Precedent/cumulative impact
40 DIPNR argued that cumulative impact is required to be taken into account in SEPP 1 objections by virtue of the objects of the EP&A Act in s 5(a) (i) and (ii) which are called up by cl 3 of SEPP 1. The Department of Planning's Circular B1 dated 17 March 1989 states:
It is also necessary to assess the likelihood of similar application being made to vary the standard in the locality. Councils should consider whether the cumulative effect of similar approvals will undermine the objective of the standard or the planning objectives for the locality. If the council considers that it will do so, the application should be refused or a decision should be made not to approve others like it.
It is therefore relevant to consider this issue under the third Winten criterion.
41 Although the issue of precedent and cumulative impact were considered separately in argument and in the stated issues, they are clearly intimately connected as the primary reason why precedent is of concern is that one decision will lead to later decisions resulting in developments having adverse cumulative impacts. I therefore intend to deal with these two issues together.
42 Lloyd J in Goldin & Anor v Minister for Transport Administering the Ports Corporatisation and Waterways Management Act 1995 [2002] NSWLEC 75 relied on Sugarman J in Emmott v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (1954) 3 LGRA 177, where he said at 182:
It is sometimes contended that a proposed development, in itself unobjectionable, should not be allowed because it is likely to lead to others of a similar character and the totality would prove objectionable. That depends , inter alia , upon the existence of a sufficient probability that there will be further applications for a number of undistinguishable developments of the same class sufficient in their totality to bring about the objectionable condition of affairs. Here it seems, as I have said, unlikely that all the hypothetical subdivisions shown on the plan tendered by the council would be sought. Applications must be considered on their own merits and it would appear to be unduly onerous to refuse an application, unobjectionable on its individual merits, on the mere chance of probability that there may be later applications sufficient, if approved, to produce in their totality some undesirable condition. In such a case as the present, if what originally appeared to be a mere possibility or chance turned out later to become a distinct possibility, there would be no reason why the council should not at that stage call a halt, if it should then appear proper to do so. Justice is not offended in these circumstances by the refusal of further applications calculated to lead to objectionable conditions after the granting of one or more earlier applications unobjectionable in themselves.
43 In Goldin Lloyd J analysed a number of decisions following Emmott which considered the issue of precedent in planning appeals. He notes at [31] and [32] that:
The authorities relied upon by Mr Hale show clearly that the precedent effect of a particular proposal is a valid consideration. In Shellcove Gardens Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council , Sugerman J expressly referred to his earlier decision in Emmott, in which he corrected the misprint in the latter judgment. Sugerman J acknowledged that "if one application were granted it might prove difficult for the council to refuse others unless the circumstances were distinguishable". In the present case there has been a finding of fact by the Senior Commissioner that there is more than a mere "chance or possibility" of such later applications.
In particular, the decision of the Court of Appeal in BP Australia Ltd v Campbelltown City Council is, of course, binding upon me. As noted above, that Court held that the risk of establishing a precedent is readily invokable by prospective developers of other land in the vicinity is a valid consideration.
44 Applying Goldin to the slightly different circumstances before me, I accept that setting an adverse precedent through approval of a single application that is otherwise not objectionable, but is likely to lead to other approvals giving rise to adverse cumulative impacts, is a relevant matter to consider in relation to a SEPP 1 objection. The Department of Planning's Circular B1 clearly raises the need to take into account potential cumulative impacts when considering SEPP 1 objections.
45 In opening, the Applicant relied on two aspects of the proposed subdivision as having environmental benefits. Firstly, the proposed subdivision would implement a weed management system and, secondly, the proposed subdivision would provide an additional lot for rural living in accordance with the objectives of the zone. I agree with the Applicant that the two benefits are in keeping with the zone objectives. I agree with DIPNR that these two benefits are clearly transferable to other lots across other areas zoned 7(c). In reply, the Applicant relied on numerous other characteristics of the site which suggested that the circumstances were particular to this site so that it could not have any application as a precedent elsewhere. While each site must inevitably have characteristics particular to it I consider the application is also made on the basis of characteristics which would apply widely. On this basis the issue of precedent is a relevant matter but only if it is either self-evident, or some evidence suggests, that subsequent similar objections if upheld will lead to adverse cumulative impacts.
46 There have been six applications for variations of cl 13B(1)(a) of the LEP under SEPP 1 in Pheasants Nest to date where DIPNR has granted concurrence. It is clear from both Mr Hume's evidence and the Applicant's submissions that the six previous SEPP 1 variations are considered to have some precedential value because they suggest that if similar applications are made a successful SEPP 1 objection can be expected. While I agree with DIPNR that previous SEPP 1 objections should not theoretically have any precedent value, as a matter of practicality they clearly do because there is an expectation by applicants that similar applications will receive similar treatment by decision makers.