How then does the matter stand? No doubt, having regard to what had happened, the respondents were justified in thinking that they had all necessary consents to continue with their building operations after 21st December 1965 and it may, no doubt, be assumed that if a formal application for consent were now made it would be forthcoming. As the learned trial judge said: "The Council Registration Board, in granting a permission under Ordinance 3 of Pt VI of the old Ch. 8, was not concerned with details of buildings; it was concerned with the use of land, or with the use of buildings erected or to be erected on land. This is shown by the terms of the permission which it granted in this case. It concerned itself with the size and position of the building, but not with the details; it said that any building to be erected must be passed by the Department of Planning and Building." But a consent given at the present time would not avail the respondents for that would not obviate the difficulties which arise from the fact that the three leases were entered into at an earlier date and when, on the assumption that no earlier consent had been given, the use of the shops as such would have been unlawful. The vital questions, therefore, are whether prior to 1st April 1966 the Council had consented to the use of the land for the erection of shops, and their use as such, and whether this has been sufficiently clearly proved to justify the making of a decree for specific performance. In our view both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative. There is no doubt whatever that in September 1965 the Council had approved of the construction of five retail shops on the subject land in accordance with plans and specifications submitted to it. The application for approval clearly stated that "when completed the building will be used as retail shops" and approval was given subject to conditions which required supervision of the building operations from time to time. Further, it should be observed that the respondents were not lawfully entitled to erect a building otherwise than in conformity with the plans that had been submitted and approved. From the letter of 3rd February 1966 it is obvious that the delegate of the Council under the then existing Ordinances, the Council Registration Board, did not think that any further consent was necessary. In this the Board was, in our view, correct. The Council's approval to the erection of the five shops, constituted a continuing consent to the work of construction which apparently commenced before 21st December 1965 and which, upon the evidence, was still continuing in March 1966. The approval which had been given was not abrogated by the introduction of the Plan on the earlier date; nor was the approval which was given an approval only to the commencement of the construction - it was an approval which continued to operate and be fully effective during the work of construction. How, then, can it be said that the Council did not, after 21st December 1965, consent to the use of the land for the purpose of the erection of shops to be used as such? There is no suggestion on the part of the Council that it did not; on the contrary, the letter of 3rd February 1966 and that of 25th March 1966, in answer to Mr. Kelly's inquiries, suggest otherwise. In all the circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the correct conclusion is that the Council, with full knowledge of the use to which the subject land was being put, did, after 21st December 1965, consent to the respondents making such use of the land. Accordingly, in our view, the appeal should be dismissed.