijn, this meant that, contrary to his Honour's finding, there was no 'discrepancy'.
76 The point his Honour was making was that the contribution of $15 million vastly exceeded any amount required to be set aside in order to 'secure' employees' future bonuses. Mr Berry's 1997 calculations yielded total estimated bonuses over the five years of the proposed scheme of $15.75 million. But his calculations proceeded on the basis of annual increases in turnover of between 8 and 11 per cent. More importantly, they assumed an increase in net margins from $14.7 million in 1996/1997 to $37.2 million in 2000/2001. In other words, Mr Berry assumed a period of large and increasing profits, which would be matched by substantial increases in bonuses from $3.42 million in 1997/1998 (the first year of operation of the post-1997 Scheme) to $3.98 million in 2000/2001.
77 The primary Judge in substance rejected Mr Berry's assumption that Spotlight had a commercial need to secure a sum equivalent to the total amount of bonuses expected to be paid over the five year period of the post-1997 Scheme. If Spotlight were to enjoy years of growth and increasing profits (as it did), bonuses would increase but there would never be any difficulty in the company meeting its 'obligations' to pay accrued bonuses to employees. It is true that in the event of the company suffering a succession of lean years, bonuses could still be declared in favour of some employees. However, the bonuses presumably would not have been payable at anything like the levels assumed by Mr Berry who, in any event, made no attempt to estimate the bonuses payable in those unlikely circumstances.
78 The primary Judge referred to the amounts in the 'Reserves' from time to time in order to make the point that these were effectively the only sums theoretically at risk in the event of a financial catastrophe striking the company. Yet there had been no attempt to tailor the initial contribution to an estimate of these amounts and no 'top-up' of the fund was made during the five years the post-1997 Scheme was in operation. In my view, the evidence strongly supported his Honour's conclusions about the discrepancy between the Reserves and the contributions. Indeed, the absence of any clear connection between the quantum of Spotlight's one-off contribution to the Incentive Trust and the need to secure the employees' entitlements is a powerful objective factor in favour of his Honour's finding that those entering the Part IVA Scheme, or that element of it comprising the contribution of $15 million to the Incentive Trust, had as their dominant purpose the obtaining of a tax benefit.
79 A fourth criticism of the judgment made by Pridecraft was that his Honour should have found that the commercial benefits of the Incentive Trust were not available under alternative arrangements. Mr de Wijn submitted that a separate reserve in the accounts of Spotlight (as put to Mr Fraid by senior counsel for the Commissioner) would not have provided security for employees, bearing in mind the unitholder's beneficial entitlement to the income and assets of the Trading Trust.
80 One difficulty with this submission is that it was not put to the primary Judge. Perhaps this is not surprising since the onus was on Pridecraft to show that there was no feasible alternative to the post-1997 scheme. Mr Fraid merely said that he did not know whether a reserve could have been created in Spotlight's accounts to set aside the required funds and that he could not recall discussing the possibility with anyone.
81 Mr de Wijn asserted that it would not have been possible for Spotlight to have set aside reserves in its own accounts equivalent to the reserves 'declared' as bonuses in favour of employees. He based this assertion on cl 21(a) of the Deed of Trust establishing the Trading Trust. This provision required the trustees to pay or set aside the whole of the net income of the trust fund of the relevant accounting period for the benefit of unit holders in proportion to their unit holding. There was, however, no attempt in the evidence at trial or in submissions to the primary Judge or to this Court to explore whether it would have been consistent with cl 21(a) of the Deed of Trust for Spotlight to set aside reserves sufficient to ensure that bonuses declared in favour of employees would be paid in accordance with a scheme designed to secure staff loyalty and commitment. It is by no means clear that establishing such reserves would be inconsistent with cl 21(a).
82 On the evidence before the primary Judge, his Honour was not in error in failing to find that the structure adopted by Spotlight was the only means available to achieve its commercial objectives. In any event, as is discussed below, even if there was no alternative to establishing a trust fund, that does not mean that Spotlight had to make a contribution of $15 million, or anything like that sum, to the fund in order to achieve its commercial objectives. Nor does it mean that Spotlight needed to make a contribution to the fund, whether of $15 million or any other amount, prior to 30 June 1997 in order to achieve its commercial objectives.